Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWitt and Senator Chandler, speaking from Phoenix, Arizona.

General DeWitt: Senator, I heard that you were out this way and I wonder if you are coming to San Francisco.

Senator Chandler: General, I haven't any present plans to come to San Francisco on this trip. I've just returned from Manzanar and I'm to visit one of these camps here this afternoon. I'm having a hearing here at the Central Building in Phoenix.

D. Is there anything I can do?

C. I don't know that there is anything that you can do at the moment. The results of my visit to Manzanar convinced me that the place is not locally secure, that you've got a very bad situation there. You have visited it?

D. Yes.

C. Of course, in the Army's check there about 60% of those fellows said they were not loyal to the United States. They said they were loyal to Japan.

D. Yes, I know that. That has been my reaction all the time.

C. Of course, you have a Military Police company there that is about 50% efficient and the rest of them, according to the commander there, ought to be in baby buggys he said.

D. You know the Military Police, a great many of those units now are being limited service men.

C. They are not very good.

D. They are not all of them good but they -- some of them are better than others and some of them are worse than others. They are not all general service, you see.

C. About half of them, I think.

D. There are a little more than that. Some of them are entirely limited service men.

C. Yes, as I recall it now, about half. You've got about 125 or 126 there and there is about half of them.

D. That's right.
C. And I took a look. I think I saw every one of them. They don't make a very
good showing.

D. No, the limited service men don't.

C. According to the officers they don't make a good showing.

D. They don't make a good showing but they did well at the time of the outbreak
there.

C. It's a question of how well they would do if they had another one and, of
course, those guard towers are a half mile apart and we found some fellows there
with shotguns, General, that couldn't shoot over 30 or 40 yards, or 50 yards.

D. They won't hurt anybody at that distance anyhow.

C. Of course, they are up there by the Los Angeles water supply and I was frightened
by the fact that over half of them, I'm convinced, are against this country.

D. I'm sorry, I can't talk over the phone, but I'd like to talk to you at some time
if you get a chance.

C. I'm sorry I didn't know that when I was at Los Angeles because I'm headed the
other way now. I've got appointments --

D. If I'd been -- if I'd known you'd been down there I would have flown down.

C. I was at Manzanar two days this week.

D. I knew you were there but I didn't know which way you were coming and I just
heard this morning you were at Los Angeles and had gone east to Phoenix.

C. I've got appointments next week in Arkansas. If I had known you wanted to,
I could have arranged to come there from Los Angeles and would have.

D. It wasn't so much that I wanted to except to have a chance to talk to you.

C. The War Department, I think, General, has sent Colonel Scobey. He should be
here sometime today but he hasn't gotten here yet.

D. Is that so? I heard Colonel Scobey was going to meet you at Gila.

C. No, General Persons called me on the telephone and said that Colonel Scobey
would meet me at Phoenix, but of course he hasn't gotten here yet. I talked to General Persons -- you know who he is -- I talked to him from
Manzanar and -- he called me over the phone -- and he said that Colonel Scobey
would join me here. I'm having a hearing here this afternoon at the request of
Senator Hayden of this state. I'm just getting ready to start it but I don't know what to say to you about that situation there. The people don't feel very good about it.

D. No, they never have, but I don't think there is any need of worrying about the water supply. I don't think so. I think the — . Well, it is pretty hard to talk over the phone, but I think it is a question of segregation, Senator.

C. I agree with you.

D. And I have recommended that to the War Department several times and for some reason — I presume they had their own good reason for it — they didn't want to do it.

C. General, I am convinced that they are in the hands of people who want to continue it as a social experiment and they want to keep their jobs and the Government is spending $70,000,000 to $80,000,000 for professors and social experimenters to try to find out some way to make those fellows be for this country. I've got a letter after the Army had its experience there and at special instance and request the lieutenant who was there gave me the facts that he had gotten. At his special request I went over it with this fellow and the fellow who is the head of the Manzanar project undertook to show his superiors in Washington how they could make these fellows change their minds. Of course, I don't think they can.

D. You can't make a Jap change his mind.

C. The chances are that while about 60% of them definitely said they were against the country, the figure is probably 70% or 80%. Some of them said they were for this country who were actually not for it.

D. You're right about that, Senator.

C. I'm trying to get them to do three things and I wonder if you agree with me. Until fairly recently they haven't made any effort at segregation and I insisted upon that the first thing. We ought to take those bad fellows out of there away from the ones that are good. I don't know how many are good — not very many. Then we ought to put as many of them as will go into the Army in the Army and those who say they are loyal ought to fight, and who are able. Those who say they are loyal and say they are physically able ought to go in the Army and they ought to go

D. Yes, but my viewpoint — of course, I don't know what the viewpoint of those in the War Department may be, but my viewpoint was that segregation was the first thing to do. Then after segregation you get the ______ and the others out of the way. Then those who could be considered as loyal and physically qualified should be either employed or put in the Army. But the segregation was the first thing. They are going to have trouble unless they are segregated first.

C. You are exactly right. Of course, a lot of those fellows that you have got at Manzanar came from Terminal Island and they are as tough as any you can find.

D. Yes, and some of them from Northern California too. In fact, they are in all the camps.

C. There are only 94 volunteers out of the whole set and there are about 10,000 people at Manzanar. What do you say about that?

D. That's what I think you could expect. That's my reaction as long as they are mixed. If they would segregate first and then go ahead and recruit I think they would have better results.

C. I agree with you. Of course, we have a bill before the Senate Military Affairs that seeks to take this thing away from this -- these progressors and have the Army look out for them, just guard them.

D. I don't think the Army ought to take them back.

C. You don't think so?

D. No, I don't think that, but I think that the other thing can be straightened out. Of course, I'm giving my personal opinion.

C. I'm glad to have it, General. I want to do what is right.

D. Because I think -- I don't think it has been handled right but I think if they would segregate and get the bad people out, get them by themselves, which could be done -- . As a matter of fact, I submitted a plan for it, a very detailed plan for segregation.

C. Who did you submit that to?

D. I sent it to the War Department.

C. I wonder if they ever gave it to Mr. Dillon Meyer, the head of this authority?

D. I don't know.

C. I doubt if they ever did. We've never heard of it. I had some extensive hearings in Washington and I talked to Mr. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War and Mr. Meyer and Colonel Scobery and others and no such plan was ever divulged to us there.

D. I don't want to put myself in a position of giving information that the War Department hasn't itself given but I did submit a very detailed plan for segregation, to be performed by the present agency.

C. I hope that this is a fair statement, I fear that these fellows who are in charge of it are more interested in keeping the thing as a going propo-
Page 5. General DeWitt and Senator Chandler. 3/6/43.

sition than they are in getting the job done. They have asked for $80,000,000 and they are getting between 70 and 80 this year.

D. I recognize it —. It is a ticklish question for me to talk about.

C. You don't need to worry about talking to me about it. I'll not use your —

D. All right. There was a plan for segregation submitted some time ago carefully worked out here at my headquarters and in which I strongly recommended it before anything else was done and what happened to it, I don't know. I'm telling you that confidentially.

C. I wonder if you would have any objection if I could inquire some way about that.

D. Well, in your own way, but just don't say how you got it.

C. No, sir, I won't. General, I hope to see you soon. How are we getting along out in the Aleutians?

D. Good

Continued on Page 6.
Senator CHANDLER: General, I hope to see you soon. How are we getting along out in the Aleutians?

General DeWITT: Good.

C: Good.

D: I'd like to talk to you about it. But I can't over this this way. Things are very satisfactory.

C: Have you any prospect of being in Washington?

D: No. I'm going North very shortly. I'll be up there quite a while. But I don't expect to come to Washington at all.

C: The next time I come out here, I'll -- I'm not certain now when it will be, but it will probably be in May, I'll try to get an opportunity to run up and see you.

D: I hope you will.

C: In the meantime, General, if anything occurs to you that you want to tell me, will you just communicate with me.

D: Yes.

C: And thank you for calling me, sir.

D: I just wanted to know if there was anything I could do. My plane is in Alaska now. I couldn't turn it over to you. But if you want any assistance at all -- anything I could do -- that you feel I could do, I wanted to put myself at your disposal.

C: That is awfully nice of you. General, if there is anything that you want to know about it in any way, will you see -- will you have somebody get in touch with me?

D: Yes.

C: And I'll be glad to give you such information as I have.

D: All right. Thank you very much.

C: Goodbye, sir.

D: Goodbye.

* * * * * *

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Weckerling

RE: Eleven Japanese Apprehended at Manzanar.

February 20, 1943

1. The Los Angeles Branch Office has advised that the eleven Japanese evacuees arrested at Manzanar Relocation Project yesterday were all pro-Japanese KIBEI who had been holding secret meetings since the December 6th riot. Two of the eleven KIBEI have requested repatriation.

2. The Eleven were apprehended by the Internal Security Police and are to be transferred to the WRA "Disciplinary" Camp at Moab, Utah.

B.J.P.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Operations Division
Attention: Captain McFadden

SUBJECT: Report on Manzanar Incident, By Colonel Harry S. Mueller

1. Reference is made to your comments on the Mueller report of the Manzanar riot and the participation of Military Police.

2. I do not concur with the recommendations made in Paragraphs 3a, b, d, and e. I do concur with the recommendation made in Paragraph 3c. The other points you establish are matters exclusively for WRA and not the Army. If you are unable to revise your views after further consideration, then it is directed that a memorandum of comment be prepared for my signature to the Commanding General, substantially as that submitted by you except as to the concluding recommendations. If you are able to revise your views, then it is directed that you revise your memorandum accordingly and I will submit it to the Commanding General through the Chief of Staff.

Karl R. Bendetsen
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

1 incl. Memo to KRB fr/ Capt. McFadden, 12/29/42, w/ attach.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen


1. The attached report on the Manzanar incident, submitted by Colonel Harrie S. Mueller to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, has been read and I wish to make the following comments thereon:

   a. Paragraph 3a states that "Tayama partially identified three of the six, one of whom he named as Harry Ueno." In my interview with Tayama he stated that the only one of his assailants which he recognized was Harry Ueno, and he made no mention of even a suspicion as to the identity of any of the other five assailants.

   b. Paragraph 3b states that a committee of five called on the Project Director and presented the following demands:

      "(1) That Tayama must be killed;
      (2) That certain other Japanese and Caucasians should be killed;
      (3) That the prisoner, Ueno, be released."

      According to the information which I obtained, points one and two were discussed at one of the mass meetings, but these demands were not made upon the Project Director. Point 3, that Ueno be released, was presented at the evening demonstration following the second mass meeting.

   c. Paragraph 3c states "No acts of violence took place at this time, although there were threats." This statement implies that the threats made were threats of violence. The information I obtained was to the effect that a general strike was threatened if the demand for the return of Ueno to the Manzanar jail was not granted.

   d. The number of evacuees stated as having been moved to the Cow Creek CCC Camp is at variance with the number previously reported; however, the writer of this report was present at the time the transfer was made, and it is probable that his figures are correct.
2. Although I have no personal first-hand knowledge of any of the events occurring after 5:00 P.M., December 9, 1942, I wish to comment on the balance of this report as follows:

a. The bulletin mentioned in paragraph 9 was discussed prior to my departure from Manzanar. It was a consensus that this action was necessary because reliable reports indicated that many of the Japanese were misinformed as to the events leading up to the evening riot. The action of the evacuees in tearing these notices from the bulletin board soon after they were posted is a further indication of the anti-American temper of many of the evacuees at Manzanar.

b. The action of the Inyo County residents, as outlined in paragraph 10, and the list of questions submitted by the citizens committee, clearly indicates the feeling of extreme apprehension on the part of those citizens in the present situation. The need for adequate police, both inside and outside of the Project, to allay the fears of the local residents, is clearly illustrated. The questions asked, and the fact that the committee called on the Military Commander instead of the Project Director, shows that the local residents look to the military to provide necessary protection and to restrain the evacuees within the Project.

c. The action of the Japanese Nationals in dealing with the Spanish Council, as stated in paragraph 11 of the report, is highly indicative of the attitude of the Japanese Nationals in general, and particularly those who have requested repatriation. In both the Manzanar and Parker Projects it was my finding that the repatriates were considered the most undesirable of all evacuees since they are entirely irresponsible, are openly and avowedly pro-Japanese, and actively opposed to all activity within the Project which might make them subject to criticism or retaliation by the Japanese Government after repatriation. The presence of evacuees who have requested repatriation greatly increases the difficulties within the Relocation Projects, and the action in this case further illustrates the need for immediate segregation.

d. The withdrawal of one M.P. Company (paragraph 15) prior to the reestablishment of normal conditions in all phases of Project operation is considered ill-advised. Paragraph 16 indicates that the War Relocation Authority has hired a maximum of 15 men for Interior Security Police. This number is entirely inadequate to replace the services of an M.P. Company and is obviously not a sufficient number to provide a strong Caucasian police force as required.

at Manzanar. A minimum of 50 Caucasian police, well-trained, would be required at Manzanar.

2. This report fails to give credit to the detachment of California State Guard, 7 officers and 40 men, who responded to the request of the M.P. Commander and did guard duty at Manzanar until after the first additional M.P. Company had arrived.

3. Based upon the information contained in this report, and information obtained personally while at Manzanar, it is recommended that the Military Police retain control of the Manzanar Project, including the guarding of the interior of the Center, until an adequate Caucasian Internal Police Force has been employed and trained so as to insure the enforcement of law and order within the Center.

Attachment:
Report by Colonel Mueller

David J. McFadden
Major, Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Incident at Manzanar, California.

TO: Commanding General
 Ninth Service Command
 Fort Douglas, Utah

ATTN: Internal Security Division.

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in letter Headquarters, Ninth Service Command, December 17, 1942, file SPKSM (AS) 254, the following report is made.

2. References: Report of Board of Officers appointed to investigate the events leading up to, culminating in, and following the request of the Project Director, WRA, Manzanar Relocation Project, that the Commanding Officer, 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company take command of the camp to quell a riot on the evening of December 6, 1942. This report was forwarded, in quadruplicate, to Headquarters, Ninth Service Command on December 18, 1942.

3. Based on the investigation referred to in paragraph 2, above, the following is a narrative of the incident which occurred at Manzanar WRA project on December 6th and 7th, 1942.

a. About 7:30 PM, December 5, 1942, a Japanese, Fred Tayama, was beaten about the head by a group of six masked Japanese. Tayama partially identified three of the six, one of whom he named as Harry Ueno. All these were arrested by WRA authorities and later all released but Ueno, who was taken to the civilian jail at Independence, California.

b. Shortly after noon on December 6, 1942, a mass meeting, unauthorized by WRA, of Japanese was held, after which a committee of five Japanese, accompanied by a large crowd of Japanese, called on the Project Director. They presented three demands:

(1) That Tayama must be killed.
(2) That certain other Japanese and Caucasians should be killed.
(3) That the prisoner, Ueno, be released.
g. Upon the approach of the committee and accompanying crowd, the Project Director, through his assistant, sent word to the Commanding Officer of the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company to bring his troops into the Center to prevent violence and restore order. Within twenty minutes after being called, the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company arrived. No acts of violence took place at this time, although there were threats.

d. The Project Director, Ralph E. Merritt, met the Japanese committee in the street. After the conference, Mr. Merritt agreed that if the following conditions were met, he would, within an hour, bring the prisoner, Ueno, back to the WRA jail:

(1) The crowd to disperse at once.
(2) There be no more mass meetings, without specific consent of WRA.
(3) No attempt be made at jail delivery of Ueno.
(4) Ueno to be tried in accordance with standard WRA procedure.
(5) The assailants of Tayama to be delivered to the WRA authorities.
(6) Thereafter all disputes to be handled through means of a committee to meet with the Project Director.

The committee of Japanese agreed to the terms, the chairman apparently explained the agreement to the crowd, which dispersed. The 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company withdrew to its camp. The prisoner, Ueno, was returned to the WRA jail to await trial by the Judicial Council of the Center. The explanation of the agreement was made in Japanese. The Project Director had the assurance of a Japanese interpreter that an adequate translation had been made.

e. About 6:00 PM, December 6, 1942, the crowd met, without WRA permit. It divided into two parts. One went to the hospital to seize Tayama, who had been hospitalized because of his beating on Saturday. Tayama had been concealed and was later removed from the hospital by WRA.

f. The other part of the crowd, some 500, went to the WRA jail to release Ueno, or to require Mr. Merritt to release him. When Mr. Merritt learned of the movement of the crowds, he sent word to the Commanding Officer of the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company to bring his organization and take full charge.

g. The Military responded promptly and formed a line around the jail. The crowd was in the jail and was quite belligerent. The Commanding Officer of the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company cleared the police station and ordered the crowd outside to disperse. The crowd did not disperse but grew larger, and began to throw stones and use threatening language. After speaking to the crowd and ordering it to disperse, without effect, the Com-
manding Officer of the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company ordered the use of CN-DM gas grenades. This effectively broke up the crowd, however, in attempting to evade the gas, some of the Japanese ran toward the troops, who, thinking they were being rushed by the crowd, fired. As a result of the firing, one Japanese was killed, and nine others wounded, one of whom has since died. The other eight are now convalescing and are reported out of danger.

h. The mob dispersed and the Center has remained calm and peaceful, at least on the surface.

i. It has subsequently developed that following the agreement made at the afternoon conference (see paragraph 3d above), the chairman of the Japanese committee instead of telling the crowd of the terms of the agreement, had actually told them to this effect: We have made our point, Ueno will be returned to Manzanar. Go home now but meet at 6:00 PM and we will get Ueno out of jail then.

4. The undersigned, with Major Greene, of this headquarters arrived at Manzanar at 7:30 AM December 7, 1942, and assumed command of the Military forces. These were augmented by the arrival at 2:00 PM of Company "A" of the 753rd Military Police Battalion (ZI) from Reno with three officers and ninety three men, and at 7:00 PM of Company "D" of the 751st Military Police Battalion (ZI) from Camp Williston with three officers and one hundred and four men. The following notice was distributed in English and Japanese:

"During the period of the present emergency the controlling authority is the military, and their orders must be obeyed. The center, so far as is practicable, will operate in the usual way. Mess halls, schools and administrative offices will be open as usual.

Mail will not be sent out nor will incoming mail be distributed. No incoming or outgoing telephone or telegraph messages will be allowed. People will not be permitted to enter without authority from the military. No group will be permitted to congregate without proper authority from the military."

During the first few days a total of twenty two Japanese men were arrested by the military at the request of WRA officials and lodged in civilian jails at Lone Pine and Independence, California under military guard. The WRA authorities were advised that these prisoners were not, repeat not, military prisoners and that they would be returned to WRA control when the military withdrew.

5. On December 8, 1942, at the request of the WRA authorities, all schools were closed. On December 9, 1942, the movement of mail in and out of camp was restored, as well as the use of the telephone and telegraph by WRA officials. Sixteen Japanese, previously passed by FBI for relocation and to whom passes had been issued by WDC were permitted to leave for relocation.
6. Mr. E. R. Fryer, Deputy Director, WRA and Mr. Zeigler, attorney for WRA arrived from Washington D. C. at 5:30 PM December 9, 1942.

7. Immediately after the dispersal of the crowd on Sunday evening, some sixty Japanese men, women and children, whose lives had been threatened, were taken to the Military Police Camp for protection. WRA received permission to use the Cow Creek CCC Camp in Death Valley as a place where these sixty people could be sent to keep them from being harmed by other Japanese. These sixty people left Manzanar on December 10, 1942. One NCO and eight men from the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company accompanied them as an escort and as a guard.

8. By December 12, 1942, practically all work by the Japanese had ceased, other than that necessary for their own comfort (cooking crews) and well-being (kitchen crews and garbage crews). There was no violence of any kind other than that on December 17, 1942 the WRA Canteen was burglarized of a quantity of cigarettes and pastry. On one other night a WRA warehouse was entered, some light bulbs and fuzes taken.

9. On December 13, 1942, the Project Director caused to be posted a statement (copy inclosed as Incl. #1) setting forth the situation. This was done because some of the Japanese claimed that they knew nothing about the agreement of the previous Sunday. This statement was torn from the bulletin boards very soon after being posted.

10. On December 14, 1942, it was learned that an officer of the California State Guard was scheduled to address a meeting in Bishop, California, on Tuesday on the subject: The menace of the Japanese to the people of Inyo County. The officer did not appear at the meeting, but a committee from the meeting called at Military headquarters on Wednesday to ask specific questions. The list of questions asked in inclosed as Incl. #2. The list was given to the WRA authorities for reply.

11. The Spanish Consul at Los Angeles, accompanied by Mr. Bernard Gufler, of the United States State Department arrived on December 16, 1942. WRA arranged for Japanese nationals to meet the consul. A committee of Japanese reported that the people wanted to return to work, but they wanted to know if the Spanish Ambassador would, speaking for the Japanese Government, approve such action. The consul called Washington and spoke to the Ambassador, who assured the Japanese that a return to work would not prejudice their relations with the Japanese Government, should they be repatriated.

12. Work was resumed on Saturday, December 19, 1942, except for those positions which had been abolished, or discontinued for the time being. Mr. Robert Brown, an assistant director estimated that there were about 400 affected, as follows:

- Camouflage factory: 150
- Community services: 90
- Policemen: 90
In addition the schools are not operating, nor any of the recreational work. The fact that some jobs are not available will give some an opportunity to grumble, but in the opinion of the Project Director, this will not be severe.

13. On Friday, December 18, 1942, an inspection was made of the soldiers sent to Death Valley as escort and guard for the Japanese sent there on December 10, 1942 (See paragraph 7 above). These men are comfortably housed, subsisted by WRA and are adequately guarding the evacuees at that camp. It is anticipated by WRA that this camp will be used until about January 15th. By that time it is expected that the Japanese there will either be relocated or sent to other projects.

14. It was anticipated that Company "D", 751st Military Police Battalion (ZT) from Camp Williston could be returned to its home station or Sunday, December 20, 1942 and that all Military Police inside the Center could be withdrawn except at the telephone switchboard, the power switch, the Post Office, the warehouses and on the water line. This would leave the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company and Company "A" of the 753rd Military Police Battalion (ZT) in the Military Police area, a force of 7 officers and about 250 men. This plan was discussed with the Project Director. He asked that no troops be withdrawn until after the funerals of the men who were killed had been held. These were scheduled for Monday December 21, 1942. The writer returned to this headquarters late Saturday evening, prepared to return at once should anything untoward take place. Major Greene of this headquarters is now in charge of the situation.

15. On December 22, 1942, Major Greene reported by telephone that no incidents had taken place following the funerals (paragraph 14 above) and that the camp was orderly and calm. The Project Director has agreed that he can handle the situation if Company "D", 751st Military Police Battalion is released. Orders to that effect have been issued. The company will depart for Camp Williston on December 23, 1942.

16. The WRA has recruited some twelve or fifteen Caucasians for its internal security. Some of these are to be mounted patrols. It is expected that some of the Japanese police will be put back to work. A recommendation has been made by Mr. Willard Schmidt, Acting National Director of Internal Security for WRA, that a training school of 50 to 75 Caucasian police be started at Manzanar. This recommendation has not been approved.

17. Because of the quality of the Caucasians already recruited for police duty at Manzanar, the Project Director feels that the presence of the additional Military Police Company (Company "A", 753rd Military Police Battalion ZT) will be required for an indefinite period. This company is now housed in pyramid tents and is now attached to the 322nd Military Police
Escort Guard Company for messing. It can be moved into one of the buildings formerly used as a camouflage factory.

18. Major Greene is returning to Reno. Captain Martyn L. Hall, 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company is now in command at Manzanar.

HARRIE S. MUELLER,
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

2 Incls.
#1 - Statement of the Project Director
#2 - Questions asked by Citizens of Owens Valley

2 Copies CG, WDC & 4th Army.
Sunday, December 13, 1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF MANZANAR

It is my desire that you know the facts concerning last Sunday's events.

When I met with the committee led by Mr. Joe Murihara shortly after noon, I agreed to bring Harry Ueno back from Independence to the Manzanar jail where he would await trial. The committee promised that the following conditions would be observed:

1. The committee guaranteed there would be no more mobs or mass meetings.

2. The committee guaranteed there would be no attempt later to free Mr. Ueno from the Manzanar jail.

3. The committee guaranteed that there would be no attempted meetings of any sort until the Center had gone back to normal conditions.

4. The committee agreed to help maintain law and order within the center, and in line with this would work with the police to deliver the men who beat Tayama.

THESE CONDITIONS WERE AGREED TO BY THE COMMITTEE

I KEPT MY WORD AND BROUGHT UENO BACK THAT AFTERNOON

THE COMMITTEE VIOLATED ITS WORD BY CALLING THE MASS MEETING AT 6:00 O'CLOCK TO URGED ONE GROUP TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL AND THE OTHER GROUP TO BREAK INTO THE JAIL

Law and order must be preserved in any community at any cost. If it cannot be preserved through the police it must be preserved through the military.

When those who said that they represented the people of Manzanar broke their word and resorted to mob violence, there was but one thing to do, and that was to turn over all authority to the military. I did this as a last resort to protect life and property from the rule of mobs.

There is no martial law.

The military are remaining with us as police to maintain law and order.

Since this is a true statement of the facts I have nothing further to say until the people of Manzanar choose to speak through responsible representatives.

[Signature]
Ralph P. Merritt
Director
Submitted by Committee from Bishop and Independence
On December 18, 1942

1. Will the internal policing of the camp remain in the hands of civilian or military authorities?

2. Will the guard at the camp be maintained at the same size as prior to December 7th, or will it be increased? If so, to what extent?

3. Do you believe that there is any possibility of a sufficient number of Japanese breaking out of the camp to endanger the civilian population of nearby towns?

4. Do you believe that the people of Owens Valley towns should prepare a plan for their own evacuation from the Valley because of the possibility of an outbreak?

5. Will other steps be taken to prevent a recurrence of the recent trouble?

6. To what extent will there be a segregation of unruly Japanese at the camp?

7. Is it expected that county authorities will prosecute and punish persons who commit crimes at the Camp?

8. Do you believe that the people of Owens Valley towns should have a definite organization for protection in case there should be an outbreak that would jeopardize the lives and property of the people?

9. Have you considered the advisability of removal of the agitators to some other camp leaving only those who have not shown an inclination to give trouble?
Transcript of telephone conversation between General DeWITT and Mr. McCLOY, Assistant Secretary of War, Washington D.C.

General DeWITT: How do you do, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. McCLOY: How do you do, General. How are you?

D: I just got back from a trip to the South and I wanted to call you and talk to you a minute about the Manzanar situation — Colonel Bendetsen has just informed me and also the Chief of Staff has informed me as to the desire of the War Relocation Authority to move 160 of these people that they have under what they call "protective custody" to the Furnace Creek CCC camp that has been abandoned right over on the border there of California near the town of Death Valley at Death Valley Junction. Now I think it is a great mistake. I think it is a definite show of weakness and I think it is just what the disturbing element in Manzanar want — I think they are working the wrong way — they ought to take out the bad eggs and leave the good ones in and — but it is the War Relocation Authority's decision. If they want to do it they'll never get my concurrence. But if the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command turns over the camp to them, and they decide to move, they'll do so under their own decision and there is no concurrence on my part. I haven't communicated with them in person and I'm not going to do it, because it is there decision and they've got to make it. And I think that is the attitude that should be taken.

M: It seems to me that this other was just putting the cart before the horse. Colonel Scobey called me just a little while back saying that Mr. Fryr — or whatever his name is —

D: Yes — Mr. Fryer.

M: — told me that that was the way to solve the thing and the Military Police man — the man that was on the ground — felt the same way.

D: Colonel Mueller. He does?

M: He feels that under the situation that is the only thing we can do — I mean today or tomorrow. As I understand it. But I think we agree that in the long run, you've got to take a different method. But he was talking about an emergency situation and I told Colonel Scobey that if the people on the grounds felt that way, it was very difficult for me back here in Washington to think any different.

D: I think so to. The only point about it is, the people on the ground are unduly influenced by the attitude of the inmates as a whole. It wouldn't have been a bad thing if several more had been killed. It would have been a very good thing. But the whole thing is building up. This followed the same pattern as……….. The whole thing is building up and every time anything is done in which the authorities acquiesce — or sort of an attitude of appeasement towards the disturbing element, it is going to be worse the next time. Now if they put that point and run out the loyal
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D: (Ctd) element in Manzanar, then you are going to have left, ultimately, nothing but the discordant element.

M: Isn't Manzanar now under our control?

D: The military police are in there as a temporary proposition only.

M: But they are under our control for the time being.

D: For the time being, yes.

M: Then it's up to us to do what we think best.

D: I don't think so. Because if we do that, then we'll begin to take things over and on the other hand, I think we should take the Military Police out just as quick as we can.

M: I'd like to get them out as soon --

D: I want to get them out if I can just as quick as I can.

M: But I don't care about -- if the War Relocation Authority wants to do it, it's all right with me and I suppose its all right with you, ....

D: Yes.

M: But I feel this way....If you think it is a mistake to have that division go that way, and the Military is in there and we're responsible, we can't avoid our responsibility.

D: We're only in there maintaining order, as I look at it.

M: In other words, we're not responsible for -- we're not maintaining the camp.

D: No. we're just maintaining order as a police force. We'll take the troops out just as quick as we can and relieve the two companies we brought in there as re-inforcement --

M: But those troops are in there more than just the orders of Mr. Frye, aren't they?

D: They are not subject to Mr. Frye's orders at all. They are subject to the orders of Colonel Mueller, Senior Officer on the Ground.

M: Well, that's my point -- that if we think that the best way to preserve order there is to divide them another way, can we avoid the responsibility of making that decision by simply saying that the wants to do it a different way.

D: Well I think so.

M: ....... decide a question like that from here.

D: You see, we've got ....

M: ....... a ticklish question from here as a matter of broad policy. If the
men on the ground feels that that is the thing to do, probably they had better assume the responsibility and do it.

D: That's the attitude I took. While I don't agree with their responsibility, I want them to make the decision and carry it out. But without any concurrence of the action on my part. I called up General Joyce and he and I are in complete agreement on it and he is going to let them have the camp if they want to use it. He so informed them, but he is not concurring with their decision.

M: Well I told Colonel S [Obey]...........that they were doing this the wrong way around.

D: Yes, I know it. I think the only thing to do is to begin to separate the sheep from the goats and get the goats all in one place. We've got to do it.

M: I'm sure of it and I'm sure the sooner we get at it the better. I think we ought to put pressure on them as we already have, to do it.

D: Yes. I think so too, sir.

M: But ................. says there will be more people beaten up there unless they move them out. I can't say from here that that decision is not a sound one.

D: No. And I don't think I can say it from here, because I'm not there on the ground. But I do think the situation is under control, and I do think the troops should be moved out as soon as we can move them. They've got a good man in charge of that camp now -- Mr. Merritt...he had only been there a few days before this thing occurred...he didn't know his people. He does know them now probably better than any of the others...on account of this incident.

M: Who isn't going to move out?

D: He's got a 160 men, women and children who they consider are loyal Japanese, who if not given protective custody, as long as they remain in the camp, will be beaten up by the rest of the population or by a large element within the population. They've got about 14 of the ring-leaders in the jail at Lone Pine. The WRA will have to work up charges against those people -- it won't be handled by the State. It can only be handled in Federal Court. They should get at that right away. But as soon as we move the troops out, the FBI can go in and begin to find out what the discordant elements are and get them all out.

M: You should not interpose your authority in there and tell them to reverse the thing and do it the way you think it should be done?

D: No I don't think I ought to. I don't think we ought to. I think if we do, they'll say: "Take over the whole camp and run it".

M: I want to avoid that. All right.

D: All right, sir. Thank you very much.