

12. We have appreciated this opportunity to serve our country on this mission. Our association and experience have been pleasant, on the whole. Our only regret is that we were unable to produce more satisfactory and beneficial results.

(signed) EUGENE SILER

Eugene Siler, 1st Lt.
C.M.P. (Captain of War
Department Army Team in
Charge of Registration
in Jerome Relocation
Center, Denson, Arkansas)

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4-E-886
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Amendment to Final Report of March 5th in re Registration of Evacuees in Jerome Relocation Center.

1. It was suggested by Major Bradford Ross that I prepare an amendment to my final report of March 5, 1943, on our mission of registering evacuees in Jerome Relocation Center, in which amendment I set out my conclusions and opinions on the subject of loyalty and trustworthiness of the evacuees in that Center.

2. My arbitrary segregation of groups for loyalty and trustworthiness would consist of these to wit:

GROUP A

Men and women entirely loyal from conviction, education and environment. This group I would choose to call the "conviction group" and I would estimate its numerical size at approximately 25% of the evacuee population above 17 years of age. Its complexion would likely prove to be 90% Nisei and only 10% Issei. I consider this group thoroughly loyal and as American as the word can connote. They are, in many instances, removed from parental influence through death or otherwise. This group will, in my opinion, "stand hitched in the dark". They, this minority, can be trusted to wage America's battle, whether on the industrial or combat front.

GROUP B

Men and women who are of expressed loyalty, principally as a matter of expediency. These people are opportunists. This group I would choose to call the "expediency group" and I would estimate its numerical size at approximately 25% of the evacuee population above 17 years of age. Its complexion would likely prove to be about half Nisei and half Issei. They could be used on the home front or combat front, in my opinion, only under close scrutiny and supervision. Cer-

tainly, they could be used in agricultural pursuits and be compelled to make regular, routine reports to proper authority. Undoubtedly, some of them are among the best farmers in the world and they should be released, supervised and used intensively for that purpose.

GROUP C

Men and women who are of expressed or implied disloyalty, through conviction, birth or environment. These people are poisonous to the welfare and interest of our country and could not be entrusted with the duties of any front, industrial, agricultural or combative. This group I would choose to call the "poisonous group" and I would estimate its numerical size at approximately 50% of the evacuee population above 17 years of age. Its complexion would likely prove to be 75% Issei and 25% Nisei, the latter consisting principally of Kibei. They are inimical to all the interests of America. One of them, a man of Shinto religion, used to chant his morning prayer to the Emperor in the early morning hours at the hospital where we lived in the Center during the labors of our mission. All members of this group should be, in my opinion, put in an internment camp and separated from all others for the duration of the war. This will cause some hardships and will break completely through some family circles and friendship groups. However, on the theory of doing what is "for the greatest good to the greatest number" it is entirely justified. When America's welfare is at stake, there can be no hesitation or timidity. This group should be secured for the duration.

3. Summarizing, we found a "conviction group" of loyal Japanese-American citizens in this Center. It is a minority group of about 25% of the whole evacuee population above the age of 17 years. But it is a group in whom the utmost trust and confidence may be reposed. This group should immediately be used in the war effort both industrially and combatively. Also, we found an "expediency group" of Japanese-Americans in this Center. It likewise consists of about 25% of the evacuee population above the age of 17 years. Since this group is loyal merely or mainly because of the demands and distates of expediency, its individuals should be permitted to engage in the war effort only under scrutiny and close supervision. But there would seem to be no reason why they could not be used in an effective way in agriculture. Lastly, we found a "poisonous group" of evacuees who are disloyal to America's interests and welfare. This group, constituting about half of the total population above the age of 17 years, should be segregated and closely secured for the duration of the war.

(signed) EUGENE SILER

Eugene Siler, 1st Lt., C.M.P.
(Captain of War Department Army
Team in Charge of Registration
of Evacuees in Jerome Relocation
Center)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 730027

By KAB NARA Date 9/13/05

MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER

2nd Lt. Stanley D. Arnold, C.M.P.

WAR DEPARTMENT

SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-886
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Final Report of Activities of War Department Team at the Minidoka Relocation Center.

1. The Minidoka Team consisting of Sergeants Akira Kato, Eugene F. Jendrek and Carl E. Tuerk arrived at the Minidoka Relocation Center the evening of February 5, 1943, departed the afternoon of March 4, 1943, and during the stay at the Center kept offices open daily including Sunday and every evening except Saturday.

2. MECHANICS OF REGISTRATION. The registration was conducted by a crew of 40 Japanese boys and girls, ranging in age from 18 to 30, under the direction of Joseph G. Beeson, Senior Employment office on the project. Registration was accomplished by blocks, registering two and sometimes three blocks daily. A receptionist divided those of military age from the others and following the registration, those of military age were directed with their files to the offices of the Team where questions 27 and 28 were discussed, answered, and the questionnaire signed. The files were later duplicated by a crew of typists working at night. The mechanics of the registration moved rapidly without interruption and no person refused to register. It was not necessary to dismiss school as registrations were made by family appointments and those persons affected were excused from attending classes during the half-day in which they registered.

3. THE WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE. The War Department message was delivered to the staff and faculty as a trial balloon and was then delivered to the Japanese in five mass meetings. It was published in a special edition of the project newspaper in both languages and was delivered at each meeting in both languages. The meetings were conducted under the Chairmanship of Harry L. Stafford, Project Director, and after delivery of the message, the meeting was thereupon opened to questioning in both languages, with one Frank Hattori, an able and loyal Nisei, acting as interpreter. All questions were repeated in both languages and answered in both languages. The meetings were without incident and the questions were about as expected.

4. SUPPLEMENTAL MEETINGS. During the first ten days and occasionally thereafter, the Team Captain attended all possible meetings on the project including school faculty, hospital staff, block managers, ministers' association, project staff meetings, coal shoverlers, baggage haulers, and self organized groups who assembled to ask questions.

5. THE ISSEI PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM. A group consisting of nine loyal Issei constituted themselves into a committee to assist in the program. They held meetings daily and kept the Team advised as to the sentiment and possible obstructions to the program in such a manner that any organized opposition which might have been forming was abated before it answered any purpose, with one exception to be mentioned later. This group thwarted and prevented opposition in public meetings.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION. The War Relocation Authority Project Director, Assistant Director, and the heads of all departments made this program their first concern and all worked day and night towards its success. Meetings to discuss policy matters were held twice or more daily and all persons on the project at all times were fully informed as to the status of the program and the immediate problems confronting. At the close of registration, the Director felt that a number of people being undecided upon volunteering, warranted a further educational program. Accordingly, he conducted a series of four meeting independent of the Army Team which resulted in an additional one-hundred volunteers. He did not coerce or threaten but explained the connection of the volunteer program to the general War Relocation Authority program. The people of the project had every confidence in their Director for the reason that their faith in him was well founded and the administration had never taken advantage of that trust.

7. THE INTERVIEWS. All time necessary was given to interviewing individuals and additional time was often spent with talkative persons for the purpose of gaining general information, regardless of what his individual views might be, and in this manner the Team was able to sense the general sentiment of the camp. All members of the Team held prolonged discussions of questions arising and formed certain general conclusions which were from time to time revised. I can not emphasize too strongly the fact that the best information on the individual, the Center, and the Japanese population as a whole was obtained in these personal interviews.

8. THE WASHINGTON JAPANESE. The Team was advised upon reaching the Center that the Washington Japanese were of a different class, generally speaking, from others of their race on the Pacific Coast, and this statement was borne out by our interviews and results obtained. The reasons were as follows:

The California and Oregon Japanese came to this country as conscript labor. They were largely lower class peasants in Japan with little education, no money, and bound to old country religions through fear and ignorance. The Washington Japanese on the other hand come to this country of their own accord, with some education and either money or business connections. They came because it was the land of opportunity and not a land of necessity. They have done well financially in the Puget Sound area and appreciate that fact. They have been too busy making money to return to Japan either for retirement or education and a large majority of the younger generation have adopted Christianity. The residents of Minidoka Center were 72% from Seattle, Washington and vicinity and the balance from Portland, Oregon and vicinity. It is peculiar to note that all of our volunteers came from the Washington group with very few exceptions, and also that the Oregon group was the prominent Buddhist stronghold. There were few, if any, Buddhist volunteers.

9. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

- a. It is the collective opinion of the Minidoka Team that 75% of the Nisei in that Center are 100% loyal citizens, and were it not for parental influence, our number of volunteers would have been multiplied by $2\frac{1}{2}$.
- b. That 50% of the Issei are loyal and that more would be so were it not for the uncertainty of their status due to lack of citizenship.
- c. There were no more than forty persons answered "NO" to question 28, and there were no more than ten requests for repatriation. Approximately fifty persons inquired as to the method of withdrawing previous requests for repatriation. Some followed up through the War Relocation Authority.
- d. That the reason parents influenced their children against volunteering was not because of actual disloyalty, but rather fear of their own present and future insecurity, and state legislative policies.
- e. That the only important elements of a background for disloyalty are:
 - (1) Too much education in Japan.
 - (2) Too little education in this country in comparison.
 - (3) Members of immediate family residing in Japan.
 - (4) Old country religious ties.
- f. That loyalty or disloyalty is based upon the above factors and not upon citizenship or non-citizenship.

- g. That it makes little difference when the Kibei received his education but rather how much he had.
- h. That either the Buddhist sects, or the Buddhist Club groups, advocate non-assistance to the military effort. The Buddhist Priests vigorously object to this statement, but the Minidoka statistics show definitely a complete drop in volunteers while the Team was working in the third quarter of the camp where the Oregon Buddhists resided.
- i. That there was so much confusion surrounding question 27 that nothing can be gained from the answers except where it is supported by volunteering, or the answering of "NO" to question 28.
- j. There was a small percentage of persons very bitter because of the evacuation program which apparently can not be overcome except by positive and immediate benefit to the individual.
- k. The classification of Japanese citizens in 4C by Selective Service was a serious error. It gave the Propaganda peddlers proof in writing that the Japanese-American had lost his citizenship. The Army Team was only partially successful in over-coming this belief though every effort was extended upon it.
- l. A small percentage of persons (Kibei or Issei) applied propaganda and mental pressure to counter the War Department program. The competent administration kept it subdued, but the pressure was constantly felt.
- m. Our experience at both Centers leads us to the conclusion that the size of the project magnifies every problem. In other words, the larger the project the more difficult it is to handle.

10. GENERAL. As far as the Minidoka project is concerned, it is the collective opinion of the Team that the administration there is the best that could be expected. The better class of people helps make a better administration, and a better administration improves the attitude of the people. There were no strikes or insubordination. There are no Caucasian employees on the project except heads of departments and half the school faculty. All clerical help is Japanese. Every evacuee is kept busy--to busy to attend any subversive meetings. In my opinion, no segregation is necessary in that particular Center although there were occasionally individual cases, including those few who answered "NO" to number 28, who should be segregated as a reminder to others who might be in doubt.

11. Generally speaking, the percentage of advanced education is higher in the Washington group and the more education a Japanese has, the more Americanized are his habits, his speech, and even his facial expression.

12. This team had the opportunity to spend a week at the Tule Lake project and it is the Team's opinion that the radical difference is due to the different type of people and administration. The administration at Tule Lake has lost all control and have permitted the disloyal elements to take control of the camp. Their policy of appeasement gets the administration into deeper water. There is no appeasement at Minidoka. The Project Director at Minidoka has not had time to set up his internal Nisei Governing body, and as a result, there is no strife between the Nisei and Issei, nor strife between any group.

13. The Team hopes that the Washington Japanese will get some favorable publicity upon their fine showing as it will be a help to them in re-establishing themselves in the post war period.

14. It is the Team's belief that the Japanese fall generally into three classes:

a. The loyal.

b. The disloyal.

c. An intermediate group of persons who are temporarily out of line due to the events of 1942 and the pressure of propaganda from the disloyal. These persons are fundamentally good citizenship material and, if properly handled, handled, they will become so embittered that a lifetime will not cure the situation.

15. SEGREGATION. It is recommended that, as soon as is feasible, the three groups above mentioned be segregated by releasing the loyal ones and interning the disloyal where they can not influence the third group of intermediates. This latter group is a proper subject for the War Relocation Authority, and, from time to time as the individuals in it see the light, they may be properly disposed of. Also in this group would be the aged and infirm, too old to make a new start in life, who will probably spend their remaining days under Government care.

16. SELECTIVE SERVICE. My original impression was that if the present program were successful and a successful Japanese-American combat team formed, that the War Department could return to Minidoka Center in six months or less and secure more volunteers than were obtained under the present program. However, the progress of the program as a whole has altered my opinion. I would recommend that Selective Service be reinstated for Japanese-Americans for the purpose of taking those who do not volunteer for selfish reasons or because of family pressure. The disloyal could be eliminated from the draft in the same manner as they are now being eliminated.

17. STATISTICS. The following are believed to be accurate statistics of the Minidoka project:

Alien female and citizens over 38.	5339
Registered male citizens between 17 and 38.	1607
Volunteers.	283
Alien volunteers.	11
Volunteers conditioned upon securing commissions.	14

Stanley D. Arnold
2nd Lt., C.M.P.
Minidoka War Department Team