

Arth Ueno as head of commissary made demands on me for reports, books etc. Refused to deal with him.

Reported for duty 3:00 P.M. Sunday. Crowd was then dispersing in area. Co-op stores earned \$38,000. up to November 1, 1942. People expected rebate of this amount. Evacuee mgrs. said, "We will withhold some for working capital and issue paid up memberships". Then State and Federal Government stepped in and said "You are not pure co-op - so you owe \$21,000. taxes". The stores were started as W.R.A. operation - not thoroughly turned over yet. Evacuees feel that mgrs. of co-op stole money and should be punished.

Ueno be returned to Camp Jail.

Tried by Camp Judiciary Committee.

Under self-government Isseis can vote but cannot hold office except advisory. They feel they should be either given full participation or none at all. Present system is a farce. This isn't Democracy and can't be so long as we are guarded by soldiers. We want form of camp government which fits the situation which actually exists.

USED made contract with private firm for camouflage nets to pay 60¢ an hour. Restricted to fixed wage \$12.00, \$16.00 and \$19.00 per month. Got special authority for \$10.00 bonus a month above pay.. Balance to go to community trust fund for full redistribution to all members of work corps. "Repatriates said "Don't take the money because if we take money from American war effort the Japanese Government will take vengeance on us when we return to Japan".

Net work built up to 600; dropped when cold weather came and schools opened. Now down to 100. U.S. Eng - officers - Rep. of Contractor and head of industrial dept. conferred with me on camouflage projects recently. Eng. Off. not to courteous. Mr. Fryling said we are committed to produce 75 million ft. of net and this camp is to produce one-third.

Told U.S.E. officers and others we were ready, but must have heat, fire protection, police at net project. These conditions have not been fulfilled. This camp must get away from commercial efforts where commercial pay is not involved. Clothing - First made free issue of clothing then decided on a fixed cash clothing allowance. All a matter of pressure to get more allowance in some way.

Lieutenant Iwaki arrived with 1st Detachment and asked "Who do you want out?" Mr. Campbell reported that dictatorship being set up by one or two Japs and everyone must have permission of this dictatorship to do any work in camp. Mr. Merritt - cont.:

Camp has now passed to control of the Japanese. Well organized meetings being held regularly. Japs have assured me that all essential functions will continue by permission of the Japanese leaders. People are licensed to work.

We have a sit down strike Passive resistance.

*Williams - Brown - Hall*  
 Arthur L. Williams - Assistant Chief - ~~Internal~~ *Internal* Security:

Reported for duty 3:00 P.M. Sunday. Crowd was then dispersing in area adjacent to jail and about a Co. on highway South of the intersection preparing to move. Crowd had completely dispersed.

Was present when Mr. Merritt and committee of five talked in police station, agreed:

Ueno be returned to Camp Jail.

Tried by Camp Judiciary Committee.

No more demonstrations.

Mr. Merritt gave permission for meeting in Block 22 that evening in accordance with terms of agreement.

Committee of 5 remained at Jail until Ueno was returned - to be sure he was returned and could report at meeting. There was a brief conversation between committee and Ueno.

6:22 P.M. - report from Dr. Goto that he had information that mob of 2000 was coming to hospital to remove Tayama and kill him. I advised Merritt and was told to get Tayama into ambulance and to remove him from Project Area as soon as military escort could be provided.

6:25 P.M. - Phoned M.P. Headquarters and talked to Lt. Kunkler; advised him of situation. He said that he had ambulance and would send with squad to remove Tayama. Dr. Little called and asked if ambulance had been sent. Called Kunkler at 6:30 P.M. and he said ambulance about to leave. Telephone operator informed me that there was an emergency at the hospital. Called M.P. Hqtrs. - Capt. Hall informed me of situation - 6:40 asked for guard. The father of Jap police told me he had been at meeting and that 2000 were on way to Jail to kill police.

Phoned Mr. Merritt 6:40 <sup>plus</sup> after mob had arrived from all sides. He said "Call Capt. Hall". I said I had. I elbowed my way to front of station. ~~Saw~~ Sentry at entrance sentry box fired three shots in air. Crowd came into jail from front and side. Committee of five demanded that they see Mr. Merritt. Phoned situation to Mr. Merritt and he said to turn it over to Capt. Hall. M.P.'s had not arrived; I waited a little while. Sentry fired three more shots. Committee of five said call Mr. Merritt again. I said, "I am sorry but the camp is now under military control."

Lieutenant Zwaik arrived with 1st Detachment and asked "Who do you want out or held?" We held Committee and 5 Jap police who were terrified. M.P.'s pushed the crowd back beyond the East side of the jail. I went back into the jail proper and found jail door open and full of rioters, but rioters said Ueno had been instructed to remain until Mr. Merritt released him. This was before the M.P. came in)

Once when I was in front of jail to look for M.P. arrival I saw a prisoner jump out of jail window. He came to me for permission to leave. He was terrified. I gave it. 12/8/42, he returned with keys and lock to jail. He had demanded keys from Jap policeman and had unlocked jail.

Departments of WRA in camp are working on preparation of full list of suspected ring leaders. Difficult to establish all leaders - various

(9)

Williams - Brown - Hall

12/9/42

Original M.P. Detachment quite small. Lt. ~~Jaik~~ and men conduct was excellent. I pleaded with the mob and particularly with the Committee of 5 (before military) told Committee that bloodshed would result - they said Committee was ready to die. Then larger body of M.P. arrived and then Capt. Hall talked to Committee in jail office. He also ordered crowd to fall back further. Moved truck from side of jail to front so headlights could be used on the crowd. Crowd sang in Japanese. Much yelling, cursing and jeering. It was dark and lights inadequate. After Capt. Hall conferred with Committee, he went outside and talked to crowd. Asked to disperse. He went all up and down line. Stones thrown or tossed from somewhere in rear of mob and some came close to Capt. Hall.

Gas was thrown directly into crowd and probably in front of crowd wind gusty - No. to So. - crowd scattered in all directions. There was much swearing and jeering by the crowd.

I was near entrance of sentry box - heard a car coming and bursts of gunfire. Seven or eight shots and car struck corner bldg and continued and struck truck with lights on. Heard ~~soldiers~~ soldiers say "Come out with hands up". Then withdrew to sentry box and went inside to get warm. Believe other shots fired but I am uncertain.

Mr. Robert L. Brown:

I propose to put out Bulletin in English and Japanese to inform all the evacuees of agreement made with the Committee of 5 by Mr. Merritt which was reported not explained by Committee Chairman Joe Kurihara. to mob Sunday noon. This to make certain that all evacuees are fully informed of reason etc. for action.

No approval was given by Mr. Merritt for ~~second~~ second meeting Sunday evening.

Captain Martyn Hall:

Believe there would have been more bloodshed if Mr. Merritt had not negotiated in the P.M. (noon). There were plenty in the afternoon mob who tried to control action of mob members. This mob had many in it who were just curious and came to see what would happen. Evening mob was really bent on business.

It is reported that one soldier took some pictures of the P.M. mob. I haven't seen them or do I have name of soldier.

Eight in Bishop jail. - Five in Lone Pine jail under M.P.

2 - FBI agents were in camp for 10 days prior to beating. Took out two men. People they talked to were all marked by mob for punishment. Had one other for removal but couldn't because of American citizenship. Believe this may have been Kurihara.

Mr. Robert L. Brown:

Departments of WRA in camp are working on preparation of full list of suspected ring leaders. Difficult to establish all leaders - various

12/9

departments etc. differ in views. People definitely are intimidated. There have been several previous political beatings of pro-Americans. **Joe Blamey - Jimmy Ota.** We caught guilty man and put him in jail for seventy-five days. Released in three days by Mr. Temple and given good job. Believe past two - three months has increased pro-Axis in Manzanar to 80%. Used to be 50 - 50.

This is a definite move by pro-Axis group to get control, embarrass the Administration, interfere with production and tie-up military personnel.

Dont ask the evacuees what they want to do - Tell them what they must do.

Self-Government, work corps, FBI, old pre-evacuation grudges, have all contributed as causes; also JACL fight in Los Angeles.

Self-Government not popular with Japs, particularly <sup>unpopular is</sup> Mike Masuoka, JACL representative at Washington, D. C.

Much resentment against JACL here in Manzanar.

Los Angeles JACL tied up with various political and sub-rosa schemes in L.A. Raised fund \$2000. - \$3000. Fred Tayama, Treasurer, and no reporting of these funds. Also JACL accused of bleeding illiterate Japanese. Also buying business of Tssei cheap before it was known that Nisei would also be evacuated.

Japs don't know what self-government is and it takes a long time for them to learn what it is and how it operates.

Japs can't get along with each other.

Big cleavage came over Washington WRA order that only Nisei could hold office, except for advisory council. Tssei couldn't see the young folks running the camp. Tssei resented discrimination and self-government. Some felt it better to have no self-government rather than half. Present system is a farce.

Great fear of what will happen to them after the war is felt by many Japs, particularly Tssei.

Captain Martyn Hall:  
noon

Sunday/morning I was eating late lunch - about 12:30 P.M. Kunkler and I had spent morning herding school children and teachers back into Area. They were going on picnics. N.C.O. came in and said that they had been looking for me - there was difficulty in camp.

Came over with small patrol - 10 talked to Mr. Merritt and Ned Campbell. They told me of the threats of mob to move in and get Ueno.

Pointed out all broked promises made that P.M.; said so sorry but crowd can't be controlled. I explained status of Ueno and legal points. They said too bad crowd won't go home. Either before or after conference walked up

Capt Hall

12/9/42

Marched up street with Mr. Merritt to meet [redacted] coming down street. Committee chairman said "People want Ueno brought back to this jail". (question whether it was a demand or request) Promised trouble if request not met. Mob won't disperse until Ueno brought back. We were then opposite the Administration Bldg.

Mr. Merritt talked to them a long time and told them Ueno had been sent to Independence for lack of space in center jail. I saw crowd might be unruly so I told Lt. Kunkler to bring balance of company. They came and went into skirmish line in front of jail and set up M.G. on road - pointing up the road into camp.

Chairman of Committee made two speeches in Japanese; supposedly to try to get crowd to go home. The crowd cheered and made comments in Japanese. Then chairman said crowd wouldn't go home so Mr. Merritt checked with me on negotiation. Mr. Merritt made agreement with the Committee on the basis of the points given you by Mr. Merritt.

Chairman of Committee made another speech; supposedly to tell mob of the terms of the agreement.

Then said crowd won't go till soldiers move. Had to move soldiers second time before crowd dispersed. - First to sentry box and second time to Highway and then the crowd dispersed.

After crowd had dispersed and M.P's had gone home, Mr. Merritt and I toured the camp and found it quiet. Came back to jail where Committee of 5 were waiting; explained all was calm. Then Mr. Merritt sent to Independence for Ueno. When he arrived shook hands all around, including me; Committee restated good faith to hold to terms of agreement.

1. No large gatherings.
2. No violence or jail storming.
3. Ueno case to be left to negotiation between Administration and representatives of the mob.

These above points spoken of many times. I cancelled all passes and held all M.P's in camp. Sometime later after 7:00 P.M., we got call that mob was moving on jail. Issued general "stand to" - Takes time and while we were preparing heard two shots from guard at Gate, evidently a signal for help. Started moving M.P's fast - 1st Detachment under Lt. Zwaik. When most M.P's were gone I came to the jail. Mob massed against jail were in street in front of jail and up street from the jail. None in jail when I arrived. Troops in line from in front of jail south.

Things were somewhat static and crowd remained in place. Can't remember when camp was turned over to me. Believed by Mr. Merritt, by telephone, not long after 7:00 P.M. Said "It's all yours - Good luck". Talked to crowd twice - once at length. Then informed Committee of 5 in jail ~~not~~ wanted to talk to me. Committee demanded release of Ueno. Told them they had broken promises. They said crowd couldn't be controlled. Release Ueno and all will go home and all will be quiet. Promised everything if Ueno released.

Pointed out all broked promises made that P.M.; said so sorry but crowd can't be controlled. I explained status of Uena and legal points. They said too bad crowd won't go home. Either before or after conference walked up and 3 bursts of Tommy gun fire. (Relief - not checked)

capt Hall  
Lt Kunkler

12/9

and down in front of crowd - explained legal procedure, fair trial, investigation with their representatives. Warned them of danger of injury and bloodshed.

to

Saw it was no use/argue. Told Lieutenant Zwaik to get M.P's and move mob back from jail. Went back to M.P. Headquarters - gone 4 to 5 minutes. When I came back crowd had been moved back from jail; not easy to move according to Lt. Zwaik. Then talked to mob again and it was then the rock throwing started; probably at line of soldiers. Committee also talked to crowd but no dispersal.

Saw it was of no use; the crowd <sup>had</sup> settled down to stay and started to sing and do organized cheering. Decided mob wouldn't break up - didn't want to shoot and talked over with Lt. Kunkler and Sgt. Reed. Checked whole line on caution in shooting, putting on gas masks and warning of gas. Issued bombs to first Sergeant. He distributed bombs. I gave order to discharge bombs into and in front of crowd. Heard three shots like shot gun fire and three tommy guns bursts. Mob reformed in first break between buildings E and No. of jail. Sgt. Reed threw two gas bombs into that mob and they dispersed quickly and retreated back further by the latrine. Some were sick. About that time a car was started toward the line of soldiers. I called "halt" to car. Sgt. Reed said "Shall I shoot?" I said "Yes". He fired ~~shots~~ with tommy gun at tires and one tire popped and car crashed into jail building - then bounced off another car and into a truck. Four to six gas bombs were used for first dispersal - comb. Vomit and Tear - CMDM.

Heard shots after tear gas was thrown. First I knew anybody was shot was when I got call for ambulance to take shot man to hospital. The afternoon call for help was relayed to me by a soldier. I came over and talked to Merritt, Campbell and Gilkey.

Evening call, I was told, they wanted me to come in and take over. Later emphasized by Mr. Merritt in person. That nite I made many inspections.

Phoned 1st-Hq. CDS - Reno, about 10 P.M. or little before.  
Colonel Mueller phones Col. Means at WDC 10:40 P.M.  
Phoned Bishop for State Guard. That I could get 150 State Guard -  
Couldn't get more than 10 immediately.  
Colonel Mueller called Colonel Wing - NSC - immediately after calling  
Colonel Means.

Press kept phoning. My instructions to my men:

1. Cautioned about gas.

Always cautioned men never fire until absolutely necessary.

Lt. F. J. Kunkler:

I personally cautioned men along the line to be cautious about shooting.

I evacuated people from hospital after M.P's had taken over camp.

Six gas bombs were used for first dispersal. Mixed gas and vomit.

Crowd broke to disperse. Segment of crowd moved toward line of soldiers across main entrance ~~gate~~ road. Guards fired without orders. Three shot gun and 3 bursts of Tommy gun fire. (Belief - not checked)

SECONDARY SCHOOL  
Education Department  
Community services Division  
Manzanar, California

Principal  
Leon C. High

Vice-Principal  
Myron A. Hesse

December 8, 1942

Date

TO: MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND FBI

Address \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: MYRON A. HESSE

Address \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Backgrounds of Japanese defiance

The following information concerning conditions at Manzanar has come to me through Japanese sources and seems pertinent enough to call to your attention. It has been stated that these items have contributed to trouble by stimulating the ~~mal~~-contents and swaying the indecisive over a considerable period of time.

(1) A Japanese army radio station in Kiska, Alaska, it is said, can be heard in this and other camps by 7-tube radios. Obviously such broadcasts contribute to restlessness. It is also said that these broadcasts constantly warn against relocation or resettlement.

(2) A pro-axis newspaper called the "Rocky Shimbun" or "Sierra Shimbun" of Denver, Colo. is said to be received through the mail by evacuees. Much of its material is said to be correlated with the Kiska broadcasts. It was intimated that the paper is printed in Japanese.

(3) Should the above items not exist in reality (my informant did not know personally) much harm is being done by gossip which spreads information purportedly from these sources.

12/7/42  
12:00 PM  
all Bulletin  
Boards

### NOTICE

During the period of the present emergency the controlling Authority is the military, and their orders must be obeyed. The center, so far as is practicable, will operate in the usual way. Mess halls, schools and administrative offices will be open as usual.

Mail will not be sent out nor will incoming mail be distributed. No incoming or outgoing telephone or telegraph messages will be allowed. People will not be permitted to leave the center, nor will outsiders be permitted to enter without authority from the military. No group will be permitted to congregate without proper authority from the military.

Colonel Mueller,  
commanding

一 般 在 住 民 に 告 ぐ !

現在當センターは軍の絶対權威の下にあります。在住民は軍の命令に従はなければなりません。但し實行出来る範圍にセンターの機關は普通に事務を行ひます。食堂、學校及び執行事務所は平時通り開きます。

左の行動は固く禁じられてゐます。

- 一、郵便物の發送及び外部よりの郵便物の配達
- 二、電話及び電信電報の受送。
- 三、當センターより外出する事及び訪問者が軍部の許可なくしてセンターに入る事。
- 四、如何なる者でも軍部の許可なくして集合する事。

一九四二年十二月七日

↑ 司令官 ミュラー大佐



NOTES on interview with Mr. Merritt, 12-7-42.

The underlying causes of this difficulty were: Feeling among the evacuees of the injustices of the evacuation, resentment against restrictions within the Relocation Center, and their mixed national loyalties. We have in this Center approximately 4,000 ~~Issei~~<sup>Nisei</sup>, 500 Kibeis, and the balance of approximately 5,000 ~~Nisei~~. Many of the loyal evacuees are passive, while the militant Pro-Axis group is very active and has worked diligently for their cause. When the mob demonstration occurred Sunday there were many passive Japanese in line with the Pro-Axis group, in lip service at least.

The FBI has not worked closely with the Project Director. The agents have used evacuees as "stool pigeons", have removed some evacuees to internment camps, and have done nothing to protect, or help us to protect, the "informers". The FBI agents, when they came into the Center, did not always report to the Project Director; however, last week two FBI agents were here and called on me, and said that they had a group of three that they were going to remove, but would take only two because the third evacuee was an American citizen.

All of the pre-evacuation problems and antagonisms of the evacuees have been transferred to the Project. People with similar loyalties and similar views can live together successfully under self-government. However, to place people with dissimilar views and loyalties together in a Center of this type creates the basis for trouble.

Fred Tayama, a loyal Japanese who had helped the FBI and who had recently been to a JACL meeting in Salt Lake City, was beaten up by a gang of six masked men Saturday night. Tayama was lying on his bed in his barracks studying. The masked men entered and beat him with clubs, but he was not seriously injured.

We are removing 40 or more who are loyal and useful to the Administration from the Japanese area, and placing them under the protective custody of the M.P.s. These are individuals, and their families, who are under threat of the mob.

The Japanese police, under the Caucasian Chief and his Assistant, functioned okeh. After the beating Saturday night they questioned a list of five suspects. Tayama tentatively identified Ueno as one of the assailants. Ueno has been a leader of the dissatisfied labor group; he is an agitator type and had organized a union of cooks and kitchen workers.

After questioning Ueno was held in the Center jail on suspicion of having participated in the beating. It was considered desirable to transfer him to the jail at Independence and this was done prior to daylight.

Ueno's roommate was picked up for questioning, but he would not talk. It was believed that he was an "emotional" suspect. He was released the following morning.

The questioning was completed by daylight and police investigators retired. The camp seemed quiet all Sunday morning. About noon I was informed that a large meeting was being held in the firebreak in the Center camp, and that inflammatory speeches were being made over a loud speaker, calling on all evacuees to strike. I immediately started for the scene of the meeting, but when I arrived I found the crowd was disbursing and was informed that a committee would call on me.

I went first to the "Town Hall". There was no one there so I returned to the police station. After I returned to the police station I saw a large crowd, possibly 1000 to 1500, coming down the road to the police station from the West end of camp. I informed the Captain of the M.P. Company by phone of the situation and asked for a guard. He responded at once and brought in a small detachment. This was at about 12:30 P.M. The M.Ps. were strung out in front of the West side of the jail and along the road East of the Administration buildings, and the crowd was on the opposite side of the road from the M.Ps.

A committee of five evacuees talked to me and demanded the return of Ueno to the Center jail, or there would be a general strike. The mob was uncontrolled and started to yell and jeer. I told the committee there could be no discussion until the mob disbursed, but this was not agreeable to the mob. They demanded that the M.Ps. be withdrawn before they disbursed.

I then took the committee of five to one side and talked to them, and stated that I would be glad to return Ueno to the Center jail within one hour after the mob had been disbursed and the camp had returned to normal, on the following terms:

1. There would be no more mass meetings and no more mob demonstrations;
2. There would be no attempt of a jail delivery of Ueno;
3. The committee would help bring in the guilty parties in the Tayama beating case.

The committee agreed to these terms. The committee leader was Joe Kurihara, a U. S. citizen, born in Hawaii, and a veteran of the previous war. He is very bitter over evacuation. This evacuee said in substance: "We are going to kill all 'informers', tonight, tomorrow night, etc. until we get them all. You can shoot us or starve us, but we wont do anything but kill informers."

The military were withdrawn to the edge of camp and the crowd disbursed. Within 15 minutes the camp had apparently returned to normal. I made a tour of the camp by car to assure myself that this was true, and then sent members of my staff to Independence and had Ueno brought back to the Center jail.

The committee of five waited at the jail until Ueno was returned. When he was brought in they talked to him and I repeated the terms of the agreement, and the committee again agreed to those terms. I told the committee that if there was any further trouble they would be held responsible.

Just after dark I was notified by phone by Dr. James Goto, that a mass meeting was being held in Block 22 to organize a militant group to go to the hospital to kill Tayama. I telephoned Captain Hall and advised him of the situation and advised him to send an ambulance with a squad of M.Ps. by a backroad to remove Tayama from the hospital. A mob arrived at the hospital ahead of the ambulance, searched the hospital, but did not find Tayama because he was hidden. After the mob had disbursed from around the hospital, the M.Ps. removed Tayama in an ambulance. About the same time another mob, led by the committee of five, converged on the jail. The Assistant Police Chief phoned Capt. Hall, advised him of the situation, and asked that the M.Ps. be on the alert. At about 7:15 I asked Capt. Hall to take over control of the camp.

There were some acts of extreme loyalty, such as the YMCA women who took in men who were being hunted, and kept off the mob. The local Japanese police force, and about 200 others in all, have done outstanding meritorious service and have been outspokenly loyal. I propose to take over the CCC Camp in Death Valley to house the active loyal until this full situation is solved.

I have been informed that today the Japs are talking in small groups about a further absolute and complete strike, to force the military to take more drastic action.

There has been much dissention over the camouflage. Under the present proposal the evacuees are to be paid 60 cents an hour for their work, but will draw only the base pay for evacuees under WRA regulations, balance to go into a community trust fund for redistribution to all evacuees in the camp. The evacuees who have requested repatriation are actively opposed to this for fear, if they accept money which was profit from an American war effort, that Japan would not accept them or, if accepted, would take retaliatory action against them after arrival in Japan.

From Captain Hall:

Group meetings were held in all mess halls last night after the shooting.

MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA  
December 6, 1942

SUBJECT: Riot.

The following is a brief outline of the rioting which occurred on my shift, the night of December 6, 1942.

6:20 p.m; Received a telephone call from Dr. Goto at the hospital, stating that a mob was marching on the hospital from block #22. The doctor said there were approximately two thousand men in this gang, so the doctor's informant told him. He said they were coming after Fred Tayama. He asked for protection, adding that Fred Tayama was in Ward number 3.

6:25 p.m; I called Mr. Merritt and explained the situation. He asked me to telephone the M. P. barracks and ask them for an escort to meet the hospital ambulance at the rear of the hospital. He requested that they take a circuitous route.

6:28 p.m; I immediately advised Mr. Merritt of the results of my call to Lt. Kunkler.

6:30 p.m; Dr. Goto called and said the gang was approaching; help was badly needed. I told him the army ambulance would pick Tayama up at the back of the hospital.

6:31 p.m; I again called and was told by the sergeant answering the telephone at the army barracks that the ambulance was leaving.

I immediately called the hospital and gave a nurse this information.

6:35 p.m; Dr. Little telephoned and requested help; he stated the mob was there. I told him the army should arrive any minute.

6:40 p.m; I called Mr. Merritt.

6:45 p.m; Jack Shimatsu, 14-6-2, a Japanese policeman in the station he stated, said that his father had attended the meeting in block #22. He said that a mob of about two thousand was coming to the station to kill all the police. He said they blamed all the police for the arrests which have been made.

6:47 p.m.; I called Capt. Hall and requested him to send a guard to protect the police station. He stated that he would do so immediately.

6:50 p.m.; The mob could be heard approaching; they were cheering and shouting in Japanese as they reached the police station. They came in the side door and front door at almost the same instant that they came in the Chief's office where I was. I went to the front office of the station and when I returned, someone had given them the keys to the jail. It also was filled with men. The sentry on the main gate fired three shots, evidently for help. I met the same men who had served on the committee representing the mob earlier in the day; with them I walked to the front office. They darted this way and that, speaking in Japanese to the rioters who were in the police station. They cleared the interior of the station of nearly everyone but the committee. However, the hallway leading from the side door into the jail was filled with men. I could see them in the jail and hear them loudly talking. They demanded that I release Harry Ueno, 22-3-4, who was being held in jail on a charge of attack with a deadly weapon. I told them I had no authority to do so, but it looked as though they had taken matters into their own hands. The spokesman of the committee then told me that they didn't intend to take Ueno that way. If I couldn't do it, they wanted to see Mr. Merritt; in fact, they wanted to see him anyway. I tried to explain to them the magnitude of the action they had taken. I pointed out to them that someone probably would be killed, or at least wounded, unless they disbanded and returned to their homes. He replied, "We don't care if we are killed; we are ready to die". I reminded him that he had promised Mr. Merritt, Capt. Hall and Chief Gilkey in the afternoon that there would not be another illegal demonstration like the one which had occurred earlier that afternoon. He said that during the meeting held in block #22 he and the others had talked to the crowds which had gathered, and the crowd had insisted on coming to the police station and securing the release of Ueno. He said, "I no longer have any control over them." Two or three times he walked out the front door and said something to the mass of people assembled; he spoke in Japanese. About five or ten minutes after the sentry had fired the first three shots, he fired the same number of shots again. The committee insisted that I call Mr. Merritt, which I did. He asked what they wanted. I explained that they demanded the release of Ueno, and that they wanted to see him. He asked, "How does it look?" I replied, "Very bad". Mr. Merritt said, "Call Capt. Hall and ask him to take command; if necessary declare martial law. The committee will have to do their negotiating with Capt. Hall; they have failed to keep their promise to me." I turned from the telephone and told the group that Mr. Merritt was not at home and that we would have to wait a short while. I called Capt. Hall and explained

Mr. Merritt's request to him. I attempted to return from the front office to the adjoining rear office, but was prevented from doing so; I found the door had been locked from the opposite side. How many people had entered this rear office through the side door I had no way of telling. After the riot, we learned that all of the criminal fingerprint cards had been stolen. Also my gloves and pipe were gone.

Shortly thereafter the first detachment of soldiers arrived, under command of Lieut. Zwaik. They immediately cleared the front of the station, but upon my request they permitted the committee to remain in the front office with five of my Japanese policemen. Three of the policemen had come for protection; the other two had remained on duty in the office. Lieut. Zwaik and his men had considerable difficulty in forcing the mob back even with the west side of the police station. However, this was done without any bloodshed.

Mr. Campbell called at about the same time the soldiers arrived. I explained the exigency to Mr. Campbell, the Asst. Project Director.

Capt. Hall arrived soon after; more soldiers came on the scene. Capt. Hall entered the police station and immediately went into conference with the mob's committee. They talked for approximately thirty minutes. The Captain made an honest effort to come to a peaceful understanding. When all efforts in this direction apparently failed with the committee, the Captain went outside, walked past the first line of his soldiers, and while between his men and the gang of Japanese rioters, he asked them in a clear, calm voice, so that all could hear, to return to their homes. His talk was met by several Japanese throwing large stones. I don't know who their target was, but the stones narrowly missed Capt. Hall and fell among his soldiers.

The command was given to use the tear gas, but the rioters still stood their ground. I heard the command, "Gas", but I didn't see any Japanese walk away. Shortly after this command about four or five tear gas bombs were shot into the crowd. The wind was blowing from the north to the south, and since most of the rioters were assembled north of where the gas bombs fell, the majority of them could have suffered no ill effects. Because of the smoke it was difficult to see for a few moments what the reaction was. However, as it blew away I saw three men lying on the ground. They quickly got up, though, and ran with everyone else either to the west or north.

I must go back far enough in my report to state that before Capt. Hall and the rioters' representatives had completed their conference, the mob sang many Japanese songs and

shoutly loudly in Japanese.

I walked back about halfway to the sentry box which is on the main gate. From this point I heard a crash and saw a car strike the northeast corner of the police station. A moment later I heard a machine gun fire approximately seven or eight times. This machine gun seemed to be located very near where the automobile had struck the building. The automobile, after striking the police station, seemed to gain speed again and travelled the entire length of the police station on the east side and struck an army truck loaned to the W.R.A., which was parked on the southeast side of said building.

The Japanese rioters were in the dark or disappearing into the interior of the Center, but I could clearly hear them cursing the soldiers. They were still loudly shouting in Japanese, too. I entered the sentry box at the main gate to get warm. I remained at this point for approximately forty-five minutes, then left for home.

Respectfully submitted;

Arthur L. Williams  
Asst. Chief, Internal Security,  
War Relocation Authority,  
Manzanar, California.

DJM  
DJM/fh  
ec  
CAD

REPORT ON THE DISTURBANCE AND RIOT AT THE

MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION PROJECT

DECEMBER 6, 1942

SECTION I. Chronological Summary of Events, December 5 - December 9, 1942.

12/5/42 - Late evening: Fred Tayama, Nisei, was beaten, in his apartment, by a gang of six masked men armed with clubs. He suffered scalp lacerations and bruises and was hospitalized for treatment. The assailants were frightened away by the cries of his daughter and escaped without being apprehended. The Center Interior Security Police, under Chief John W. Gilkey, started an immediate investigation which continued throughout the night. Five evacuees were picked up for questioning, including Harry Y. Ueno, who had been tentatively identified by Tayama as one of the assailants.

It was decided to hold Ueno on suspicion of participation in the beating, but all other suspects were released. The Project Director and the Police Chief decided to transfer Ueno to the County Jail at Independence, California and this transfer was made prior to daylight, December 6, 1942.

12/6/42 - The camp appeared to be quiet during the entire morning. Noon: A mass meeting of about 2,000 persons was held in the fire-break at the West side of the camp. A loudspeaker system was set up and the crowd was harangued by speakers who urged a general strike to enforce the return of Ueno to the Center Jail for local trial.

Approximately Noon: Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, received information that a mass meeting was being held and started immediately for the scene of the meeting. When he arrived he found that the crowd was dispersing and was informed that a committee would confer with him. He then went to the Manzanar Police Station.

12:30 P.M.: Mr. Merritt phoned the M.P. headquarters to inform the M.P. Commander of the situation and to request that an M.P. guard be sent into the camp. Captain Martyn Hall, (C.O.) of the M.P. Company responded immediately and brought a detachment of 10 men into camp and posted them in a line in front of the jail and across the entrance road.

About the time the M.P. detachment arrived a large crowd, possibly as many as 1000, with the committee in the lead, was seen coming down the road towards the police station from the west side of the camp. Mr. Merritt and Captain Hall walked up the road and met them in front of the Administration Building, about one-half block from the police station.



Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

Captain Hall decided that the crowd might easily become unruly and had his second in command bring the balance of the M.P. Company into the camp. The company was deployed along the road which runs along the west side of the police station and jail, the east side of the Administration Building, and across the main entrance road. One machine gun was set up at the road intersection and aimed toward the mob.

Mr. Merritt talked with the committee of five and they demanded the return of Ueno to the Manzanar jail, or there would be a general strike. Mr. Merritt conferred with Captain Hall regarding negotiating with the committee and then did negotiate.

An agreement was reached between Mr. Merritt and the committee of five as follows:

1. That Ueno be returned to the Manzanar Jail within one hour after the mob had dispersed and the camp had returned to normal;
2. That there be no more mass meetings and no more mob demonstrations;
3. That there be no violence and no attempt to deliver Ueno from the Manzanar Jail;
4. That the committee would assist in identifying and apprehending the evacuees who participated in the Tayama beating.

The mob was apparently uncontrolled. There was much yelling and jeering, particularly when the machine gun was set up in the street.

After the agreement was reached, the chairman of the committee of five, Joe Kurihara, made a speech to the mob in Japanese for the avowed purpose of informing the mob of the terms of the agreement. The Japanese Chief of Police, acting as interpreter for Mr. Merritt, told him the speaker had informed the mob of the agreement. However, it was later reported by supposedly loyal and trustworthy evacuees who were present and heard the speech that Kurihara did not inform the mob of the terms of the agreement, but told them that this was their victory; that Ueno was being returned to the Manzanar jail; and that they would meet again at 6:00 P.M. and then force Mr. Merritt to release Ueno from the Manzanar jail.

2:45 P.M. (approx.): The Military Police withdrew and the crowd dispersed.

3:00 P.M.: Mr. Merritt and Captain Hall toured the camp in a car and found conditions apparently quiet and normal. Immediately thereafter Mr. Merritt sent members of his staff to Independence and had Ueno returned to the Manzanar jail.

Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

The committee of five waited at the police station until Ueno was returned. The committee talked to Ueno in the presence of Mr. Merritt and Captain Hall and Mr. Merritt restated the terms of the agreement, and the committee reiterated their good faith in accepting these terms. Mr. Merritt informed the committee that if there was any further trouble they would be held responsible for it.

On the surface, the Center was quiet and peaceful during the balance of the afternoon. Captain Hall cancelled all passes for military personnel and held the entire company in the M.P. area.

6:00 P.M. (Approx.): A second mass meeting was held adjacent to Block 22 to organize a mob for two purposes:

1. To take Tayama out of the hospital and "to take care of him."
2. To force the Project Director to release Ueno from the Manzanar jail.

Here again, inflammatory speeches were delivered by mob leaders over a loud speaker. (From this time to 10:00 P.M., exact time and sequence are difficult to establish).

6:22 P.M.: Assistant Police Chief, Arthur L. Williams, was informed by Dr. James Goto of the Center Medical Staff that he had information that a crowd was coming to the hospital to remove Tayama. Mr. Williams advised Project Director Merritt and was instructed to remove Tayama from the hospital in an ambulance and take him outside the Center area under military escort.

6:25 P.M.: Mr. Williams 'phoned the M.P. Headquarters and advised Lieut. F. J. Kunkler of the situation. Lieut. Kunkler stated that he would send an ambulance with a squad of M.Ps. to remove Tayama.

6:30 P.M.: Mr. Williams 'phoned Lieut. Kunkler again and inquired if the ambulance had left and was informed it was about to leave.

6:35 P.M.: Telephone switchboard operator informed Ass't. Chief of Police Williams that there was an emergency at the hospital.

At approximately 6:35 P.M., a mob of several hundred arrived at the Center hospital and entered through the front and rear doors and jammed the catwalk corridor between the wards. A part of the mob, variously estimated from 100 to 200, entered the hospital and searched most or all of the wards for Tayama. He had been hidden, ~~was~~ not discovered, and was later removed in an ambulance under military escort after the mob had been dispersed. Evidently this mob joined the mob at the jail, after searching the hospital and failing to find Tayama.

Re: Summary of Events at Manzanar

6:40 P.M.: Assistant Chief Williams informed the M.P. headquarters of the situation and asked Captain Hall to bring in Military Police. He then 'phoned Mr. Merritt and informed him of the situation. Mr. Merritt said, "Call Captain Hall" and Mr. Williams said the call had already been made.

6:45 P.M. (approx.): A mob of several hundred arrived at the Center police station and jail and the committee of five and other members of the mob entered the building from the front and side. Ass't. Chief Williams again 'phoned Mr. Merritt, who said "Turn the camp over to the M.Ps." Shortly thereafter Mr. Merritt 'phoned Captain Hall at M.P. Headquarters and told him he wanted the military to come in and take over the camp.

6:50 P.M. (approx.): First detachment of M.Ps., under command of Lieut. Stanley Zwalk, arrived at the police station. The balance of the Company was moved in in increments within a few minutes by Captain Hall and Lieut. Kunker.

The M.Ps. took control of the police station and jail, pushed the crowd back from that building and formed a skirmish line along the road to the west of the jail and to the south along the east side of the Administration Building. The crowd was pushed back to the opposite side of the road and up the main road to the west. The committee of five, and five terrified Japanese policemen, were detained in the police station by the military.

Captain Hall talked to the mob and both ordered and urged them to disperse. He walked up and down the line, reviewing the entire situation, the agreement that had been made, and the possibility of violence if they did not disperse. The crowd demanded the release of Ueno and refused to disperse unless he was released.

Captain Hall then talked to the committee of five and they also demanded the release of Ueno. The Captain explained the matter of broken promises and general status of Ueno and the committee stated that they were so sorry that the crowd could not be controlled but that if Ueno was released everyone would go home and everything would be quiet. Captain Hall refused to release Ueno.

Captain Hall again walked up and down in front of the mob, talked to them, and urged them to disperse. At this time some rocks were thrown or tossed by the mob, apparently at the line of soldiers, and there was much jeering, hooting and name-calling. The committee of five also talked to the mob but still it did not disperse.

Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

By this time the crowd had settled down, apparently prepared to stay in place, and singing and organized cheering had started. Captain Hall decided that the crowd would not break up peacefully and that he did not want to fire into the mob. He conferred with Lieut. Kunkler and decided to use gas to force the mob to disperse. The officers passed up and down the skirmish line and instructed the M.Ps. to put on gas masks and be prepared to use gas, and also cautioned them not to fire unless forced to do so.

Gas bombs, combination tear and vomit, were issued and at Captain Hall's order these bombs, at least six in number, were thrown into and at the edge of the crowd. The wind at that time was gusty and blowing generally from north to south. Four bombs were thrown at the northern end of the mob and two were thrown at the intersection of the main entrance road and the road on the west side of the jail in an effort to force the crowd to break up and to fall back to the west of the main entrance road and into the open spaces between the buildings across from the police station.

The crowd started to break up and run, immediately that the gas bombs were discharged. A portion of the crowd broke toward the M.Ps. who were stationed across the main entrance road. Some M.Ps., number and identity unknown, fired without orders into that portion of the crowd which came charging toward them. According to the best information available, there were three short bursts of sub-machine gunfire and three shots from a shotgun. One evacuee was killed and nine wounded, two critically, by this gun fire. A list of the dead and wounded is attached as TAB A. Included in this list is one evacuee who was a tear-gas casualty.

Part of the mob re-formed in an open space in the block to the northwest of the police station, after being dispersed by the first gassing. Captain Hall observed this and had two additional gas bombs thrown into that small mob and they dispersed immediately. There were no further efforts made by the mob to re-form.

Following this second gas bombing, a Chevrolet coupe, assigned to the Fire Chief, and which was parked on the road north of the police station was seized by unknown evacuees, started up, put in gear, and headed at a good speed toward the M.P. guards stationed along side of the police station. Captain Hall and Sergeant Reed were in the area north of the Police Station and saw the car coming. Captain Hall shouted "halt" and when the car did not halt (it was driverless), he ordered Sergeant Reed to fire at the tires with his "Tommy gun". Seven or eight shots were fired, one of which punctured the left front tire causing the car to veer sharply to

Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

the left. The car struck the northeast corner of the police station, literally tearing off that corner, careened off of a parked car and crashed into a WRA truck parked just beyond the south end of the police station, badly damaging the front end of the car. The Chevrolet coupe had been left parked at the fire station, with the keys in it, so that the Fire Chief or his Assistant, whichever one was first to arrive, could use it in an emergency without delay.

The wounded were removed to the Center hospital by ambulance as soon as possible after the crowd dispersed and were treated by the regular hospital staff. The one evacuee who died as a result of gunshot wounds was dead when removed to the hospital and it is the opinion of the medical officers that death had been instantaneous, as he was shot through the heart.

Fred Tayama was removed from the hospital in an ambulance, under military escort, after the crowd had dispersed, and taken to the M.P. area. The five members of the mob committee and the prisoner, Fred Y. Tayama, were taken under military escort and placed in jail at Bishop, California. A number of terrified loyal evacuees were placed in protective custody in the M.P. area.

The crowd was dispersed and order restored by 9:30 - 9:45 P.M. Captain Hall decided that he would need additional military personnel to control the situation and believed that he could get up to 150 California State Guard almost at once. He therefore 'phoned the State Guard Officer at Bishop, California, and requested that a company of State Guards be brought immediately. However, he was informed that the personnel was badly scattered and only about ten men could be furnished immediately. Captain Hall asked for all personnel available.

10:00 P.M.: Captain Hall 'phoned Headquarters, Central Defense Sector, Reno, Nevada, and informed that headquarters of the Manzanar situation to that hour, requesting that additional military personnel be sent in at once. Colonel Harrie S. Mueller, C.O., Central Defense Sector, 'phoned full information on the Manzanar incident to Colonel Lewis M. Means, P.M., WDC & 4A, about 10:40 P.M. Immediately thereafter he 'phoned this information to Colonel C. K. Wing, Director of Internal Security, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas. He took action to send two M.P. Companies to Manzanar at once, one from Reno and one from Las Vegas, Nevada.

Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

As soon as the drowd was dispersed, Captain Hall posted the necessary guards around the perimeter of the Center, over vital installations, and established patrols throughout the Center area. No further disturbances were observed during the night; however, one evacuee was hospitalized with scalp lacerations, reported to have been received when he was beaten by an unidentified gang. This beating evidently occurred very shortly after the mob was dispersed.

Detachments of California State Guard arrived during the period from 12:00 M. to 7:00 A.M., December 7, 1942. In all, seven officers and forty enlisted men reported and performed duty until the afternoon of December 7, when the first additional M.P. Company had arrived and was ready for duty.

12/7/42 - Morning: Colonel Harris S. Mueller, C. O., Central Defense Sector, and Major Paul C. Greene, Operations and Training Officer, Central Security District, arrived. Colonel Mueller assumed command upon arrival. After thoroughly acquainting himself with the situation, Colonel Mueller instructed Project Director Merritt to continue the administration of the Center with his regular staff in as nearly normal manner as circumstances would permit; but that all operations would be subject to the orders of the military.

The operation of all work projects was suspended.

Project Director Merritt telephoned Mr. Dillon Myer, National Director, WRA, and apprized him of the situation at Manzanar. He requested authority to transfer a group of loyal evacuees, who were under threat of the mob, to CCC Camp, Cow Creek, Death Valley, and that Mr. Myer arrange for the use of that camp. He further requested Mr. Myer to come to Manzanar immediately to assist in finding a solution for the difficulty as this seemed to involve national WRA policies.

During the day a number of additional evacuees, and their families, who were under threat of physical violence by the militant pro-Axis group, were removed from the Japanese area to the M.P. area for safety. Two additional suspected ring-leaders were picked up and placed in the jail at Bishop, California.

1:00 P.M.: Colonel Mueller issued an order to inform the evacuees that the Center was under military control, that internal functions of the Center would continue as usual, and that the movement of incoming and outgoing mail, telegrams, and telephone calls was prohibited. This order was published in both English and Japanese and posted on all Center bulletin boards.

Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

12/7/42 - (Cont'd.)

2:00 P.M.: Company A, 753rd M.P. Battalion, arrived from Reno, Nevada.

3:45 P.M.: Colonel Lewis M. Means, Provost Marshal, WDC & 4A, and Captain David J. McFadden, CAD, WDC & 4A, arrived

The officers and enlisted men of the California State Guard were released and departed from the Center, following the arrival of the Company A, 753rd M.P. Battalion.

6:00 P.M.: Company B, 751st M.P. Battalion, arrived from Las Vegas, Nevada.

Throughout this day, Hq. WDC & 4A and Hq. Ninth Service Command were kept advised of the situation. By evening approximately 150 evacuees were under the protective custody of the Military Police. They were fed in the M.P. mess and given temporary sleeping quarters in the Project Administration Building and in the M.P. Infirmary.

12/8/42 - Colonel Mueller announced the organization of his staff to include the appointment of Robert L. Brown as Public and Press Relations Officer for the Military Command.

10:30 A.M.: Project Director Merritt recommended to Colonel Mueller that the high schools be closed because of lack of adequate attendance and the belligerent attitude of part of the pupils.

10:50 A.M.: Colonel Mueller ordered high schools closed. Project Director Merritt telephoned Mr. Myer in Washington, D. C., and again informed him of the necessity of relocating the loyal group then under protective custody, and the need to develop an adequate Caucasian police force for the Center, before the Military Police could be withdrawn. Mr. Myers instructed Mr. Merritt to suspend all action of the transfer of the loyal group to CCC Camp at Death Valley, pending the arrival of E. R. Fryer, Deputy National Director, who would arrive the following day.

Late afternoon: Mr. Willard E. Schmidt, National Chief of Project Interior Security Police, former Chief of Police at Manzanar, arrived to assist in the investigation of the rioting and the development of the Center police force.

Five additional suspected ring-leaders were picked up and placed in the jail at Lone Pine, California, under military guard. This jail, previously unused, was taken over from Inyo County for exclusive use of the military.

Hq. WDC & 4A and Hq. Ninth Service Command were kept advised throughout the day of the situation.

Re:  
Summary of Events at Manzanar

12/9/42 - Elementary schools were closed because of the failure of the students to attend.

All functions within the Center necessary to health and sanitation continued in nearly normal fashion. It was reported that two or three Japanese had set up a virtual dictatorship and evacuees worked only with their permission. No work projects were in operation.

No definite action was taken to develop a Caucasian police force pending the arrival of Mr. Fryer. Tentative plans were made and CAD, WDC & 4A, was requested to furnish a list of former WCCA Interior Police who might be available for such employment.

One additional suspected ring-leader was picked up and placed in jail at Lone Pine, California. Colonel Mueller ordered the transfer of evacuees being held in jail at Bishop to the jail at Lone Pine. A list of the evacuees held in military custody is attached as TAB B.

Hq. WDC & 4A and Hq. Ninth Service Command were kept advised throughout the day of the situation.

5:00 P.M.: Colonel Means and Captain McFadden departed for San Francisco.

At the time of the departure of these officers, Mr. Fryer had not yet arrived. The Military Police were in complete control of the camp and the Administration of the camp was being carried on by the regular project staff under the supervision of the military. No work projects were being operated and schools were closed. Evacuees were on a virtual sit-down strike and the functions of the camp necessary to health and sanitation were being carried on only with the permission of the Japanese leaders.

Approximately 150 Japanese, the so-called "loyal" group, were in protective custody of the Military Police.



# WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

In reply, please refer to:

MANZANAR RELOCATION AREA  
MANZANAR, CALIFORNIA

December 6, 1942

STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE PRESS NIGHT OF DEC. 6, 1942

\* \* \* \* \*

"On the eve of the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor, a pro-axis group among the Japanese at Manzanar have brought on a crisis which has made necessary calling of the military police and the placing of Manzanar under martial law as protection to the people of Manzanar and the people of Inyo County. Whenever in the opinion of the Military police complete order has been restored and the FBI and other government agencies have completely cleaned up the agitators and leaders, the camp will be returned to its normal administration. The entire staff of the caucasian police, Japanese police and administrative staff have stood by during the day with calmness and courage, with the hope and expectation that loyal people of this camp will be able to regain control. It must be remembered that at Manzanar out of 10,000 people we have approximately 4,000 native born Japanese and 500 American born who were educated in Japan. I pay tribute to the efforts of loyal people of this camp, but the percentage against them from the outset has been one difficult of control, climaxing in today's break".

