ANTI-TANK COMPANY
442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
APO 782
U. S. ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report

TO: Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team
APO 782, U. S. Army.

On the morning of 4 April 1945, the 3d and 4th platoons, Antitank Company, 442d Infantry, moved into Serravalle as litter bearers, ration carriers, ammunition bearers, and P. G. W. guards with the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry attacked and captured Mt. Carchio and Mt. Folgorito. During this action the 3d and 4th platoons were performing their duties as described above. On 5 April 1945 the 3rd and 4th platoons continued being attached to the 3rd Battalion. The 1st platoon was attached to the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry as carrying party. The 2d platoon was attached to the 100th Battalion as litter bearers.

On 6 April 1945, the 1st platoon continued as litter bearers with the 100th Battalion. 2d Platoon was relieved from 100th and attached to 2d Battalion while the 3d and 4th platoon was attached to 3d Battalion.

On 7 April 1945, the 3d and 4th platoons were relieved of attachment to the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry, and attached to the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry as litter bearers. The aid station and the evacuation route down Mt. Carchio to Azzano was under observed mortar and artillery fire coming down from Mt. Altissimo.

On 8 April 1945, Antitank Company, was relieved of attachment and returned to the Company C. P. at Pietrasanta. For the next two days the Company remained at Pietrasanta.

During the days from 4 April to 8 April 1945, it was the men of Antitank Company who carried rations, led mule trains, and carried medical equipment to their own positions.

On 10 April 1945 the 1st and 3d platoons were sent to establish road blocks on the right flank of the regimental sector at Forno and Gronda. The mine platoon was used to sweep roads for mines in front of the advancing 1st and 3d platoons. The 2d platoon was kept in the Company C. P. as reserve.
On 11 and 12 April 1945, the 1st, 3d and 4th platoons were engaged as rifle troops on our right flank. During this time the platoon leaders with the help of the Italian Partisan leaders organized a group of 100 or more Partisans to help protect our right flank. During this time the 2d platoon was used to carry water, rations, ammunition and medical supplies to the 1st, 3d, and 4th platoons.

On 13 April 1945, the 1st, 3d and 4th platoons received a considerable amount of mortar fire. The Company C.P. moved to a new area in Montignoso about 1300.

On 14 April 1945, the 3d platoon was relieved and returned to the Company C.P. as regimental reserve.

On the evening of the 13 April 1945, the Regiment was notified of the 1st, 3d, and 4th platoons having some Italian Fascist prisoners who had been attacking the town of Resceto which was in the immediate vicinity of the road blocks. These fascists had come from Mt. Tambura on a mission to determine the strength of the American units. Six Fascists were captured and two escaped.

/s/ Charles L. Schettler
/t/ CHARLES L. SCHETTLER
1st Lt. Infantry
Commanding

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY
Capt. Infantry,
S-2, 442d RCT.
CANNON COMPANY
442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
APO 782 U S ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO: Commanding Officer, 442D Regimental Combat Team,
APO 782, U. S. Army.

When the Combat Team was attached to the 92d Infantry Division for operations along the Ligurian Coast of Italy, it was directed that Cannon Company be attached to the Artillery Battalion in direct support of the Combat Team, in this instance, the 599th Field Artillery Battalion. As attached, the company served as an extra battery for the 599th Artillery Battalion. However, the company furnished a proportionate share of forward observer teams to the battalion and employed its commuters at the battalion's fire direction center.

On 4 April 1945, between 2030B and 2130B hours, the company moved out into positions in the vicinity of Ripa, Italy (97.0 – 95.5). During the night positions were prepared, ammunition supplies brought up and the guns registered to fire the initial barrage the following morning.

By the following morning, the positions were completed and the company guns joined in firing the initial barrage which was to be followed by the assault by footsoldiers of the Combat Team. The company fired 650 rounds in direct support of the Combat Team in missions throughout the day.

On 6 April, the company remained in position near Ripa, firing 504 rounds of H.E. and 39 rounds of W.P. in support of the Combat Team. The first observation team of one officer and 6 enlisted men were sent forward to the 2d Battalion. Due to the difficult terrain and the desire to lay telephone wire for communication in addition to the radio, a large party from the company was required. During this day, counter-battery fire on our gun positions were received.

On 7 April, the company fired 304 rounds of H.E. on enemy positions in support of the Combat Team.

The next day, 8 April, the company fired 260 rounds of H.E. Targets were nearing extreme range and reconnaissance was carried out for displacement forward. During the first 4 days in positions near Ripa, the company was subjected to enemy harassing artillery fire, mostly during the hours of darkness. However, no casualties or damages were sustained, though several rounds fell within 10 yards of the gun pits. Supplies of ammunition and rations were brought forward during the hours of darkness as the road leading to the gun positions was under enemy observation and subject to artillery fire. After dark on this evening, the company prepared to displace to new positions in the vicinity of Montignoso.

On 9 April, displacement to the new position at Montignoso was completed at 0130B hours. During the blackout drive, the 4th Section prime mover overturned in a bomb crater at the edge of a road, killing one and injuring five others. All casualties were evacuated and the 4th Section gun was manned by men drawn from other sections in order to keep all six guns in action. An observation team of one officer and three men joined
the 3d Battalion as forward observers. During the day, 124 rounds of H.E. were fired in support of the Combat Team.

On 10 April, the company fired 200 rounds of H.E. and on the following day, 11 April, 5 rounds were fired on base point for registration. However, most enemy targets were out of range and displacement forward was not possible as roads were impassable. The company fired no rounds the following day, still unable to displace due to impassable roads.

On the 13th of April, the company displaced forward to new positions at Carrara. The position was occupied just before dawn. It was learned later that the company was under hostile observation and that for several hours there were no friendly troops other than the company as flank security of the Combat Team. Immediately upon the opening of fire for registration in the afternoon, counter-battery fire was received from enemy self-propelled guns and artillery located at Punta Bianca. One man was wounded by this fire.

During the night of 13-14 April, the company was subjected to moderate enemy artillery fire, wounding three enlisted men, one of whom died later. Two rounds of W.P. were fired in an attempt to register, but observation was impossible due to a heavy fog. However, enemy counter-battery fire was received immediately after the company opened fire. The enemy had good observation on the high ground in front of the Regiment on our left.

/s/ Sydney S. Bruce
/t/ SYDNEY S. BRUCE
1st Lt, Infantry
Commanding

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY
Captain, Infantry,
S-2, 442d RCT.
SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO: Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team, APO #762, U.S. Army.

Prior to the day the Combat Team was alerted to go on line for the spring offensive along the Ligurian Coast, two enlisted men from the company returned from a mine school held at the 92d Division headquarters near Viareggio, Italy. The Radio Section received a new type of radio set designated as the SCR 694, a comparatively new set for combat operations.

On 5 April 1945, the day of the "jump-off", both the SCR 300 and 694 radio sets opened their nets at 0455. Contact was established with cub planes carrying the divisional commander and staff and the forward observation posts. All enemy action was received through the 300 radio.

One wire crew, the night before, 4 April, laid a communication line to the 3d Battalion which was to attack Mt. Folgorito at 0500 hours. This line was laid under cover of darkness. Four wiremen each carried a D-R 4 (1/2 mile of 110 wire) up the steep slope where the 3d Battalion CP was located. Another wire crew laid communication lines to the 10th Battalion CP, while another laid locals with the Regimental CP. After the 3d Battalion jumped off, the 2d Battalion moved into position near the 2d Battalion CP. One wire crew was sent out to lay a line from the 2d Battalion to the CP. This line was laid under enemy observation. The wire crews maintained wire communications during the rest of the day and through the night. On this day, the I & R platoon sent out two squad to operate an observation post for the Regimental Staff. Communication lines were laid by the men in the squads with the assistance of company wire crews. This line was laid up a 500 foot hill in the vicinity of Vallecchia. From this CP, enemy action on the right flank was observed. Information relayed to the CP proved to be of strategic value as enemy was sent into disorganization and confusion by friendly action.

On 6 April, the Radio Section continued to maintain communication on both the 300 and 694 sets between the battalions and observation posts. The main radio traffic was on the 300 radio. The wire crew laid another line to the 3d Battalion through another route as the battalion had moved to another position. The wireman were forced to maintain the line all day as the line was frequently cut by artillery fragments. The I & R platoon continued to man the Regimenal CP all day and through the night by alternating squads.

On 7 April, three men from the Radio Section volunteered to carry rations to the 3d Battalion. These three men were wounded when they came under an intense mortar barrage, while carrying the supplies. Two switchboard operators from the Wire Section volunteered to carry rations and supplies to the 3d Battalion on Mt. Folgorito. The I & R platoon continued to maintain the observation post near Vallecchia, while another squad was sent to maintain
Ltr Hq CO, 442d RCT, subj: "Operational Report", dtd 7 Oct 45.

another CP located near Castello. As enemy artillery fire increased, the
communication lines were broken, but in each instance, the lines were quickly
repaired by the men operating the CPs.

When the 442d Combat Team was entering Montignoso on 8 April, unidentified
tanks were observed by the 3d Battalion CP. Before artillery fire was to be
placed, the identity of the tanks had to be known. Contact with these tanks
was established through our 300 radio sets, the tanks were friendly. The wire
section continued maintaining communication lines, and also prepared for move-
ment to a new CP site. The I & R platoon was called to lay smoke pots near Mt. Polgorito for a supply route. The smoke screen was a success, enabling
supplies to move ahead.

On 9 April, the Regimental CP moved into Montignoso. The elements of
the I & R platoon were attached to the 2d Battalion to maintain an CP. The
following day, the platoon continued manning CPs, and also aided in bringing
back prisoners to the rear Regimental CP.

On 11 April, the forward radio crew departed for Fumiana, carrying all
radio equipment themselves over steep and broken terrain. Although the terrain
was not favorable for radio communication, communication was maintained.

On 13 April, the Regimental CP moved into the town of Carrara. Wiremen
of the company laid wires to the separate companies, locals, and to the forward
battalions. One crew laid a line to the 3d Battalion in Gragnana and also set
up a switch. Another crew with the assistant communication officer, went to
Castelpoggio to lay the 2d Battalion line. While laying this line, the men
were under enemy observation and came under a barrage of mortar fire. Although
the Regimental wire crews usually lay lines to the battalion rear CPs, this
wire crew laid a line to the 2d Battalion forward CP. The switch at Gragnana,
which came under heavy artillery fire, operated with efficiency with the wire
crew. Artillery fire coming from Punta Bianca hit the town of Carrara continu-
ously, many hits were scored on the Regimental CP and company CP. Two wire
men were wounded while laying wire to Service Company in Carrara by this fire.

/s/ Milton A. Hirsh Jr
/c/ MILTON A. HIRSH JR
Captain, Infantry,
Commanding.

A EXTRACT TRUE COPY

ORMILLE C. SHIRLEY
Captain, Infantry,
S-2, 442d RCT.
MEDICAL DETACHMENT
442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
APO 782
U S ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team,
APO 782, U. S. Army.

On 5 April 1945, after carrying on their backs medical supplies,
litters and individual full field packs through steep and winding trails to
the "jump-off" point on the night of 3 April, the 100th and 3d Battalion
Medical Sections were committed to action, accompanying their respective
battalions. Both battalions met heavy resistance immediately, and casualties
passing through both battalion aid stations were very heavy. Constant enemy
artillery and mortar barrages in the vicinity of the forward aid stations
made treatment and evacuation of the wounded trying and difficult. Despite
the mountainous and torturous terrain, the evacuation of casualties was
affected by the litter relay train system. This process took litter bearers,
walking continuously, 8 hours to complete a case. The first day's casualties
totalled well over 130 plus many medical cases. Due to the fact that the
aid station groups anticipated heavy casualties, all necessary arrangements
were completed before the "jump-off" and the casualties were evacuated and
treated with minimum loss of time.

On 6 April, the 2d Battalion Medical Section moved into line and
met the same difficult evacuation problems as other aid stations. In addition,
the 2d Bn aid station was subjected to mortar and artillery barrages
and long range machine gun fire, which made the process of treatment and
evacuation all the more trying. Litter bearers from the Provisional Company,
Company B, 317th Medical Battalion, and Italian Partisans assisted the 2d
Bn Medical Section in evacuating the battalion's casualties.

During the first 4 days of action, Medical Detachment personnel,
who were serving the aid stations and the front-line companies, suffered
casualties totaling 13 WIA and 1 KIA from enemy action.

Through the night of 8 April and the morning of 9 April, the evac-
uation of the wounded continued to remain over the long and torturous ter-
rain. However, the Combat Team's casualties since the first day became
considerably lower. On the afternoon of 9 April, a new route was opened on
Highway #1, reducing the 12-hour evacuation trip to 2 hours and relieving
somewhat the litterbearers, who had been working long continuous hours.
These included the men from the Provisional Company, Anti-Tank Company, the
anti-tank platoons of each battalion, and Italian civilians.

On the 13th of April, the Regimental Section moved into Carrara by
motor convoy from Massa. During the evening, the Regimental CP and Aid
Station were subjected to heavy shelling from coastal guns located at Punta
Bianca. A direct hit was scored on our 2½ ton truck, setting it and a medical
jeep which was adjacent to it on fire. Both vehicles were a total loss.
Equipment and records were partly salvaged and no troop casualties were
suffered. During the four-hour period from 1515 to 1900 hours, some 1300
rounds of fire of all types were thrown near the Regimental Section.

/s/ Clarence H. Buckley,
/t/ CLARENCE H. BUCKLEY,
Major, Medical Corps,
Regimental Surgeon.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORWILLS C. SHIREY
Captain, Infantry,
S-2, 442d RCT.
SERVICE COMPANY
442d REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
APO #782 US ARMY

7 October 1945


TO : Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team,
    APO 782, U. S. Army.

When the Combat Team launched the diversionary attack
along the Ligurian Coast of Italy on 5 April 1945, the company
was bivouacked near Cenamiore, Italy, from which point it
serviced the attacking elements of the Combat Team. Although
the area did not come under enemy shellfire, elements of the
company, such as truck drivers hauling supplies to the forward
battalion supply dumps, came under fire but without suffering
casualties.

During the first five days of operations, the company
was taxed with the problem of reaching supplies to the forward
elements of the Combat Team, operating on rugged mountainous
terrain which necessitated the hand-carrying of all rations
and ammunition. The company supply officers and enlisted men
personnel attached to each battalion, supervised the distribu-
tion and packing of supplies, established supply routes up to
Mt. Folgorito and Mt Carchio, supervised the carrying parties
made up of both Combat Team personnel and Italian civilians,
and often times led the supply parties to the unloading point.

On 13 April, the company moved into Carrara by motor
convoy, and was met by a heavy artillery shelling as it entered
the town. On this day, the Regimental ammunition dump was also
moved into Carrara. Despite the shelling of the town, the
munitions personnel successfully unloaded and placed the
ammunition in a safe place as possible. No casualties were
suffered by the company in spite of the artillery fire coming
from Punta Bianca. The moving of the ammunition dump into the
town was necessary since the supply route to the south was
almost impassable due to enemy shelling and bridge blowing.

Enemy shelling of the town continued intermittently
during the day and night for the next several days.

The Postal Section operated each day, going for the
mail to Viareggio and making the distribution of mail and parcels
to the companies.

/s/ Roderick Matheson
/t/ RODERICK MATHESON
Captain, Infantry
Commanding.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY

ORYVILLE C. SHIREY
Captain, Infantry
S-2, 442d RCT.
232D COMBAT ENGINEER COMPANY
442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
APO 782 U S ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team,
APO 782, U. S. Army.

When the 442d Infantry launched its attack along the Ligurian Coast in Italy on 5 April 1945, the third platoon of the Engineers was called upon to support the infantry by sweeping roads for mines and maintaining them in the area north of Mount Altissimo.

During the rapid advance of the 442d Infantry the dozer was used constantly to fill road craters, remove carcasses of dead animals from supply lines, and build by-passes. On 10 April 1945, the 100th and 2d Battalions advancing north and east of Massa in a drive toward Carrara, Italy, were in need of a suitable supply and evacuation route. The road from Massa to Canevaro had been made impassable by a 50-yard long crater dug by the retreating Germans on the out-skirts of Massa. It was also mined with anti-tank, anti-personnel, and artillery shells converted into mines with pressure devices which were buried too deep for detection by electrical mine detectors or probing.

The 232d Engineers began the work of opening this vital route at 1300 hours 10 April 1945 in spite of heavy enemy artillery barrages which intermittently hit the area and mines which were highly sensitized by the long period underground. The company, realizing the critical need for the road for evacuation and supply, worked continuously, alternating among the three platoons of 40 men each on every shift, under intermittent barrages which caused some damage to equipment and wounded two riflemen standing in the work area. By methodical hand probing and by the use of detectors when feasible, 20 12" artillery shells rigged as mines were removed with truck winches. In addition, 30 schu-mines, 3 Tellermines, and 5 Italian box-mines were removed.

The highly sensitized nature of the mines and the difficulty of detection made the work of the dozer operators a hazardous proposition. Four dozer operators who braved this danger in order to help open the route without delay were wounded when their dozers were blown up by undetected mines. Despite the fact that 1 officer, 4 dozer operators, and 2 other enlisted men were injured in four mine explosions and shelling continued unabatingly the work was continued without let-up.

Bee-hive charges were utilized in blowing up the side of the cut to get material for an embankment. When one of the
wrecked D-7 dozers could not be removed, an ingenious solution was evolved whereby the immovable dozer was used as a trestle and a 30-feet bridge of 10-ton capacity was built over it. After working from 1300 to 10 April, the Engineers had the supply and evacuation route open by 2200 hours the next day. The opening of this vital link from Massa to Canavara with a minimum of delay helped open the only supply route and alleviated the serious supply difficulty caused by terrain that precluded the use of hand-carrying parties.

Frequently details of men from the company were detached and attached to 442d Infantry units to clear gaps through minefields and do other engineer work during infantry assaults. During the attack of Mount Belvedere by the 2d Battalion, one squad of the first platoon was attached to F Company to do engineer work from 7 April to 10 April. On 12 April three enlisted men were attached to I Company, and four enlisted men were attached to L Company. One squad of the first platoon was attached to the 2d Battalion from 13 April to 15 April, and from 20 April to 23 April one squad of third platoon was attached to the 100th Battalion to do engineer work.

/s/ Pershing Nakada,
/t/ PERSHING NAKADA,
Captain, Corps of Engrs,
Commanding.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY
Capt., Infantry,
S-2, 442d RCT.
ANNEX NO. 1

Proposed Citation, 100th Battalion,
442d Regimental Combat Team.
HEADQUARTERS 92d INFANTRY DIVISION

AG 200.6-AD

APO 92, US Army
26 September 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit (Oak Leaf Cluster)

TO: Commanding General, MTUSA,
APO 512, US Army

1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that the 100th Battalion, 442d Regimental Combat Team, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 and 6 April 1945, near Lericiessa, Italy.

2. The 442d Infantry attached to the 92d Infantry Division was ordered to attack in the Ligurian Coast sector of the 5th Army front on 5 April 1945. The division objective was the naval base at La Spezia. The sector assigned to the 442d Infantry Regiment was the mountain sector commanding the coastal plains overlooking the cities of Massa, Carrara, Sarzana, and La Spezia. This high ground if secured would necessitate a German withdrawal on the coastal plains. The object of the attack (made 11 days prior to the jump off of the balance of the 5th and 8th Army troops in Italy) was to cause the enemy to divert reserves from the Po Valley sector to the Ligurian Coast sector and thus weaken the Po Valley sector and prepare it for assault by other elements. As shown by later developments, the success of the attack affected a feint which contributed to the overwhelming "breakthrough" of the 5th and 8th Armies on the opposite Po Valley Sector of the Italian Front.

In the 442d plan the 100th Battalion was to make a frontal attack from our MLR on hill Florida on the formidable ridge running from Rippa north to Mount Folgorita, composed of hills called Georgia, Orie's 1, 2, 3, and Rocky Ridge. The long prepared enemy defenses on this 1500 to 2000 foot ridge had resisted numerous attacks by other elements and had prevented the advance of the 5th Army front in this sector for some 5 months. The positions were composed of reinforced and interlocking trench systems, 12 built-up rock pill boxes, mutually supporting machine gun emplacements, caves with embrasures covering all approaches, and a very large bombproof dugout used to shelter the enemy during barrages. Heavily-laden enemy minefields covered the entire forward and reverse slopes of hill Georgia and all probable avenues of approach were especially concentrated with hostile mines. At the time of the attack these positions were manned by 1, 2, 3, and 5 companies of the 1st Battalion, 285th Regiment, and some elements of the 148th Fusilier Battalion. Enemy artillery on the coastal plain, including naval coastal defense guns at Punta Bianca, had unlimited observation and direct fire on the battalion sector.
Ltr Hq 92d Inf Div, AG 200,6-AD,
26 September 1945

Though the terrain in the sector dictated that no envelopment movement could be accomplished on the right side of the ridge, it would be possible to envelope from the valley on the left flank. However, it was decided by the battalion to attack along the top of the ridge with supporting fire from hill Florida and the coastal plains held by our troops. The companies were assigned their objectives. When these objectives were gained, the companies were to establish a base of fire; and the next company was to work its way under cover of fire through the left flank to the next objective. These tactics were to continue until the battalion's hold on the ridge was widened and other movements were made possible. Enemy observation from Rocky Ridge and the Ohio's were to be smoked and kept continually under fire.

Under cover of darkness on the night of 3 April 1945 the 100th Bn moved into the town of Vallechia and remained under cover during daylight of the following day. At 1800 hours, 4 April, the 81mm Mortar Platoon of Co D, 100th Bn worked their way up to their initial gun position, behind a long ridge 1500 yards northwest of Vallechia, and registered on their present principal targets—Georgia, the Ohio's, and Rocky Ridge. During the night of 4 April the remainder of the battalion moved up to the ridge Florida; relieved the 3rd Bn, 371st Infantry Regt; and set up a base of fire with the machine gun platoons of Co D, plus 2 platoons of 371st Inf, supported by the 81mm mortars of Co D, 100th Bn and Co M, 371st Inf. Co B, 100th Bn, was placed on the line of departure, and Co A was poised to jump off at H hour. This movement and relief were so skilfully executed that they were not detected by the enemy. The battalion established 2 OP's which covered the battalion area with excellent observation for the first phase of the attack.

At 0430 5 April two platoons of Co B were deployed on the crest of Florida hill to give fire support as Co A passed through. At 0455B hours an intensive artillery barrage composed of division artillery, attached TD's, and the AT guns and 81mm mortars of the 100th Bn, 3rd Bn (442d Inf), and 371st was laid on Georgia, Rocky Ridge, and the Ohio's for a period of ten minutes. At 0500 the enemy retaliated with artillery and mortar fire in the valley on the left flank, running up the draws toward the ridge and returning, stopping short of the ridge. In planning this, the battalion had foreseen the probability of this enemy counter barrage in these positions and had displaced the troops so that no damage was done by this enemy shelling.

At 0505 hours, the assault platoons of Company A jumped off and passed through the left platoon of Company B. With two platoons abreast, one on each side of the north-south ridge mass, Co A started for Georgia hill and worked its way for a distance of some 150 yards through a very thick minefield. When the leading elements were almost to the crest of the hill, an enemy mine was tripped, informing the enemy as to the direction of our attack. In the ensuing few minutes, seven more men tripped mines and became casualties. On detonation of the first mine, the enemy reacted with 6 machine guns, supported by a considerable number of machine pistols, rifles, and grenades against the attacking company. The 3rd platoon on the left flank crawled under the heavy fire and deployed against the enemy positions. The first squad, under the
cover of fire from the other two squads, made a flanking movement to the left. By creeping slowly through the heavy fire and minefield, they worked their way to within grenade throwing distance of the first machine gun position. Under the covering fire of the squad, the scouts closed in on the gun position and knocked out the enemy guns by using "tommy guns" and grenades. After silencing the first gun position, the scouts continued forward and in the same manner neutralized the second machine gun position. The lead squad then closed with the remaining two enemy gun emplacements, which covered the approaches to the objective, under the cover of fire from the remainder of the platoon. With the effective use of all weapons, they successfully knocked out these positions. The remainder of the platoon, after an intensive firefight with the enemy lodged near the peak of the crest, succeeded in reaching the peak. Meanwhile, the 1st platoon on the other side of the ridge mass worked their way through the minefield and moved up rapidly to the crest of the hill; and by 0530 hours, A Co had completely occupied the hill mass of Georgia, up to the crest.

The enemy, from well entrenched positions on the northern slopes of Georgia, laid down a wall of small arms fire with automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and bazookas on the crest of the hill and stopped the advance of Co A. Subsequently, the enemy laid down a very heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire, which made further advance too costly. When Co A reached the crest of the hill, Co C was ordered to attack through the left flank of Co A to secure and occupy Ohio 1 and Rocky Ridge. At 0600 hours, Co C passed through 3rd platoon of Co B and worked through the left flank of Co A. In executing this flanking movement, Co C was subjected to intense mortar and artillery fire and several casualties were sustained. Automatic fire and grenades from an extension of Georgia in the rear (north) and fire from interlocking machine gun positions between Georgia and Ohio 1 stopped Co C almost parallel to Co A's forward advance positions. Attempts to maneuver to the flanks of the resistance resulted in heavy casualties from antipersonnel mines. In conjunction with the 3rd platoon of Co A, the 1st platoon of Co C made repeated frontal attacks on enemy bunker positions. Each assault resulted in heavy casualties from automatic fires and mines. The extensive minefields prevented the use of more than one platoon in frontal assaults and made flank movements too costly. Squad and platoon actions against these caves and emplacements were launched time after time, but the attacking companies were unable to gain much ground. Hand to hand cave and trench fighting ensued, during which time grenades were thrown back and forth by both sides. Requests were made to higher headquarters for engineer teams to blast these bunkers and emplacements, but no help came. Flame throwers were also requested to aid in digging the enemy out of their positions, but it was not until very late in the afternoon that two of these flame throwers were made available for use. In the fierce hand to hand fighting two of the bunkers were captured and neutralized.