# LIST OF PAPERS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*File under No. 323.7 Manzanar*

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**INSTRUCTIONS.—** When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.
NOTES ON MANZANAR.

Water Shed: It was noted from Highway 71 at Crowley Lake, a part of the Los Angeles water lines, there were hundreds of head of cattle grazing in the swamp lands around the lake. This source of contamination is surely as great as any wading in feeders by Japanese children.

Mr. Campbell, Asst. Manager is in charge. Mr. Nash leaves this F. M. for Project Managers' conference in San Francisco.

M. P. Officers say they have talked Mr. Nash into discontinuing the following practices:

1. Issuing picnic passes for large groups to leave Center.
2. Send groups out without passes.
3. Send groups out without caucasian guard.

(Except to 3 and 4 now are trusties on water pumps across road from Center). Have good cooperation with Project Management. C. O. attends Directors' Daily Conference two or three times a week, as observer, not as a participant. Guard trucks pass through camp every four hours posting guard.

Three guard towers needed in back. Guards in rear walk through brush and are unable to see much of their area. One man alone has no protection against attack. Not able to get replacement bulbs for searchlights. Have requisitioned Engineers. No reserve stock. One bulb burned out tonight. They do not inspect vehicles for contraband. Vehicle is stopped by gate guard and directed on into camp to Interior Police Station for information as to how to obtain pass. All roads entering camp have now been closed except main gate. Say local friends tell them that when location of camp was announced all local sporting goods houses experienced a sell out of guns and ammunition. Entire neighborhood is self appointed police force to see that evacuees stay within limits. This is the county that had the civil war with the Los Angeles aqueduct.

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Claude E. Washburne
Lt. Colonel, C.A.C.
Chief, Inspection & Fiscal Div.
INSPECTION AND FISCAL DIVISION
Wartime Civil Control Administration

August 12, 1942

NOTES ON MANZANAR.

Mr. T. C. Ray, U.S. Engineer in charge of camouflage net factory reports to M. P. at 8:30 this A.M. that a strike is in progress in his plant. That he expects rioting and destruction of Government property. Says, 14 evacuees from Dunbar are causing all of the trouble. Says, loyal Japanese told him of a secret meeting last Friday night at which no camp representative was present. Says, the cause of the argument is that the Japanese want wages commensurate with other defense workers. Says, there was an understanding that 6 nets per day was a normal output and evacuees were to receive $12 per month. Fast workers produced a day's work of 6 nets in less than 8 hours and were allowed to leave when that amount was completed. Then it was announced that fast workers must keep on working a full 8 hours day, regardless of output, and trouble started. Said, workers could not understand why they could not be considered on basis of output.

Cited evacuee freight detail hired by Southern Pacific Company at 67½¢ per hour (to be raised to 87½¢) whom camp charges $20.00 per month for board and room. Could not see why he couldn't have net crew hired on piece basis of so much per square foot. (Nets are different sizes). Says, quota is 790 nets per day and that they can make 1000. (He apparently was talking about Eng. Corps quotas). Says, present nets are costing 3.3¢ per sq. ft. for labor, materials and freight on materials, (does not include District overhead) against 8¢ per sq. ft. at the start. Says, present capacity is 100 nets per day with 600 employed, 400 are satisfied and want to continue work but are afraid of "goon leader" threats of bodily harm.

Kenneth Horton, Chief Interior Police wants uniforms, badges, and night sticks for force. Says, trouble element make fun of his force and tell them they have no badge of authority. Says, there is no penalty for violations. Chief confirms this, says, if they pick anybody up, they are immediately released by administrative staff. Says Day and Williams, the original caucasian force, are being relieved because they do not qualify under the W.R.A. Civil Service requirements. Says, 10 years police experience is not sufficient to qualify. Says, Van Akin from Santa Anita, with 22 years' service with the Los Angeles Police Dept. qualifies and will be given Chief's job. Says, old W.C.C.A. personnel there now to his knowledge are the 4 police mentioned above, Mr. Miller in charge of Mess and Housing (now is in the hospital) and Mr. Brander, Personnel Officer says that Kibel (pronounced Key-Bay) group held a meeting Saturday night. They had permission
to hold meeting in Japanese language. After the meeting, Manager Nash, handed down a decision that no more such meetings would be held. Says Nash set last night (Tuesday) for a speech to Japanese but the Interior Police reported planned violence against Nash if he made the speech. They reported this to Nash and he called it off giving the excuse that he had to leave early to get to San Francisco for the conference.

Mr. Horton says that they make no inspection of package mail under the following order:

Office Memorandum       June 9, 1942

"To: Chief Horton, From: Project Director, Subject: No inspection of parcel post.

From today there will be no further inspection for parcel post by the police department.

/s/ Roy Nash
Project Director"

Other instructions which he has are memorandum:       July 11, 1942

"From: Project Director, To: Kenneth Horton, Chief of Police, Manzanar,
Subject: Inspection of packages for Evacuees.

Hereafter, unless you have reason to be suspicious of the contents, it will not be necessary to open and inspect personal packages addressed to evacuees coming in either by mail or by truck.

Of course, if you have any reason to be suspicious, go ahead with inspection as formerly.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ned Campbell
Asst. Project Director

Dictated by Roy Nash, cc: Mr. Temple, Chief of Community Services."

Memorandum       July 14, 1942

"From: Asst. Project Director, To: Chief of Police, Kenneth Horton,
Subject: Contraband Property.

No search has been made for contraband articles that may be included in the furniture of evacuees that is now in storage. It is desired that you, upon receipt of household goods and other property of evacuees of Japanese ancestry at this Project, cause a thorough search to be made of such
property with a view of removing therefrom any items which come under the category of contraband property. This will be done prior to the turning over of the property to the evacuees for their use at the Project.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ned Campbell
Ass't. Project Director

cc: Mr. Temple, Chief of Community Services

Horton says, he has no knowledge of any suspected trouble makers from other camps being transferred to Manzanar. Says, W.C.C.A. always furnished such information between camps but no such system was in effect in W.R.A. to his knowledge. Says, an F.B.I. man is in camp today, investigating the Kibei group (Born in U.S., educated in Japan then returned to U.S.) Horton does not know how many there are at Manzanar. Kibei say they do not understand English and therefore ask to hold their meetings in Japanese. Says, the Citizens League held a meeting last Saturday night. Says, Kibei's were there and spoke openly of loyalty to Japan and were loudly cheered. Says, that Nash called a meeting Monday morning to investigate the Kibei group but did not include the Interior Police in the meeting. Says, Nash wanted him to lock up some of the leaders for the F.B.I. Horton says, he told Nash that he was working in harmony with the F.B.I. and that the F.B.I. did not want that and besides Nash had the wrong men.

Horton then discussed Karl Yoneda whom he had under close observation because Yoneda was an ex-Harry Bridges organizer, wrote for Communist papers and had Communist visitors in camp at least twice. Says, Yoneda is very Anti-Axis although of Japanese ancestry he is married to a Russian Jewess. He is a block leader and a member of the Kibei. Horton says, Yoneda spoke from the floor at the last Saturday night meeting and was noticeably pro-American. He was loudly booted and threatened to such an extent that the Interior Police gave him an escort for protection to get to his quarters. Horton states that the Saturday night meeting was very evident pro-Japanese as indicated by the trend of the boos and cheers.

Horton states that the Interior Police have no record of visitors. Says they escort visitor to administrative office where pass is issued or denied. (Says, passes are frequently denied by office) When asked if Interior Police picked up passes, Horton said, gate guard did that. M.P.'s say, Interior Police take them up.

Some confusion apparently existed on this point.

Inquiry was then made on contraband. Horton stated that one friendly search had been made by him on his own responsibility as a normal duty since W.R.A. had taken over. Said procedure was for his men to go to barracks and ask resident if he had any contraband explaining items not allowed in barracks. Said, no actual search was made of premises. Said they had made one actual search in a case where he had received a report
that a certain individual possessed a revolver and some large knives. He stated that in this case they called the evacuee to his quarters and told him of the report and asked him if he objected to the search. The evacuee agreed to the search and assisted them. No contraband was found.

Re: Evacuees leaving camp without Caucasian escort. Horton stated that there were 3 evacuees assigned to operation of a pump across the highway and within sight of guard tower. Says, this pump is used to increase the water supply system in the camp. Says, there were also 3 evacuees permitted to service a chlorinating plant located on the creek back of the camp. Also there were movements from camp area to fields through M. P. lines to a Caucasian guard out in the field.

Re: Access to aqueduct. Says, garbage crew with Caucasian guard in charge crosses aqueduct (at this point an open stream) 3 or 4 times a day. Says, this was a popular detail because they used to stop and fish there. Says, native fishermen objected and fishing there has been stopped, by evacuees. Says there was also some bathing in Bear Creek which runs into aqueduct, but that had also been stopped.

Re: Picnics. Says, picnics are now all on reservation. Commented on one under escort of Campbell, Temple and Nielsen that went to Seven Pines, a private summer home area 10 miles from camp. Thinks Nielsen had rented a cabin there and was familiar with the spot. Says, the group was visited by Mr. Claude VanNorman, a retired engineer of the Department of Water and Power, City of Los Angeles, who is a brother of H. A. VanNorman, Chief Engineer, Dept. of W. & P., City of L. A. Horton said "Claude probably told them off and Campbell and he had an argument". Campbell told VanNorman he wouldn't speak that way about the Japanese if he knew them, suggested he come down some day and they would show him around. VanNorman said he had been in there plenty of times and seen enough. Campbell came back into camp and wanted to know how VanNorman got in without his knowledge. It was decided that VanNorman had ridden the power company trucks which frequently came and went without much notice.

Horton then discussed one TOKIA SLOCUM, police investigator, war veteran, was Sgt. York's Sgt. Major, responsible, loyal, prominent, active in legislating a bill to give citizenship to veterans of World War I. Active in American Legion and Veterans of Foreign War. Says, some Colonel in New York who is gathering war records, is in continuous correspondence with Slocum. Horton wanted me to meet him and talk with him, but time did not permit.

Keyoshi Higoshi, Lt. Interior Police, ex-Insurance Agent from Terminal Island; Secretary J. A. C. L., Niesi, in interview stated that Ted Akahoshi, the head of the Block Leaders Council, is an alien and that over half of the Council members are aliens. This group of a majority of aliens represent
the camp in which about two-thirds are citizens. Says, Administration does not consider who are aliens and who are not. Citizens feel that they are not properly represented and government leans decidedly towards anti-American. Says, the Kibei is their problem child. Says, majority are pro-Japan, with very limited English, yet a minority are pro-American and speak English.

Mentioned one JOE KURTHARA, ex-service, World War, Mich. 320 F.A., 85th Division very bitter now on treatment received from Government. Now an extreme anti-American. He is outspoken and open in his acts and deeds. He is the martyr type. Wants the F.B.I. or Army to pick him up and make a martyr of him.

Mentioned VanAkin, new proposed Chief, said, when VanAkin drew the "graveyard shift" he went home and went to bed and told them to call him if needed. Evacuee police did not like that and did not respect him or his ability. Said 5000 evacuees in blocks visited had signed a petition to keep Horton and that evacuees in blocks not visited had called at office wanting to sign. Said, pro-American Japanese were disturbed over recent trends. Preferred W.C.C.A. over W.R.A. for safety sake and closer liaison with Army. Only objection to W.C.C.A. was from ranchers who had leased their places could not talk over business with tenants except in public visitor's house. Did not want to take them to quarters necessarily, simply wanted privacy on business discussions. Says, women are worrying now about not getting plasterboard to seal barracks before winter comes. Also regret that women's latrines have not been partitioned. Says, Nash is not popular with evacuees. Says, he is O.K. on administration, but lacks diplomacy. Cites trouble recreation group had in getting material for stage. Nash promised it daily with no action. Also, promised police uniforms for 3 months, but no effort made to even improvise. Result, Interior Police morale low. Issued police laws then did not support police when they apprehended violators. Evacuees know this now and make fun of interior police. Thinks Nash lacked diplomacy in handling known crack-pot recreation leader. Was getting good results, Nash mishandled him. This was the fellow that threatened to bust a rock on his bald head. People appreciate leader's effort and think Nash was at fault. Leader now has hearing and following in public meetings. This possibly explains threatened violence to Nash if he attempted to make a speech. Did not hold evacuees confidence and respect. Nash told them they could see him and talk with him personally, but they can't. Explained Citizens Federation, a local Manzanar organization conceived by pro-Americans to consolidate group who were fighting J.A.C.L., whom some thought were partly responsible for the Evacuation. Aims are:

1. Improving camp conditions.
2. Educating citizens for leadership.
3. Participating in war effort.
4. Preparing for post-war.

Organization is being fought by Kurihara.
Re charge of Police Head: Says, reason evacuees are so strong for Horton and assistant are that belief is they were responsible for noticeable change in local feeling toward Japanese; very evident in town, stores or any place they come in contact. Evacuees know of bitter local feeling at beginning but Horton and assistant, were natives of Inyo County and had many influential friends and have built up confidence on both sides. Evacuees feel that VanAkin is not the type to retain it and local sentiment might change to their detriment, particularly so, with the growing anti-American control in camp which in time will leak out and inflame native population.

Fred Tavana, Industrial Dept. Warehouse 23, reports to F.B.I., G-3 Army, G-3 Navy was present at Saturday's meeting. Obtained from him copy of report he submitted also copy of his personal opinion. Says, Stancliff, head of production, appeared to resent his interference when he told him anti-American agitators were physically pointing out to evacuees as proof of American demonstration of equality of races by -

(1) Caucasian mess table in same mess hall with evacuees was served steaks while evacuees were served stew.

(2) Caucasian houses across the street had private baths and toilets and finished walls when evacuees nearby, of higher previous social standing, lived like hogs.

Says, (1) has been corrected and (2) is done, but he still thinks it was an unwise idea and has been hard to counter. Thinks if the houses had been built outside the fence, the difference would not have been so evident. Says, Campbell made a good speech this A.M., gets by better than Nash, but did not think he should have made the remark "No work, no eat".

Koji Ariyoshi, camouflage net worker, Hawaiian, objected to Miller, foreman at camouflage plant making announcement of 8 hour day requirement by Army on account of present conditions. Considered conditions serious enough to deserve announcement by Nash or Campbell. Wanted them to try reasoning by camp heads rather than orders by subordinates on account of growing strength of anti-American group.

The "Dunbar Group" now leading attempted trouble making at Camouflage Plant, is a rough bunch of youngsters. One leader Fukuchi is in trouble frequently before the Judicial Committee (local government court, of which, Ariyoshi is a member). Wife wants a divorce because Fukuchi knocked her down in public, at camouflage plant. At 1 P.M., Fukuchi went to factory and released ropes holding nets, stated that they would call a strike and threatened girls with violence who wanted to remain at work. He did not know how many were in the group, but knows of a number of outsiders (not in camouflage plant) who are joining with Dunbar's group to help them cause trouble.
Says, Campbell spoke from a truck this morning at the factory and acknowledged to workers his mistake of allowing piece work and said from now on it would be 8 hours. (He remarked here that carpenters, linoleum layers and farm workers were not working an 8 hour day and the camouflage workers could not understand why they were discriminated against). Campbell indicated the size of the pile of telegrams he had on his desk that he had sent and received from the Army pleading their cause, but had been denied. Workers did not believe that statement because he gave no logical reason. Joe Kuribara was there to lead questions when Campbell asked for them, at end of speech. Evacuees knew Joe was not a camouflage worker, had no business there, was an able trouble maker, was a draftee of last war, was speaking openly against America. Ted Akahoshi, known by all as definitely pro-Axis, was evident in the background. He as chairman of Block Leaders Council, is getting brave with his power in the camp. Asked Fred Toyaura to come to his barracks to have a talk with him. Fred (F.B.I. reporter) would not go. Akahoshi says, they are organizing for after the war. Tells them to go to Ogura (a block leader) for their assignments and instructions. Ogura is disseminating the information that he has important contacts with the Japanese Government and has charge of organizing and training Japanese leaders for use after the war. He is promising accepted Japanese land in Australia and Chinese and Korean slave labor.

After above digression and apology, Ariyoshi returned to report on Campbell's meeting of this morning. He stated that after the meeting the workers went back to the plant but did not work from fear of Dunbar group. This P.M., Superintendent, Henry Ishizuka, in an effort of compromise, asked them to produce one net in order to collect pay for the day. Ishizuka said he was unable to control the workers. Ariyoshi said that when he left the boys were throwing material all over the place. He said that the pro-Axis element tho not employed at the plant, came in and attempted to influence the workers while they were at work. He thought that the Administration should not permit anyone in the plant except workers, unless they had permission to enter.

He stated that Karl Yoneda and Tom Younagaki were strong pro-American, the only two block leaders who would back him in his  __recruit__ for enlistment of Japanese in the Army for a second front force. In the face of threats of violence he obtained 218 signatures on the enlistment petition for forwarding to President Roosevelt.

Ariyoshi appealed to the Army through me to work out a plan for separation of pro-Japan and pro-America Japanese at once to stop present trouble brewing at Manzanar and which he says is already in progress at Parker and which he says is inevitable in all W.R.A.'s Centers. He says now is the time for the Army to let the Japanese come out in the open and take sides. He says,
the Japanese know who is loyal and who is not and who is uncertain, and that with the support of the Army, they can in his opinion, be separated. He says, the two groups cannot exist in the same camp without serious and continuous trouble. He asks for a pro-American Camp with the entire project devoted to defense work. He says, true pro-American Japanese need that much help from America to give them self confidence in the sincerity of democratic principals. He suggested that a board of Army Officers be appointed to conduct hearings in the camps to assist in separating the sheep from the goats. He says that if the plan is properly announced, a large percentage of the Japanese are ready and anxious to make their choice, publically. He says, that pro-Japan Japanese are refusing repatriation because they want to take more than $300,000 with them to Japan. He says, that families are already separated in opinion and will welcome a separation on the basis of Japan vs. U.S. He stated that some of the Japanese now returning from concentration camps to centers, are bringing with them literature and methods furnished by professional Japanese spies who are allowed to carry on their schools on sabotage unmolested in concentration camps. He says, he has submitted his plan to Nash for W.R.A., but he thinks the Army are better qualified through strictness and fairness in seeing the thing carried out. He strongly urged immediate action before "mob rule" took control as it was doing at the camouflage factory today. He said rioting was on the way. He said the Terminal Island boys on the linoleum crew, tried last week to kill Tokio Slocum in Block No. 4 by dropping a heavy roll of linoleum on him. He said that after the Saturday meeting, the "goon group" had yelled in Japanese "Kill him, die you dog"! He said that the last two weeks had shown a tremendous change for the worse in law and order at Manzanar. He mentioned the incident of the old man that had to move from an anti-American block under threat of bodily harm, because he had 3 sons in the U.S. Army and displayed the service flag with 3 stars and an American Flag. With tears streaming down his face, he took down the flags to protect his wife from harm, but stated he would still continue each morning to raise the American Flag in his heart and that could not be denied him.

Claude B. Washburne
Lt. Colonel, C.A.A.
Chief, Inspection & Fiscal Division
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Karl R. Bendtsen

SUBJECT : Disturbances at Manzanar

1. During inspection visit to Manzanar, August 11-12, 1942 it was noted that a strike was in progress at the Camouflage Net Plant at Manzanar. Opportunity presented itself to gather some information as to the background of the trouble, and notes were taken at the time. These notes, being quite extensive and of a confidential nature, have been transcribed and retained in the Inspection and Fiscal Division for future reference if desired. A complete set was circulated to the Executive Officer and Chief, P.S. & R. Division for their information.

2. For your information the notes are summarized as follows:

   Information gathered indicates -

   a. "Kibei" meeting conducted in Japanese language with approval of Project Manager at 8:30 P.M. at Mess Hall 15 on August 8, 1942 was decidedly anti-American.

   b. Trouble makers appear to be establishing themselves in local government and taking advantage of apparent lack of cooperation between Management and Interior Police.

   c. Anti-American groups are organizing, gaining in strength and becoming more brazen in words and actions.

   d. Pro-American and cooperating evacuees are intimidated by unrestrained threats of bodily harm.

3. In the opinion of the Inspector, serious trouble can be expected at Manzanar and possibly other War Relocation Projects if present practices continue.

4. It is recommended that, if not already in effect, some plan of surveillance be instituted to watch trends in War Relocation Project areas located within the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army area.

Claude B. Washburne
Lt. Colonel, C.A.C.
Chief, Inspection & Fiscal Div.

cc: G-2
P.M.
Japanese Meeting at Manzanar, August 8, 1942.

1. 8-18-42 AC of S, AC of S, G-2, CIB CAD

Attached herewith for your information and reference to War Relocation Authority are two accounts of the August 8th meeting at Manzanar as reported by confidential informants of this office.

J.W.

2 Incls.
Reports re meeting
at Manzanar

2. 8-23-42 AC of S, Regional CAD Director, WRA

Attached comments pertaining to Japanese meeting at Manzanar, August 3, 1942, are referred to you for information, notation and return.

K.R.B.

3. 8-24-42 WRA AC of S, CAD

1. Contents attachments noted.
2. Complete report on Manzanar meeting of August 8 on file in this office. F.B.I. was called in on case; results of their investigation not yet revealed to this office.

E.R.F.

4. 8-25-42 AC of S, CAD G-2, CIB

Attention is invited to Note 3.

K.R.B.

2 Incls.
SUB. Japanese Meeting at Manzanar, August 8, 1942.

1 8-18-42 AC of S, AC of S, G-2, CITCS CAD

Attached herewith for your information and reference to WRA are two accounts of the August 8th meeting at Manzanar as reported by confidential informants of this office.

J.W.

2 Incls.
Reports re meeting at Manzanar

* *

2 8-23-42 AC of S Regional Director, WRA
CAD

Attached comments pertaining to Japanese meeting at Manzanar, August 8, 1942, are referred to you for information, notation and return.

K.R.B.
MEMORANDUM for the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army (THROUGH: Chief of Staff)

Subject: Report on Proceedings of Meeting held at Manzanar Relocation Center, in which Japanese Language was Used.

1. Reference is made to the accompanying papers, including memorandum to the Chief of Staff from G-2, dated 13 August, 1942, enclosing a copy of a report submitted by one Fred Tayama by memory the morning following a meeting held at the Manzanar Relocation Center on August 6, 1942, by a group predominantly pro-Japanese.

2. From the tenor of the G-2 memorandum, it would appear that he is under the impression that Manzanar is an assembly center under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. As a relocation center it is under the exclusive operating jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority.

3. Report of the manner of operation and administration of Manzanar and other relocation centers has been frequently made to the Commanding General, both by memorandum and informally by the Civil Affairs Division. These reports have indicated, among other things, that the use of the Japanese language is permitted, that unsupervised meetings are held, that parcel post and other packages addressed to evacuees residents are not inspected as a general rule. It is also well known to the Commanding General that since the operation of Manzanar has passed from the Wartime Civil Control Administration to War Relocation Authority, a complete change in attitude and practice has occurred. At the same time the desirability for maintaining complete separation between the fields of responsibility of the Commanding General on the one hand, and War Relocation Authority on the other, has been a continuing policy in this command.

4. The Civil Affairs Division has long advocated the desirability of providing for the separation of Kibei and their immediate families from Nisei. Although technically the term Kibei includes any American born person of Japanese ancestry who has returned to Japan. As used in this memorandum, the Civil Affairs Division refers to those
American born persons of Japanese ancestry who have returned to Japan for education between the ages of 12 and 21 and who have received Japanese indoctrination during those formative years. More recently, in a recommendation on the possible use of persons of Japanese ancestry in the armed forces, the Civil Affairs Division renewed that recommendation. (Tab A)*

5. The proposal of the G-2 section that the "Civil Affairs Division discover the Kibei leaders in all assembly centers and camps through security police, camp management and the use of Nisei stooges" must be subjected to some analysis to determine its practicability and must be considered carefully in the light of existing circumstances and the basis of the evacuation program.

a. As far as using assembly center staffs, including interior security police, for the purpose of discovering "the Kibei leaders...in staging a similar meeting as was held at Manzanar," in the operation of assembly centers the Wartime Civil Control Administration has never permitted the holding of meetings in Japanese. The one case in which such a meeting was attempted at Santa Anita, contrary to the published rules, resulted in the indictment and subsequently the interment of the leaders. Further, under present operating rules the WCCA prohibits the development of confidential relationships between camp management and assembly center residents for two reasons: (1) the camp management is not capable of operating as a counter-espionage instrumentality; and (2) through the development of such confidential relationships the opportunity for organization of rackets and fraudulent practices might arise. In one case it did, at Santa Anita.

b. The interior security police have been constantly endeavoring to prevent the infraction of center rules. Of course interior police were not engaged as a counter-espionage instrumentality, and because they are well known to all center residents, as they necessarily must be, they are under a considerable handicap in this connection. However the
interior security police have in the course of development a study (shortness of time may preclude its completion) pointing to the existence of the subversive elements among evacuees not heretofore considered dangerous.

6. The evacuation program itself has been predicated primarily upon counter-fifth column considerations, as all persons of Japanese ancestry have been treated alike and have been moved from the coastal frontier. Due to the magnitude of the task and the required speed, the program was designed to bring all persons of Japanese ancestry under immediate control and instrumentality of counter espionage were not included in the machinery created to accomplish the objective. This was necessarily so, as the Wartime Civil Control Administration, under the direction of the Civil Affairs Division, did not have a counter-intelligence mission but merely an evacuation mission.

7. The Civil Affairs Division, as indicated above, has always been of the view that separation of "Kibei" as defined above, from Nisei should be undertaken. It does not believe that the method proposed in the G-2 memorandum is practicable. While the use of Nisei informants may be helpful in developing a list of "Kibei" it is believed that this would have to be supplemented by a survey of Immigration and Naturalization Service records at the principal ports of entry in order to ensure the completion of a reasonably accurate list. The latter is a clerical task. It could be undertaken by the Statistical Division, WCCA, provided a staff was recruited and trained for the purpose. At the direction of the undersigned, a partial procedure designed to satisfy the stated objective has been developed. This includes the use of a questionnaire to be executed by all Japanese evacuees and the general mechanics required for a survey of appropriate port of entry records.

8. Of course, the transfer of evacuees by WCCA to WRA jurisdiction is going forward with considerable rapidity and will be completed by October 31. Once evacuees come into WRA jurisdiction completely, the separation of Kibei from Nisei would be a project which that Authority would have to administer. Civil Affairs Division believes that if the War Department requested it to undertake such a project the WRA would accede to such a request, as the subject has been discussed by the Civil Affairs Division and the WRA informally. It has also been considered at some length by the Washington office of WRA. Of course to the extent that relocation centers are located in the Western Defense Command, the stated mission of the Commanding General is such that a request of that nature could logically be predicated on military security requirements.
8. The undersigned has long been of the view that under the dual citizenship possessed by most American-born persons of Japanese ancestry, "Kibei" have, by their actions, indicated an election in favor of Japanese citizenship with consequent forfeiture of U. S. citizenship. The undersigned has discussed this matter with Justice Department representatives who were not unresponsive to the proposal. In these conversations it was suggested to the Justice Department that they could intern "Kibei" under this doctrine. Recently the undersigned requested Lieutenant Hall, acting executive in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, to present this matter again to the Justice Department with a view to determining whether that Department would approve the internment of Kibei or would indicate whether the development of a legal procedure for this purpose is practicable (Tab S).

9. In conclusion the point is made that Western Defense Command set as its objective the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2. The primary objective is being attained. It must be remembered that initially the voluntary migration of such persons to the interior was encouraged. It must also be borne in mind that large numbers of Japanese are at large not only in the interior states of Western Defense Command, including Idaho, Utah, eastern Washington, eastern Oregon and Montana, but also beyond Western Defense Command in such states as Colorado, Wyoming, etc. Among such persons are doubtless numbers of Kibei as well as Issei (aliens who presumably at least have not records in the intelligence services sufficient to support their internment) and Nisei. In encouraging the voluntary migration of Japanese to the interior and in permitting the free movement of resident Japanese in the interior states of Western Defense Command, this headquarters did not take the position that the separation of Kibei from the others was vital to the security of the command. It merely took the position that the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the coastal frontiers, including the forest areas, was vital to the military security of this command. Accordingly, it does not logically follow that this command should undertake the separation project proposed by the O-2 section and heretofore recommended by the Civil Affairs Division. The internment of all Kibei, provided legal means are available, may be essential. If so, it should not be limited to the determination of Kibei leaders in assembly and relocation centers but should be extended to all Kibeis in the United States, whether presently under Federal supervision or not. To accomplish this the following steps would have to be taken:

a. The establishment of a suitable definition of "Kibei."

b. The approval by the Attorney General of the proposition that dual citizenship Kibei, by their conduct, have forfeited U. S. Citizenship.
Confidential

(Memo for CG re Report on proceedings of meeting held at Manzanar) August 20, 1942

c. A survey of ports of entry records with a view to determining which American-born Japanese who had returned to Japan had remained there during the formative years and subsequently returned to the United States.

d. The apprehension of all such persons by the Department of Justice as aliens and their internment in accordance with present internment program practices.

f. Seek any appropriate legislation in aid of the program, such as legislation declaratory of the proposition that U.S. citizenship has been forfeited by Kibei (although the undersigned does not think this legislation is essential).

10. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that this headquarters propose to the War Department a program designed to accomplish the steps outlined in the preceding paragraph and that one of the divisions of the General Staff, this headquarters, be designated to prepare the necessary action for carrying out this recommendation.

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

Inclosures - 2
1 - Tab A
2 - Tab B
3 - Tab C
CONFIDENTIAL

July 23, 1942


To: Colonel Theodore J. Koenig, C. S. C.
   War Department General Staff
   War Department

1. By letter dated July 14, 1942 (Tab A), you have requested my views in connection with the formulation by the War Department of a policy governing the military utilization of American-born persons of Japanese ancestry.

2. The views set forth in the subsequent paragraphs of this letter are predicated upon the following premises:

   a. While it is accepted that some American-born Japanese are loyal, it is impossible quickly to separate the loyal from the disloyal.

   b. It is accepted that a very high percentage of Kibei (persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States, educated in Japan but returned to the United States) are disloyal.

   c. It is unknown what percentage of Nisei are disloyal. It must be presumed that their potential for disloyalty is low in comparison with other classes of Japanese. (By Nisei is meant American-born persons of Japanese ancestry, including those persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States who have been to Japan but who have not been educated in Japan and whose presence in Japan has served to accentuate their preference for the Army way of life.)

   d. The military utilization of Nisei is practicable.

   e. Presumptively, American-born Japanese have dual citizenship. Disloyal American-born Japanese should be regarded as having forfeited United States citizenship. Kibei should be so regarded as having
made an election. Accordingly, they should be interned for the duration and they should not be inducted or recruited into the armed forces. Where practicable, their labor should be otherwise utilized in the war effort. This could include their employment as language school teachers, where qualified, but not as translators of important documents or as interpreters for combat intelligence.

The segregation of Kibei and Nisei is possible and practicable. A method of doing is by compiling the data from the ships' manifest records in the possession of the U. S. Immigration Service at all United States ports of debarkation. (This has already been done at San Pedro and San Diego and the information is available.)

Kibei should be inclusive of those American-born persons of Japanese ancestry who returned to and were educated in Japan for a period of more than one year between the ages of 12 and 20.

3. In paragraph 1 of your letter you have presented four general considerations. I will comment on these in the order mentioned in your letter.


The military potential of American-born persons of Japanese ancestry is to be regarded from two aspects:

(1) The numbers between the ages of 18 and 45 years as of 1940, estimated for 1942 and projected to 1944;

(2) The military uses for which they may be employed.

The latter is covered subsequently in this paragraph. From the viewpoint of numbers, a tabulation projected to 1944 and separated as to Kibei and Nisei on the basis of available information is attached (Tab B). It is to be noted that Tab B includes projected statistics for Hawaii.

b. The possible methods of military utilization.

For re-emphasis, the point is made that Kibei are
not included in this division, except as set forth incidentally in paragraph 2 above.

The recruitment and induction of Nisei may conceivably be undertaken for any one, or a combination of any, of the following purposes:

(1) For limited services and limited place of employment (the present policy).

(2) Without restriction as to service of place of employment.

(3) Into all-Japanese-units with unlimited service (combat or services of supply branches) and unlimited place of employment.

(4) For combat labor service with unlimited place of employment.

(5) For combat labor service with limited place of employment.

(6) For non-combat service with unlimited place of employment.

(7) For non-combat service with limited place of employment.

(8) Maintenance of the present complement for limited service in the interior of continental United States without further recruitment or induction.

The utilization as combat troops in active theaters.

There are four possible utilizations of Nisei as combat troops in active theaters. These uses divide themselves generally into two classifications, viz., (a) theaters where contact with enemy Japanese troops is improbable; and (b) where contact with enemy Japanese troops is probable. In each case, utilization may be subdivided into the following:

(1) Unlimited
(2) Limited