291.2 RELEASE OF JAPS
1ST SECTION
# LIST OF PAPERS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**File under No. 291-2 Release of Japs**

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**INSTRUCTIONS.**—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.
DIGEST OF NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL SHOWING PRESS ATTITUDE ON EVACUATION

UP TO JULY 23, 1942

Los Angeles, California. Herald Express, January 31, 1942.

Ounce of prevention worth pound of cure.


Precautions taken by Government obvious necessity. When it gets into local hands, pressure group politics and personal headline seekers also get in. - Chester H. Rowell.

San Francisco, California. Chronicle, February 9, 1942

Realism must govern alien enemy issue. No infallible way of separating sheep from goats in mass order.

Los Angeles, California. Times, March 4, 1942

The only sensible method of dealing with whole problem is that ordered into effect yesterday by Lieutenant General DeWitt.


Practical order to be accepted practically. The first lesson of General DeWitt's preliminary evacuation order is that when a practical man has a practical job to do he does it practically. In this he differs from a politician who makes a speech. We want no vigilantism.

Portland, Oregon. Oregonian, March 6, 1942.

Bitter fact of war is, its force and betrayals make it necessary to issue Pacific Coast evacuation order.

Oakland, California. Tribune, March 11, 1942.

In war we must expect shocks, economic as well as military...but nobody can question the wisdom of actions and orders behind the jolts.

Reno, Nevada, March 11, 1942, The Journal

Japs must be removed to areas where they can do no harm.


We are demanding something be done to exclude Japanese from vital defense areas.
Digest of Newspaper Editorials - Tab A


Displeasure in Tokyo, but everyone favors evacuation.

Long Beach, California. Sun, March 16, 1942.

Evacuation absolutely necessary. Many loyal Japanese Americans realize this. Americans, soldiers are suffering, too. In case of raid, Americans might not make distinction between loyal and other Japanese.

Orange, California. Orange County News, March 17, 1942.

Our security requires Japanese be removed, but in a way in keeping with the principles of humanity.

Oakland, California. Tribune, March 18, 1942.

Energetic measures taken by General DeWitt justified.

Vancouver, B. C. News Herald, March 19, 1942.

Clearing this coast of Japanese we are strengthening Canada's front line in Battle of the Pacific.


Words of praise for General DeWitt and Colonel Bendetsen. - Carrol W. Parcer.


All Japanese must be excluded even though a majority are loyal citizens. The loyal Japanese should not allow their citizenship to be marred by taking too long to arrange for evacuation. - Key Hartsock.

San Diego, California. San Diego Union, March 24, 1942.

The experience we have had with the Japs should cure us of the delusion that they can become responsible and loyal citizens.

Salt Lake City, Utah. Salt Lake Telegram, March 25, 1942.

News stories about evacuation say Japanese appear happy. Important thing now is to assure the safety of the nation on the home front. That's just as important to a loyal Japanese-American citizen as it is to any other American Citizen. The Japanese in America can well regard their evacuation as their part of the nation's victory effort - and with a grin and a "thumbs up" make it a demonstration of patriotism. Somehow we like that spirit. It is typically American.

America cannot afford a Trojan Horse. - Franc Shor in This World.


In the evacuation of the Japanese from Bainbridge, there is a universal agreement that the Army did its job efficiently and humanely. The cooperation of the Japanese on the island was also notable. A second event was the manifest fairness of the trial, in federal court, of the first Japanese-American to face serious charges as a result of the war. Incidentally the defendant was acquitted by an all-Caucasian jury. We say "incidentally" because, no matter what the outcome, there would have been general agreement that court procedure was functioning efficiently and without prejudice.

Salem, Oregon. Statesman, April 10, 1942.

Japanese evacuees are receiving humane treatment; will be better off under Uncle Sam's wing away from scene of possible hostilities, than if they had been left here.

Los Angeles, California. Examiner, April 11, 1942.

The grateful compliments of the entire Pacific Coast, and particularly of California have been well deserved and are due to General John L. DeWitt and Tom C. Clark....We are fortunate that the men chosen for the job rightly interpreted the American spirit of tolerance and humanity and observed it with justice and impartiality.

Palo Alto, California. Times, April 13, 1942.

The mass movement is one of the most important details in this war's strategy, losing nothing in heroic quality by its purely preventive character. And General DeWitt, it's here!


When the final story of this chapter is written, it will be recorded that the American government has combined necessity with decency, with the utmost credit to itself.

Portland, Oregon. Oregonian, April 30, 1942.

They (the Japanese) are very fortunate to be under restraint in an orderly, democratic manner. It may not have been their fault, in any degree, that we were betrayed by their nation and their race. But the time for trusting without precaution is past.


There is a pledge implied in their retained privilege (that of
Digest of Newspaper Editorials. Tab A

absentee voting) and they cannot be so blind as not to perceive it. Stern necessity has placed them where they are but if they will, they are still American.


The disloyal ones among them - there are disloyal ones and it is because of inability to quickly weed them out that all the Japanese have had to go - will take the oath perhaps most loudly of all. From the loyal one, the oath is not needed. From the disloyal, with fingers mentally crossed, it will mean nothing. If it did, we could safely take the oath from all the Japanese and let them all come back.

Los Angeles, California. Times, May 19, 1942.

What arguments were presented to the President by the military authorities of this district have not been made known, but to assume that General DeWitt, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army and Naval Intelligence were motivated by race prejudice, greed for land, or popular hysteria, as this letter calmly does, is just silly. And, it was the arguments of this group that plainly impressed the President.

One has but to recall the original objections of the administration, as voiced by Attorney General Biddle, to removal of the Japs, to realize that it was not popular clamor that influenced the President, but very cogent evidence submitted by the military command. The implication that the President would be swayed by race prejudice, greed, or hysteria is no compliment. His instincts are in the other direction... The exclusion was a military measure and was recognized as such, and as necessary, by the Japanese themselves, who submitted to it with more good sense than is displayed by the signers of the petition. These Japanese knew that there were traitors to the United States in their midst and further that complete identification of all of them was impossibly difficult.

Dallas, Texas. Herald Times, June 6, 1942.

The removal is perhaps the most remarkable thing that our government has done since we entered the war. This huge transplating of population was essential.

Redwood City, California. Tribune, June 24, 1942.

"Operating evacuation centers is not job for U. S. Soldiers," says editorial in answer George W. Savage, Inyo County publisher.

Inyo, California. Inyo Independent, June 26, 1942.

"We wonder if Mr. Eisenhower hadn't come to realize that the WRA is a hot potato, just a little too warm to handle with bureaucratic tongues. The WRA, with its social service approach to Japanese problems, plus its very evident examples of maladministration, already had two strikes on it.
Digest of Newspaper Editorials. Tab A

The experiences we have seen at Manzanar since WRA took over are being repeated elsewhere."

Dallas, Texas. Times Herald, June 9, 1942.

The removal of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese extraction from the West Coast to interior points is, perhaps, the most remarkable thing that our government has done since we entered the war. Many of the Japanese who have been evacuated are American citizens by right of birth and are loyal to this nation, but there were too many of them in one locality. The evacuation of the Japanese as a war measure shows that it is not wholesome for the nation for any immigrant group to become too numerous in a particular locality.

San Bernardino, California. Sun, June 26, 1942.

In the face of reports that the large majority of Japanese in California evacuation camps approve of the army's decision that it was unwise to permit Japanese to reside on the Pacific Coast war zones, Mike Masaoka, national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, has made vigorous protest in New York. When Masaoka will point out how the United States Army can determine who is a good Japanese citizen and who is an enemy, the country might be interested in his protest. Miss Teri Matsuoka offered resolution, narrowly defeated, that "as all loyal Americans, we support every measure that will help to insure victory for the United Nations, despite any personal hardships or sacrifices." Among the opponents of her resolution were many white Americans who are interested in the technical questions as to how the United States government can restrain the movements of citizens, regardless of their racial inheritance. The army has taken a practical viewpoint of the Japanese situation on the Pacific Coast and adopted the only plan that seems feasible.

Los Angeles, California. Times, July 10, 1942.

"Now General DeWitt has let Governor Olson know that the Governor was talking through his well-used hat and that the Japs-rounded up at tremendous cost and trouble aren't going to be released for anybody. This is straight talk, that even an Olson should understand. If the Governor will get down to earth and join in the sensible efforts of various groups to recruit various available city workers.... for emergency jobs in the fields, we can save the crops." - "As You Might Say----" ED AINSWORTH's column in Times.

Merced, California. The Sun-Star, July 6, 1942.

Releasing the Japs to work on the farm would, in large measure, undo all the government has done so far to provide that safety. Only Japs who volunteered would be used on the farms, and, obviously, if any
of them wanted to get outside the reception centers for purposes of sabotage or other acts of treachery, volunteering for farm work would provide him the opportunity to get out and do his dirty work.

"Jottings" by "Vic" Reich

Martinez, California. Gazette, July 14, 1942.

Governor Olson's pleas that Japs be returned here from internment camps to work in harvest fields has met with a cold reception from the war department. General DeWitt did a mighty fine job in removing Japs from important military zones. The job was done with the usual precision and thoroughness with which the army always goes about a task. And when it was completed everyone breathed easier. They felt that a menace to the safety of the entire Pacific Coast has been removed. It was with some amazement then that the people read several days ago that the Governor was advocating their return.


"The Army, which has smoothly, expeditiously and humanely handled the evacuation, and is carrying out the advance phases of the relocation, is not officially concerned with the peacetime problem which will follow as night follows day... The probable outcome is that the Constitution will prevail rather than the unconstitutional opinions or desires of any group or even State. That is the normal and expected course of affairs. The Army, meanwhile, through its Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Wartime Relocation Authority, the completely civilian agency engaged in placing Japanese in groups where they may support themselves for the duration, are setting examples in smooth, harmonious functioning which may point the way for new postwar relationships between Japanese and the white population. The Japanese, both aliens and American citizens, are being provided an opportunity to prove themselves willing and able to make serious sacrifices for this, the adopted land of some, the homeland of many more. As they continue to prove themselves, they will be proving also their right to the full and complete protection of the American Constitution, in peace or war, from this time forth. This war can conceivably put a definite end and answer to the domestic "Japanese question."


Editorial comments on Columbuz's transfer of coast aliens inland, comparing it to evacuation of California Japanese. "Hard on the innocent, it is forced on them because of the difficulty of separating them from the guilty." Other examples of difficulties arising from mixed populations were also given.
DIGEST OF EDITORIALS FOLLOWING MANZANAR INCIDENT OF DECEMBER 7, 1942,
SHOWING NEWSPAPER ATTITUDE ON "LOYALTY" NINE MONTHS AFTER EVACUATION.

Long Beach Press-Telegram of December 8, in an editorial on the Manzanar matter says, in part: The riot "furnished a sufficient answer to those who have been questioning the wisdom of the Army's isolation of Japanese inhabitants of this country. All Japanese were moved away from potential war zones along the coast and placed under guard in camps of the interior for the good and sufficient reason that some of them were dangerous to the United States when this nation and Japan were involved in war, and nobody could tell certainly which of the Japanese were loyal to America and which were enemies at heart."

Continuing on the subject of loyalty, the editorial said: "The violent demonstration by pro-Axis Japanese at Manzanar does not provide the evidence whereby a complete separation of the sheep and the goats can be made, but it does prove beyond any doubt that a considerable percentage of the Japanese in this big relocation camp are loyal to Japan and consequently are enemies of the United States."

The San Francisco Chronicle, in an editorial December 8, discussing the Manzanar disturbance and good and bad actors among the Japanese, says in part: "We cannot select on the basis of the disorders because the bad actors are sure to plant their kind on the other side. There is no ready-made solution. As with other matters, we must make the best of it and increase protection inside the camps. This, of course, means more restriction, which the decent ones endure but find onerous."

The Portland Oregonian in an editorial of December 8, discussing the Manzanar disturbance and the question of separating good from bad said in part: "On the other hand, now that such an incident has arisen, perhaps it would be well to consider the wisdom of a division. There is great injustice in throwing together those who — in the manner of brothers when they fall out — are particularly bitter. Those who profess loyalty to America, especially if they are American citizens, should not be driven into close quarters with their enemies."
Various news items, letters to the editors, and editorial comment in the days following discuss the question of loyalty and disloyalty, and separation of the Nessei from others.
MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen

SUBJECT: Loyalty and Disloyalty of Japanese Evacuees

1. All digests of comment and opinion on file have been prepared with emphasis placed on expressions of "military necessity" rather than loyalty or disloyalty of evacuees. A survey of these digests show that no mention has been made in our news releases or in factual news stories that there was "no time to determine loyalty of evacuees". Editorially these were some remarks that time should be taken. These remarks were mainly in periodicals catering to religious groups and social workers. Numerous responsible newspapers stated that it was impossible to select the sheep from the goats. See Tab A.

2. A quick survey of editorial comment following the Manzanar incident shows uniform agreement that General DeWitt's evacuation order was sound as it was impossible to determine the loyal from the disloyal evacuees. See Tab B.

3. A careful check of our news releases reveals that there was never any remark made of the lack of time for determining loyalty or disloyalty. Military necessity was given as the sole reason for evacuation though a collateral remark was made in the first round-up story that protection for the Japanese was considered. This protection angle was also touched on in the Commonwealth Club talk.

4. Consideration can well be given to the editorial comment in Tab B. This comment does reflect the general attitude of the press of the West as to loyalty and disloyalty. It is difficult to believe that the press, and the public, will suddenly believe that some magic formula has been evolved which will now make possible accurate determination of loyal and disloyal evacuees. It appears that the public and the press will only accept such a new formula of selection after the way has been paved by segregation or some logical procedure which will naturally result in establishing pools of potentially loyal and disloyal.

5. In attempting to evaluate the future attitude of press and public it is difficult to believe that discerning editors will not recognize that the proposed plan to have the Army certify to the loyalty of certain
Memo To Colonel Bendetsen - Mr. Box - 1-25-42

Evacuees will place the responsibility upon the Army while WRA retains administrative decision. Certainly Congress is equally able to recognize the incongruity of such a situation.

BYRON D. BOX
Director of Information

Attachments: 2
#1. Tab A
#2. Tab B
MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army


July 22, 1942

1. In compliance with request (TAB A) dated July 14, 1942, in which it was desired that consideration be given the military utilization of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry.

2. In the consideration of this question, these premises are postulated:

a. The mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coastal area was necessary because of the military situation existent in the Pacific area and because it was impossible, in the short time available, to separate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

b. It is not possible, at the present time, to make a wholly accurate separation between the loyal and disloyal Japanese.

c. It is possible, at the present time, to make an empirical segregation between the loyal and disloyal Japanese.

d. It is accepted that a very high percentage of KIBEI (Persons of Japanese ancestry, born in the United States, educated in Japan, but returned to the United States.) are disloyal. It is believed that a very high percentage of NISEI (Persons of Japanese ancestry born and educated in the United States.) are loyal.

e. Presumptively, the KIBEIS are disloyal, therefore, they should not be inducted nor recruited, but should be treated as internees, until proving themselves loyal.

f. Presumptively, the NISEIS are loyal, therefore, as soon as possible they should be accorded all the
privileges of citizenship, including the privilege of serving in the armed forces, until proving themselves disloyal.

3. Once the segregation has been made, four questions arise:

(a) The military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry;
(b) the possible methods of utilization; (c) the utilization of combat troops in active theaters; (d) the advantages and disadvantages of (b) and (c).

a "The military potential of Americans of Japanese ancestry." It is estimated (TAB B) that in continental United States there are 23,000 Japanese males, native born, between the ages of 18 and 45 years, inclusive. In 1944 it is estimated that there will be a total of 26,500 male American-born Japanese between the ages of 18 and 45 years, inclusive. Of this number, it is believed there are between 8,000 and 9,000 KEEHS. They can be readily identified by examining United States Government reports, such as immigration reports. This would leave, out of an estimated total of 23,000, in 1942, a potential of 14,000 to 15,000.

b "The possible methods of utilization." (1) They could be used to make up a work corps in the construction of roads, buildings, etc., at home as well as abroad; but not in combat zones. (2) Those skilled in the use of the Japanese language could be used as translators, instructors, or interpreters in specially designed language schools. Also, they could be used in the same capacities with troops. (3) They could be used as combat labor battalions.

c "Utilization as combat troops in active theaters." If used as combat troops, presumptively, they would render more effective service in the European theaters because of the traditional animosity of the Japanese people for the German people. Initially when used as combat troops, they should be used as combat engineers or pioneer troops.

d "The advantages and disadvantages of (b) and (c)." The advantages are in the items enumerated. The disadvantage is in the probability that more initial surveillance would be necessary.
"Should American male citizens of Japanese ancestry be recruited or inducted into the military service?"

Yes, subject to qualifications.

a. Separate Kibe from Nisei.

b. Induction of all Nisei, until, as individuals, they prove themselves disloyal.

c. Segregation of all Kibe until, as individuals, they prove themselves loyal. Then, and not until then, recruit or induct them into the military service.

d. Those skilled in the use of the Japanese language to be used as translators, instructors and interpreters in special language schools, or in these same capacities with troops.

e. Serve as labor battalions, particularly as combat labor under fire.

f. Not to be employed in any theater where there is a reasonable possibility that they would have contact with Japanese troops.

g. To be employed in the European theater where, presumptively, they would render more effective service because of the traditional animosity between the German and Japanese people.

h. Proving themselves in combat labor, to be then used as combat engineers or pioneer troops.

i. Initially, they should not be permitted to enter officers' training schools.

j. Initially, they should not be permitted to rise higher than the rank of captain.

"What should be the size of the unit?"

Size of unit should be appropriate to the need.

a. Initially, this need should find expression in units not larger than a battalion.

b. Initially, such battalions should not be combined into a division.
Initially, such battalions should be scattered.

By scattering such battalions initially, it would permit competition between different Japanese units themselves, as well as between Japanese battalions and Caucasian battalions.

"There are now Americans of Japanese ancestry scattered throughout the military service. Should this personnel be concentrated into the service units?"

Yes, and for these considerations:

a. Loyal Japanese recognize that the evacuation was necessary.

b. They recognize that because of the short time available it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal.

c. They recognize that the evacuation did stigmatize them, as loyal citizens.

d. Family ties are strong among the Japanese.

e. There is racial pride.

f. Fighting, as a group would increase the morale of their families, at home.

g. Fighting as a group would increase their morale, as soldiers.

h. Fighting as a group would place in American history a compensating offset to evacuation as a group.

Effect of present restrictions.

The present treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States is to preclude almost every possibility of future serviceable citizenship. Some intelligent action looking to a change must be made to provide an opportunity for these persons to demonstrate their loyalty and their right to live as free people in this country after the war. This must be done or they must all be returned to Japan after the war. If this is done then as many as are sent become added to our enemies abroad.
By keeping them in Relocation Centers for the duration without giving them the opportunity to serve their country in time of great need is destructive of any possibility of generating patriotism. The proposition of segregating them into the interior of the United States without giving them the opportunity to prove themselves under combat conditions is also demoralizing.

Moreover, the fact that there are some of the same kind of people in units that are in Relocation Centers with no further chance for induction inevitably will result in the proposition that we must be rid of those who are already serving. Their close relationship in relocation projects will inevitably result in a deterioration of their morale.

However, there is a disadvantage to inducting, or recruiting, these Japanese of proved loyalty in that they will require a higher type of officer to command them, and to lead them. Certainly surveillance will be necessary initially. More intensive training will be needed and more training along psychological lines probably will be necessary.

Students of the Japanese people all agree that as a people they are very dependant upon leaders. As individuals they lack some of the initiative found in other Americans, but as soldiers the probabilities that as a group they are better educated than other American soldiers, just as a group they probably have a higher intelligence than the average. It follows, therefore, they will make for superior soldiers under proper leadership.

Using them as units would do much to offset the propaganda of the present Japanese government to the effect that this is a race war. That racial lines are being drawn in the United States, as witness the segregation in Relocation as well as in Assembly Centers, of Japanese who are loyal Americans, and whom the Japanese Government recognizes as such. But whom the American Government does not recognize as being good enough to fight alongside Caucasian troops.

If the ultimate conclusion is in the negative, viz, against the induction or recruitment of persons of Japanese ancestry into the Armed forces of the United States, it is only logical that those presently in should be released and transferred to the enlisted reserve corps and placed in Relocation Centers. Continuance of the present situation of having some Japanese in the Armed Forces, and many under guard of the Armed Forces is not defensible.