Throughout the day the 81mm mortar platoon of Co D gave very close and effective support to the attacking companies. Starting with their preparatory barrage in conjunction with the artillery, they engaged their principal target then shifted their fire, as Co A moved into the attack, from Georgia to the Ohio's and Rocky Ridge, where numerous machine guns were inflicting heavy casualties on the attacking companies. More than 10,400 rounds of HE were fired before they displaced to a new position on the rear slope of Georgia hill at about 0930 hours. Stubborn strongpoints blocking the advance of the battalion from Georgia to the Ohio's were constantly barraged by very close 81mm fire. Each time the OP called for fire, two mortars fired concentrations of nine rounds each. This continued through the day and night in addition to their harassing fire missions. The other two mortars were laid on a road leading south into the valley on the left, and all night long searching concentrations were fired at 30 minute intervals. During the first day HE shells were fired at the rate of 50-75 rounds per hour.

Numerous patrols were sent out by both attacking companies during the day and night, and valuable information was gained; but heavy casualties were sustained. Throughout the day intensive artillery fire was received from the coastal plains, as the attacking unit in that sector was unable to gain ground.

At 2200 hours, a platoon of Co C made a night infiltration attack to knock out the series of bunkers and emplacements, but this attack was repelled by heavy automatic fire and mines. However, two prisoners were captured, and valuable information regarding the effects of our mortar and artillery fire was gathered from them. The battalion dug in and continued to patrol heavily.

Casualties of the 100th Bn: 14 KIA, 53 WIA
Casualties of the enemy (est): 14 KIA, 2 captured, unknown WIA

That night a new plan of attack was formulated by the battalion commander and company commanders to overcome the strongpoints on the northern slope of Georgia.

At 0530B hours, 6 April, one platoon of Co B, reinforced by a section of light machine guns, started a wide flanking movement through the left of Co C along a covered trail toward the rear of the enemy bunkers. This platoon moved cautiously over the heavily mined area and reached a point almost to the rear of the enemy positions without being detected. Two squads were deployed with one squad and the LMG section as a base of fire to cover the advance of the rest of the platoon. As the attacking squads began to work their way up to the enemy bunkers, their presence was detected by the enemy; and they were subjected to very heavy fire from small arms, rockets, and grenades. With excellent use of fire and movement, the platoon worked itself into position and closed with the enemy, methodically destroying the machine gun emplacements and bunkers. Their use of fire and movement was so effective that they overran all of the positions and captured 14 prisoners, killed 4, and wounded 7. After cleaning up all the resistance in that area, the platoon
then swerved sharply to the left toward Ohio 1 and engaged another machine gun position which had opened fire upon them. Using the same tactics of fire and movement, they silenced the guns, captured 11 more prisoners, and killed 3 more of the enemy. These enemy positions were guarding a large supply dump, and the platoon captured enough food to feed a company for one month. Large stores of small arms ammunition, grenades, several machine guns, radio sets, and rocket ammunition were also captured in adjacent caves dug into the side of the mountain. By 0900 hours, the entire hill mass of Georgia was cleared of the enemy.

During this attack, periodic concentrations of HE and smoke were placed on the Ohio Ridges and the high ground to the north to screen their movements. During the early morning hours, the smoking of the hills was very effective and kept enemy observation down to a minimum. By midmorning the wind velocity had increased and had rendered the smoke screening quite ineffective. The enemy immediately laid down a very heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire on the forward positions on Georgia and on the approaches to the Ohio hill which made any advance impossible. From well dug in emplacements and bunkers, the enemy threw very heavy fire with machine guns and other automatic weapons. Evidently, they had brought in reserves and had formed a strong defensive line running on the high ground from Rocky Ridge to the Ohio hills. The enemy fire became so heavy that all advance was halted.

The battalion immediately called for close air support and at 0830 the first wave of planes came over to blast the enemy strongpoints. The battalion commander personally directed the planes through the regimental headquarters and the XXII TAC Liaison Officer, who was in radio contact with the attacking planes. On the first bombing run the planes came too close to our attacking troops, and the battalion commander called them off target. He then fired one smoke shell on the target to assist the planes. On the next run the planes were on target, and they bombed and rocketed the targets expertly. They flew three such bombing and rocketing runs on targets on Rocky Ridge, the Ohio's 1, 2, and 3 and later returned to strafe enemy positions. The air support was expertly rendered with continuous communication between the battalion commander and the planes.

Immediately following the air force mission, 2 battalion of 155mm laid a ten-minute barrage on the same targets. In the wake of this preparation, Co B on the left and Co C on the right began their attack, Co B attacking Rocky Ridge and Co C attacking Ohio 1. The barrage was followed so closely that some casualties were suffered from our own artillery.

Co C stormed up Ohio 1 so rapidly in the wake of the barrage that they were able to capture a completely surprised enemy post of 40 men. The 3rd platoon of Co C advanced rapidly, leaving mopping-up operations to the remainder of the company, and stormed up Ohio 1 and proceeded to advance toward Ohio 2. In the mopping-up operation on Ohio 1, four of our men were wounded by snipers. With one platoon of Co C consolidating ground gained on Ohio 1, the remaining platoon was immediately sent to advance to the left of Ohio 3 to aid the 3rd platoon. Meanwhile, the 3rd platoon had
veered to the right of Ohio 2 and had engaged enemy positions there. In
a brief but fierce firefight, they captured these positions together with
8 prisoners. The 2d platoon coming up from the left engaged positions
there and knocked out all enemy resistance. The advance was so rapid that
very little resistance was met. The 2d platoon then immediately set out
for Ohio 3 while the 3d platoon consolidated on Ohio 2. Maneuvering swift-
ly the 2d platoon overwhelmed three machine gun positions on Ohio 3 and
captured 14 more of the enemy after a fierce firefight. Between the hours of
1100 and 1230, in the mopping up on all the Ohio hills, 22 more of the enemy
were captured.

Meanwhile, Co B had moved out towards Rocky Ridge following a covered
route in the draw between Georgia and the Ohio ridges, but their advance
was slowed due to the heavily mined areas in their path of advance. Casual-
ties from mines amounted to 3 KIA and 4 wounded. Threading carefully
through the minefield, Co B succeeded in getting close to the ridge. From
a point about 200 yards from Rocky Ridge, the 2d platoon was sent to attack
up the ridge toward Ohio 1 and the 3d platoon down the ridge toward Rocky
Ridge. The 2d platoon was fired upon from a bunker while working their way
through a minefield; but with excellent use of cover, the platoon succeeded
in closing with the enemy emplacement and, after a fierce firefight, destroy-
ed the position, captured 7 prisoners, and killed 2. They continued to
advance up the ridge and subsequently captured large stores of ammunition
including one light mortar, one 20 mm AT gun, 3 rocket launchers, and a large
number of mines without further resistance. In the meantime, the 3d platoon
had moved down the slope towards the rocky crag where they encountered a very
well camouflaged minefield. While attempting to skirt this minefield, they
were fired on by a series of four enemy machine gun nests. Using rifle gren-
da and all of their firepower, the platoon closed in on the enemy positions
The squads, having split into three different teams, then advanced on the
enemy by leap frogging and forced the enemy to relinquish their bunkers after
a firefight lasting approximately one hour. In all, six bunkers were cap-
tured. 17 of the enemy were captured, 2 killed, and 2 wounded. One of those
killed was the officer in command of defenses there. The platoon, however,
suffered 5 killed and 8 wounded from mines and small arms fire. By 1330
hours the entire mass known as Rocky Ridge was securely in our hands. Co B
then formed a defensive line on the ridge and tied in on the right flank
with Co C on the western slopes of Ohio 1. During the remainder of the
day, small isolated groups of the enemy came up to surrender.

During this final assault on the Ohio's, the 81 mm mortars of Co D
fired powerful concentrations of some 600 rounds of HE during the prepara-
tion for the attack in conjunction with the artillery and, during the attack,
giving close support to the attacking companies in addition to continuing
their harassing missions.

In the meantime the 3d Battalion, in accordance with the Regimental plan
of attack, executed an enveloping movement on the battalion's right flank,
seized Mt Folgorito, and sent Co L to Mt Cerretta to disrupt the enemy's rear
and contact the forward elements of the 100th Battalion. At 1500 hours, a
combat patrol from the 2d platoon of Co C was sent to Mt Cerretta to contact
Co L. This patrol met only scattered resistance and made contact with Co L
at 1900 hours. While working its way up Mt Cerretta prior to making contact
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with Co L, they encountered and captured a supply of food and ammunition meeting only slight resistance.

At 2000 hours a concentration of enemy was detected forming for a counterattack in the vicinity of Strettoia, west and below Rocky Ridge. Immediately, an intensive artillery and mortar concentration was ordered for the area. All four 81mm mortars of Co D were laid on the designated area in conjunction with the artillery turned the enemy assembly area into a mass of dust and explosions. The threat of an enemy counterattack was eliminated. The battalion was ordered to defend their hard won ground. Protective fire was laid, and the first phase of the general offensive was completed. Casualties for 6 April amounted to 9 KIA and 23 WIA. In all, at a cost of 23 KIA and 86 WIA, the 100th Battalion pierced in to days some five kilometers of the strongest kind of defense a stubborn and fanatical enemy could offer. During this period the 100th Battalion captured 131 prisoners killed 24, wounded an unknown number, and captured 3 supply dumps, 15 machine guns, light mortars, large numbers of small arms, and large stores of ammunition and food.

The Gothic line on the Ligurian Coast had been pierced, and the 442d controlled the commanding ground. This breach in the line resulted in the complete breakdown of the entire line. By the end of the week the 442d had pushed some 12 miles over difficult mountain terrain liberating the large communication center of Massa and the city of Carrara.

Due to the rugged nature of the terrain and the disposition of the enemy, only one narrow, winding trail was available for the purpose of bringing up supplies by mule train to the LD. On the night of 5 April the mule train was taken as far forward as the former LD, and rations and ammunition were hand-carried by parties from the line companies from that point to the forward positions. During the process of transferring the supplies from the pack train to carrying parties, enemy artillery opened up killing several mules, wounding three men, and scattering the supply train. The dispersed mules were rounded up, and the supplies delivered.

On 6 April, the lengthening of the supply route and the hazardous conditions under which the supply train must travel made the problem of supply even more difficult. The tactical situation found the companies spread out in three different directions—the location of two of the rifle companies being such that they were inaccessible by mule train. This necessitated carrying by pack train as far as possible and then hand carrying the balance of the way by parties furnished by the AT Co, 442d Inf, AT platoon, 100th Bn and A&P Platoon, 100th Bn over narrow winding trails through heavily mined areas. Again on the night of 6 April, the supply train was disrupted by enemy shellfire, and two more mules were lost by mines when they became frightened and stepped off the trail. The distance from the supply point
to the farthest company was approximately five miles, and the carrying parties were accompanied by a combat patrol for protection.

Throughout 5 and 6 April 1945, the carrying parties were kept moving day and night in order to keep the supply of ammunition available whenever it was needed. Keeping the 81 mm mortar platoon supplied with ample ammunition was a difficult task in itself, as some 3000 rounds were fired in these two days of hard fighting.

3. Overlay and a sketch showing dispositions of troops cited and general terrain features attached.

4. The following information is submitted:
   a. Nature of terrain: Mountainous and rocky
   b. Enemy morale: Excellent
   c. Morale of our troops: Excellent
   d. Weather: On 5 April 1945, slightly cloudy in the morning, bright and clear in the afternoon. On 6 April 1945, cloudy and cool.

5. Information on Battalion Personnel:
   a. Number of men present who took part in action:
      4 April 1945, 40 officers and 832 EM; 5 April 1945, 38 officers and 775 EM; 6 April 1945, 37 officers and 724 EM.
   b. Number of casualties suffered by unit cited:
      5 April 1945, 14 KIA and 53 WIA
      6 April 1945, 9 KIA and 33 WIA
   c. Approximate strength of troops adjacent and in support, and character of support rendered by other units: 3d Bn, 442d RCT, on right, executed enveloping movement and seized high ground on battalion’s right flank. One battalion of 370th Inf attacked along the coastal plain on left flank, gaining approximately 1000 yards before it was stopped. (2d Bn, 473d Inf relieved the 370th on left flank on 7 Apr 45). 599 FÃ©n, which was in direct support of the 442d RCT, Cannon Co, 442d RCT, one plt of G Co, 84th Cl. Mortar Bn and 1st plt, B Co 894th TD Bn, supported the attack by firing on targets as called for by the Bn Commander. AT Co, 442d RCT, two Platoons were employed for evacuating casualties and carrying supplies. 57th Fighter Gp, XXXII Tactical Air Comd., supported the attack by bombing and strafing hostile strongpoints as called for by the Bn Commander.
   d. Exact date and time of attack:
      (1) “Georgia”: Attacked at 0500B 5 April 1945, occupied at 0532B, 5 April 1945, completely secured O900B, 6 April 1945.
      (2) “Rocky Ridge”: Attacked at 0930B, 6 April 1945 (this was final assault) and secured at 1130B, 6 April 1945.
      (3) “Ohio’s 1, 2, 3”: Attacked at 0930B, 6 April 1945 (final assault), secured at 1230B, 6 April 1945.