Rivers, Arizona
March 15, 1943

Mr. L. H. Bennett
Project Director
War Relocation Authority
Rivers, Arizona

Dear Mr. Bennett:

Please accept for yourself and staff my sincere appreciation of
the splendid cooperation extended to me and the non-commissioned
officers of my group during our tour of duty at the Gila River Relocation
Center.

It is particularly gratifying to me, as I know it is to you, that
under rather trying and difficult conditions there was not one incident
that marred the intent and purpose of our joint mission.

May I especially commend the excellent spirit, ability, and devotion
to duty of Miss Margaret Ost, William Huso, and John Landward with
whom I have been in daily contact throughout the registration. I am no
less appreciative of the very splendid service rendered the Government by
the young ladies attached to my office here. Misses Sue Yamagami, Minnie
Nishimoto, Helen Fuchiwaki, and Yayoi Suzuki formed the nucleus of the
clerical and stenographic force; their industry, loyalty, and unusual
ability was truly inspiring.

On the eve of our departure may I wish you and your organization,
on behalf of myself and men, continued success and thank you for the
many courtesies extended to us.

Sincerely yours,

Norman E. Thompson
Capt. CMP
GRANADA RELOCATION CENTER

Captain William S. Fairchild, C.M.P.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-386
Pentagon Building
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Report of Granada Relocation Center Team Captain

1. In accordance with Major Bradford Ross's request, I submit a report of the registration at the Granada Relocation Center, Amache, Colorado, and as requested by him, you will find incorporated herein personal opinions formed by the team captain on the Center as a whole and of the loyalty of the evacuees located in the Center.

2. The enlisted personnel of the team consisted of Staff Sergeant Robert I. Bischoff, 32147264, Sergeant George F. Davis, 19139660, and T/4 Fred H. Odanaka, 39157446, the latter being of Japanese ancestry.
   a. Sergeants Bischoff and Davis were both extremely helpful and their tact and common sense in handling every situation which arose during the stay at the Center is commended.
   b. Sergeant Davis, a lawyer by profession, who volunteered less than six months ago, was selected by the team captain to deliver six of the eighteen talks. The question and answer periods following the talks were very efficiently conducted by him.
   c. Sergeant Odanaka, who stayed with his parents at the Center, helped with the registration and was very valuable in explaining the program to those with a slight knowledge of English. He was unable to obtain much information of the reaction in the Center as the evacuees seemed reluctant to discuss the program with him.
   d. Copies of letters from the three sergeants are attached to this memorandum.

3. The Granada team reached the Center on February 5, 1943 and departed on February 27, 1943. After a conference with the Center council at which the program was outlined, a series of fifteen meetings were held, on February 8th and 9th, which meetings were attended principally by all male citizens between the ages of seventeen and thirty-eight. Aliens, both male and female, were present at these meetings and there were no restrictions placed upon their attendance. The prepared speech was delivered verbatim at each of these meetings.
following which there was a question and answer period which permitted those in the Center to receive an explanation on any part of the program that was not clear to them. Registration of male citizens between the ages of seventeen and thirty-eight was commenced on February 10th and by February 13th, practically all male citizens of military age had executed questionnaires. The registrars were Caucasian school teachers connected with the Center and they assisted each registrant in completing answers to all questions except questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight on form 301-A. After the questions had been completed except questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight, each registrant was given his questionnaire and he then appeared before a member of the Army team to answer questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight. When a registrant answered either of these questions in the negative, the member of the Army team was very careful to explain to him the meaning of the question and the significance of such an answer. In those cases where there was the slightest doubt as to the person’s understanding of English, he was directed to the Japanese-American sergeant in order that the sergeant could explain the meaning in Japanese.

4. As of February 13, 1943, there were a total of thirty-one volunteers out of a total of one-thousand, two-hundred sixty-eight (1,268) draft age citizens registered. From that date until February 17th, there were no additional volunteers. On February 18th, a long distance telephone conversation was held between Colonel Scooby and Lt. Hughes in Washington and Mr. Kay Sugahara, employed by the personnel office at the Center, the head of the expiring council, and the team captain at the Center. The two Japanese-Americans who participated in the conversation decided it would be well to call to the attention of the old council which was presently going out of office and the new council which had not at that time taken office, the possible adverse publicity that might arise from a poor response to the voluntary induction feature of the program. The old and the new councils then called a series of three meetings to be held on February 19th and 20th to be attended by Nisei men of draft age, the purpose of the meetings being to apprise them of the situation and to clear up any misunderstanding they might have had as to the significance of various answers to questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight.

5. At these meetings on February 19th and 20th, the head of the old council gave a report of his telephone conversation with Colonel Scooby and Lt. Hughes. He was followed by two Nisei who had volunteered and who gave to the meetings their reasons for volunteering. The captain of the Army team was asked by the two councils to enumerate the possible answers that might be given to question number twenty-seven and the possible interpretation that might be placed on each type of answer. A copy of the talk made by the team captain on this point is attached here-to.
Then, Mr. Paul Terry, superintendent of schools in the Center, made an excellent talk in which he gave his ideas as to possible reaction by the average American citizen to either a good or a poor response to the voluntary induction phase of the program. Mr. Lindley, the project director, concluded the program with a talk in which he brought to their attention the large number of Issei who had answered "NO" to question number twenty-eight, the loyalty question. Mr. Lindley stated that about three times as many had answered "NO" to this question as had volunteered. He told them that those who had answered this question in the negative should carefully weigh the consequences of this answer because those persons would have future privileges denied them and they were probably headed for either a concentration camp or a prison camp with a possibility that after the war, they might be returned to Japan, in which event they should be giving serious thought as to what their reception might be in Japan. He then stated to them that the opportunity to volunteer would be closed at 2:00 P.M. Wednesday, February 26th but until that time those who wished to volunteer would have the opportunity to do so and those who wished to change their answers to either question twenty-seven or twenty-eight would be permitted to make the change.

6. On the afternoon of February 26th, all completed questionnaires were mailed to Washington and at that time the total number of volunteers for the entire period covered by the program was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens 15-37 inclusive</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens 17 years old</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliens</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>108</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this time 1331 male citizens 17 years old and over had been registered of which approximately 1163 were of military age, 106 were 17 years old and 42 were over 37 years.

7. The Army team left the Center on February 27th and Mr. Walter J. Knodel, War Relocation Authority Representative on the Army team was left in charge of completion of registration of all female citizens seventeen and over, all aliens seventeen and over, and any male citizens seventeen years and over who had not previously executed questionnaires. It was agreed that Mr. Knodel would have an article published in the Center newspaper advising the citizens of military age that he would accept applications for voluntary induction until completion of the registration on or about March 6th. The team captain also advised him that it would be permissible for him to accept any changes in questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight forwarding such changes to Washington. Mr. Knodel is extremely capable and his efficient handling of the mechanics of registration was responsible for the smooth operation of this part of the program. He was ably assisted by Mr. Lewis Fanslan.
8. On February 22nd, after 1117 questionnaires had been checked, it was found that questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight had been answered as follows:

Volunteers who answered "YES" to both questions  57
"Yes, if drafted" to 27 and "YES" to 28  587
"NO" to 27 and "YES" to 28  346
Qualified answers to 27  16
"NO" to 28  109

It is possible that there may have been some doubt in the minds of some of the registrants as to how question twenty-seven should be answered, if a person did not wish to volunteer. In my opinion, there should have been no doubt whatsoever about this point after the series of meetings on February 15th and 19th. With regard to the "NO" answer to twenty-eight, I am firmly convinced, and this opinion was shared by other members of the Army team including the Japanese-American sergeant that there should have been no question in the mind of any person as to the meaning and significance of a negative answer to this question. All persons who wished to do so were permitted to change their answers to twenty-seven and twenty-eight in accordance with instructions received from Washington. All questionnaires which did not contain an unqualified "YES" answer to question twenty-eight were placed in the "NO" category. There may be a few who answered "YES" with some qualification to this question and then later changed it to an unqualified "YES" and these should be given the benefit of the doubt unless they answered an unqualified "NO" to question twenty-seven but such cases will comprise a very small percentage of the total.

9. After questionnaires containing a flat "NO" or a qualified "YES" to number twenty-eight were segregated, the team captain decided that the names of these persons should be given to the project director for his future guidance and this was done. I was very much surprised to learn later that either the project director or the Chief of Police had given each block manager the names of the persons in his block who had not answered "YES" to twenty-eight. In talking with several persons who came to change their answers to twenty-eight to an unqualified "YES", it appeared to me that each block manager was urging those in his block to change their answer not only because of what might happen to the particular individual but the possible effect that a negative answer might have on future policies with respect to the other evacuees. A number changed their answer to "YES" giving as their reason that they did not at first understand the meaning of the question. For example, as I recall it, one person wrote his reason for making the change on the question "at first I did not fully comprehend the significance of my answer". He at least had a very good working knowledge of the English language. After being told that the chances were that they would be placed in a prison camp or in a concentration camp, it is surprising to me that all those who answered "NO" to twenty-eight did not change their answers.
10. On February 20th, I learned that from February 14th to February 26th, two 16 millimeter movies were shown in the Center, one being "Glimpses of Japan" and the other being "Tokyo Symphonic Sketch". I arranged for a private showing of these movies and found they depicted the beauty of Japan in peace time as well as the industrial progress Japan has made. This was good propaganda for the pro-Japanese group and along the lines Colonel Rasmussen described in his talk to the Army teams in Washington on January 26th. I was told there was some applause at the showing and when the movies failed to appear at one of the mess halls as scheduled, there was quite a bit of grumbling until they were produced. Mr. Lindley, the project director, was present at the private showing and from the comments he made, he apparently saw no particular harm in these pictures being shown in the Center. There is another way to look at this and that is if these movies caused some of the Nisei to lean toward Japan, they were probably loyal to Japan in the first place and now is a good time for us to know it.

11. In my opinion the "Yes, if drafted" answer to twenty-seven is not necessarily an indication of that person's disloyalty because there are many Caucasian-Americans who are not willing to volunteer but are willing to serve if drafted. While I regard the majority of those who answered this question in this manner to be loyal, I do believe there is a distinct possibility that some of these may be disloyal. Along this line of reasoning a Caucasian employee in one of the offices at the Center told me that one of the young Japanese-Americans working in his office had made the statement to him in the presence of several Japanese-Americans that he had answered "Yes, if drafted" to number twenty-seven because if after the war the situation in the United States should be unbearable for the Japanese people, if he had given any other answer, it might prevent him from living in Japan.

12. I believe it is true that there is still a great deal of resentment among the Nisei because they have been taken away from their homes and businesses and placed in the Centers. Many have apparently accepted the explanation given for their removal, but I have a feeling that they have done this because they think it is the smart thing to do. Some I talked with commented on the fact that the Chinese were not removed from the Western Defense Command even though many Americans can not tell the difference between the Japanese and the Chinese. I believe the Nisei still exert a great deal of influence on the Nisei and as an example of this, a friend of mine in the Center whom I have known for many years, told me of a case of a thirty-five year old Nisei he knew, who would not marry a Japanese-American girl because he could not obtain his mother's consent. Due to the fact that the Japanese have not intermarried with the Caucasians to any great extent but have in most cases lived with other Japanese, I can not convince myself that they have become as Americanized, for example, as people of German or Italian descent.
13. Before coming to Washington, I, like many other Americans, was biased with regard to Japanese, but after hearing the various speakers in Washington during the time they Army teams were being instructed, I realized that the situation of the Japanese-American citizens now was one which could possibly happen to some other group of our population in the future and therefore in leaving here for the Center I was unbiased and had an open mind on the whole question. I have been asked to give my own personal opinion regarding the loyalty of these people and the impressions I gained from my visit to the Center and while I know very little about the subject, I feel that my first opinion in so far as it applies to the majority of Japanese-Americans was correct.

14. Conclusions:

a. Probably most of the volunteers are loyal. This group will be under close observation.

b. Some of the "Yes, if drafted" group may be disloyal. Refer to paragraph 11.

c. Those who answered "NO" to question twenty-seven are disloyal.

d. Those who answered "NO" to question twenty-eight are disloyal. I place qualified answers to this question in the same category.

e. Careful study of other key questions in form 304-A may indicate disloyalty even with a "YES" answer to questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight.

f. Release from relocation Centers for unlimited employment based on evaluation of a questionnaire and without a thorough loyalty check will be dangerous. A loyalty check may be of little value now because the resentment held by these peoples might not be indicated in such a check.

WILLIAM S. FAIRCHILD
Captain, C. M. P.
Commanding Granada
Relocation Center Army Team
TALK MADE BY CAPT. W. S. FAIRCHILD ON FEBRUARY 18 and 19, 1943 TO MALE CITIZENS OF MILITARY AGE AT GRANADA RELOCATION CENTER, AMECHE, COLORADO.

There are three ways to answer question 27.

First, "YES".

Secondly, "NO".

Thirdly, "YES" or "NO", qualified by "if drafted" or the like. The meaning and significance of the various answers are as follows:

"YES" means that you are willing to volunteer and that you will sign the necessary papers for immediate induction. This answer will be interpreted by the War Department as well as the general public and by those who oppose you as concrete evidence of your loyalty and patriotism. It is also evidence of your good common sense. The advantage of your volunteering cannot be overemphasized. After all the army can draft you if it wants to regardless of how you answer question 27. Understand, however, that the War Department is definitely interested in overcoming prejudices that exist against you among certain groups of our population. A good response to this call for volunteers will receive favorable publicity throughout the nation and will prove that those in the War Department and other branches of the Government were correct in their estimate of you.

The answer "NO" unless you are a conscientious objector or a minister means that you are Not Willing to fight for your country. We are engaged in total war. A citizen of Military age, regardless of race or creed, who will not fight for his country when that country is at war, with its very life at stake, does not deserve to have a country. If you answer "NO" to question 27 you can expect that interpretation to be put on your answer.

Now a person might answer "NO" to this question with some qualifying statement such as "No, because I have dependents" or "No, because of some physical disability". With such a qualifying statement it would not necessarily mean that such an answer would imply that the person was disloyal provided that the person was sincere in making the answer. But let me point out that Selective Service and not the draft registrant decides if a person is to be excused from serving because of dependents or physical disabilities. Further, with reference to the answer "No, because of dependents" - this does not apply to you in the center because your income in the army will be considerably greater than your income here and those dependents left here will be cared for by the W. R. A.
Now we come to what seems to be the answer generally given by most of you and that is "Yes, if drafted". Well, the fact of the matter is that if you drafted you most certainly will serve in the armed forces if the government wants you and it will not make any difference whether you said "Yes, if drafted" or "No". Although, the present program is voluntary, the combat team will be raised, if necessary, by draft.

It appears likely that this answer "Yes, if drafted", was given so frequently because you felt that this answer would show that you were loyal and at the same time make it possible for you to obtain a defense job before being called in the draft. As I see it that answer is just a case of sitting straddle of the fence. You can do it – but you will miss the boat entirely – because the opportunity to do yourselves, your families and your friends a great service will have been lost.

As far as the War Department is concerned the answer "Yes, if drafted" does not indicate to them that you are not loyal. They were convinced that the majority of the Nisei were loyal Americans and because the War Department was convinced of this fact they fought powerful opposition to give you this opportunity to prove your loyalty as American Citizens. This program does not contain everything that was desired by you or the War Department. It does contain all that it was possible to obtain. It is up to you to show the American public and those who oppose you that are worthy of the faith and confidence of us, your friends.

If through your own actions this program fails, you need not expect future efforts in your behalf.

If you accept this opportunity by volunteering in large numbers, you will convince the American public that you are worthy of every confidence.

Whether or not you want to go into the army is not the question.

The question is – are you far sighted enough to realize that this is your opportunity?

The choice is yours.

William S. Fairchild
Captain, G. M. P.
San Francisco
California
March 1, 1943

Memorandum

SUBJECT: Registration

TO: Capt. W. S. Fairchild, Commanding, Army Team,
Granada Relocation Center, Amache, Colorado.

The following constitutes a report of the impressions and opinions
formed by the writer while assisting in the registration of peoples of
Japanese ancestry who are at present interned at the Granada Relocation
Center, Amache, Colo.

The results obtained, as to enlistments, are, at first blush, poor.
However, a closer analysis, taking into consideration the circumstances,
reveals that the contrary obtains.

To begin with, as you are aware, the Center is inhabited by more
than 7000 peoples of Japanese ancestry. I shall not go into details
regarding their living conditions save to say that I hope only that
those Caucasians, who are interned by the Japanese Govt., are treated
half as well.

Now, what effect have their living conditions on enlistments. Just
this: - who, with the "soft touch" they have, is going to exchange a life
of comfort and ease for one of hardship and danger. Not many! In fact,
consider how many Caucasians feel similarly. If they did not, there would
be no need for conscription.

It was hard to maintain an unbiased attitude when 8% or 9% of the
registrants gave a negative answer to question #28 of Form 304 (a); par-
ticularly, since the meaning of that question was carefully explained to
each registrant before he responded. Consider what effect a subversive
element like that can have on enlistments.

It was apparent from more than one incident brought to our attention,
that many of the Issei and Nisei were opposed to our programs and exercised
no little amount of restraint on those who otherwise might have volunteered.

Finally, let's give some thought to the civilian management of the
Center. First of all - orchids to Walter J. Knodel, the employment officer.
I think you will agree that he was of inestimable help. Not only did
he aid materially in the working out of the mechanical details of the
registration, but he revealed a mature understanding of Japanese psychology,
the sine qua non, in handling the rather delicate machinery that was set
in motion.
The same cannot be said for the two other W.R.A. officials with whom we were most in touch - Lindley, the Center Director and Tomlinson, the police chief.

Both appeared to be entirely devoid of any knowledge of psychology and, what is worse, common sense.

For example, permitting that propaganda motion picture to be shown was just about the most unintelligent thing that would be done.

Again, circulating among the Japanese block leaders the names of those who had answered in the negative (supra) to question §28, was sheer stupidity. And threatening them with dire consequences if they did not change their responses to the affirmative, falls into the same category.

So, considering the obstacles that had to be surmounted, we can rightfully feel that the mission was as satisfactorily completed as was possible under the circumstances.

(Signed) Robert I. Bischoff, 32147264
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Registration

TO: William S. Fairchild, Captain, C.M.P.,
Commanding, Army Team, Granada Relocation Center
Lamar, Amache Branch, Colorado

With reference to the registration of the Nisei males, seventeen years of age and over, I believe that there may have been a little misunderstanding as to the interpretation of the question No. 27 on the 304A form.

Several have answered No. 27 on the 304A form in the negative because of dependents, or physical disability, or desire to farm and did not get the full meaning of the question.

As for question 28 on the 304A form, I firmly believe that there should have been no question in the minds of the persons filling out the form 304A when answering the question. This includes both Nisei and Kibei.

The number of volunteers was about the figure to have been expected from this center, (approximately 10% of the eligibles).

The principle reason for not having a better showing is the fact that the camp here has been very quiet, and having enjoyed greater freedom than the other centers, the people haven't felt that they wanted to leave. Such as the case in few of the other centers where the people have been confined to a limited area, and so, had a greater desire to get out, even by joining the army.

My firm belief is that the majority of the Nisei are loyal. A few may have been misguided by pressure from the Kibei or Issei and answered in the negative.

Fred Odanaka, T/4, 39157446, MILS LS Camp Savage, Minn.

(Signed) Fred H. Odanaka
March 8, 1943

My dear Captain Fairchild:

Please forgive the delay in writing this memorandum of my thoughts regarding Amache. I have been extremely busy since returning to California. I trust the following will serve to give you my impressions.

I have come to the conclusion that the number of volunteers was as good as could be expected. I doubt if the percentage would have been higher in any other racial group. Moreover there were many things about the program and the conditions at the camp that prevented a larger number of volunteers. For example the limitation of service in the army to "combat duty" prevented many from volunteering. The more or less free and easy living and working conditions at Amache and the expectation of war defense work as an alternative to service in the army also acted as a deterrent. For these reasons it is my opinion that the number of volunteers is not a gauge of loyalty, except in a limited sense.

The fact that over 100 Nisei answered "No" to the loyalty question is a matter for serious consideration. Subsequent changes in the answer to question 325, are of no importance. There may have been a few cases of misunderstanding but I think that the question was clearly understood by most of those who answered in the negative.

It is my firm opinion that many of those who answered the loyalty question in the affirmative did so as a matter of convenience and not as a matter of conviction. The only way to determine this is by a complete loyalty check. This would include citizens as well as aliens.

There are many factors which make it difficult for the Japanese to be completely loyal to this government. One of these is the deep seated resentment of the race prejudice which bars the Jap from American society. All Japanese, particularly the Nisei, are conscious of this race barrier and regardless of what they say and how they smile it away every Japanese resents it. Another factor is the natural resentment on the part of all Japs of the evacuation program. They were moved from their homes and deprived of their property and businesses for reasons which most of them do not believe sufficient. They may pretend to understand and to forgive but they do not understand and they do not forgive. As a consequence the loyalty of the Japanese is likely to be skin deep. The slightest insult or offense could be the cause of a dangerous and easily justified (in the mind of the Jap) reaction.
Since the foregoing applies to Citizen Japs as well as to
aliens I am of the opinion that no Jap should be allowed to bear arms
or to work in defense industry until his loyalty has been thoroughly
checked. His answer to a loyalty question is of practically no con-
sequence except where the answer is "No", in which latter event his
disloyalty is practically conclusive. But the answer "Yes" to a
loyalty question is wholly inconclusive.

I had several other ideas in mind regarding the free and
easy manner in which the camp at Amache is operated but this is really
beside the point in which we are interested, i. e. loyalty. We should
investigate all of them before we give them any privileges and then
we should be ever watchful until their loyalty is established by posi-
tive acts and conduct.

I have made this brief and to the point. I hope it will help
you in formulating your own statement.

Naturally I would like to know what happened in the other
camps. A personal note addressed to my office would be most welcome.
Send me your address in Washington and I will communicate with you again.
Things are in good shape with me.

Sincere personal regards,

(Signed) George T. Davis

COPY
ROOKER RELOCATION CENTER

Captain John A. Holbrook, C.M.P.
March 27, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-526
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Report of Team Captain, Rohwer Relocation Center, Rohwer, Arkansas.

1. The Army Team assigned to the Rohwer Relocation Center, Rohwer, Arkansas, consisted of John A. Holbrook, Captain, C.M.P., Commanding, S/Sgt. Richard H. Wills, Jr., T/Sgt. Isamu Maschi and Sgt. George H. Burton, Jr. These men were assembled with nine other Army Teams of the same size in the Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. and carefully instructed in the duties of presenting to the Japanese-Americans of the Relocation Centers the War Department Mission, explaining its purpose and the effect which its success or failure would have upon those who were opposed to the people of Japanese ancestry, more particularly since Pearl Harbor. We were given the benefit by lectures of the experiences of all available officers and civilians familiar with the Japanese people for nine full days. The writer is certain he and the personnel of his team left Washington convinced that the War Department Mission was a good one; that the Japanese-Americans, even though they had suffered hardships, losses, and humiliation by being evacuated from the West Coast and assembled in Relocation Centers, were still loyal citizens of the United States and were willing to do their part in winning the present war; that those of military age and physically fit would welcome the opportunity to enlist in the Armed Forces; and that those not qualified for Armed Service were anxious to obtain defense work outside the Centers. The Army Team assigned to Rohwer left Washington, February 2, 1943 and arrived at Rohwer, Arkansas on February 4, 1943, carried out their mission and departed from Rohwer to their respective home stations on March 10, 1943.

2. The Rohwer Relocation Center is situated about one-half mile north of the village of Rohwer, Desha County, Arkansas. The adjoining territory is very thinly populated. A branch line from McGehee, Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee of the Missouri-Pacific Railroad runs directly alongside its eastern boundary. The occupied portion of the Center is
about one mile square, surrounded by a low wire fence. The terrain is delta land, very low and flat lying about twenty feet, below the adjoining Mississippi River levee. There are approximately 2500 Japanese people living in the Center, 150 Caucasian employees, and an M.P. Recruit Company of about 135 men quartered just outside the east fence between the Center and the railroad. The population is classified about 2500 school children, 1600 male citizens, seventeen years old and up, about 1400 female citizens, 17 years old and up, and about 3000 aliens, both male and female, 17 years old and up, and about 175 repatriates of both sexes. Numerically the population is divided into two groups, half from around Stockton, California and half from around Lodi, California, with a decided minority in either group which can be called well educated. They are being terribly overrated by the social welfare workers whose only approach so far seems to be to flatter them about their intellectual ability. They are housed in new one-story Government buildings, arranged into thirty-three blocks of fifteen buildings each. Each block consists of twelve apartment buildings, 20x20, having six apartments each, housing twenty four persons per building. Each block also has a public service building, 20x100, a block mess hall, 40x60, a buildings housing laundry, a men's latrine and a women's latrine. About half the population works within the Center for the War Relocation Authority in offices, mess halls, hospitals and construction and maintenance. They receive an average of $16.00 per month besides their lodging, board and hospitalization.

3. The Rohwer Relocation Center is supervised by a Project Director, Mr. Roy D. Johnston, assisted by Mr. James F. Raines, Assistant Project Director and a staff of Caucasian Department Chiefs. The personnel employed in the departments are mostly Japanese-Americans and a few aliens. The internal police and fire department is all Japanese except the chiefs. The Japanese population is governed by thirty-three block managers and thirty-three block advisers, one of each from each block. These are divided half Issei and Nisei and headed by a chairman of block managers. These are all elected by the Japanese themselves, subject to the approval of the Project Manager. These heads hold regular and special meetings and frequently confer through their chairman with the War Relocation Authority Manager on all matters pertaining to the government of the Center. In the presentation and operation of the War Department Plan, the Project Manager insisted that the block managers be thoroughly acquainted with the program before going into the blocks.

4. The Army Team, War Relocation Authority Management, block managers and advisers held several meetings in which the Mission was read in both English and Japanese. Questions were asked and answered before registration was instituted. At these meetings the attendance was good, but a general hesitancy and reserve was very obvious. Subsequently, block meetings were held at which the entire population were invited. The Mission was read
in English, copies printed in Japanese were distributed and the same results were obtained. Attendance was good. Some questions were asked in English and Japanese, mostly critical of the program and the policy of the Government in the treatment the Japanese had received and the possibility of continuing the same treatment in the future. There was a decided reserve at all of the meetings. These meetings were often attended by the welfare officers of the Center who invariably injected into the discussion an apologetic attitude which aided and abetted the feeling that the Japanese were being discriminated against, and lending authority to these Japanese attitudes for demanding from the Army Team a guarantee of some kind for their cooperation or loyalty. This social welfare attitude was finally eliminated from the meetings upon the demand of the Team Captain. The Project Manager insisted that the registration be voluntary until every block had been canvassed. This was completed on March 1, 1943. When it was found that only 27 had volunteered for induction, 31 filed Form DSS 304-A and 297 filed Form WRA 126 Revised out of a possible 5900, then the Project Director agreed to make the registration compulsory, and after a conference with Mr. Dillon S. Myer, the War Relocation Authority Administrator, this policy was put into effect and registrations were completed by March 10, 1943 with a total of 29 volunteers, 1578 filing Form DSS 304-A and 4240 filing Form WRA 126 Revised.

5. A brief summary of the questions asked concerning the combat team by the Japanese at block meetings, or excuses for not volunteering for induction during the voluntary registration are as follows:

a. Why were we classed as enemy aliens and placed in 4 C?
b. Why must we prove our loyalty by volunteering for induction?
c. Why must we be separated with a Japanese-American Combat Team?
d. Will my relatives who are in internment camps be released if I volunteer?
e. Why aren't we drafted in the same manner as other Caucasians?
f. Can my relatives go back to their homes on the West Coast if I volunteer?
g. Why are we put on the spot and asked to volunteer to save our people who haven't done anything wrong?

6. After the registration was made compulsory and there was indication that if the volunteers were not sufficient to man the combat team that the provisions of Selective Service would be put into effect, the questions were as follows:

a. Why do we have to be segregated into a separate combat team?
b. How do we know that an unfair quota won't be used in the Relocation Centers?
c. Why can't we volunteer to do farm work or work in industry?
d. How can we fight against our relatives in Japan?
e. What guarantee have we that our citizenship won't be removed when laws are being passed preventing us from owning land, etcetera, in some states even if we do serve in the Armed Forces?
f. Why do we have to decide so soon? We want more time to think this over. We can't make up our minds so fast. Why the hurry, unless there is something about the program that we haven't found out yet?
g. What guarantee have we that if drafted, we will have the same rights to deferments for dependents, etcetera, that the Caucasians have? And how can we be deferred for essential industry when we have had no chance to get out and get jobs in war production?
h. Why can't we enlist in the Air Corps, or the Navy the same as any other Caucasian?

7. Every opportunity was given the Japanese and Japanese-Americans in Rohwer Relocation Center to become acquainted with the program in detail. The Mission was recited in English at all meetings and when requested, recited in Japanese by one of their own people. It was printed in English and Japanese in the Center news sheets (The Outpost). Every opportunity was given to ask questions in Japanese and English and all questions were answered in the same manner. There is no possibility of a single Japanese or Japanese-American having had any misunderstanding of the War Department Mission or Program.

8. The Project Manager, Mr. Roy D. Johnston, rendered every assistance within his power to make the Mission a success. He was patient and tireless in his attention and courtesies to the Army Team. This cooperation however did not extend into his subordinate departments. They were not interested in the program, chiefly because it made more work for them. It was liable to reduce the Center population to where their services would be no longer required. And it did have a tendency to cause some unrest among the Japanese which disturbed their peaceful procedures. The Caucasian personnel is not high type and has not had much experience in handling people in such numbers. This is probably explained by the antagonistic attitude of the people of Arkansas and especially in the area surrounding the Center, making it very difficult to get suitable Caucasians to take employment. This was particularly true in the construction and maintenance departments where the Japanese did not work well. They did just what their Japanese leader told them to do and nothing more, and the Caucasian supervisors did nothing about it. In fact, the whole Center is very unpopular with the population of Desha County.
CONCLUSIONS:

1. The Japanese and Japanese-Americans in Rohwer Relocation Center are satisfied where they are. They are in full control of the economic, social, and political affairs of the community. The Caucasian management and personnel are afraid of the Japanese chiefly because they do not understand them, and are overzealous in their efforts to prevent any publicity concerning the Center. They are following the path of the least resistance and allowing the Japanese to have their own way. The Japanese in turn have no respect for the management but will not cause any trouble as long as they are in control. Therefore, any program to compel any action is resented by both the Japanese and Caucasians. The Japanese through their internal intelligence system are always well informed of any contemplated action on the part of the management.

2. The Japanese and Japanese-Americans in Rohwer Relocation Center beyond military age have never been very active in getting outside employment and therefore were not especially interested in wholesale leave clearances. One reason being that they never were in the high paid class. Therefore, they are about as well off or better off where they are as where they were. This is especially true of the Issei females and the older males who have always worked hard on the farms in California. The actual pay for labor on the farms surrounding the Center is no better than what they are getting inside the Center plus the fact that they are being told emphatically by the War Relocation Authority officials that they can stay as long as they wish and that no attempt will be made to force them to leave.

3. The Japanese-Americans of military age, that is, between the ages of seventeen and thirty-seven inclusive, as a group, are not interested in volunteering in the Armed Forces because they are not loyal citizens. At least to the extent that they care to express themselves without some material recompense for their loyalty. In fact, they have no concept of the true meaning of the word. They confuse the term with doing something for somebody for which they must receive advancement, socially and materially. This attitude is being fostered and kept alive by the decidedly disloyal Issei and Nisei groups within the Center.

4. The Japanese-Americans in Rohwer Relocation Center are admittedly from their own statements more disloyal today than when they were evacuated from the West Coast. They are more confused about their future. They are being practiced upon by an ill advised group of welfare workers who find in them a fertile field for the establishment of a social workers paradise, in which, theoretically, no person would be obligated to anybody or anything, especially to the extent which a loyal citizen can be expected to voluntarily express himself.
5. Finally, the result of the registration is conclusive in that they are not wholeheartedly willing to decide to be loyal, therefore, they must be considered disloyal. There is considerable evidence that this so-called discrimination, segregation or oppression of the Japanese-Americans is the work of the Japanese Government propagandists, through the Japanese in the Centers who are loyal to the Japanese Government, because the Japanese-Americans cannot point out any specific cases of discrimination except where their egotistical and selfish desires have been thwarted by the same methods which would be applied to a Caucasian, under the same circumstances.

6. There is reason to believe that unless some decisive action is taken by the Government quickly, the morale of the Japanese and Japanese-Americans will become so bad that disorders can be incited very easily by any of one of the numerous disloyal groups.

7. Submitted herewith are statements by the three team sergeants who accompanied the Team Captain on this mission. Also submitted is a copy of the report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War on March 23, 1943.

John A. Holbrook, Capt., C.M.P.,
Rohwer Relocation Center
Relocation, Arkansas
March 22, 1943

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: Report of the Team Captain, Rohwer Relocation Center, Relocation, Arkansas.

TO: Office of Assistant Secretary of War, Pentagon Building, Washington, D.C.

1. Total number of male citizens in Rohwer Relocation Center from the age of 17 years and up, 1925 of which approximately 850 are between the ages of 17 to 37 inclusive.

2. Number of persons executing Form 304-A up to and including March 10, 1943 was 1573. No reports have been received showing any increase since that time.

3. Percentage of Disloyal Citizens is estimated to be 50% of the total citizen population.

4. Number of affirmative answers unqualified to Question # 28 on March 10, 1943 was 710.

5. Number of negative answers to Question # 28 on March 10, 1943 was 858.

6. Number of citizens requesting repatriation on March 10, 1943 is not available but from memory would suggest it is not over 50. These are new applications, the ones who had previously requested repatriation were not required to register.

7. Reasons why the Team Captain believes certain individuals are disloyal are as follows:
   a. The openly disloyal citizens in Rohwer Relocation Center do not hesitate to say that they are not loyal to the Government of the United States. This group represents about 20% of the total male citizens which include the Kibei and would not hesitate to commit acts of violence if permitted.
   b. There is another group which refuse to seriously consider the question of loyalty as being of any value and who will and do answer
no today, yes tomorrow, and back to no the next day. This group is representative of another 20% of the total male citizens. This group is chiefly the more ignorant faction who can be easily led, can be made dangerous, or could be turned into reasonably good citizens if handled properly. It probably would require years to accomplish.

c. The last group of 10% of the male citizens are now in the bargaining class. They could be made loyal for a price. They very openly demand a guarantee in return for an expression of loyalty or some form of recompense or to use their expressions, (Will I be considered disloyal if I do not answer question #28?), (If I say I am loyal, will my father be released from internment camp?).

5. In so far as the answer to question #28 being indicative of conviction or convenience, it is the opinion of this Team Captain that where a citizen answered NO unqualified, it was definitely conviction. If he answered either NO or YES qualified, it was for convenience and when unqualified YES was answered, that about 50% of such were from conviction and the remainder for convenience.

9. This Team Captain's conclusion regarding segregation is that the disloyal Japanese-Americans should be given a swift trial on a charge of disloyalty or obstructing the war effort and be, if found guilty, put into internment camp, where they would be compelled to work under very strict discipline, and enjoy no privileges whatever. This would certainly give those interned individuals a distinct realization of the penalties which can be imposed, and impress upon the others the gravity of disloyalty to the land of one's birth. Certainly the morale in the center is running down hill fast, and something must be done shortly or the problem will get real serious.

10. The Reinstatement of Selective Service to induct Japanese-Americans in the centers who are in bg would have two results. It would prove to the Japanese-Americans that the U.S. Government was not to be fooled with. And second, it would force a concrete attitude of loyalty or disloyalty among the most troublesome group. The Japanese have a very great respect for positive authority.

11. Total number of volunteers for induction was 29.

12. Reasons for this low number are as follows:
   a. Too many of the Military age group are not loyal and feel under no obligation to do anything for this Government.
   b. Others are afraid of retaliation against their parents by the Issei and Nisei.
   c. Others are afraid of the possibility of having to fight against their own relatives.
   d. Others do not like a separate combat team.
   e. Others want to bargain their voluntary action for something impossible or ridiculous.
   f. Others have no desire to go in the Army under any circumstances.
   g. Others use the subterfuge of saying they are willing to go if drafted and all the time hoping they won't be.
h. Others refuse because they feel that they are under no obligation to prove their loyalty since their status as citizens has been questioned by being placed in relocation centers.

13. Induction of Missi girls into the W.A.A.C. would probably produce the same result and for the same reasons as outlined in regard to the men.

JOHN A. HOLBROOK,
Captain, C. M. P.
Rohwer Relocation Center
Relocation, Arkansas
SUBJECT: Personal report of War Dept. Mission
        Rohwer Relocation Center, Relocation, Ark.

TO:       Office of Asst. Secy. of War
          Pentagon Bldg. Washington, D. C.

1. Arrived Rohwer Relocation Center, Rohwer Arkansas on
   March 5, 1943.

2. The cooperation of the W. R. A. and the Army Team was
   not too good.

3. The cooperation of the Japanese American was very poor,
   for no Japanese American Leader in this center took part in presenting
   to the success of this mission.

4. We the Army team have done all we can in presenting the
   program.

5. The reason for failure to the volunteers is that too
   many are thinking about the past and not thinking about the future.

6. The loyal Japanese Americans have shown their loyalty
   and appreciation of this program, but the disloyal have shown no
   interest and have caused the loyal Americans some trouble in answering
   the number twenty-eight and the twenty-seventh questions (mostly
   ones who have been in Japan).

7. There are many who signed the twenty-eighth question in
   which indicates that he is disloyal, these should be separated from the
   loyal Americans.

8. Will leave Rohwer Relocation Center on March 10, 1943 for
   Camp Savage.

(signed)

T/4 Isamu Adachi
Rohwer W. R. A.
Relocation, Ark.
Rohwer Relocation Center, Relocation, Arkansas.

TO: Office of Assistant Secretary of War 
Pentagon Building, Washington, D.C.

1. The cooperation of W.R.A. officials at Rohwer was as well as could be expected. However, their local newspaper here was not utilized and some W.R.A. officials, in speaking publicly at the meetings, said the evacuation was not a military necessity and etc.

2. The Army team from the start of the program was unable to enlist the cooperation of any of the Japanese. None of the leaders attempted to bring about cooperation. Several meetings were had with Block Managers, in an effort to get them to see the value of the program, with no results.

3. All evacuees were given ample opportunity to become acquainted with the program. Besides the regular reading of the mission and question and answer period, the Japanese were encouraged to ask questions in private if they so desired. This member of the team believes all in this center fully understands the program.

4. This member of the team believes the failure to volunteer can be attributed to the following reasons: (1) the Japanese regard the evacuation as such a gross injustice it has lowered their degree of loyalty, (2) some believe the race prejudice in the United States has become so great that they will never again enjoy the rights and privileges of loyal citizens, therefore, why volunteer to risk life for something that looks so dark and uncertain, and (3) the two above reasons coupled with the fact that there are hundreds of disloyal Japanese here to influence the thoughts of the loyal that it has had the opposite effect of an inspiration to volunteer.

5. The Japanese-Americans in this center are not as loyal as a similar group of citizens outside the center. However, there are as many law-abiding citizens inside as outside. This can be accounted for by the fact that there has been nothing to inspire patriotism and a desire to fight. These people have been far removed from the experiences an ordinary citizen would encounter in a country that is at war, such as, having friends and relatives in the service. Their loyalty can possibly best be compared to that of a strict isolationist group before the war.

6. The great majority of the Japanese-Americans do not appreciate the present program. The only program that would be appreciated is one that would place them in their exact positions before the evacuation.

(SIGNED) 
Sgt. George H. Buxton, JR. 
Member, Army Team 
Rohwer Relocation Center 
Relocation, Arkansas
SUBJECT: Personal report on War Department Mission.

TO: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Pentagon Building, Washington, D.C.

1. Arrived Rohwer Relocation Center, February 5, 1943. February 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 spent in determining plan of presentation, instruction interviewers, and meeting with block managers and leaders.

2. February 10 to February 28 spent in deliverance of mission and voluntary registration, the N.R.A. officials refusing to make registration compulsory.

3. March 1 to March 9 spent in compulsory registration.

4. The N.R.A. authorities continually expressed a sympathetic attitude toward the evacuees and lent noticeable moral support to their complaining and bargaining attitude.

5. The general attitude of the evacuees was one of apathy and distrust. The failure of a singly block leader to take the lead and openly approve the program was a big factor in the failure of the program.

6. The presentation of the program was quite adequate, every evacuee being given more than enough consideration both in regard to the delivery of the mission and the answering and explanation of the problems and questions. If there was any insufficiency in the presentation of the program, it was in failing to convince the block managers and leaders; at the outset as to the urgency in the need of the support of the evacuees toward the program.

7. Failure to secure more volunteers was a result of several factors. The foremost reason or factor was that there appears to be no more, if as much, enthusiasm to join the Army among the Japanese-Americans than among the Caucasian Americans. Secondly, the Issei and the Kibei exerted considerable influence towards the failure of the program. And thirdly, there is the factor of distrust and suspicion toward the Army and the Government resulting from the discriminations caused by the evacuation.

8. A majority of the evacuees are loyal to the United States. However there is no doubt but that there are many disloyal persons in the center. There seemed to be no organized movement but there was adequate evidence that the disloyal ones are not just a few, and are active in their support of the Japanese Empire.

(Signed)  
(18107716)
COLORADO RIVER RELOCATION CENTER

1st Lt. John H. Bolton, C.M.P.
WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON
March 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
Room 4E-886
Pentagon Building
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall


1. The analysis which follows is not complete, having been made on March 3, 1943. The figures shown are accurate in their analysis, the Team Captain is sure; however, no time for checking was available. The total number of registrants as shown on a later report is 3356. The Team Captain’s check on the number of volunteers shows 215. At the time Mr. Myer’s telegram was received asking for analysis on all of the “Yes, Yes”, and most of the “No, Yes” forms 304-A had been sent on following instructions. There were only 620 forms 304-A still left on the project. The complete analysis is only of these less favorable ones, and therefore is not a fair evaluation of the mass answers.

A. Those military age 17 to 37 inclusive — Not available.

B. Those above military age — Not Available.

1. Total registrants
2. Total registrants refusing to register
3. Registrants replying “Yes” to Question 28
4. Registrants replying “No” to Question 28
5. Registrants not replying to Question 28
6. Registrants replying “Yes” to Question 27
7. Registrants replying “Yes” with qualifications
8. Registrants replying “No” to Question 27
9. Number volunteering in Army
10. Total eligible for filling 304-A

* This applies only to the 620 Form 304-A’s still on the project.
Group A1—17 to 37 inclusive

1. Number registrants with one or both parents interned. See Question 11 on Form 304-A.
   25  9
2. Registrants with either father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter in Japan. See Question 11.
   213 51
3. Registrant who travelled in Japan three years or more since 1934 and attended school two years or more. See Question 14 "Yes!"
   162 42
4. Registrants now registered with Japanese citizenship. Question 25 "Yes" and Question 25A "No."
   89 21
5. Registrants who have requested repatriation. Question 26 "Yes.
   77  6
6. Registrants who have requested repatriation and who are on any list furnished as coming from the State Department.
   None None

Group B1—38 and above

1. Number registrants with one or both parents interned. See Question 11 on Form 304-A.
   None None
2. Registrants with either father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter in Japan.
   5  None
3. Registrants who travelled in Japan three years or more since 1934, and attended school two years or more. See Question 14 "Yes."
   None None
4. Registrants now registered with Japanese citizenship. Question 25 "Yes" and Question 25 "No."
   None None
5. Registrants who have requested repatriation and who are on any list furnished you as coming from the State Department.
   None None

2. The whole registration, which was handled by War Relocation Authority personnel assisted by Nisei and a few Issei registrants, went along smoothly without any complications. All evacuees were registered.

3. This War Relocation Authority project is divided into three units. Of these three units, Unit Three showed up much better all the way through the mission than the other two units. Those in Unit Three were never involved while in California in the evacuation period with any disturbances; they are better integrated; they are for the most part city people; they have developed industries; they have not had any disturbances while in the Relocation Center.
Unit Two evacuees are made up of an entirely different sort. There is much less integration; there have been some disturbances there, but they have developed no leaders in those disturbances, and nothing serious has developed. Unit One is the most complex of the three units, as well as the largest, with a population of around 8000. The evacuees there are, for the larger part, farmers, with a much smaller number of well educated in proportion to the other two units with their populations of around 5000 each. In Unit One was the strike in November which was a very disturbing thing to the evacuees. To the credit of the evacuees most of them considered it just a "Japanese holiday" and did not at all appreciate the fact that there was behind it a group of disloyal. This unit has also in it a number of men, especially bachelors, who have been sent there from other Centers. But there are a number of distinctly and outspokenly loyal as well as a few outspokenly disloyal ones. If there was any failure in getting completely honest answers to the loyalty questionnaire in any of the three units, it was among those of Unit One. There was more fear of consequences of Japanese success there than elsewhere, and more uncertainty as to the future.

4. The news that if the combat team was not raised by voluntary induction it would be raised by draft was greeted by the comment, "Why can't we be drafted immediately?" Many young boys said that the draft would be the answer to their parents who were objecting to their volunteering. When the Issei and female Nisei registration took place, the majority of them took the modified oath of loyalty asked of them.

5. Quite a number of those who had answered "No, No", to #27 and #28 came in to make changes in answer after the announcement was made that they could. Record of those changes, was kept by the War Relocation Authority and the Team Captain does not have the figures. Most of those who wanted to make changes were refused both by the War Relocation Authority and by the Military Team when it was clear that their reasons for changing were that they would not be released from the Center if their "No's" remained. One case, not at all typical, was that of a Kibei who had answered to #27, "Yes, if I serve only on American soil."

6. It is quite difficult to arrive at any definite percentages of loyalty or disloyalty. This team Captain has the impression that actual and dangerous disloyalty will run, if and when it can be accurately checked, not over 5% and perhaps as low as 3%; and that is not wishful thinking but run on the same basis from 20 to 25%. The remainder are those who are "on the fence" for one reason or the other. There is little danger of those "on the fence" becoming dangerous to the point of aiding the enemy if the small per cent of disloyal can be removed as soon as possible from the Centers and put under an armed guard. The rest of them, certainly all the loyal, and many of those who are still unsettled in mind may safely be permitted leave. Those who remain should, by all means, be put to some useful and remunerative work—remuneration to be dependent on their production.
7. **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

a. Segregate the small percentage of disloyal and trouble makers, thus removing from the Centers the chief cause of disloyalty and trouble. One of the existing Centers should be used for this group, and it should, if possible, be a Center where some voluntary farming can be developed.

b. Do not publicize in the Centers or anywhere else more than is absolutely necessary the removal from Centers of trouble makers. The Team Captain was informed on the day before departure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had removed two men quietly and without any publicity. That method of dealing with trouble makers is the best way to deal with such problems. The whole project does not "lose face" when disturbers are removed without publicity; and the "grapevine" takes care of getting the news around more effectively than any news publicity will do it. There is no point to getting the news of such removals to other Centers. The ones who would be chastised by such news in other Centers are very few; resentment is bred among those who are wavering; and the loyal ones are disturbed. These conclusions are the result of the reception of the news of the arrests at Gila River Relocation Center, which, incidently, was common knowledge among many of the evacuees before the Military Team or the War Relocation Authority authorities heard of it. But if there had been no newspaper publicity on that removal, the full effect of such arrests would have been gained.

c. Remove immediately from the centers the definitely loyal. Get them into productive work, into war employment. Let them take their places in Caucasian communities.

d. Until the definitely loyal can be absorbed, get them into a Center set aside for them where they will be together and apart from the small percentage of trouble makers and disloyal. Give them something to do of a constructive nature, such as farming or war production. Give the Issei as much appreciation and opportunity as the Nisei.

e. The draft should be introduced into the Centers immediately. If for no other reason, the draft will give the evacuees a feeling of being a part of the United States. The families and friends of the few Nisei who are in the Army now are very proud of them and more outspoken in their loyalty than the average.

f. The remainder, who will be around 70% of the total now in the Centers, should be kept in Centers and given ample opportunity to work at some productive occupation.

g. Remove the restrictions on the sale of farm products to the Army, thus giving those who wish to farm the feeling of contribution to the Nation at War.

h. Increase the scope of farming to include cattle and hog raising as well as soil cultivation.
1. Most important of all, establish in each Center a fully equipped Public Relations Department and increase its scope to the giving of information about our nation and its war effort. The chief fault of the Colorado River Relocation Center was that everyone there, War Relocation Authority employees as well as evacuees, felt out of touch with the events of the present day. The Public Relations Departments in the Centers are doing a good job, so far as they are able; but they are sadly handicapped by lack of equipment. They should have modern printing presses and adequate materials for turning out newspapers of interest everywhere to everyone.

2. Set up a definite program of education of all evacuees with stress on the meaning of democracy and the United States. The evacuees, as a whole, including the college and university graduates, are very ignorant of freedom and democracy. "Loyalty is a combination of impression," and such impressions can be controlled by education.

John H. Bolton,
1st Lt., C.M.P.,
Team Captain,
Colorado River Relocation Center.
TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER

1st Lt. Evan W. Carroll, C.M.P.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War  
Room 4E-886  
Pentagon Building  
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Captain John M. Hall

SUBJECT: Report of the Team Captain, Tule Lake Relocation 
Center, Tule Lake, California.

1. The Tule Lake Team arrived at the project Sunday, February  
8, 1943, completed duties and departed from Tule Lake Saturday after-
noon, March 13, 1943.

2. The population of the Tule Lake project as given to the Team 
Captain by the project statistician was 15,083 and broken down as fol-
lows:

   Male citizens - 17 and over  2,969
   Female citizens - 17 and over  2,794
   Male aliens - 17 and over      3,005
   Female aliens - 17 and over    1,968

2,342 Forms 304-A from male citizens were completed up to the 
time of our departure. A list was compiled of the 627 who failed or 
refused to register - showing name, age and housing number. Original 
of this list was forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of War on March 13, 1943 and the duplicate copy was left with the 
Project Director for handling as per War Relocation Authority direc-
tions.

54 volunteers were secured.

Progress on other registration at the close of March 13, 1943 had 
been very slow with only 2,036 female citizens, 750 male aliens and 
597 female aliens registered.

3. Preliminary meetings were held on Monday and Tuesday, February 
8 and 9 with the War Department message presented in mass meetings held 
during the afternoon and evening of February 9, 1943. Registration 
commenced February 10, 1943, using the "block system". Schools were
closed and all Caucasian teachers and assistant teachers (Japanese) were used as registrars. The Military Team established separate offices in the project for interviews.

This plan of registering was unsatisfactory and developments were such that same was changed to a central registration on February 18, 1943.

4. The Team Captain had many meetings with City Council (Nisei), Planning Board (Issei), Block Managers and colonists of different blocks, and I am attaching hereto a list of questions asked in these different meetings, and answers and clarification demanded before they would agree to register.

5. It is the opinion of the Team Captain that the Planning Board as well as the City Council was obstructing the registration program and positive proof was secured of the Planning Board obstruction to the male citizens completing the Form 304-A. (The City Council and Planning Board finally resigned en masse, but was again functioning upon our departure)

6. The mission of the Team finally developed in securing registration which made it very difficult to obtain volunteers under such a program. Pressure of all kinds was brought to bear on the registrants of military age to give a negative answer to question 27 and in no way discuss volunteering.

The difficulties encountered and the resistance to the entire registration program is derivative of the condition which has existed in the project through the Planning Board and the City Council. There have been strikes or cessation of work in a number of departments for several months. I, the Team Captain, could find no record of disciplinary action being taken by the Project Director or any arrests or removals from the project since the beginning of the center. Further investigation developed that some suspected leaders in agitation against registration had been involved in previous difficulties; namely, one Junichi Numura, age 67, who was arrested and placed in jail following a mass meeting, at which time Numura was given the floor for a question and delivered an address in Japanese, the inference of which was further agitation against registration. Records will disclose that Numura had been a disturbing element for several months. Numura was removed to San Francisco, California for an enemy alien hearing.

7. There was a strong Kibei group who were actively disloyal, intimidating and doing violence to those who ordinarily would have cooperative in registering. Twelve of these were jailed March 1, 1943 for being involved in one beating and one attempted assault of two loyal evacuees. These twelve pleaded guilty and received only light jail sentences in Modoc County, California. A screening process of this Kibei group who refused to register resulted in 75 being removed from the project to a Fish and Game Division Camp taken over for this purpose.
Aided by the Military Police Escort Guard Company, 28 evacuees from Block 42 were removed to the Fish and Game Division Camp for failing to register, after staging a demonstration and presenting a petition, a copy of which is attached.

8. A general strike by the Japanese was called for Monday, February 22, 1943 in opposition to this approval and a general disapproval of registration. Although most labor gradually reported to work in a few days, some departments were still out on March 13, 1943.

These incidents and others could be reported to show the reasons for such a low number of volunteers and the failure to complete registration. Those volunteering were threatened and, if living with their parents or family, they were also threatened.

9. The Internal Security Division of this project was inadequate and no protection was afforded those evacuees who registered, volunteered or otherwise cooperated in the program. Incidents of same could be enumerated to further substantiate a recommendation.

10. The evacuees were very resentful of the evacuation program and the objections to registration developed into a bartering, howling, yelping, et cetera, and as a result of various meetings and observations during our tour at Tule Lake, I wish to report that there is a very definite plan and program under way by the evacuees, in the hands of a delegated group, to prepare a case and substantiate same for damage claimed as a result of losses sustained by the evacuees.

In the opinion of the Team Captain and concurred in by all members of the Team, it is believed that Selective Service should be reinstituted in this project for the following reasons:

a. Definite attempts were made by most of the male citizens to avoid any future possibility of their being drafted by openly stating their disloyalty to the United States.

b. A number of loyal citizens who wished to serve in the Armed Forces, could not volunteer due to pressure and threats from an active disloyal group.

There was a large percentage of the evacuees in the same project who desired to repatriate, some of whom had never been to Japan. This seemed to be based either on disloyalty or else complete lack of hope in regard to their future in the United States. However, from a practical viewpoint, with a rush to repatriate, during this program, it was also to avoid registration since the War Relocation Authority had announced that those who had filed for repatriation would not be required to register.

A segregation policy should be adopted in this project:

a. Male citizens who have not or will not register.

b. Trials for violence, trials for interfering with recruiting.

c. Disloyal ones to internment camp.