

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA333.5
X201 *name*#703 /pwt
1055
17 Feb. 43.

Transcript of telephone conversation between General BARNETT and General JOYCE, Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Ft. Douglas, Utah.

General JOYCE: This is Joyce speaking . . . pull up your button will you.

General BARNETT: Yes, sir all set. (SCRAMBLER ON)

J: I was calling up General DeWitt to give him the latest dope in regard to the Japanese response in regard to this recruiting, you know. It is running along about the same:

At POSTON it is running alright, there is a satisfactory response, no opposition, no trouble expected etc.

DELTA, response is poor and there is opposition and possible trouble.

TULE LAKE, the response is poor and there is some opposition, no trouble expected.

MINIDOKA is satisfactory and it is going well there.

GILA RIVER, the response is poor, there is opposition and they expect possible trouble.

At MANZANAR there is no response, there is opposition, they don't expect trouble.

There at GILA RIVER the FBI went in this morning to arrest sixteen Japs and I don't know the result of that yet but I guess it is alright.

Now, yesterday afternoon Colonel Scobey called up from Washington and he was very much put out that the Japs were not going to be allowed to go into Districts #1 and 2. See?

B: Yes sir, I understand, he called here also.

J: He got one of our fellows in Internal Security here and he was told of course that would have to be handled by Western Defense Command and he said he would call up them so I suppose he has. What answer did he get?

B: He got the answer that there would be no change in the situation. The General said that without a directive from the War Department (and he had had none) that his policies were to continue on the existing War Department policy as published in the letter of . . . I forget the exact date, you know the one I mean.

J: Yes. Well, General DeWitt says no change from what we have put out.

B: That's right, sir.

J: Until the War Department directs otherwise that's that, but old Scobie was quite impertinent about the thing with the Major he was talking with on the phone here that he didn't have anybody higher than that.

B: He was a bit of the same with Bendetsen and Bendetsen talked to the General and I heard the General's side of the conversation and he told him very definitely that he was going to adhere to the existing policies . . . and not even to suggest to him that they send a directive out here. In other words, make it a personal matter between Bendetsen and Scobie, however, not official because . . . but to state his policy as being the existing instructions on the thing.

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Page Two #703 2/17/43

J: As I say, it is purely a Western Defense Command matter and there we are . . . I am glad to get your angle of it from there. How long is the General going to be away?

B: He will be back tomorrow.

J: Well alright, I am getting out of here the later part of the week myself, I am going South but that doesn't make any difference I will always be available. Things are simmering along about the same on this response business . . . no trouble yet. Incidentally, our friend Scobey made some remarks that were not too good about one of the MP Guard companies, the one at Gila River for instance (Escort Guard Company) and he was just all wet on his information. He passed that over to the Provost Marshal General's Office in Washington.

B: Yes sir. Well, he was out here you know, he made a quick trip through the area recently.

J: I know, I know, but he was wrong about that information. Did he dip into things a lot around?

B: Well, this was the first time. I have known Scobie a long time, of course more in a social way than in any other. When I left Washington he was Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but I guess he is in Mr. McCloy's office now.

J: Yes. Well alright . . . he is just injured at not being able to (clear the?) create Districts #1 and 2, that's all.

B: I think this is one of his pet ideas too and he is pushing it hard. He is enthusiastic for it and you can't blame a man for that.

J: No, no, it is alright . . . so long as he gets his dope right, I don't care.

B: So long as he doesn't get the wrong facts or distorted facts.

J: Fine.

B: Thank you very much, sir.

* * * *

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:
(CIB) 333.5(2-4-43)

February 19, 1943

333.5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Weckerling

RE: Registration of Japanese at Relocation Projects.

1. Reference is made to previous memoranda reporting progress of registration of Japanese evacuees of military age in Gila River and Colorado River Relocation Projects.

2. Major McGRATH of the Portland Branch Office has reported that registration at Tule Lake Relocation Project is proceeding much more slowly than was originally anticipated. Of the estimated 4000 eligible for registration, only 400, or 10 per cent have registered to date.

3. The following notice was found posted on a building in Block 42:

"All people in Block 42-46 stick to Sacramento group and oppose registration."

B.T.P.

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WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

1231 MARKET STREET

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

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July 23, 1942


MEMORANDUM for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subject: Formulation of proposed draft of reply for signature of the Commanding General

1. You have advised that the Commanding General has constituted the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3 and Civil Affairs Division, as a Board to propose a draft of reply to a letter dated July 14, 1942, from Colonel Theodore J. Koenig, G. S. C., president of the War Department Board convened to consider the military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. Colonel Koenig has asked for the Commanding General's opinion on several aspects of the problem confronting the War Department Board.

2. Herewith a proposed draft of reply for the signature of the General for consideration of the Board. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that in paragraph 2 d, it is not concluded whether the military utilization of Nisei is or is not practicable. It is merely assumed. This in turn must be considered in the light of the available reservoir. The size of this reservoir is as shown in Tab B attached to the proposed draft.

3. Copies have been furnished the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2.



Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Inclousures - 3

- 1 - proposed letter
- 2 - Tab A
- 3 - Tab B

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D R A F T
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1st Ind.


HQ WDC AND FOURTH ARMY, Presidio of San Francisco, California, July 23, 1942.
TO:

1. It is my opinion that the potential value to the military service of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry is negligible. This opinion is based on extensive studies and reports in connection with their evacuation from the West Coast, and on discussions with persons having had wide experiences with Japanese on this Coast.
2. The evacuation of the Japanese was resorted to as a military necessity which was predicated upon the fact that the Japanese, whether aliens or citizens, were, as a group, disloyal to this country. While there is no doubt that a certain percentage of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry are loyal to the United States there is no practicable means of determining who possesses this quality and to what degree.
3. Should it be decided to utilize Americans of Japanese ancestry in the military service the question of recruiting or inducting them is not one of any great importance as neither of these two methods will assure only loyal Japanese being brought into the service.
4. The decision as to the utilization of Japanese now in the military service should be based on the manner of performance of duty with units in the zone of interior. All Japanese troops within this command were transferred to Corps Areas in the interior shortly after the declaration of war with Japan. This Headquarters, therefore, has had limited opportunity to observe soldiers of Japanese ancestry under wartime conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL *MMB*
N. M. B.

D R A F T

- (1) American male citizens of Japanese ancestry should be inducted into the military service largely for use as interpreters and translators. The number of Americans of Caucasian ancestry suitable for this vital assignment with the field forces is negligible. The Japanese language, particularly the written, is fully understood only by persons of Japanese ancestry and a handful of white Americans. Properly selected for loyalty, I believe that the second generation Japanese are indispensable for this important duty with combat intelligence sections in the Pacific Theater PROVIDED that the intelligence groups are headed by a white officer, and provided that all are graduated from the Military Intelligence Service Language School. The experience of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Alaska Defense Command, with graduates of this school has been very happy so far. ~~It~~ We will welcome the assignment of many more of these men.
- (2) I do not recommend that Japanese be inducted into the service for the purpose of the organization of units consisting exclusively of Japanese. I believe that most will be excellent soldiers in practically all units for general service including infantry, armored forces, artillery, engineers, medical corps, etc., when mixed with personnel of Caucasian ancestry.



J. W.

D R A F T

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC: Confr. ltr from War Dept., G.S., Washington, D. C., July 14, 1942.
SUBJECT: "Military Utilization of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry". TO: CG, WDC, Pres of San Francisco, Calif.

G 3


014.31 (G-3) 1st Ind. (Continued)

014.31 (G-3) 1st Ind.

HQ. WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY, Presidio of San Francisco, California, July 25, 1942. TO: Colonel Theo. J. Koenig, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

The remarks that follow apply to identically numbered paragraphs and sub paragraphs of original communication:

"2. (1)"

Failure to utilize the considerable number of American male citizens of Japanese ancestry in the United States, would constitute failure to make use of all available manpower. It is my opinion that it is possible to use Nisei organized into units, subject to the following limitations:

- a. In the Continental United States only, in interior Service Commands.
- b. Removed from areas subject to sabotage of a character that would interfere with the war effort.
- c. In service units only, unarmed.
- d. Additionally as interpreters and translators in the MID, in limited numbers, where desired, without regard to location.

"2. (2)"

Partially answered above. Under no circumstances would I recommend the organization of a division, since it could serve no useful purpose except in a combat zone, which is not recommended. Recommend no Japanese (Nisei) unit be organized larger in size than a battalion.

"2. (3)"

Yes.

"3."

The number of loyal citizens of the Nisei class is an indeterminable question. I do not consider that any consideration

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BASIC: Confr. ltr from War Dept., G.S., Washington, D.C., July 14, 1942.
SUBJECT: "Military Utilization of United States Citizens of
Japanese Ancestry". TO: CG, WDC, Pres of San Francisco, Calif.

014.31 (G-3)

1st Ind. (Continued)

should be given to the effect of present restrictions of Military
service on future citizenship for the Japanese.

J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding



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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CONFIDENTIAL

July 23, 1942

Subject: Military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry.

To: Colonel Theodore J. Koenig, G. S. C.
War Department General Staff
War Department

1. By letter dated July 14, 1942 (Tab A), you have requested my views in connection with the formulation by the War Department of a policy governing the military utilization of American-born persons of Japanese ancestry.

2. The views set forth in the subsequent paragraphs of this letter are predicated upon the following premises:

- a While it is accepted that some American-born Japanese are loyal, it is impossible quickly to separate the loyal from the disloyal.
- b It is accepted that a very high percentage of Kibei (persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States, educated in Japan but returned to the United States) are disloyal.
- c It is unknown what percentage of Nisei are disloyal. It must be presumed that their potential for disloyalty is low in comparison with other classes of Japanese. (By Nisei is meant American-born persons of Japanese ancestry, including those persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States who have been to Japan but who have not been educated in Japan and whose presence in Japan has served to accentuate their preference for the American way of life.)
- d The military utilization of Nisei is practicable.
- e Presumptively, American-born Japanese have dual citizenship. Disloyal American-born Japanese should be regarded as having forfeited United States citizenship. Kibei should be so regarded as having

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(To Colonel Koenig re Military utilization of US citizens
of Japanese ancestry) July 23, 1942

made an election. Accordingly, they should be interned for the duration and they should not be inducted or recruited into the armed forces. Where practicable, their labor should be otherwise utilized in the war effort. This could include their employment as language school teachers, where qualified, but not as translators of important documents or as interpreters for combat intelligence.

f The segregation of Kibei and Nisei is possible and practicable. A method of so doing is by compiling the data from the ships' manifest records in the possession of the U. S. Immigration Service at all United States ports of debarkation. (This has already been done at San Pedro and San Diego and the information is available.)

g Kibei should be inclusive of those American-born persons of Japanese ancestry who returned to and were educated in Japan for a period of more than one year between the ages of 12 and 20.

3. In paragraph 1 of your letter you have presented four general considerations. I will comment on these in the order mentioned in your letter.

a Military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry.

The military potential of American-born persons of Japanese ancestry is to be regarded from two aspects:

- (1) The numbers between the ages of 18 and 45 years as of 1940, estimated for 1942 and projected to 1944;
- (2) The military uses for which they may be employed.

The latter is covered subsequently in this paragraph. From the viewpoint of numbers, a tabulation projected to 1944 and separated as to Kibei and Nisei on the basis of available information is attached (Tab B). It is to be noted that Tab B, includes projected statistics for Hawaii.

b The possible methods of [military] utilization.

For re-emphasis, the point is made that Kibei are

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(To Colonel Koenig re military utilization
of US citizens of Japanese ancestry)

July 23, 1942

not included in this division, except as set forth
incidentally in paragraph 2 e above.

The recruitment and induction of Nisei may conceivably be undertaken for any one, or a combination of any, of the following purposes:

- (1) For limited service and limited place of employment (the present policy).
- (2) Without restriction as to service or place of employment.
- (3) Into all-Japanese-units with unlimited service (combat or services-of-supply branches) and unlimited place of employment.
- (4) For combat labor service with unlimited place of employment.
- (5) For combat labor service with limited place of employment.
- (6) For non-combat service with unlimited place of employment.
- (7) For non-combat service with limited place of employment.
- (8) Maintenance of the present complement for limited service in the interior of continental United States without further recruitment or induction.

c The utilization as combat troops in active theaters.

There are four possible utilizations of Nisei as combat troops in active theaters. These uses divide themselves generally into two classifications, viz., (a) theaters where contact with enemy Japanese troops is improbable; and (b) where contact with enemy Japanese troops is probable. In each case, utilization may be subdivided into the following:

- (1) Unlimited
- (2) Limited

- 3 -
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CONFIDENTIAL(To Colonel Koenig re military utilization
of US citizens of Japanese ancestry)

July 23, 1942

In my judgment, it is logical to subject them to service under combat conditions. If practicable, they should not be rendered immune or shielded from exposure to the risks of combat. However, their use should be limited to those theaters where contact with enemy Japanese troops is improbable. In view of the proposition stated in 2 b above, viz., that rapid segregation of loyal from disloyal is impossible, unlimited combat usage is unsound. Similarly, their induction for service in mixed units is not considered sound. This is so, notwithstanding the argument that the composition of an all-Japanese unit may play into the hands of enemy design, or place within reach the opportunity for fifth column action in concert.

Of the forementioned possibilities, limited combat service in theaters with low probability of contact with enemy Japanese troops is recommended. Types of limited service in such theaters favorably considered are: as combat engineers; as combat quartermasters; or to perform general service in labor battalions in the combat zones of such active theaters for the construction of such combat works as roads, railroads, airfields, communications, revetments, trench systems, underground storage, depot works, etc. In all events, surveillance, suited to the circumstances, should be constant.

d The advantages and disadvantages of b and c above.

As paragraph b above embodies a discussion of possible methods of utilization, a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of mere "possibilities" is obviously not apropos. Accordingly, these comments will be limited to the consideration of advantages and disadvantages of paragraph 2 c above. The present conflict has been characterized as "total war." Hence, the maximum use of available manpower is mandatory. Viewed against the back-drop of this mandate, military employment of the Nisei reservoir is a manifest advantage. Conversely, its rejection for military usage is disadvantageous. However, a disadvantage consequent upon its use, rather than upon its disuse, may result from the opportunity thus accorded for disloyal action. In turn, the degree of opportunity for hostile action is governed by the character of military employment. Under conditions of

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(To Colonel Koenig re military utilization
of US citizens of Japanese ancestry)

July 23, 1942

total war, the opportunity for effective disloyal action by employment for military purposes may be as great in the zone of the interior as it is commonly considered to be in a theater of operations. Therefore this consideration, fundamentally speaking, is resolved into the question of whether to employ Nisei in any military capacity. Perforce, if militarily employed at all, that employment should be to the best advantage. This has not been attained under present policies. Certainly to the same extent that prisoners of war can be employed in any theater under supervision, or that the domestic population of hostile occupied territory can be employed to maintain local economy and industry, Nisei can be engaged in the armed forces under military control. It is only thus that they may demonstrate their protestations of loyalty.

4. Specifically, you have asked for my opinion on three questions set forth in paragraph 2 of your letter. My views follow:

- a Responsive to the first question, you are advised that in my judgment this should be answered in the affirmative, subject to the limitations set forth above. Stated otherwise, Nisei, as herein defined, should be recruited or inducted into the armed forces for service (1) in a theater where contact with enemy Japanese is improbable; and (2) in combat labor units.
- b In view of the foregoing comments, the organization of a division is not recommended. For the performance of labor under combat conditions, the maximum sized unit should be a battalion to be assigned with corps or army special troops, or GHQ Reserve for employment as the situation requires. Initially at least, the armanent issued should be sufficient only for defensive but not offensive action.
- c You inquire further specifically as to my opinion on the question whether American-born Japanese now scattered throughout the military service should be concentrated into units. In order to give effect to the views set out above, such action would be essential. Moreover, if their service is to be utilized at all, consideration should be given to the resentment that some non-Japanese soldiers may harbor against serving in the same unit with Japanese. Such resentment will find repercussions in lowered morale among both Japanese and non-Japanese.

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CONFIDENTIAL(Colonel Koenig re military utilization
of US citizens of Japanese ancestry)

July 23, 1942

5. You have further requested that I make any other pertinent general comments, specifically on the effect of present restrictions on future citizenship.

a If it is concluded that military utilization of Nisei is not practicable, then it is my considered judgment that those persons of Japanese ancestry now in the military service should be released from active duty and transferred to the ^{enlisted} reserve corps. There are close relationships between Japanese in evacuee centers and those in the service. The recommendation is made that they be transferred to the enlisted reserve in order to maintain military control, should it ultimately become desirable. If this were done, it is believed only sound that the soldiers thus released join their families in relocation centers and be accorded some opportunity to contribute to the war effort in such centers, through organized effort under government supervision.

b Effect on future citizenship.

If no further Nisei are accorded an opportunity to serve in the armed forces, though they may be of troop age and otherwise physically qualified, it is highly probable that a stigma will thus attach which can never be overcome and that the possibility of future useful citizenship will be virtually concluded. If this condition arises and the United States then has within its borders a group of persons whose loyalties have been thus alienated, the solution of the problem must rest with the Congress, because of the social-political aspects of the problem.

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant-General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Inclosures - 2

1 - Tab A

2 - Tab B

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NPD730027

By PT NARA Date 9/14/05

reply refer to:
MID 904 (7/14/42)

CONFIDENTIAL

July 14, 1942

Subject: Military Utilization of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry.

To: Lt. General John L. De Witt
Commanding General, Western Defense Command
City of San Francisco, California

1. A board of officers has been convened in Washington representing G-1, G-2, and Operations Divisions of the General Staff, Army Ground Forces and War Re-allocation Authority, for the purpose of considering the subject of this letter. Consideration is to be given to:

- (1) The military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry.
- (2) The possible methods of utilization.
- (3) The utilization as combat troops in active theaters.
- (4) The advantages and disadvantages of (2) and (3) above.

2. In view of the General's experience with Americans of Japanese ancestry within the Western Defense Command, the Board considers it of vital importance to have his views on this important subject. More specifically may we ask his opinion on the following:

(1) Should American male citizens of Japanese ancestry be recruited or inducted into the military service?

(2) If the answer to the above is yes, then what should be the size of the unit organized?
(Hasty preliminary estimate indicates a sufficient number for a division.)

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND730027

By PT NARA Date 9/14/05

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(3) There are now Americans of Japanese ancestry scattered throughout the military service. Should this personnel be concentrated into service units?

3. Any other comments or opinions which the General might care to make in these connections as to loyalty of this class, the effect of present restrictions of military service on future citizenship, etc. will be very acceptable.

MEMORANDUM for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subject: Formulation of proposed draft of reply for signature of the Commanding General

**THEO. J. KOENIG,
Colonel, G. S. C.
President of the Board**

1. You have advised that the General has constituted the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3 and Civil Affairs Division, as a Board to propose a draft of reply to a letter dated July 14, 1943, from Colonel Theodore J. Koenig, G. S. C., president of the War Department Board convened to consider the military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. Colonel Koenig has asked for the Commanding General's opinion on several aspects of the problem confronting the War Department Board.

2. Herewith a proposed draft of reply for the signature of the General for consideration of the Board. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that in paragraph 2 d, it is not concluded whether the military utilization of Kisei is or is not practicable. It is merely assumed. This in turn must be considered in the light of the available reservoir. The size of this reservoir is as shown in Tab B attached to the proposed draft.

3. Copies have been furnished the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2.

[Handwritten signature]

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Estimated native born Japanese male population 18 to 45 years of age, inclusive for the continental United States, the Western Defense Command Area, and Hawaii, 1940, 1942, and 1944

Nativity	1940			1942			1944		
	United States	W.D.C.	Hawaii	United States	W.D.C.	Hawaii	United States	W.D.C.	Hawaii
Native born Japanese males	19,000	17,500	25,000	23,000	21,200	29,000	26,500	24,400	28,500
Nisei	13,300	12,250	17,500	16,100	14,840	20,300	18,550	17,080	19,950
Kibei	5,700	5,250	7,500	6,900	6,360	8,700	6,900	6,360	8,700

Estimates of the number of native born Japanese males 18 to 45 years of age, inclusive, are based upon the 1940 Census enumeration and are computed as of approximately July 1st of each year designated. Estimates of the number of Kibei and Nisei are based upon Los Angeles Port of Entry figures to 1942. The estimated percentage of Kibei among continental native born Japanese males has been arbitrarily applied to the Hawaiian native born Japanese males. It is likely that the percentage of Kibei Hawaiian Japanese exceeds the percentage among continental Japanese, but there are no available statistics upon which to base a reliable estimate. In addition, it should be noted that the Hawaiian Nisei are less well assimilated than the continental Nisei and the term, therefore, does not have the same meaning when applied to Hawaiian Japanese.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NP0130027
 By P1 NARA Date 9/14/05

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 HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
 PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3

(G-3)

July 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: The Commanding General.

1. There is no meeting of minds of the members of the board designated to study the subject of Military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. Comments below are abstracted and briefed from written opinions expressed by members of the board.

G-1:

- a. Japanese of negligible value.
- b. Impossible to determine loyal from disloyal.
- c. No opportunity to observe soldiers of Japanese ancestry under wartime conditions, since they were evacuated shortly after declaration of war.

G-2:

- a. Should be inducted for use as interpreters and translators, due to paucity of personnel available for this duty.
- b. Recommends induction and use in WDC under control of white officer after graduation from MIS language school.
- c. Recommends against formation exclusive Japanese units but recommends absorption in Caucasian units in both arms and services.

CAD:

- a. Utilization of Nisei practicable, Kibei impracticable.
- b. Recommends Nisei be used in theaters where contact with Japanese troops improbable.
- c. Recommends Nisei be used as QM, Engr or labor battalions in combat zones under constant surveillance.
- d. Maximum size of unit no larger than a battalion.

2. Attached is a draft of suggested indorsement to original letter on this subject.

Hamilton
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WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

1231 MARKET STREET

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Telephone KLONDIKE 2-2611

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ARMY
COMM

November 25, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

X 323.7 Santa Anita

SUBJECT: Letter Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 9/14/42, Re Defective Operation of Santa Anita Assembly Center, to Brigadier General H. A. Kroner, General Staff.

TO : Chief of Staff, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California.

1. Reference is made to memorandum from this office dated October 12, 1942, subject as above, which transmitted a report of investigation of the subject referred to in the letter of J. Edgar Hoover. This investigation was made by Major A. V. Boldt of this headquarters and in the concluding paragraph of his report mention was made of a similar investigation which was being conducted by Edmund A. Mason of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A complete report of Mr. Mason's investigation has been received and is inclosed herewith.

2. Mr. Mason has made a very extensive investigation of the fourteen different alleged violations and complaints. The following is a brief analysis of his investigation.

a. Shortage in Center Canteen Finances:

The report states, "-- it appears that the canteen operations were supervised and controlled in an attempt, and with the apparent result, of preventing any serious irregularities therein." This statement is made with reference to a \$214,863.81 operation covering the period May 25, 1942 through September 1942. There was a total shortage of only \$535.33, plus a fire loss (canteen No. 2 on 9/6/42) of \$2,297.43.

b. Mess Hall Irregularities:

8,430,091 meals were served to evacuees at an average cost of 12.73 cents each. There appears to be a food loss of \$1171.38. Had this loss not existed the average price per meal would have been increased to 12.74 cents. No charge of theft is made.

c. Meals Served to Caucasian Employees:

A total of 20,425 meals were served to Caucasian employees for which \$4,472.06 should have been collected but only \$4,430.00 was received -- a total shortage of \$42.96.

To: Chief of Staff, WDC

November 25, 1942

d. Clothing Allowances:

An evacuee, Kyoshi Minami, alleged that there were irregularities in clothing allowances. However, these accusations were vague and were not substantiated by the investigation.

e. Gasoline Shortage:

Report states that for a period of about four months 21,754 gallons of gasoline were received and 20,964 $\frac{1}{2}$ gallons dispensed -- 840 gallons remained on hand, showing an overage of 50 $\frac{1}{2}$ gallons for the period.

f. Irregularities in Use of Government Cars:

Report states that apparently a few evacuees were making personal use of government-owned automobiles within the Center. However, such use appears to be almost negligible. There was some use of government automobiles by Caucasian employees, such as driving to neighborhood towns and to and from their homes.

g. Personal Business Transactions with Evacuees:

Three such instances were reported -- one of which was negligible, amounting only to an accommodation by an employee to an evacuee. Another involved an interior policeman who was apprehended in the purchase of a radio from an evacuee for \$12.50. The policeman was dismissed. The third involved purchases of \$187.48 by the Center Fire Chief for evacuees on which the Fire Chief received a 10% rebate or \$18.72, which he pocketed.

h. Irregularities in Issuing Shoes:

The report discloses that five pairs of shoes, total value of \$12.50, were issued in the name of non-existent evacuees on order of a mess hall steward, Ernest W. Reed. Reed was dismissed and prosecuted on a felony charge.

i. Theft of Government Property:

Several homes of Caucasian employees were thoroughly searched but the investigation disclosed no such thefts.

j. Edible Food Carried Out in Garbage:

Investigation failed to substantiate this rumor.

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k. Meetings in Amory's Quarters:

Report of clandestine meetings among members of the Center Manager's staff in "Amory's cottage" were not substantiated by the investigation.

l. Eating of Lunches by Caucasian Employees:

Report indicates that at least two employees admitted that Caucasian employees did partake of lunches prepared for the evacuees. However, this practice existed only during the closing days of the Center.

m. Theft of Property from Mess Hall:

Investigation of all alleged infractions were unsubstantiated and charges were found to consist only of hearsay.

n. Selling of Jobs:

Charges were found to be unsubstantiated and to consist of insufficient credible testimony.

3. The information developed by the investigation was presented to the Assistant to the United States Attorney at Los Angeles who refused to prosecute the individuals involved for lack of sufficient evidence. It is recommended that no further action be taken and that the matter be considered closed.

Karl R. Bendetsen
Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Approved as recommended

DW

11/27/42