MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel William A. Boekele

Reference is made to the attached memorandum from General DeWitt regarding the circumstances surrounding the firing done by men of the M.P. Company at the time of the rioting at Manzanar December 6, 1942.

In my report on the Manzanar riot I stated as follows: "The wind at that time was gusty and blowing generally from north to south. Four bombs were thrown at the northern end of the mob and two were thrown at the intersection of the main entrance road and the road on the west side of the jail in an effort to force the crowd to break up and to fall back to the west of the main entrance road and into the open spaces between the buildings across from the police station.

"The crowd started to break up and run, immediately that the gas bombs were discharged. A portion of the crowd broke toward the M.Ps. who were stationed across the main entrance road. Some M.Ps., number and identity unknown, fired without orders into that portion of the crowd which came charging toward them."...

When the gas bombs were discharged a portion of the mob started to run toward the M.Ps. stationed across the main entrance road to avoid the effects of the gas. However, the M.Ps. who fired had no way of determining the intentions of the crowd.

David J. McFadden
Major, Infantry.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

January 6, 1943

1. Reference paragraph 2 of the attached letter from the Assistant Secretary of War: If I remember the report correctly, while the men of the MP Company who fired did so without orders, they fired as a result of pressure by a certain group of Japanese who were attempting to avoid the effects of the tear gas. In other words, there was no way for the men to determine whether or not the crowd was moving towards them intentionally, and in my opinion were amply justified in firing without orders and on their own initiative.

2. I wish you would verify the exact wording of this and let me know.

The above can be verified from reports made by Colonel Means, Colonel Mueller and Captain McFadden.

I agree with your report on the Japanese police opening fire on a "charging" crowd or merely trying to get away from the gas. The report specifically states that they "fired without orders." This point does not appear clear, as it was "breaking up" in trying to get away from the gas.

I have sent the report to the Provost Marshal General, as it may be of help to him in his training.

Sincerely,

John J. McCloy

1 Incl:
Ltr fr Asst Sec War to General DeWitt 1/6/43.

Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt
Commanding General, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California
January 6, 1943

Dear General DeWitt:

Thank you for the report on the Manzanar affair which has just reached me. As you know, I have been concerned about conditions not only in the Manzanar project, but in all the other centers as well, and your report on the Manzanar affair gives a good picture of the development of these riots, all of which appear to have the same general pattern.

Upon reading the report, one point does not appear clear. Did the military police open fire on a "charging" crowd or merely as it was "breaking up" in trying to get away from the gas. The report specifically states that they "fired without orders." This point is important perhaps not so much as an interpretation of this incident as it may point to lessons for the military police in the future. I have sent the report to the Provost Marshal General, as it may be of help to him in his training.

Sincerely,

S/John J. McCloy

Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt
Commanding General, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California
SECTION II — ANALYSIS

1. Background for Strike

Over a period of several months there have been a number of beatings in the Manzanar Center. In all cases the beatings were administered at night by an unidentified gang, and the victims were those accused of being informers, or those who worked closely with the Administration. In one instance, an evacuee member of the police force was beaten, reportedly because he had been too diligent in searching the baggage of returning agricultural workers for contraband liquor. The evacuees guilty in these beating cases were not apprehended.

One evacuee was recently found guilty of personal assault by the Center Judicial Council, and sentenced to a term in the Center jail. He was paroled after three days by the Caucasian Chairman of the Judicial Council, who is the head of the Community Services, and given a job in the Community Services Division.

During the three weeks prior to the riot there was an increase in beatings and threats of violence. It appears that this was a part of an organized campaign to intimidate the loyal, and particularly those who were assisting the law enforcement agencies in identifying the disloyal and the law breakers within the Center. FBI agents had been working in the Center for ten days prior to the beating of Fred Tayama, and two evacuees had been removed by these agents. The presence of the FBI agents seems to have fanned the hatred of the evacuees for informers, and Tayama was beaten because he was suspected of having assisted the FBI.

2. Immediate Cause

The immediate cause of the disturbance was the arrest of Harry Y. Ueno on suspicion of participating in the beating of Tayama. The militant evacuee group claimed that Ueno was innocent; that he should be held in the Center jail and tried by the Center Judicial Council; and that, even if guilty, he should not be punished, as the beating was justified since Tayama was an informer.

Ueno was the evacuee Commissary Steward in charge of distribution of food stuffs to the evacuee kitchens. He and other evacuees had made charges of mismanagement and shortages of food stuffs, particularly sugar, involving Director of Feeding, Joe Winchester and Assistant Project Director, Ned Campbell. At the direction of the previous project director, Campbell and Winchester investigated these charges and their report showed only a very minor shortage of sugar. Ueno had also organized the kitchen workers into a virtual "union". It was believed by some of the evacuees that the arrest and removal of Ueno was instigated by Mr. Campbell because of these activities, and to prevent Ueno from testifying further on the matter of food shortages.
It must be noted that the original demand of the mob, at the afternoon demonstration, was for the return of Ueno from the Independence jail to the Manzanar jail. After this objective had been attained, the mob then demanded, at the time of the evening riot, that Ueno be released outright.

3. **Underlying Causes.**

a. Actual grievances of the Evacuees:

1. Lack of proper school buildings. One block is being used exclusively for schools, which has caused some crowding of evacuees in apartments;

2. Lack of steel cots and mattresses for all evacuees. Approximately 2000 were reported to be still using canvas cots and straw ticks;

3. Non-payment of clothing allowances to date. There has been some free issue of clothing, but cash allowances are to be effective only from November 1st. These allowances are to be paid on the November payroll, which should be paid about the end of December;

4. Lack of necessary lumber to make apartments liveable;

5. Dissatisfaction over operation of the Center Cooperative Stores. These stores had made a gross profit of $38,000 to date. It now appears, since these stores are not pure cooperatives, that it will be necessary to pay $21,000 in State and Federal taxes. Many evacuees cannot understand this taxation and believe they are being robbed;

6. Dislike of two administrative employees, who were charged with playing favorites and misusing food supplies.

b. Factors which contributed to dissatisfaction among evacuees:

1. Bitterness over evacuation, and the loss of their rights as residents and as American citizens. Feeling that Japanese were discriminated against, as they were the only nationality evacuated;

2. Personal losses suffered at time of evacuation, and difficulties in securing adequate protection of property and interests since evacuation;

3. System of Center self-government, which deprives the Issei of the right to hold office, and which places the Nisei in a dominate position. This has led to a struggle between the Issei and the Nisei for actual control of the Center self-government;

4. All old, pre-evacuation grudges and troubles have been transferred to the Center, and have been magnified since the evacuees have been confined. This applies particularly to the quarrel between the JACL and group opposed to the JACL.
(5) Fear of the FBI and of being taken from the Center and placed in an internment camp;

(6) Dissatisfaction over the policy pertaining to, and operation of, the camouflage net project, and general dissatisfaction over wages;

(7) Claim that best field workers were not given fit, adequate housing, and that they were not paid the going wage, and that most of these workers returned to the Center without any savings;

(8) Vacillating WRA policies, and the mistakes and unkept promises of the Project Administration;

(9) Psychological reaction of the evacuees to confinement and their inability to reconcile and adjust themselves to strange and abnormal living conditions.

g. Administration factors which contributed to the cause of the strike:

(1) The WRA policy sets up a relocation center as a social community with a maximum of self-government under the general supervision of the project director and his staff. This self-government includes the use of an evacuee police force to maintain law and order, and an evacuee judicial council with limited law enforcement powers. The normal machinery of community government does not seem to be suitable for the abnormal conditions existing in relocation centers;

(2) Absence of a strong, adequate Caucasian police force within the Center to enforce law and order. This Center has a Caucasian Chief of Police, and a Caucasian Assistant Police Chief;

(3) Failure of the Manzanar Administration to apprehend and punish the offenders in previous beating cases, and those guilty of intimidating other evacuees;

(4) Lack of sufficient forcefulness on the part of the Project Director and staff in the administration of the camp. Promises were made to evacuees which could not be, or were not fulfilled. Evacuees were asked what they wanted to do, rather than being told what they were to do. Evacuees were allowed a maximum of self-determination under WRA policies, within the Project;

(5) Undue delay in the payment of clothing allowances, and the changes of policy regarding clothing allowances, which confused the evacuees;

(6) Failure of the Manzanar Administration to keep the evacuees fully informed of their obligations, rights, and privileges under WRA policies.

The mass meeting held at noon on December 6, 1942, was evidently promoted and instigated by a group who were determined to secure the return of the prisoner to the Manzanar jail, and it was obvious that this was considered only the first step, as it was evident that they intended to get him released from jail after his return.

The word of the meeting was evidently passed throughout the Center by word-of-mouth.

The leaders of these mass meetings seem to have made careful plans, in that a loud speaker system was provided, and a chairman and speakers had been selected prior to the hour of the meeting.

The members of the committee, five in number, who dealt with the Project Director on behalf of the mob, were selected by the chairman who presided at the mass meeting, and were not selected by the crowd. This further indicates a prearranged plan.

At the time of the afternoon demonstration an agreement was reached with the Project Director for the return of the prisoner to the Manzanar jail, and the chairman of the committee made a speech to the mob in Japanese, avowedly for the purpose of telling the terms of the agreement. However, according to reports by loyal Japanese who were present, the chairman told the mob that they had won a victory and Ueno was to be returned to the Center, and reminded the mob that a second meeting would be held at 6:00 P.M. and they would then force the Project Director to release the prisoner.

The evening mass meeting was equally well organized and well planned. At the direction of the committee chairman, half of the mob went to the hospital to remove Tayama, and the other half of the mob moved on the jail to force the release of Ueno.

Although, in both the afternoon and evening mob demonstration, the members of the committee of five insisted that they could not control the mob unless their demands were granted, it appears that they so stated in an effort to force the granting of the demands.

The size of the afternoon mob was variously estimated at being 800 to 1500. The approximate number that participated in the evening mob demonstration is difficult to establish. It was reported by loyal Japanese that 2000 attended the evening mass meeting, and one-half were directed to the hospital and the other half to the jail. It is probable that a large percentage of the evacuees who went to the hospital later joined the mob at the jail, and that the mob probably attained a maximum size of 1500 or more.
5. **Violence, Sabotage, and Intimidation.**

Threats of physical violence were made by speakers in both afternoon and evening mass meetings against certain evacuees, and against three members of the administrative staff, by name. The mob then went to the hospital after Tsuruma, with the avowed purpose of committing physical violence on his person.

There were no reported acts of violence by the afternoon mob.

The evening mob threw rocks and stones at the soldiers, and drove a car headed toward the line of guards, as previously reported in Chronological Summary. This mob also entered the police station and jail, but did not open the jail by physical force. The Japanese policeman who had the keys to the jail was threatened with physical violence, and was forced to turn over the keys so the jail could be opened.

There was only one known gang beating after the mob dispersed and the military had taken control of the Center (this was previously outlined in Chronological Summary). There were rumors of other beatings, but no evidence to substantiate the rumors.

It is apparent that this demonstration was a culmination of the widespread campaign of intimidation by threats of violence on the part of the militant, anti-American group. A number of actively pro-American evacuees were threatened, either during or following the mob demonstration, and they and their families were removed from the camp and placed in protective custody in the military area. Various other reports were received of threats being made against individual Japanese for acts favorable to the Project Administration, after the military had taken control of the camp. After the camp was under military control it was reported that no evacuees were permitted to work unless such was approved by the leaders of the controlling Japanese group.

There were no reported acts of sabotage.

6. **Conclusions:**

It is the general opinion of the Project Director, representative members of his staff, and Military Police Officers present, that this mob action was organized and managed by a militant anti-American group, and that action toward such a demonstration had been going on for a long period of time, and that the arrest and confinement of Ueno was merely seized upon as a convenient, immediate cause for action. The purposes behind this action are believed to have been to dominate the internal functioning of the Center, to force the Administration to succumb to the demands of this organized group, to hamper the administration of the Project and stop all productive work.

The above named believe that the following steps are essential for the solution of the difficulties at Manzanar:
a. Develop a strong, adequate Caucasian police force before the military withdraws from the Center. Some Japanese police can be used, but it is impossible to organize an all Japanese force capable of maintaining law and order.

b. The loyal evacuees, now under protective custody of the M.Ps., must not be returned to the Center, but must be removed to a location outside of the Center. This action to be a temporary expedient pending their relocation.

c. A complete program of segregation of the pro-Axis groups, and pro-American groups within the Center, must be put into effect without delay.

d. The job of investigation of this disturbance, and the identification and prosecution of the ring leaders, must be placed in the hands of a single law enforcement agency.

David J. McFadden
Captain, Infantry

December 14, 1942.
SUBJECT: Interim Report on a riot at Manzanar

TO: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen

1. In the riot at Manzanar on the evening of December 6, 1942, one evacuee, a Nisei, aged 17, was killed by gunshot wounds in the heart and abdomen; death was evidently instantaneous. Nine other evacuees received gunshot wounds; two were critically injured, and the balance were seriously injured. The condition of the injured as of December 9, 1942, was that the two critically injured were still in a critical condition, and the condition of all others was good. Of the injured group four were Kibeis, three Niseis, and two Isseis. One evacuee was hospitalized for treatment for tear gas and was reported as recovered on December 9, 1942.

2. As of December 9, 1942, there were 14 male evacuees being held in military custody in the jail at Lone Pine, California. The make-up of this group was as follows: 8 Isseis, 5 Kibeis, and one Nisei. These evacuees were selected for detention on the basis of the following:

   a. One evacuee who had been arrested on suspicion of having participated in the beating which occurred on December 5, 1942;

   b. Five evacuees who were members of the committee which had placed the demands of the crowd before the Project Director;

   c. The remaining eight were selected by Project personnel on the basis of their past activities within the Center, and upon observed or reported activities during the disturbance on December 6, 1942. Part of this group were picked up and detained on the recommendation of Mr. Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director. As soon as this procedure was called to the attention of the Project Director, he required the concurrence of his Chief of Police and other staff members, before recommending that any additional evacuees be placed in custody by the Military Police.
Interim report on riot at Manzanar

To: Colonel Bendetsen

3. There was one additional known beating at Manzanar after the beating of Saturday, December 5, 1942. John Sonoda, Kibei, aged 25, was beaten by an unidentified group Sunday evening, December 6, 1942, after the mob had been disbursed and the camp taken over by the military. He was knocked unconscious and hospitalized for treatment. He was not seriously injured and his present condition is good. It was reported that this evacuee had applied for enlistment in the Naval Intelligence.

4. It is the opinion of the Project Director and members of his staff that there is some direct evidence, and much circumstantial evidence, against the evacuees who are now held in custody by the Military Police, but that sufficient evidence has not been obtained to establish clear legal cases against these men. Work will be required by trained and experienced law enforcement agents to secure the necessary evidence to establish cases for criminal action against these evacuees.

5. Approximately 150 evacuees are now in the protective custody of the Military Police, and are quartered outside of the Japanese area, being fed in the Military Police mess hall. This group is made up of individual evacuees, and their families, who have been threatened with physical violence, or fear physical violence for themselves or family, if they remain in the Japanese area under present conditions. These intimidated evacuees are:

   a. Those accused of being informers;
   b. Those who were actively Pro-American;
   c. Those who are accused of being too friendly and intimate with the Project Administration, and specifically with two members of the staff, against whom a group of evacuees have grievances.

6. The status of the Manzanar situation as of December 9, 1942, was: That the Military Police were in complete control of the Project; That the Administrative functions of the camp were being carried on by the regular Project Staff under the Project Director, as directed by the Military Police Commander. No work projects were operating, and the schools had been closed because of the failure of the majority of the pupils to attend. The actual situation within the camp was that the evacuees were on a sitdown strike, and only those operations essential to the health and sanitation were being carried on. A virtual dictatorship had been set up by two or three Japanese, who were in substance licensing evacuees to perform work essential to the operation of the camp.

David J. McFadden
Captain, Infantry
December 10, 1942

NOTES ON DISCUSSION with Dr./Little, Surgeon in Charge of Center hospital - 12/8/42

Joe Sonoda, Kibei, was beaten up Saturday night in the kitchen where he worked. He said they weren't kidding either; they were really after him. He was mauled by two by fours and knocked out. This happened after the shooting Sunday night. He was hospitalized for lacerated scalp and bruised condition; now is in good condition. Have no other knowledge of any beatings since the military took over.

James Ito was evidently killed instantly. Wound was over the heart. He was brought into the hospital cold and stiff. Rigor mortis had set in. Did not do an autopsy. Wound over heart looked like 35 caliber. Two wounds in lower left flank looked more like 45 caliber judging from the holes. Nine in hospital with bullet wounds, two serious, one shot through stomach and pancreas and the other shot through small intestines, 14 inches of intestines removed. Both in critical condition but we have hopes they will survive.

About 7 P.M. mob came to hospital, about 70 or 80 came into the front door and thousands were in the cat-walk corridors between the wards. I got the crowd out into the street and talked it over with them for ten minutes or so. I wanted to take a committee through the hospital to show them Tayama was gone as I thought Dr. Goto had gotten him out. I don't believe any of the mob got into the ward where Tayama was located. Japanese nurses aids formed en masse in front of the door to keep the mob out.

150 came into the hospital. They wanted Tayama to take him out and "take care of him."

The nurses who helped move Tayama from the ward 3 to ward 1, have since been threatened.

The ringleaders in the Sunday night mob were not obvious. Mob was principally young fellows. Evidently the ringleaders were in back of the crowd pushing the curious ahead. In the past three weeks there has been an increase in beatings and window-breaking.

There have been many rumors of illicit use of good supplies. Some Japanese felt that Ueno, chief cook, was the only Japanese who could testify as to the dates, amounts received, etc., as he was in charge of the food stuffs in the Japanese kitchen.
Notes from Dr. Morse Little

The basic underlying causes for unrest are discrimination of Japanese over other aliens, evacuation and losses suffered due to evacuation; failure of the government to protect the property left behind by the Japanese; (evacuees claim they can't get satisfactory answers to their letters regarding their property) and the conflict between the pro and anti-American group.

GRIEVANCES OF THE EVACUEES:

1. 2,000 still on canvass cots and straw ticks when they were long ago promised mattresses and steel cots.

2. Hospital is designed and built for normally healthy soldiers and not for mixed population.

3. Promised out-patient clinic two or three months ago. This is not furnished.

4. No school buildings. Block 7 being used for schools and this has caused much moving and reduction of living space. 2500 school children in this block with only 1% toilets.

5. Lumber needed to make apartments livable not provided, yet useable scrap lumber sometimes burned.

6. Distrust and dislike of the assistant project director, Campbell. Mob told Mr. Merritt Sunday, that they would "get" Campbell if he was not removed.

7. Center Coop. Stores did 125,000 gross business, 38,000 net, which evacuees expected would be re-distributed to them as a bonus. Now it appears 21,000 must be paid in state and local taxes. Evacuees felt this is "robbery".
### MEDICAL AND HEALTH SECTION

**Date:** 12/9/42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Injury</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. James Ito Nisei</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Gunshot wound of heart and abdomen</td>
<td>Dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. James Kanagawa Kibei</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Perforation of pancreas and stomach</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tom Hatanaka Nisei</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Perforated intestine 14&quot; removed</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. George Kano Nisei</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Wound of left leg</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Henry Inouye Kibei</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Wound of back of chest</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kenjiro Nagamine</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Wound left femur Compound fracture</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Issei, All educ. in Japan. Here in 1912.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Jingo Nakamura</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Wound left forearms</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Issei, All educ. in Japan. Here in 1919.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Harry Mukada Kibei</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Wound of neck</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Harry Charles Sakihara Nisei</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Wound left leg</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3/5/24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Frank Takahashi Kibei</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Wound left thigh Fractured femur</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11/1/20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Yoshio Hoshihiro Kibei</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Tear gas</td>
<td>Well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10/20/11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Beaten by Japanese prior to shooting**

Fred Tayama (Hawaii) Nisei 7/15/05
Scalp lacerations good

**Beaten by Japanese after the shooting**

John Sonada 6/26/17
Scalp lacerations good
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Place and Date of Birth, Schooling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ted Ichiji Akahoshi</td>
<td>5-10-1</td>
<td>Born in Japan 4/7/84. Grammar school in Japan, came to US in 1904. High school &amp; Stanford Univ. in US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife: Nana Akahoshi &amp; family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Issei)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokichi Harry Hashimoto</td>
<td>19-4-2</td>
<td>Born in Japan, 1/27/00, and educated there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Issei)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond Horoshi Hirai</td>
<td>2-2-3</td>
<td>Born in Japan 1/1/02. Grammar school in Japan, came to US at age 15 and attended HS &amp; Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY, in US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Issei)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokuji Kurosawa (Issei)</td>
<td>11-4-1</td>
<td>Born in Japan 6/2/95 &amp; educated there except for BS degree in Elec. Engineering, Univ. of Utah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Tadao Nakagawa (Issei)</td>
<td>22-10-4</td>
<td>Born in Japan 1/26/03, educ. there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozo Fred Ogura (Issei)</td>
<td>1-11-1</td>
<td>Born in Japan 3/8/37, educated there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian wife: Mary, at 3520 Winter St., LA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazua Susukawa (Kibei) (Wife: Reiko Susukawa)</td>
<td>6-5-4</td>
<td>Born in Hawaii 4/15/04. Educated in Japan, except 3 years HS in Honolulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Birthdate</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wife: Mrs. Yaso Ueno)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Kinzo Wakayama (Kibei)</td>
<td>36-7-3</td>
<td>Born Hawaii 6-16-97. Educ. in Japan 15 years. In US 12 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wife: June Toki, born US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genji George Yamaguchi (Issei)</td>
<td>13-1-2</td>
<td>Born in Japan 9/7/02. Grammar school in Japan. High school &amp; extension course at UCLA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keiji Aratake (Issei)</td>
<td>28-4-3</td>
<td>Alien - Age 50. Evacuated from Los Angeles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes taken December 9, 1942.

Colonel Mueller:

"I have appointed a Board of Investigating Officers, but it is taking no action until Major Sheets, JAG, MSC arrives and some legal points can be checked. Colonel Davidson, NCS, suggested that I suggest to the Project Director of the WRA, that he make an independent investigation of this trouble."

James L. McNair: (in charge of motor pool)

"The Chevrolet Coupe was the Fire Chief's car, and was kept with keys in it so that either the Chief or Assistant Chief could use it in an emergency. After the gazing and shooting it was started up, put in gear, and headed toward the line of M. P's. in front of jail. Man jumped out after it was started. Shots were fired which struck car, 4 holes in the car, left front tire went flat which deflected the course of the car, car hit NE corner of jail, demolished corner of building, and left front fender of the car. There was much singing, talking, cheering, by the evening mob, and many epithets."


"Afternoon crowd was 1000 to 1500. The M. P's. were strung around the jail and up the street as far as the Post Office in front of the Administration area. Crowd was noisy, singing, talking, shouting. There was much gibbing, jeering, of the soldiers, and some spitting at the soldiers. M. P's. performed duties very well, and officers and non-coms were very much on the job. In the evening the soldiers broke up the mob, and I heard the gas bombs and also two bursts of about four shots each. Believe these bursts were from Tommy Guns. I would judge about one minute between the gas bombs and the gunshots."
This man (Henry Akira) wanted my help and assistance and the project director to get Fukuda paroled and wanted me to go with him and see the director, but couldn't go with him then so asked me to write a note of introduction to Mr. Merritt. I didn't know this man but worked on his crew for a short time. I wrote him a note of introduction and after I was hospitalized I asked Mr. Merritt if Akira had come to see him and he said no.

I was an interpreter at the Fukuda trial. He wouldn't speak at the trial and when asked why he said "well there are reasons."

A friend of mine was to work in camouflage was warned by Akira that he would be killed if he did so.

Akira was in my apartment possibly to look over the layout.

I attended JACL meeting in Salt Lake City recently, meeting with Mr. Neyer and other JACL representatives. On returning was asked to speak in Mess Hall No. 28 in regard to conference. Agreed to do so and date was set for Monday, December 7. On Saturday, December 5, 11:50 a.m., Mr. Naruto, who had asked me to speak, came and asked if I could talk tonight. Said I couldn't prepare so quickly so was agreed on Monday night.

Played pinochle Saturday afternoon and went to supper. We were to resume after supper but one player didn't return so the other players went out. My wife was sick in bed. I took a shower and when I came back my wife took a shower. Then when I returned, laid down on the bed to prepare outline for my speech. I was flat on my stomach, naked and under the covers. The door was behind me, opposite the foot of the bed. I heard a knock on the door and I said come in and turned aside looking over my shoulder and saw two men, both with masks and both with clubs who attacked me and hit me on the head; felt like yelling but was worried about my daughter who was in the apartment. Four other masked men were in the corner of the room, two in the corner by my daughter and two in the opposite corner of the room.

All swung on me but could not hit me much. I grabbed hold of one man and his mask camended a bit. I was going to bite his ear off. I recognized the eyes that I saw when the mask came down. Didn't pull mask clear off because blows hit arm and fingers and one other man pulled me off and then another man hit me with a club. By this time I was out of bed and grabbed a folding chair and backed into the corner and hit one man. My daughter ran out the door and started screaming and people started assembling in front of my apartment and the gang fled. The man I recognized by his eyes was Henry Ueno.
About fifteen minutes later another group came in, but said that this was the wrong place, this was the children's ward. This group stayed about half an hour. Later Dr. Goto came in. I could recognize him and then he went out and later returned. I waited and waited. There was much activity but nothing happened. Later someone pulled my bed out of the ward so that I could be seen. I crawled out and an old man saw me and walked away. I thought he would tell the mob. I saw head nurse Wetsel and Japanese Police Chief, Hiyashi. They took me to a private ward and later two soldiers came for me and took me away in the ambulance.

Solutions for this trouble: Must sort the bad people and relocate them if you are going to have peace. Kibei are the worst element — much more so than older Issei who have some bitterness over non-citizenship, but are not pro-Axis.

Commander Ringle has an article from September Harper's Magazine which points out ways of separation.

Many Japs are passive; even negative in their attitude, but you can't find in the small space of the Center that they get narrow minded and feel suppressed and desire excitement. Leave 60 to 70 real leaders, particularly the Kibei and Nisei who have been recently to Japan.

Japs feel that they were discriminated against as they were the only ones moved and the Germans and Italians were not.

Administration used certain amount of coercion to force evacuees into camouflage work by cutting down work on other projects. This was wrong approach. Should sell them on the work. Should not trick and exploit to get workers.

Ted Okahoshi, a good friend of mine, turned pro-Nazi after evacuation. He felt that this was a race war; that American citizenship not worth anything to the Japanese and the Japanese must win the war. I believe Okahoshi is one of the ring leaders. He was formerly Executive Secretary of the Wholesale Produce Dealer's Association in Los Angeles; K. K. Ozawa is President.

Joe Shimada signed up for Naval Intelligence and I heard he was beaten up since Saturday. One police officer was beaten up. We searched baggage thoroughly and took liquor away from returning beet field workers.

Majority here at Manzanar hate "informers". There has been a series of beatings. There have been many threats and much intimidation among suspected informers.

Issei's cannot obtain American citizenship so they naturally cling to Japan (their sympathies). Almost no Issei's have pro-American feelings but probably they are not actually anti-American.

Grievances: (1) WRA promises not carried out — Nash promised great freedom of movement around the Center and not granted.

(2) First 1000 volunteers obtained through the
There has been an investigation of the alleged food shortages and only minor sugar shortages found. Investigation concluded over two weeks ago.

Now all who have been beaten up have been (1) JACL workers; (2) suspected informers, and (3) those close to the administration.

Tyama, as a JACL man and suspected informer.

We have no radio expert to check evacuees' radios for long and short wave.

Fred Tyama, Nisei, former operator of restaurant chain in Los Angeles, active in JACL.

I have sent reports to F.B.I. and Lt. Commander Ringle; also Major Reardon, and have also made verbal reports to F.B.I. Agent McCormick. I tried to keep this secret but not always possible. When I wrote, I didn't give my return address. Three letters from Lyle Kurisohi (victim of beating at Poston and JACL man) reached me here.

December 4 went to eat in kitchen, Block 24; met an evacuee who wanted to talk to me about Frank Fukuda who was sentenced to 75 days in the Manzanar jail with 60 days suspended.
MEMORANDUM: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen

SUBJECT: Chronological report of press contacts on Manzanar riot.

1. First notice of the trouble at Manzanar came from the Associated Press at 10:00 p.m. Sunday, December 6. The Associated Press reported that they had a story regarding a riot at Manzanar Relocation Center and asked for comment. At my request they read their dispatch and stated that the information has come from Ralph Merritt, project director.

2. At 10:05 p.m. I placed a call for you and contacted Colonel Boekel at CAD office giving him the information I had received. I then reported to your office.

3. At 10:20 the United Press and International News Service called and said they had a request from Los Angeles asking for details of the Manzanar story. Informed them that we were checking and would call them as soon as information was available.

4. Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. contacted all three wire services stating that we had no specific announcement, but from reports we had received we believed the news carried in their wire stories was substantially correct. Also informed them of the fact that the problem was one for a civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, and that the Western Defense Command has no administrative authority over relocation centers. Explained that the Military Police on the external boundaries of the project were only there to prevent the entrance or exit of unauthorized persons from the project area. Referred them to WRA for any statement but also told them we would give them any information we had which was properly public information. Asked them to keep us informed.

5. At 11:30 p.m. was called by United Press and told that the military had taken over the Manzanar Relocation Center; that there had been shots fired by the military personnel; that one evacuee was killed and nine wounded.
6. Reported this UP news of the shooting to your office and upon your request asked the wire services to attempt to hold off news reference to the shooting, as it possibly could be deemed military information. They reported that the stories had been sent out.

7. Upon information and advice from you that you would attempt to contact the War Department Bureau of Public Relations, Milton Eisenhower and Byron Price's Office of Censorship, I asked the wire services to put a message on their wires relative to the Manzanar story. They agreed to do this. The message was substantially the following:

"Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command requests that newspapers withhold use of the shooting incident in Manzanar story until a definite ruling is received from Byron Price's office. Colonel Bendetsen is contacting Office of Censorship and that agency's word should come through shortly. Bendetsen feels shooting story in present form can be used by Japs for reprisals our own nationals".

The substance of this message was sent by Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service at about 12:30 a.m., December 7, 1942.

No word was forthcoming from the Office of Censorship until the wire services called me about 2:30 a.m., December 7, stating that a message had come over the wire telling that Office of Censorship had stated that Manzanar story was okeh. In discussion with wire services I pointed out that this did not refer to shooting incident, and that Colonel Bendetsen would attempt to get a more specific answer from Price's office.

In conversation with you I found that the War Department Bureau of Public Relations had not taken action on your request. Informed the wire services that you were calling War Department again and asked as a personal favor that they hold off a little longer which they agreed to do.

8. At 3:30 a.m., the wire services reported that Byron Price's office still said that Manzanar story was okeh and that Ralph Merritt could be quoted as a person of authority. Notified you of this, and on your advice called the wire services and thanked them for their splendid cooperation and advised them that to protect themselves from unjust criticism, they should use their own judgement on the story.
9. At 4:30 a.m., had received word from two services that the story, as they had received it from Manzanar, was being released. INS still held off.

10. At 6:00 a.m. December 7, the INS used the story for their evening papers.

11. Effectiveness of the cooperation given by the wire services was shown by the fact that no a.m. papers of December 7 carried the shooting story in their full editions. All of the newspaper men contacted admitted that the story could have serious consequences in retaliation and reprisal on our nationals in the hands of Japan. They agreed that this was a case where tempered judgement on the part of the War Department and the Press could benefit the treatment offered our nationals in the hands of the enemy.

12. I feel that all three wire services, and through them the newspapers subscribing to their service, should be commended for their willing cooperation.

Byron D. Box
Director of Information
Sunday evening I heard the loud speaker being used at a mob meeting; heard instructions for one-half of the mob to go to the police station and one-half to the hospital, to get Tayama. I ran to the phone and phoned police station and phoned Mr. Merritt. He said "don't worry, the M.P.s will be there with an ambulance within a few minutes. The mob did not get into the ward where Tayama was hidden. Lots of Japanese joined the mob because of boredom and desire for activity. All Japanese police were threatened and resigned. Returning beet-field workers resented thorough search for liquor. This was reason Inai was beaten.

Toki Slocum was recently put on police force. He was generally resented because he bragged of working for FBI and putting Japs in internment camps. Committee told Administration sometime ago that all informers must be moved or there would be trouble. Japanese all felt that they were in internment camps now and should not "snitch" on each other, but simply "sit tight" and take things as they are. They feel this is enough confinement.

Believe first action Sunday afternoon was spontaneous with the agitation of a few ringleaders but that the evening demonstration was well organized.

Ueno figured that the foods distributed did not equal the amount of food received. Campbell and Winchester were suspected of misuse or misappropriation of foods. Investigation now going on regarding these charges on food. Mob felt that Ueno was removed from camp to prevent him from testifying in this food case and believed that he had nothing to do with the Tayama beating.

Believe there will be much trouble if the 50 who are now with the military police are returned to Manzanar. They should be placed elsewhere or relocated and not to another relocation center.

No clothing allowances have been paid to date. Some free distribution of clothing like WPA without charge, or so the evacuees thought. First plan was that all clothing so issued was to be charged against clothing allowances since July 1st. Then this was changed to no charge and to free issuance of clothing but allowances were to be paid November 1st and this was to be put on the payroll which normally would not be paid until the end of December. Many people have suffered under the clothing policy.

WRA has made many changes of policy. Made some mistakes and made some promises which have not been fulfilled.
Notes from Dr. Coto's discussion.

Evacuee committee now trying to arbitrate and settle present difficulty. This committee wants Campbell and Winchester transferred and the informers, ten by name, removed.

Camouflage net project originally had about 1,000 workers - now 35. New work on something of competitive piece work basis well over the usual production. New policy requires 44 hours a week regardless of production. Workers lose interest, etc.

Project administration does not keep Japanese informed of difficulties and progress to obtain needed items. Project does not understand Japanese psychology.

Some Japanese are too proud to apply to Social Welfare for financial aid. There have been only about 30 applications in six months.

I don't believe there is an anti-American or pro-axis person in the camp. Most Japanese have taken the Japanese evacuation with a grain of salt; it is just for the duration, everybody is suffering and the only thing to do is to take it easy and sit it out.

Relocation is a fine idea but evacuees lack finances to make the move and to provide adequate clothing and other necessities for relocation. The situation in regard to relocation is impossible and futile and relocation is no solution.

Best field workers were not provided with living quarters as agreed on and not paid a going wage. 80% returned to the Center without any savings. USES would not help in the matter of wages.

If this is war, we young people really want to be doing something really worth while and the administration want allow real work.

The mob Sunday evening threatened to get Campbell.
STATEMENTS

December 10, 1942

Mr. Willard E. Schmidt, former Chief of Police at Manzanar and now head of War Relocation Authority internal Security Police:

I am not surprised at this blow-up. I suspected there would be a slugging match between the pro-Axis and Axis groups.

Tom Imai, Manzanar Chief Policeman, was beaten up for seizing booze being brought in by returning beet field workers. Our chief police have been fairly efficient, though some of them are on the "List for Retaliation."

Self-government was offered the evacuees but many did not vote and some openly opposed it saying "we are under the military and the military should control." F.B.I. worked well with us here but retained information they obtained as confidential. Trouble makers must be removed.

Statements of Mr. Gilkey, present Police Chief:

A second mob in the evening came toward the jail from both directions—side and front. They arrived after the mob had arrived at the hospital. The afternoon group of five to eight hundred; part of these, possibly three hundred were probably curious onlookers.

There were about 2000 in the meeting; same number at the fire break by Block 22. Speakers used a loud speaker system.

Assistant police chief was on the job in the evening, and withdrew on the instructions of Mr. Merritt right after the military took over. Believe if Mr. Merritt had been here about two months earlier the trouble would not have happened — his policy is to relocate as many as possible and as quickly as possible.

Mr. Schmidt, continued:

Segregation is essential first of the pro-patriots; second the pro-Axis and third the pro-Americans. Part of this trouble is a fight between the JACL and the pro-Axis group.

Ueno was fired by Mr. Winchester and re-hired. Ueno became commissary steward and formed a kitchen worker's union. Ueno is in some way coupled with the rumored mismanagement of camp food stuff. Probably if we removed 50 loyal people for their protection there will soon be another group suspected of being "informers." Justice within the center has not been intelligently handled. One case, a man was given 9 months in the center jail for knife. He was paroled in three days and made chief clerk of the community services by Mr. Tsuchida who was head of the community services and was chairman of the judicial council.
One day in Warehouse 23, Harry Ueno and Joe Kurihara asked me for formal debate, pro-Japan vs. pro-America. They claimed 90% are with them, 5% for defense, and 5% with me. They warned me of what would happen to me when the Japanese came over here. They are solely pro-Japanese.

Many Japanese feel that JACL are responsible for evacuation. I was Southern District Representative of District JACL and evacuees feel that JACL sold them "down the river" in evacuation. Ueno and Kurihara asked me why I did not deny accusations against me and said "so you are ???" and refuse to debate. I told them I would debate with any responsible person, but not with hoodlums like them.

At the beating I recognized Ueno by his eyes. He always looks down and cannot lock you in the eyes for more than five seconds.

On December 1, 1941, I helped organize an Anti-Axis Committee in Los Angeles. Toki Slocum was made chairman.

Bonzi is a special salute for the Emperor. Used particularly in that way by the Kibei.

I was born in Hawaii and came to the United States at the age of 18 months. I have never been in Japan. My parents were born in Japan, but have been here for many years.

My daughter did not recognize any of my assailants when I was beat up. My wife was not there; she was in the bathhouse. Someone in the group asked for an ambulance before I got outside and was able to. Assailants left slugging club inside and one big one, unused outside.

Sunday, about 10:30 A.M., I was to go home from the hospital, but Dr. Goto did not want me to and suggested that X-rays might be a good idea - so I said I would stay. I had many visitors about 3:00 P.M.; one girl told me that Joe Kurihara said at the Block 22 meeting that it was too bad Fred Tayama was not killed, but it was not too late yet and also they would get Slocum, Masaka and Carl Yoneda. She told me that I had better get out. I said I was not scared of Kurihara being dangerous and said all of them were cowards. She said, "I am scared, maybe Kurihara is not dangerous, but you should see the mob - they have blood in their eyes!"

After supper Dr. Goto came and said, "Get dressed the M.P.'s are coming to take you away". I dressed and went with the Doctor. He saw a mob coming and put me in the fracture bed and went out. The mob came in front and rear doors of the hospital shouting "Tayama, we are coming to kill you". They gave every ward a search thoroughly, but did not see me. Saw about twenty in room I was in; could see out a little and could see faces in the mob. The mob made a second search, but did not check the bed I was hidden in and did not find me. All but three went out and they discussed the three cars that had gone out of the Center in the last ten minutes and that I had probably gone out in one of them. They stayed about five minutes and talked over my case and said how they would hang me when found and cut me up and parade me around camp.
Don't see how we can get these people to go back to work at $12.00, $16.00 and $19.00 per month.

Saturday - Driving of the car into the police was after the M.P.'s had taken over. There was definite jeering of soldiers in the afternoon mob.

Sunday - Soon as we knew mass meeting being held, we notified M.P.'s to stand by. M.P.'s arrived at Jail about same time as mob was marching down street. M.P.'s threw line across front of Jail and across road west of Administration Bldgs. Set up one M.G. in road in front of Jail. Capt. Hall held M.P. Co. in alert after noon disturbance.

***************

Mr. Lewis Thuesen - Jr. Administrative Assistant;

I returned from Independence about 1:30 - 2:00 P.M. Mr. Merritt, and Capt. Hall were in crowd, apparently talking to the leaders who were then in front of crowd. Mr. Merritt got up on steps of bldg. and talked to the mob leaders, particularly to one Jap, evidently the chairman. The crowd was noisy; called soldiers many names; much cat calling; particularly when M.G. was set up. Names like S.O.B. tin soldiers. Some of the soldiers made replies - were obviously made and all remarks were in answer to jeers of the mob. Just a few soldiers made replies.

I heard this much of agreement:

1. Ueno would be returned.

Mr. Merritt did not make speech. Soldier withdrew to sentry box. Crowd didn't disperse. One Jap tried to get them to break up. Then Captain Hall moved soldiers to highway - still no dispersal. Committee Leader talked again in Japanese and the crowd dispersed.

Evening - Did not come to police station as soldiers said "we mean business" and I'd better stay out." I was in quarters with the McNairs and looked out occasionally. Could see police station from the window. Heard gas bombs go; looked out and the crowd generally was breaking out of the gas and running up street, cursing and jeering the soldiers.

That I saw body on the ground and a few men looked over body and withdrew. Later the body was picked up, before shooting (may have been gassed). Approximately 5 minutes later, believed I heard a few more gas bombs and very shortly after two bursts of shots - sounded like machine gun. After shooting there was a truck or car by entrance of Jail with lights on, shining up the street. About 6 soldiers rushed back of lights and then vehicle lights jiggled. I wondered if something was wrong back of truck. Crowd was singing before gas was thrown.
Maryknoll Mission had promised union wages which were not paid. This dispute over wages caused them to feel they were tricked and then did not get paid for three months.

(3) Some passed complaint on the food and on the discrimination of the feeding of Japanese and Caucasians. (This has been largely adjusted)

(4) Difference in housing furnished to Japanese and Caucasians.

(5) Bitterness over evacuation, losses, disregard of citizenship etc.

Mr. Kash, Director to September 23rd, ineffectual misunderstanding of Jap position. Inefficiency at Manzanar.

Discrimination, mistakes and unkept promises have lead to many loyal evacuees becoming disloyal. There is too little to do but talk, talk, talk and the grievances grow and grow. The basic cause of this trouble is the combat between the pro-America and the anti-America groups.

Mr. Kissle - Similar to Coverley. When I came in I found excellent basis for trouble. Not inadequate police force or plans for meeting emergency, but the build up for trouble due to Administration errors.

I am trying to work out problem of what to do with threatened Jap - without showing weakness.

Set up Death Valley as a processing center for persons awaiting clearance for re-location. Avoid unfavorable public reaction to Manzanar.

Believe threatened Japs return to Manzanar would lead to further violence.

If we remove a few ring leaders - others will spring to take their place.

Trying to get at basic causes and eliminate as many as possible.

Japs say - Facilities are basic of Jap social structure - Should not be judged Israel - Wicel - Yibel, but on basis of classification of dominant member of family.

Japs in protective custody say: To reach peace do

1. Remove ring leaders.
2. Remove persons under threat of the mob.
3. Put camp under military or under evacuation police force.
4. Remove Caucasians to other jobs, who are under direct high criticism of evacuees (Campbell - Winchester).

Investigation of sugar situation by Waara, Campbell and Winchester, under direction of Mr. Kissle.

Report submitted and then turned over to Usen and his fellow佣金ary workers by Project Director.
Mr. Merritt:

At first meeting Sunday noon in fire break crowd was harangued by Joe Kurihara and his supporters. They stated "We must kill these rats and dogs" - without naming names. Finally crowd started demanding names. These were given as Ned Campbell, Joe Winchester, Fred Tayama and two other evacuees. (See Brown's story)

Winchester had been accused by Japs of mismanagement of food supplies and misappropriation. Investigation of the food supplies was completed prior to my return November 24, 1942.

Mr. Nash, Director to September 23rd, ineffectual misunderstanding of Jap psychology; left camp in bad shape.

Mr. Crowley; mild, inexperienced and not far seeing. Not experienced in handling mass people.

Mr. Kimble - Similar to Coverley. When I came in I found excellent basis for trouble. Not adequate police force or plans for meeting emergency, but fine build up for trouble due to Administration errors.

I am trying to work out problem of what to do with threatened loyal Japs - without showing weakness.

Set up Death Valley as a processing center for persons awaiting clearance for re-location. Avoid unfavorable public reaction to Manzanar.

Believe threatened Japs return to Manzanar would lead to further violence.

If we remove a few ring leaders - others will spring to take their place.

Trying to get at basic causes and eliminate as many as possible.

Japs say - Families are basis of Jap social structure - Should not be judged Issei - Nisei - Kibei, but on basis of classification of dominant member of family.

Japs in protective custody say: To reach peace do

1. Remove ring leaders.
2. Remove persons under threats of the mob.
3. Put camp under military or under caucasian police force.
4. Remove Caucasians to other jobs, who are under direct high criticism of evacuees (Campbell - Winchester).

Investigation of sugar situation by Msrs. Campbell and Winchester, under direction of Mr. Kimble.

Report submitted and then turned over to Ueno and his fellow commissary workers by Project Director.

We have a sit down strike Passive resistance.