d. Continue program of permitting the release of the loyal from the project into military service or employment in productive phases of the war effort.

11. Major Sam Marshall, Special Service Officer, Army Service Forces, arrived at the project on February 18, 1943 and departed March 6, 1943, during which time he made various reports as to difficulties encountered at Tule Lake.

12. Lieutenant Stanley D. Arnold, Team Captain, and enlisted personnel of the Minidoka Team reported at Tule Lake on March 6, 1943 and remained until duties were completed on March 14, 1943.

Enlisted Personnel of the Tule Lake Team departed as follows:

a. Staff Sergeant Attilio B. Sabatini, Corps of Military Police, First Service Command, transferred in grade March 6, 1943 and reported to Investigations Division, Office of the Provost Marshall, Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California, March 15, 1943.


c. Sergeant Taro Tsukahara, Military Intelligence Service Language School, Camp Savage, Minnesota, traveled direct to Camp Savage, Minnesota reporting for duty, after three days delay en route, March 21, 1943.

Evan W. Carroll
1st. Lt., C.M.P.
Team Captain,
Tule Lake Relocation Center.

Enclosures - 5
Copy statement from Nisei woman
Questions pertaining to Army Induction Message
Questions pertaining to Form 304-A
Questions pertaining to 126 Revised
Petition to Selective Service Board
"I am perfectly sick, nauseated, disgusted and completely shocked at the response — nothing but sickening, petty, cheap, and sordid *gripes*, *whinings*, etc. It was a wonderful proclamation — very impressive. Horrified to learn that these god dam niseis and jiseis are still howling and yelping — asking or rather bartering with questions like "can we collect indemnity for all past losses" "Will Pres. Roosevelt make a statement saying we're all loyal", "Can our parents return to California". Here we are, in a struggle involving not one group, not one nation even, but whole peoples, millions dying, millions suffering, etc. — and we shallow, gutless nisei are haggling for our rights, instead of fighting for them. and then we howl about discrimination — I am convinced we should have been evacuated. This experience has made us bitter, maybe, but not yellow. It isn't that I expect Niseis to volunteer — that's an individual choice, but now they won't commit themselves. They don't want to say yes, but they scared to say no. These that are volunteering are too good for the rest. We are undergoing much emotional strain, bitter disappointment, bewilderment and finally utter contempt."
1. Spirit in which the message is interpreted to have been written is one of fair play toward all racial minorities and non-racial discriminations.
   a. Why is it that the Selective Service System has employed exclusively the form "Statement of United States citizen of Japanese ancestry" in the introducing of the Japanese American Citizens?
   b. Does the selective service system employ likewise an exclusive form for the purpose of inducting Negroes and other racial minorities, such as the United States citizens of German and Italian ancestry?
   c. In the message it states as follows, "the proof of a nation's good faith is to be found in whether it moves to restore full privileges at the earliest opportunity." (Does the government guarantee to compensate for the great sacrifices both spiritual and material which the Japanese American citizens and their parents were compelled to make because of the forced evacuation?)
      1. Does the government guarantee to compensate the properties lost by both the Japanese American citizens and their parents?
      2. Is the government determined to take a drastic step to curtail "Anti-Japanese Agitators" and thereby create a healthy and favorable public opinion toward loyal Japanese-American in the United States?
   d. Does the American Government allow the United States citizens of Japanese ancestry to volunteer for the Navy, Air Corps, or any other division of the United States forces according to the volunteer's choice and to the same qualifications which American soldiers are subjected?
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO FORM 304-A

1. What privileges and rights will be granted Niseis and their parents providing that the Nisei applicant answers the question 27 and question 28 affirmative?

2. What assurance will the government and the Army give the applicants and their dependents providing they should promise to accede to the questionnaire?

3. What will the penalty be providing the applicant refuse to answer the questionnaires in the form of 304-A, which the reason is the applicant is not trying to evade the questionnaire but merely asking for clarification for the form 304-A?

4. Providing or in event that the applicant should answer the question 27 "yes", would that specify or mean that the applicant or applicants are volunteering for Military service?

5. Are the Citizens of the Japanese Ancestry now residing in free zones compelled to answer the same questionnaires?

6. Providing the applicants honest answer to question 28 form 304-A is affirmative but the answer to question 27 in form 304-A should be negative for the reasons stated in form 304-A should be negative for the reason stated that it was against his religion or will, will the applicant be contradicting his own statement? Will there be any relation between question 27 and 28 or are they two individual questions by itself?

7. If the Japanese-American citizens are called through draft and refuse to be inducted and give up their U. S. citizenship, what will be the penalty?

8. Many of us have filled out the selective service prior to evacuation. Reasons for duplicating the procedure.

9. Are other nationalities required to register too?

10. Majority of the Niseis are definitely against the plan of segregation for reasons that it's an evidence of racial discrimination, creates jealousy among own race, probably will be sent to defend the most dangerous positions of combat duty.

11. Is it a fact that this decision was reached by the War Department upon the recommendation of the JACL?

12. There's an evidence of racial discrimination now because Japanese soldiers are restricted to travel within a certain area. At present, the Germans and Italians are receiving compensation but no such provisions for the Japanese.
13. Is it possible to discourage the idea of forming a special regiment as proposes?

14. Can Japanese soldier or civilian nisei go back to California. If we can't go back, why should we go into the Army?

15. Citizenship paper does not stand out now, we should be treated just like any other American citizen?

16. Why do we at these relocation centers have to fill in the new Army selective service questionnaire when the Caucasian Americans are not doing so?

17. If we volunteer, why is it that we cannot volunteer for the other branches of service besides the Army? In the Army questionnaire if you answered the No. 27 question, yes, do you have to go wherever they want to send you? If the men here between the ages of 17 to 37 do not want to join the Army and fight, would it not be possible to place them operating farms or work similar to which they are adapted?

18. Would like to know why there is a suggestion of forming an all Japanese force?

19. Why the sudden enlisting of Nisei boys after putting them behind fences at this camp?

20. When all Japanese (Nisei and Isseis) were officially ignored from some Oregon cities, when an attempt was made to take nisei's citizenship away, when citizens and aliens were put behind the fences, and even Nisei volunteers were refused before evacuation and Kibeiis discharged, is it necessary to register or volunteer? Personally, the answer is NO.

21. Are the Niseis allowed to enter other branches of the Armed Forces than combat duty? Nisei should be allowed to go into what ever branch of the service they prefer or are qualified for. If they are not allowed, it can only mean race discrimination.

22. What branches of the War industry are the Nisei eligible if they are not taken into the army?

23. What classification do persons with dependents in relocation camps have?

24. What are the frozen war industries, and will the nisei be allowed to enter them?

25. Why aren't the men in armed forces allowed to come into the two Relocation camps in Zone 1 to see their parents before they go overseas?

26. Are the dependents in relocation camp eligible for dependent allowances?
27. If the Japanese-American citizens in relocation centers do not comply with the selective service draft, how will the government handle the problem?

28. Has the Army told us definitely whether the Niseis will be inducted into the armed forces if they do not volunteer and if so, when is this induction to take place?

29. Has the Army or Government squelched foul propaganda talk made by leading statesmen, editors, and writers of various papers and magazines who play on our weakness (Japanese) for their own personal gains by heavily publishing such undemocratic articles as: (1) deportation of all Japanese and Japanese-Americans after the war, (2) not permitting Japanese blood to return to their homes after the war and (3) revoking the citizenship rights from all people of Japanese blood.

30. We do not wish to have Japanese combat teams for the following reasons:

1. Should have equal rights as Americans and should mingle with American army. It would draw a color line if they make a single unit as the negroes.

2. The Government and WRA has emphasized that to prevent any anti-Japanese sentiment as found before the evacuation due to too many Japanese living together in one locality, they are endeavoring to scatter the Japanese population into wide areas and have them mingle among other races. If this is a fact, there should be a greater understanding if the Japanese men mingle with American soldiers that as one battalion fighting as a unit. You cannot judge a person by what you read. You must meet them to get the true feeling and spirit. In the first place the publicity itself is discriminating. If the army insist on Japanese combat unit, they are contradicting the WRA statement and policy.

3. As in case of Dunkirk and Batan when our forces were faced with unavoidable defeat, we all praised their loyalty and heroism, but if the Japanese combat unit was put in the same predicament no doubt people will call us disloyal or even brand us as traitors. We cannot help but feel this way, and we should be justified considering all the unfair and discriminating publicity given through magazines, newspapers, and politicians for their personal gain.

31. Even when we are in uniforms why can't we travel all over the Union like the rest of the persons in Uniform?

32. When the sons are serving in the armed forces, why can't the parents return to their home place instead of keeping them in camp?

33. If we are going to be treated as citizens, why was the word, "Citizens of Japanese Ancestry" used instead of plain American citizens? Why was a separate form made of us only?

34. What constitutes a dependent, if any, of a Tule Lake colonist who is now registered at this center as a "head of a family"?
35. If a colonist is drafted for military duty in the U.S. Army, will the U.S. Government provide or make available provisions for the continuing welfare of the dependents of the draftees? By dependents is meant the unemployable parents, minor children or invalids. If so, how will it be done? And will they be kept in some camp such as Tule Lake or forced to live in their own way on the outside?

36. Will Japanese-American citizens drafted from this center for the armed forces of the U.S. through some channel of the Selective Service be put into the same or similar units as is contemplated for those who now volunteer?

37. There are no doubt at present many nisei who absolutely refuse to take up arms in this war now raging. However, there are some who desire to help in the war effort on the home front. Is or will this difference be recognized and considered by the U.S. Government?

38. Why aren't the other branches of service open to Niseis besides the Infantry, Medical, Artillery, and Tank?

39. A request for the guarantee of equal and undiscriminated rights accorded to Caucasians to be added to question 27 and 28 in form 304-A.

40. Is combat battalion to be composed only of volunteers?

41. What combat zone will this battalion be sent out?

42. Why are we not eligible to serve in the marine, navy and air corps?

43. Is the Army informed about the prejudices and discrimination toward the best field workers last year? (Those men went out to relieve the labor shortage, thereby aiding the war effort, but were the American people willing to accept that as a symbol of loyalty and good faith towards the U.S.? No. Prejudice and discrimination shows that they were not willing to recognize the contribution made by the best workers.)

44. Can one refuse to answer on grounds of conscientious objection?

45. If a person answers "yes" to question 27 and 28, does it mean that the person is volunteering immediately or rather does it mean that the person has volunteered?

46. Will the parents have any special privileges if their sons are serving in the armed forces?

47. Will the nisei soldiers be given unqualified privileges to visit the relocation centers as well as the prohibited areas of the Western Defense Command as any other American soldiers?

48. The forms that have already been filed with the registering Army Team, may they be retrieved for alterations?

49. What is the penalty for answering questions 27 and 28 by "no"?
50. If the parents answer the question 28 on form 126 WRA Rev. with "no" whereas the niseis (sons) answer the question 27 and 28 of the form 304-A with "yes" what will be the future decision of the U.S. Government be in regards to the categorical status of the parents versus sons?

51. Should make three (3) answers possible; namely, "yes", "no" or "neutral".

52. How much assurance can be had to the future existence after the war? Will it be likewise to the World War I Veterans of Japanese ancestry?

53. If we answer question 27 "no", will we still be inducted?

54. Is preference granted to volunteers as to what branch of service is desired?

55. Any compensation for Nisei after the war for evacuation?

56. Why is it necessary to register again for selective service?

57. Why aren't the Japanese parents of the U.S. soldiers treated the same as Italians and Germans?

58. If you answer "no" to the # 28 question, would it endanger your American citizenship?

59. If you answer "no" to the # 27 question on 304-A form, would you be classified as a conscientious objector?

60. Regarding Question # 27, can we describe the reason for putting down "no"?

61. What would be the penalty for refusing the Selective Service Registration?

62. In case of a Nisei whose father was put in the internment camp forcefully and by the evacuation his mother being very poor economically, does the U.S. War Department think that the Nisei can contribute to the U.S. wholeheartedly? What is the U.S. Department opinion?

63. How long will the training period be if one joins the Army before he is sent to a combat zone?

64. Will dependents of Nisei soldiers be given same care as other Americans in case of death, assuming parents remain in the WRA center?

65. Why are the Niseis in the Army not given weapons at the present time?

66. If one is not volunteering, can he have a choice of Army, farm work or war work?
67. Why is it that you want to take us back into the army after rejecting some of us before?

68. Is farm work considered War Industry labor?

69. Why do we have to answer question 28 if question 27 is answered correctly?

70. Will the Niseis be allowed to return to their homes to settle any unfinished business when they are to be inducted?

71. Will the Nisei soldiers' parents who have been interned be released to join his family if the son is inducted?

72. Suppose one does not care to volunteer but as a selectee is willing to serve in the non-combatant services, what is the result?

73. Is drafting of Niseis, a bill that has been passed by Congress or is it just an Army order?

74. In regards to question 27, is this going to be for volunteering or drafting?

75. What will be the status of those men who have a Reserve Officer's Commission?

76. What will be the status of men who are in the Enlisted Reserve?

77. Will a man be considered disloyal if he answers "no" to question 27?

78. If we volunteered into the Army or be drafted into war work, what protection will be guaranteed by the government to protect such persons from harm that some parents or relatives who lost their son or relative in action against the Japanese, might inflict upon them?

79. All of us over 17 years of age are required to register, whereas, our Caucasian fellow citizens are required to register under the original selective service regulations within the age limits of 18 and 38 or thereabouts. This is another indication of racial discrimination.

80. What is the present status of Japanese-Americans, especially of those classified as "4-C", and how would it be affected by the present army "proposal"?

81. Are Kibei's required to answer question 28?

82. Could question 28 be modified or struck out entirely? As question 27, can it be modified or struck out?

83. Would it be necessary to put the name, birthplace, occupation, etc., of the father's and mother's? (In reference to questions 9 and 10).
84. What happens to your former selective service classification?

85. Is it possible to answer question 27 with a conditional "yes"?

86. Will Niseis be allowed to join any other unit of the Army besides only the all-Nisei unit?

87. Will the boys in camp (centers) be classified according to their previous occupational status (before evacuation) or be classified according to the present project work?

88. What about the ex-soldier who were neither honorably discharged or been reclassified into reserve corps, are they obligated for registration?

89. If the majority of the Niseis object to the special combat unit of Japanese-Americans, would the Army change its plan and mingle the Niseis with the other Caucasians?

90. Would Kibei-Nisei who has dual citizenship be jailed or fined if they answered "no" to the 28th question?
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO WRA FORM 126-REVISED

1. Is it true that the application for leave clearance is compulsory on the part of the female citizens and aliens?

2. Has it not been the policy of the WRA that all those wishing to secure such leave clearance mentioned in Item 1, be voluntary on the part of such person?

3. What necessitated the WRA to use the same form for the two groups of people who are of two entirely different category—namely, female U.S. Citizens and the enemy aliens?

4. What power and authority if any has the WRA to enforce on the people of Japanese nationality to apply for leave clearances if the WRA 126-Rev. is compulsory as stated in question 1. (Please quote the specific clause in the National and International legal documents as to the origin of WRA Authority)

5. What does the phrase "unqualified allegiance to the United States of America" as stated in question 28 of WRA 126-Rev. mean specifically?

6. Why is it that the name of the Spanish Government which as far as we have been informed, is to be of neutral government, be mentioned in questions 29 and 30?

7. Questions pertaining to question 28.
   a. What is the definition of the word loyalty? (Issei standpoint)
   b. What is the reason for the new order of the War Department?
   c. Is this an Army order or is it by all the will of people of the United States?
   d. Order of the War Department for any other purpose than stated.
   e. What is the explanation of Army Proclamation of allowing Japanese-Americans privileges, but prohibiting them from entering Western Defense?

8. A more definite explanation and clarification of question 28 is requested.

9. It seems that approximately seventy-five per cent of all these questions on Form 126 have been answered previously on the WRA census records, etc. Why should it be necessary to answer them again?

10. When signing the leave clearance papers, they asked us what part of the country we would like to go. Why is it that we are unable to go back to the Northwest after being cleared for leave? Is it wise to answer such questions on the questionnaire if no official word has been received regarding penalties for not answering or filling in such forms?
11. Issei husband and Nisei wife or visa versa. Must answer differently as to loyalty. In what right way may they answer together?

12. Will Government compensate all Japanese for loss of time and money due to evacuation?

13. Mr. Covrelly or the Army representative stated today (2/10/43) that those issei who do not care to apply for leave clearance as such may change the title of this particular application form to "Registration" when filling it out. However, the question which remains is: Since the question to be answered remain unchanged, cannot this particular document still be considered an application for leave clearance in spite of the fact that the registrant intends it only to be a "registration" and nothing more?

14. The U.S. Government has offered an opportunity to the nisei of this camp to demonstrate their loyalty to this country. It is assumed that this is made in all good faith. However, judging from the message read by Sgt Sullivan on February 9, 1943 to some colonists, it seems that if a nisei were to affirm his loyalty by going out as a defense worker, this offer on the part of the Government is actually not in good faith as restrictions are still in effect in regards to the exclusion of Japanese people from the Western Defense Area. There is need for some clarification or statement on the above point.

15. There are many talks that interviewers write "yes" although the person being interviewed says "no" in answering the questionnaire. (Comment: Evacuees want strict correction on that).

16. It was stated by our former Project Director Mr. Marshall in a question and answer meeting held in late October or November, 1942, was transmitted from Japanese Government to the Government of the United States, saying that the former recognizes all the Japanese alien held in the various centers as the prisoners of war. Please clarify.

17. Does signing the clearance paper mean that the signee has to go out if and when there is a job on the outside?

18. What is the qualification for army nurse and WAAC?

19. If an Issei pledge allegiance to Japan or repatriation but wants to go outside, can he go?

20. We should get allowance for dependent.

21. If you sign the leave clearance form, does one have to go if later one decides he does not want to go?

22. What would be the consequence should question 28 be left unanswered?

23. Is the leave clearance form the same as the form issued at the placement Bureau?
24. If a girl applies for a leave clearance on this form, must she go out if the Government calls her?

25. The WRA 126-Rev. form specifies that it is for aliens and women over 17 years of age; the selective service is for men (citizens) of 17 years to 38 years; then what form does the Nisei men over 38 years of age sign? Is there a form for them?

26. Will we ever be made to leave camp against our wishes just because we signed this form WRA.126?

27. Would it be satisfactory to write "undecided" at present?

28. Could the questionnaire be translated into Japanese?

29. Issei should not be forced to answer this question 28 since they are not permitted to become naturalized; they would become "men without a country".

30. In U.S. contemplating giving citizenship to the Isseis who answered question 28 "Yes"?

31. Shouldn't the assistants to the registrars have a good command of both Japanese and English?

32. Does the Geneva Conference Treaty carry provisions about asking such a question of the Issei as the questionnaire?

33. Is it necessary to enumerate the sports and hobbies of the Isseis?

34. Are Japanese aliens prisoners of war? Will they be considered prisoners of war if they should answer "no" to question 28?

35. Is it still possible for evacuees in this project to make application for repatriation to Japan?

36. Does the answer "no" for question 28 mean that we cannot go out when the clearance comes?

37. Does the statement "back to normal" mean that you can go back to where you come from?

38. Do persons who have registered for leave clearance after December 1, 1942 have to fill this clearance paper too?

39. Will the Japanese-American Girls be allowed the same privileges as Caucasian nurses and W.A.A.C.?

40. What will be our economic security and status, if relocated?

41. Will we ever be made to leave camp against our wishes just because we sign the WRA 126 form?
42. Must a person who has no intention of going out register for leave clearance?

43. In filling references of five people, can they be either Caucasian or Japanese?

44. What would be the penalty for Issei if they refuse the registration?

45. Due to lack of clear memory, if the registrant should make an error in statement, what penalty will he get?

46. In the event a person is eligible for outside employment by the virtue of being duly "cleared", will he receive financial assistance for reestablishment?

47. Will the "cleared" aliens be given the status of "friendly aliens" or will they be categorically retained in the "enemy alien" classification?

48. Will the Isseis swearing "yes" to question 28 of the form WRA 126-Rev. be given assurance of American citizenship?

49. If we sign for the Leave Clearance and the work offered us is not satisfactory, what is the result?

50. Is compulsory relocation or registration for this purpose or mass relocation one of the purposes of this registration?

51. Why is it that the Niseis are required to re-register?

52. Why is it that all Niseis in relocation centers singled out to answer special questions in regard to our loyalty?

53. May we request that the United States Government endeavor as nearly as possible, to reestablish us to our former status previous to evacuation?

54. If Isseis answer "no" to questions 27 and 28, will they be treated as internees in Concentration Camps?

55. If Niseis refuse to answer Questions 27 and 28, will they be treated as enemy aliens?

56. For those who do not want to settle outside, what difference does it make if the paper is changed from leave clearance to just registration? If it is possible to just strike out the leave clearance part, what's the use of having the registration?

57. For those who refuse to register, is it possible to have them treated as those who have applied for repatriation?

58. What will happen if everybody refuses to register?
This isn't signing by force — as individuals

To Board of Selective Service:

We the undersigned do not wish to sign to selective service. But to repatriate we will sign any time so until then there won't be any business.

1. Masashi Tanimoto
2. Haruo Yamamoto
3. Frank S. Marubashi
4. Hiroshi Kamiya
5. Henry M. Imahara
6. Jim M. Tanimoto
7. George Tanimoto
8. Kizuki Miyasaki
9. Tsutomu Ohara
10. Namio Ohara
11. Kazuo Yamasaki
12. Jimmy Kaneko
13. Masaru Yoshikawa
14. Mutsuyuki Fukushima
15. Namoru Tanimoto
16. Samuel Kaneko
17. Takeru Shinseki
18. Takashi Kamiya
19. Hiroshi Kamimori
20. John Kaneko
21. Paul Takeshita
22. Henry Marubashi
23. Satoshi Kamiya
24. Seio Kamimori
25. Sadaoishi Murakami
26. Hiromi Kumano
27. Tokuhiho Doi
28. Mitsuo Kaida
29. Toyotsugu Kumagai
30. Ben T. Miyasaki
31. Robert Kaida
32. Fred Oki
33. Hiroshi Ota
34. Seiso Kanesaki
35. Takeshi Nakatsu
CENTRAL UTAH RELOCATION CENTER

1st Lt. William L. Tracy, C.M.P.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Services of Supply
Office of the Provost Marshal General
Washington

April 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War Room 4B-386
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John H. Null

SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Final Reports Previously Submitted at Central Utah Relocation Center and Colorado River Relocation Center.

1. The Military Team arrived at Central Utah February 5, 1943 and departed March 3, 1943 at which time we had registered the male citizens above seventeen years of age 100%. All Forms 304-A, plus those with DSS-165 attached, had been sent to the proper office.

2. I have stated in previous reports from time to time my personal reactions to the residents' reception of the plan, to which I can add in general that:

   a. Almost unanimously they seemed to think the whole proposition was one that they needed months to "think over"; one that they should have been "warned about".

   b. But their real "reasons" I believe spring from beliefs such as:

      (1) Resentment of evacuation
      (2) Draft dodgers—that is, wishful thinking that a "No" to question 28 would prevent their acceptance into the Armed Services;
      (3) Separation of families and uncertainty as to what future lay ahead for the old folks;
      (4) Regardless of our promises, doubt as to Japanese future in this country; and
      (5) Family pressure, Issei pressure, Kibei pressure—and here I would like to say that pressure groups attitudes reflected across the table at patient, painstaking interviews seemed to be: We, the Japanese, can use the means now at hand, that is the present volunteer scheme, as a lever to force the Government to admit publicly that there was a justification for the evacuation plan or the taking away of our civil rights. We had best demand what we want now or never.
2. Reviewing the above, one still wonders how a loyal citizen could allow himself to be swayed. This may be explained by lack of leadership among Nisei and of course their average age, which I understand is about 20 years and 6 months.

3. I think it pertinent to remark that following orders, I did not, prior to the receipt of the telegram from Colonel Scoobey, received March 1, 1943, permit a single one of the Forms 304-A to leave the hands of military personnel, once a Japanese citizen had entered the private interview room with us and answered Questions 27 and 28. I even went so far for reasons of safety and also I hoped by the psychological effect on my doubters among the residents, of sending the completed forms for each day over to the Officers Barracks of the Military Police Company in charge of two sergeants. The following morning they would be brought back to the Registration Hall and at 1100 I would personally take them to the local Post Office for mailing. This, plus the fact that each and every citizen was given a private and courteous 10 and 15 minutes in the private interview room with either myself or one of the three sergeants as he answered Questions 27 and 28, seems to dispel in my mind all claims that I understand some of the boys are now putting forth as, "I did not understand the questions", and "I was afraid to answer 'Yes' because of what might happen to me in the Center."

4. On the evening of March 2, 1943, a meeting was held of all female citizens at which I introduced Lieutenant Dean of the W.A.A.C. Her recruiting speech was very well delivered and received, but I was interested to note that the usual resistance to the separate combat team was stronger than with the boys, as shown by the following:

- **Question:** If the W.A.A.C. were open to you, how many of you would like to be kept as a separate unit?

- **Answer:** None. (No hands were raised.)

- **Question:** Why?

- **Answer:**
  1. Japanese are all we see here.
  2. Because we are mostly concerned with adjusting ourselves to others.
  3. At base we were spread out through Caucasian race. It smacks too much of race segregation.

5. Complying with Colonel Scoobey's wire received March 1, 1943, the following statistics were given to the Project Director, who sent them to Dillon Myer on March 2, 1943.
6. As per orders, we left Central Utah March 3, 1943, and arrived at Colorado River March 5, 1943, where I had been instructed by Lieutenant Hughes to aid Lieutenant Bolton in rounding up hesitant volunteers, if any. After looking the ground over I had a long talk with Project Director Wade Head and his Assistant, Ralph Galvin. I told them I was open to any and all suggestions, but they had none. We decided the time had passed for any more meetings; that the show had been put on and whether it was good or bad only time would tell, but that a repeat performance was of dubious value, if even being doubtful if it would draw an audience. Wade Head then gave his official o.k. for both teams to leave March 10, 1943.

7. To sum up on Colorado River, the potential volunteers simply were not there. Lieutenant Bolton and his Team had done a splendid job. Following orders of Lieutenant Hughes, I did not supersede him but merely kept my eyes and ears open, results of which revealed that rumors of "Twenty-five volunteers are waiting at block 50 and so to make up their minds, at 6:00" turned out to be somebody's pipe dream. The kid who volunteers now will do so through making up his own mind or overcoming parental objection in his own way.

8. I was surprised to find at this Center the way the War Relocation Authority had taken the entire plan into their own hands from the beginning, even the former J-123 office being handed over to their office and passing through hands of Japanese office help for mailing. Two Military Police enlisted men aided at private interviews on Questions 27 and 30. I received, without seeking same, three versions of strike here three months ago and believe it was more serious than was revealed at the time. Shots were fired by Military Police over the heads of a crowd, bonfires burned all night, and at least one leader (a minister) was later interpreter at Army Team's meeting. A few days before I left, the Federal Bureau of Investigation removed two trouble makers from the Center, unknown to the Army Team. The general desire of the War Relocation Authority heads seems to be to give the impression all is "sweetness and light."
9. Two and a half weeks after leaving Central Utah, I received a letter from the Project Director stating that 49 more men had volunteered, and giving me a list of 200 who had changed their answers on Questions 27 and 28 from "No" to "Yes" or to qualified. I called him on the telephone from my home and learned that those who had already volunteered had, of their own volition, set up a headquarters, called a meeting of all who had signed "Yes—Yes" and urged them to volunteer. He also told me that upon my departure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had moved in and were personally interviewing all who had signed "No—No". This letter, plus of course the desire for leave clearance, clearly explains to me the large number (200) who have rushed in to change their answers on what they claim they have "just discovered" to be important questions.

10. While I was present at both of these Centers, the questions of segregation and loyalty were frequently discussed. In regard to these matters I would say:

a. First, I would say that I believe segregation is a necessity if only for the sake of the loyal ones.

b. Second, regardless of the statistics, it is my belief that of the 1500 citizens about 25% are definitely and truly loyal to the United States.

William L. Tracy
1st Lt., C.M.P.
Team Captain,
Central Utah Relocation Center
HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
1st Lt. Ray McDaniel, C.M.P.
WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-586
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Final Report of Activities of War Department Team
at Heart Mountain Relocation Center.

1. The Army Team that visited Heart Mountain was composed of
Lieutenant Ray McDaniel, Staff Sergeant Joseph W. Dukes, Sergeant
Thomas A. Boulger of the Fifth Service Command, Columbus, Ohio and
Staff Sergeant Kazunobu Tamura of Savage, Minnesota.

2. The Team arrived at Heart Mountain February 5, 1943. Two
days were spent with the Project Manager, Mr. Guy Robertson and his
staff at which time we were getting settled and organized. Due to the
cold weather, we could not hold outside meetings so all meetings were
held in various mess halls. Before the Team got underway, we held a
joint meeting with the Evacuee Block Manager and secretaries. Talk-
ing with the, they seemed to approve of the program wholeheartedly.
Our meetings got underway by holding mass meetings in mess halls—
three each day, one in the morning, afternoon and evening. The meetings
were conducted as planned, that is, first I read the prepared address,
then threw the meeting into open discussion. From the very first,
most of the questions dealt with policy questions such as the Govern-
ment's and Army's attitude and why they had been evacuated in the
first place. Only a few questions would be asked pertaining to the
Army itself. The last day before registration was to start, the
situation got out of hand. Numerous meetings had been held by the
evacuees and various committees came to me asking me to petition the
War Department in regard to a delay in registration. They gave rea-
sons such as they wished a longer time in which to think the matter
over; they were not organized as to what they wished to do and threat-
ened that if registration were not delayed, they would not register.
At no time were there outward threats by any individual, but as a mass
they were quite firm. Upon the advice of the Project Manager, I de-
cided to withhold registration for two days.

MECHANICS OF REGISTRATION. The War Relocation Authority
supplied me with forty trained registrants. The day we were to start
registration only twenty appeared for work. Those absentees claimed they had been threatened if they took any part in registration. We got underway registering two blocks each day and proceeded with no more interruptions.

4. BREAKDOWN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 304-A. Question #27 on male citizens 17 years of age and over:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES QUALIFIED</th>
<th>NO QUALIFIED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question #28 on male citizens 17 years of age and over:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1467</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total applications for expatriation: 329
Total applications for repatriation of aliens: 151
Total enlistments: 42

5. REASONS FOR DISLOYALTY. In talking with the evacuees and answering their many questions, I found that most of the Kibei seemed to be disloyal. Also a surprisingly large number of the Nisei, particularly those under 22 years of age, seemed to think Japan is the country in which they should hold allegiance. In our discussions most everyone disapproved of the Japanese Combat Unit. They claimed they wished to fight along side other American citizens. Many gave the reason for not volunteering as, they wished to fight in other branches of the Armed Service. They felt that if they were free to go about the United States as other citizens they would feel it their duty to fight for this country, but they, being confined to a relocation center, thought the Government was not doing all that American citizenship rights entitled them to. Undoubtedly, many of the younger Nisei were influenced by their parents. In several instances the parents have applied for repatriation, and the family ties being so strong, the younger boys not only answered "NO" to question #27 but have asked for expatriation. At Heart Mountain there were no cases brought to our attention where physical violence was threatened if they volunteered or answered "YES" to the loyalty question, but many told me that they were ridiculed when they spoke of their intention to volunteer. The younger Nisei, Particularly the loyal ones, have no organization at all. The Kibei and the disloyal Nisei are well organized and are doing everything within their power to discourage loyalty. Another group that is doing much to discourage loyalty is the bachelor Issai. They, having no ties in America and knowing they can never become citizens, seem to do everything within their power to cause the younger boys to feel likewise. The aged Issai, Those that came to this country after they were grown and have raised families, seem to be the most loyal of all. As they explained to me, they know the conditions in Japan and realized the great advantages America offers. Since they are old and uneducated, only a few heed their words and warnings.
6. ADMINISTRATION AT PROJECT. I find no complaint at all the way the Project Manager, Mr. Guy Robertson, is conducting the administration at Heart Mountain. The heads of all departments are Caucasians of unquestionable loyalty. While I was at his project, he gave me his full support at all times and no requests were denied. In talking with the evacuees, they all seemed to have the greatest respect for Mr. Robertson, both personally and administratively. While he governs the Center with a firm hand, he still is most considerate and will give the evacuees a hearing any time they come to his office. Certainly he is, and not the evacuees, running the Center. Mr. Joe Carroll, the Employment Manager, was a representative that came to Washington prior to our Team going to Heart Mountain. Since he attended our school at Washington, he was most familiar with the War Department's policy, and Mr. Robertson appointed him to work with me while at the Center. At all meetings, both day and night, and at the registration center, Mr. Carroll was always present. The facilities of the local newspaper were at my disposal and any news items or bulletins that I wished published were printed immediately. At Heart Mountain there has never been a strike or any form of violence, and it is not because the administration has given in to the evacuees' demands but because of wise judgment and proper management. Regardless of the War Relocation Authority's over all policy, the Army can be satisfied with the administration at this Center.

7. SUMMARY AND PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS. According to the registration, 24% of the citizens are definitely disloyal. They answered "NO" to question #28. I would say 25% are loyal and true Americans. The remaining 51% are the middle group that could be swayed in either direction. They are the ones that do not have convictions of their own but are being swayed first by one faction, then the other. Of the 329 that have asked to be expatriated, there is no question of their disloyalty. For the good of the 76% of the citizens, I think the 24% that are definitely disloyal should be removed from the Center at Heart Mountain. They are the ones that are poisoning the minds of the middle group and are harassing the 25% group that are definitely loyal. I do not believe the low percentage of volunteers is indicative of the loyalty of the evacuees. Many answered question #27 "YES" if drafted. In talking with these boys, they expressed willingness to fight for America, but due to influence from parents and outsiders they hesitated to enlist in the Armed Services. I believe most of the loyal group and the 51% middle group would welcome Selective Service. If they were called by Selective Service, they could then go into the Service and parents and friends would have no reason or excuse to bring pressure upon them. Many of the young boys find life at Heart Mountain more enjoyable and easier than they have experienced prior to evacuation. It is a tendency with all Americans to take life easy and not wish to give up what we might call a comfortable and easy life. If Selective Service does not go into effect, these young men of military age will remain in the Center for the duration of the war which will not only be a waste of manpower but will cause a demoralizing effect upon them. It is true that some
of them are anxious to get out into defense work, but they fear the reception they might receive from the people on the outside. In conclusion, I repeat—segregate, at once, those that we know are disloyal and let Selective Service reclassify and draft all those that are of military age, physically fit, and come under the classification that is now being taken into the Army.

RAY McDANIELS
1st Lt., C.M.P.
Team Captain,
Heart Mountain War Relocation Center.
MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER

1st Lt. Eugene D. Bogard, C.M.P.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Services of Supply
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
Washington

April 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-386
Pentagon Building
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Final Report of Activities of War Department Team at Manzanar Relocation Center.

1. The Manzanar Team consisting of Lt. Eugene D. Bogard, Sergeants Irvin Tierman, James A. Hemphill, and T/4 Kenneth M. Uni arrived at Manzanar the evening of February 6, 1943 and departed the evening of March 10, 1943.

2. The Army Team first met with the Project Director and staff to consider the best means to obtain results in the registration at this Center. It was decided that at first we meet with a committee of four of the evacuees who represented the various subcommittees of the people. After this meeting with the staff and the people's committee, it was decided that we publish the War Department speech in both English and Japanese along with the questions and answers in the local newspaper. Instead of holding meetings with the entire Center, it was felt that better results could be obtained by first meeting with the block managers and their assistants of each of the thirty-six blocks and present the program to them. We would then hold meetings with male Nisei only, taking four blocks at a time. We arranged our schedule so as to allow two hours for the presentation of the speech and discussion to the various groups.

3. The aliens and women were not included in the meetings as the staff and evacuees felt that we would get better results by leaving them out entirely as far as the meetings were concerned. The information in the newspaper, the information and discussion of the block managers with the block residents, and the male citizens would give the Issei all the desired information they should have concerning the program.

4. The schools were closed and all project work was stopped to allow the registration which started on February 12, 1943 and was
completed five days later. All men and women, age seventeen and up, registered. There were no persons in the Center who failed to register.

5. The Army Team then started its interviews with the male citizens and continued until all forms 304-A were completed. Upon receipt of a telegram from Colonel Scobey, we held forms 304-A to permit male citizens to change their answers to questions 27 and 28 should they so desire.

6. All forms 304-A were sent by express on March 10, 1943 to The Provost Marshal General's Office, Joint Board. Forms 126 Revised were left at Manzanar to permit the War Relocation Authority to obtain certain statistical information they desired continued in these papers. These forms will be forwarded to the War Relocation Authority in Washington, D. C. as soon as this information is obtained.

7. **Statistical Information.**

**Tabulation of Forms 304-A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No. of military age 17 to 37 inclusive</td>
<td>1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No. over military age</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Registrants</strong></td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No. refusing to register</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Registrants replying &quot;YES&quot; to question 28</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Registrants replying &quot;NO&quot; to question 28</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registrants replying &quot;NO&quot; to question 28 and wishing to go to Japan</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Registrants refusing to answer question 28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Registrants replying &quot;YES&quot; to question 27 with qualifications</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Registrants replying &quot;NO&quot; to question 27</td>
<td>1332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. No. volunteering in army</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Male Citizens of Military Age - Answers to Question 28**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>&quot;YES&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;NO&quot;</th>
<th>Refuse to Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. One or both parents interned</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Close relatives in Japan</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Travel and/or educated in Japan</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Convicted of criminal offense</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Registered for Japanese Cit.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Registered for repatriation and on list furnished by State Dept.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Male Citizens over Military Age - Answers to Question 28**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>&quot;YES&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;NO&quot;</th>
<th>Refuse to Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. One or both parents interned</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Close relatives in Japan</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Travel and/or educated in Japan</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Convicted of criminal offense</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Registered for Japanese Cit.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Registered for repatriation and on list furnished by State Dept.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. One or both parents interned
2. Close relatives in Japan
3. Travel and/or education in Japan
4. Convicted of criminal offense
5. Registered for Japanese Cit.
6. Registered for repatriation and on lists furnished by State Dept.

Tabulation of Forms 126 Revised

1. Unqualified "YES" answers 2139
2. Qualified "YES" answers 336
3. Unqualified "NO" answers 2351

Total 4826

8. Since leaving the Center, we have received four more volunteers making a total of one-hundred.

9. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS BY ARMY TEAM ON REASONS FOR ANSWER TO LOYALTY QUESTION AND VOLUNTEERING.

a. Influence of parents

(a) Insistence by parents that sons retain allegiance to Japan, and acceptance by sons of right of parents to impose this decision. (Army Team agreed that this was the strongest single reason causing male citizens to answer "NO" to the loyalty question and was almost universal among "teen age" group.

1. Reasons for parents attitudes:

(a) Relief that Japan will win the war and will penalize those that side with the United States and reward those who side with Japan.

(b) Wish to return to Japan and expect their sons to accompany them and support them. Fear sons cannot go back to Japan if they declare allegiance to United States.

(c) All have interests, ties and relatives in Japan which they wish to hold on to, and fear these will be jeopardized if sons declare allegiance to the United States.
(2) Bitterness and resentment caused by the evacuation and treatment since.

(a) Suffering caused by loss of property and possessions, humiliation, and incidents of evacuation, and restrictions in Relocation Centers - "barbed wire, watch towers, machine guns" - has built up the feeling that the United States has forfeited any right to their loyalty. In a number this has created a desire to fight the United States.

(3) Belief that Japan will win the war and a desire to be on the winning side.

(a) In other cases where they are not sure whether Japan will win, they want to hedge their bets, and retain dual citizenship.
(b) "Japan will win the war and after victory will force the United States to pay large indemnities, including the losses incurred by each evacuee of business, earning power, prestige, and personal feelings. Male citizens are urged by parents to say "NO" to the loyalty question in order that such indemnities may be collected. The youngsters, looking for an easy way out, are suckers for such persuasion.

(4) Threats by agitators, propaganda and rumors:

(a) Threats of social ostracism; of what Japan will do if it wins the war; of forcible separation of families who do not agree on answers to loyalty question. (Apparently agitators and propagandists have been going to each apartment and arguing with those considered loyal and giving reasons why they should answer "NO" on loyalty.)

(b) Rumors, too numerous to list, but stemming from lack of faith in the good intentions of the government springing up continuously and tending to undermine loyalty.

(5) Belief that racial discrimination will make any future in the United States too difficult, and that a return to Japan is the only solution.

(a) History of exclusion act, alien land law, evacuation, and daily evidence in newspapers indicating widespread public opinion in favor of further curtailments of rights of citizens of Japanese ancestry has made many, who have never been in Japan, feel that they must go there in order to escape racial discrimination.
(6) Lack of faith in the good intentions of the Government.
   
   (a) So many promises made and broken that there is wide-spread suspicion that this is another move to discredit and discriminate against those of Japanese ancestry.

(7) Bitterness left by the Manzanar riot.
   
   (a) Hatred of Army left because of the two who were killed and other who were shot, all of them said to be in the back.

(8) Previous lack of assimilation in American society, e.g.
   
   (a) Terminal Islanders - spent most of their time at sea, and on land remained entirely apart from American influences.
   
   (b) Kibei - education in Japan isolated them from younger Nisei, and made them resist assimilation.

(9) Belief that the answer "NO" would keep the individual from being drafted, and possibly insure his return to Japan.

(10) Ignorance and misunderstandings.
   
   (a) Belief, especially at first, that the answer to the loyalty question - which includes the words "defend the United States" - really meant volunteering.

   (b) General fear among the more ignorant ones, caused by poor knowledge of English, failure to understand the meaning of questions asked, etc. (The Army Team agreed that the answer to the loyalty question was closely tied to the amount of education, and that the more highly educated ones and those whose parents were better educated were usually loyal.)

b. Reasons for answering "YES" on loyalty question:
   
   (1) Convinced that they wished to remain in the United States and that no matter what the Government does, their future lies in this country.

c. Reasons for scarcity of volunteers:
   
   (1) Opposition to a Combat Unit composed of Japanese-Americans, because it continues the racial discrimination and segregation which they feel is the root of their troubles.
(2) Fear that their families remaining in the Center will be ostracized and possibly terrorized if their sons volunteer.

(3) Family pressure against volunteering - even when the parents are loyal.

d. Attitude toward the draft:

(1) Loyal ones are almost universally anxious to be drafted and will welcome it - feel that the arguments against volunteering do not apply to the draft and that ostracism of their families will not occur if army service is made compulsory instead of being left up to individual choice.

e. Possibility of obtaining changes in answers to the loyalty question:

(1) The Army Team agreed that most persons had apparently already made up their minds before registration started, and that no arguments or other kind of approach would have made a difference in more than a handful of cases.

10. When the registration was completed, the Project Director Staff and the Army Team met with the evacuees committee to ascertain information as to the percentage of people who were disloyal to the United States. We were also interested in learning why we were not able to secure more volunteers for the Army. The following information regarding the registration and its results was given by the Japanese committee:

a. Inability to separate loyalty question from question on volunteering for service in the Army. If loyalty question had been asked in connection with leave clearance only, an overwhelming majority would have answered "YES".

b. Belief that there is no future in this country for Japanese or Americans of Japanese ancestry, emphasized by:

(1.) Continued political activity outside to further disenfranchise the Japanese.

(2.) Universal fear of continued racial discrimination.

c. Bitterness and rancor left from experience of evacuation. (The groups were convinced that the much better showing on loyalty from the Hawaiian Islands was due to the fact that Japanese in Hawaii had not been subjected to evacuation.)

(1) Terminal Islanders, who are most negative group in their answers to loyalty question, are the ones who were most hastily evacuated and received roughest treatment. In general, those who lost most are now most disloyal.
d. Family pressure and family ties:

(1) Older people who have lost all their capital and stake in this country because of evacuation feel they cannot reestablish themselves here and must return to Japan. They expect their sons to go there and support them, and sons accept the obligation.

e. Fear that answer to "YES" on the loyalty question would lose them any rights to Japanese citizenship which they may have.

(1) Many want to retain dual citizenship with rights in both countries.

f. Emotional confusion:

(1) Answers to questions on loyalty and volunteering by those inside a Relocation Center are decided on a purely emotional basis involving many factors having nothing to do with loyalty; and very different results would be obtained if questions were asked outside Centers after relocation or restoration to all rights of citizenship.

g. Broken promises made by the Army when evacuation first took place, and by the Government.

(1) Experience of parents whose sons are already in the Army but who were evacuated and lost all their property makes them think that present promises "to take care of the parents" mean nothing.

h. Age and lack of leadership among Nisei.

(1) Average age of Nisei is around 20. They have not attained maturity and still depend upon their parents for decisions.

(2) Most of the pre-war leaders were picked up at the outbreak of the war. The Nisei leaders at Manzanar were all taken out for their own protection after the riot; other potential young leaders within the Camps who are loyal are relocating as rapidly as possible, and are afraid to speak out, leaving those who remain increasingly dependent on Kibei and Issei guidance.

(3) The Kibei group at Manzanar averages five or six years older than the Nisei and has more experience and leadership. Because of their knowledge of Japanese, they are in general the interpreters for the Issei, and have much more influence with them than do the Nisei.
1. Failure of Issei to understand the program.

(1) Few meetings were held for Issei and they were obliged to depend upon newspapers and reports of sons and block managers for the Army speech, answers to questions, and explanations of the program. Many had no idea of the issues involved and their counsel to their sons was based on inadequate understanding and on rumors of all sorts.

k. Rumor that answer on loyalty question would determine the Camp to which individuals would be sent, and anxiety of families to remain together. Burden of this decision assumed by the parents.

The group were unanimous in their regret that no Japanese evacuees were consulted before the registration procedures were determined in Washington, and feel the counsel of evacuee leaders as to timing and handling of the matter would have resulted in much larger proportion of "YES" answers to the loyalty question.

11. Mr. Merritt, the Project Director, his staff and the Army Team do not agree with paragraph 1. of the above report of the people's committee entitled "Failure of Issei to understand the program". Originally the people's committee, the block managers, and the staff agreed with the plan of registration which we pursued, and it was at their suggestion that the meetings were conducted with only the citizens present. The staff and the Army Team feel that the presence of the Issei at the meetings would have made no difference in the present results. The speech and information on the program were printed in the local newspaper in both English and Japanese. The block managers were entirely familiar with the program and held meetings with the citizens and aliens within their blocks regarding the entire program.

12. Recommendations.

a. The Army Team feel that there should be a definite segregation as soon as possible at this Center, as the report shows fully 50% of these people are definitely disloyal to the United States of America. We find that the three main groups responsible for this condition are those from Terminal Island, the San Pedro and Wilmington Harbor District, and those Nisei who have returned to this country since 1934. It is our opinion that these people are divided into three classes; namely, those who are disloyal, those who are loyal and the intermediate group that is unable
to make up its mind one way or the other. Of this latter group. We feel that a great many of these people can be educated by some type of a program that will make them, or a big majority of them, good American citizens.

b. Selective Service should be opened in this Center as soon as possible as we found in our talking to these young men that a big portion of them would willingly serve if drafted. By being called through Selective Service, their parents, who are Issei, could not influence them under these conditions nor could outside pressure from radical groups interfere.

c. The attitude among the young women of the Center towards the W.A.A.C. and Army Nursing Corps in extremely good. They are very enthusiastic regarding these two branches of service and we feel that we would secure a great many recruits when these services are open to them.

Eugene D. Bogard
1st Lt., C.M.P.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Services of Supply
Office of the Provost Marshal General
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-836
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Complete Report on Evacuee Registration at the Jerome Relocation Center, Denson, Arkansas.

1. On February 6, 1943, the War Department Army Team arrived in this Center on special duty assignment for the purpose of disseminating information, taking questionnaires and taking applications for voluntary induction of qualified evacuee male citizens for a special combat team of the United States Army shortly to be in process of formation and training.

2. February 6-9, inclusive, were days spent in orientation and in indoctrination of the evacuees as to our plan and purpose. First, we presented our message to an assemblage of Caucasian personnel, including the Project Director and all those who might be calculated to assist in the program by act, deed, or word of mouth. Next, we presented our message to an assemblage of evacuee leaders, including block managers and council members and possibly other evacuee persons of influence present. Lastly, we presented our message in 14 mess halls on 14 occasions to the assembled evacuees coming from all blocks and parts of the Center, and these presentations included 6 deliveries of the message in the Japanese language through the official translation furnished to us by the War Department and translators in the Center.

3. The official publication of the Center published our message in English and Japanese and also published questions and answers on all pertinent angles and ramifications of our program. This publication has wide circulation and coverage within the Center. A complete schedule of time and places of registration for all eligible evacuees was also published in the same paper prior to the beginning of actual work of registration.

4. Even after the routine of registration had begun, additional meetings of block managers and other influential evacuee persons were held from time to time with the Project Director and the Captain of the Army Team both present and ready to answer any and all questions that might be presented.
5. Members of the Army Team attended a young people's forum of assembled evacuees in one of the mess halls one night during our first week, and we then and there answered many questions and made many explanations to the best of our ability. A night religious service during our first week was likewise turned into a sort of forum where many questions were propounded and then answered by the Captain of the Team and Sergeant Yoshihata, member of the Team, both of whom happened to be present on that occasion.

6. February 10-22, inclusive, we carried on daily registrations, excepting Sundays, in the mess hall of each and every inhabited block of the Center. Our machinery consisted of 3 registration teams, each composed of approximately 15 evacuee interviewers and one army sergeant, and each of these registration teams had qualified Japanese translators and also Japanese translations of alien form WRA 126 revised. These translations were posted in conspicuous places in all mess halls where registrations were carried out.

7. February 23-March 4, inclusive, we held so-called cleanup registrations daily, except Sunday, in a central place in the Center for delinquent registrants and stragglers. The time and place of the cleanup registration were duly advertised in advance. In the routine of cleanup registration we worked two hours of night duty after supper on five different days. This was designed to help many people finding it difficult to appear for registration during ordinary working hours. We also sent small team groups to the hospital and other places and homes occupied by incapacitated evacuees willing to register. In the machinery of cleanup registration we had all three sergeants and all evacuee interviewers, making a total of about 50, constantly on duty at the times and the place of cleanup registration. We are firmly of the opinion that every eligible evacuee had opportunity, and even double opportunity, to register, and if full and prompt cooperation of evacuees had been forthcoming, a complete registration of all eligible evacuees in the Center would have been made by the Army Team and their helpers in about half the actual time required.

8. During our stay and in the work of our mission we were visited by Colonel Miller, Colonel Scooby, and Lieutenant Pierce, United States Army, all of Washington. All of them offered helpful advice and suggestions, which we endeavored to observe in the fullest way. It is fair and appropriate to add that we had the fullest cooperation and assistance of the Project Director and his entire staff during our entire stay and throughout the labors of our mission.

9. Loyal and efficient assistance to the Army Team Captain was at all times given by the members of the Teams, the 3 army sergeants, and the Team Captain has written letters of commendation to the commanding officer of these men at their permanent stations.
10. We believe the answers to loyalty questions on a large number of questionnaires taken by our team reflect a sizable group of disloyal persons in this Center. We believe this Center is the only Center in the United States having within it a group of evacuees previously interned under military order. Probably, the presence and influence of this group accentuated the disloyalty already existing in dormant state among some. Upon one occasion Sergeant Yoshihata, member of our Team, received indirect threat of physical violence against him for his work on our program and his presence in the Center. We were unable to obtain identification of those originating the threat. The threat did not deter Sergeant Yoshihata or the Team in the slightest degree, but it was, we believe, indicative of an underlying hostile element, probably partially organized, that has frustrated our efforts in some measure. A brother of Sergeant Yoshihata living here in the Center has been taunted and somewhat humiliated by his fellow workers because of Sergeant Yoshihata’s work and presence here in the Center. This, too, is some indication of the underlying hostile attitude of some evacuees. Although the geographical location of this Center is farther removed from the homes of its evacuee residents than that of any other Center in the country, except Rohwer, yet we are not prepared to say whether this condition had anything to do with existing hostility of attitude, psychologically or otherwise.

11. Statistically, we present the following figures and recapitulation:

Number of days spent in the Center by Army Team ........ 28
Number of formal speeches and formal presentation of the official message by Army Team ........ 16
Evacuee population of this Center .............. 6498
Evacuee population of this Center, age 17 years and over, without repatriation intention, estimated by Project Director ........... 5675
Total number of registrants executing questionnaires during stay of the Army Team .............. 4810
Total number of applications taken for voluntary induction .............. 22
Total number of form 304-A taken ................ 1341
Total number of WRA form 126 Revised taken ................ 3469
Total number of male citizens, age 17 and over, evacuee residents of Center without repatriation intention .............. 1586
Total number of eligible evacuees in the Center refusing or declining to register at time of completion of duty by the Army Team .............. 865
Percentage of eligible evacuees registering during the stay of the Army Team .............. 85