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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE WASHINGTON



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HEADQUARTERS
92d INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Commanding General

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APO 92 U. S. Army 15 October 1945


SUBJECT: Reason for Delay in Submitting Citation of Unit.

TO : Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512, U. S. Army.

1. Transmitted herewith is the proposed citation for the 442d Infantry Regiment.

- 2. Delay in submitting proposed citation is the fault of this command.
- 3. During the processing of historical and official records of the 92d Infantry Division, it was apparent that an eversight had been made in not granting the proper recognition to the outstanding accomplishments of the 442d Infantry Regimental Combat Team.
- 4. The 442d Infantry Regiment was detached from this division on 15 June 1945; communication difficulties occasioned considerable delay.

l Incl: as indicated J. E. WOOD Brigadier General, U. S. A. Commanding



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


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9. MEX #3: Proposed Citation, 3d. Battalion, 442d Regimental Combat Team HEADERARTERS 92D INFANTRY DIVISION APO/92, U.S. ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit.

- TO : Commanding General, MTCUSA, APO #512, U. S. Army.
- 1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that the 442d Regimental Combat Team, less the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 April 1945 to 15 April 1945 in the vicinity of Serravezza, Carrara and Fosdinovo, Italy.
- 2. The 442d Regimental Combat Team, less the 552d Field Artillery Battalion, is being recommended for a unit citation for distinguishing itself by extraordinary heroism in action in which it exhibited gallantry and determination that set it apart and above other units participating in the same engagement. This action was the diversion attack which began 5 April 1945 along the west coast of Italy and served as a feint for the subsequent break-through of the bulk of Fifth army forces into Bologna and the Po Valley. This attack in the west was carried out by the 92d Infantry Division with the 442d Regimental Combat Team and the 473d Infantry Regiment attached for operations. The 370th Infantry Regiment attacked initially along the coastal plain, but was relieved after two days by the 473d Infantry Regiment (Incl.#1 Sketch). Several miles inland, the 442d Combat Team swept the mountain areas. However, the entire success of the attack hinged upon the 442d Combat Team's ability to completely destroy the enemy's elaborate system of defensive fortifications, hown out of solid rock and reinforced with concrete, which formed the western anchor of the Cothic Line. These fortifications were so constructed as to give interlocking fires and allaround protection to the defenders and to afford observation for the enemy's mobile field guns as well as his batteries of long range coastal rifles located on Punta Bianca, a peninsula jutting out from La Spezia. They were dug into mountain peaks rising almost sheer from the coastal plain, themselves formidable natural barriers, and leading up to Mt. Folgorito (2800') and Mt. Carchio(30001) the peaks of which gave the enemy unlimited observation of the Ligurian Coast and Highway #1. So long as the enemy held out here, the coast and the route north were untenable. These rock masses were bare of vegetation save for scanty scrub growth. Their surfaces were steep and in places precipituous. Loose soil and sliding rock made the slow, laborious ascent dangerous in itself without the added hazard of enemy observation and fire. The enemy forces, which had been upgraded for three weeks prior to the attack, were veteran troops of the 281st Regiment, 148th Division, later reinforced by five crack battalions which had initially been in reserve, but were later committed by the enemy in an effort to stop the 442d Combat Team.

In spite of these almost unsurmountable obstacles, the enemy positions which had resisted all assaults through the fall and winter of

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1944-1945 were penetrated by the 442d Combat Team on the first day of the attack. On the second day, 6 April, the entire enemy MLR from Serravezza to Mt Carchio was utterly destroyed and our positions were secure. Within ten days, the 442d Combat Team had swept forward twelve miles over terrain that was never less than mountainous, flanked Massa, occupied Carrara, and was threatening the last defenses before the naval base of La Spezia.

In detail, the operations of the 442d Combat Team were as

follows:

The Combat Team commander was first faced with the necessity of making a difficult decision: whether to throw two battalions against these formidable positions in a frontal assault or to attempt an encircling movement which would send one battalion into a 2500 foot climb up the precipituous slopes of Mt. Folgorito in total darkness, to be followed by a dawn attack over unknown terrain. It was decided to follow the latter plan, since it gave the Combat Team the advantage of surprise and, though the physical difficulties were extreme, indications were that the terrain was so difficult the enemy had not fortified this approach heavily. Consequently, the 100th Battalion was assigned the task of making a frontal attack on the enemy MLR, situated on a series of sawtooth beaks culminating in the Mt. Folgorito hill mass. These peaks had been designated from south to north as "Georgia", "Ohio 1", "Ohio 2", "Ohio 3", and Mt. Cerretta. The 3d Battalion was directed to make the encircling movement against Mt. Folgorito, and the 2d Battalion was held in mobile reserve, prepared to follow either of the leading battalions should the necessity arise. (Incl.#2, Sketch)

During the night of 3-4 April, the 3d Battalion marched to an assembly area in the small mountain town of Azzano on the Mt. Cavallo hill mass, separated by a narrow valley from Mt. Folgorito and under direct observation of the enemy. The climb to the assembly area required five hours with full equipment, and was accomplished in total darkness with the steep rocky trail made even more dangerous by a drizzling rain. A miss-step meant a plunge of anywhere from 15 to 150 feet down the mountainside. In this climb, twenty-five men of the battalion were injured in falls. All the following day, 4 April, the battalion remained hidden in the houses of Azzano since the

entire success of the operation hinged on secrecy.

The next night the 100th Battalien moved up to its line of departure on the hill mass designated "Florida", just south of the enemy held "Georgia" peak, effecting the relief of elements of the 371st Infantry Regiment without arousing the slightest suspicion on the part of the enemy that a relief was taking place. At the same time, the night of 4-5 April, the regimental Cannon Company moved into position at Vallecchia and tied into the Fire Direction Center of the 599th Field Artillery, acting as an extra battery. Anti-tank Company, unable to employ its guns effectively in the mountainous terrain was split up into platoons to act as carrying parties for rations and ammunition and assist as litterbearers where needed. Two platoons were assigned to the 3d Battalion, and one each to the 100th and 2d Battalions. The regimental command post was established at Vallecchia and contact established with the two attacking battalions.

At 042200B April, the 3d Battalion moved out from Azzano, taking only Companies I and L and the machine gun platoons of Company M for the

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initial assault, which was to be made from the saddle between Mt. Folgorito and Mt. Carchic at 050500B, at the same time the 100th Battalion made its frontal assault on the enemy MIR. Picking a route of advance based only on limited visual reconnaissance and the unconfirmed information of a Partisan as to the whereabouts of enemy concentrations, the battalion climbed toward its objective. The "trail" zigzagged constantly upwards over the treacherous, shale-covered slope. The men, with full battle equipment, including mortars and machine guns, crawled for the most part on their hands and kness or pulled themselves up by grasping a low growing shrub or the rifle butt of the man above them, but often slipping and falling until a comrade caught them to push or pull them forward again. One rifleman was hospitalized when a falling boulder struck him and hurled him 60 feet down the slope. Many others suffered bruises and sprains but none turned back. Another example of the difficulty of the climb can be gleaned from the fact that it was later necessary to set up sixteen relay aid posts along the trail to evacuate the battalion's wounded.

The attack on the Mt. Folgorito-Mt. Carchio ridgeline was scheduled for 0500 hours and was to be made without artillery preparation. Due to the almost superhuman task of scaling the mountainside to reach the line of departure, the troops did not jump off until some minutes after the scheduled time, but by 0600 hours, some time before dawn, the attack was in full swing. Thus, the attacking battalion, after six hours of exhausting effort, plunged into an attack on strong enemy positions. Company L swung south along the saddle toward Mt. Folgorito and Company I sent one plateon north along a spur toward Mt. Carchio. Gun positions were seized and the enemy killed or made prisoner, and it was evident that complete surprise had been achieved. By 0730 the ridgeline was secured, but it was evident that the enemy were now thoroughly aroused. It was considered inadvisable to waste men trying to seize Mt. Carchie at this time, so Company I contented itself with driving the small enemy force into the recesses of the peak, meanwhile destroying two observation posts by artillery fire. Meanwhile Company L was driving rapidly toward Mt. Polgorito, until they were halted and forced to seek cover about midway to the peak as the enemy, desperate to hold this key observation post, countered with a storm of small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Casualties were heavy, but the attacking forces held grimly to the ground already seized, and repelled a sharp counterattack. Moving carefully through the heavy fire, Company L had reached the base of the extreme peak of Mt. Folgorito, when the enemy observation post located on the summit, called down a ring of fire from heavy mortars, artillery, and the heavy coastal rifles of Punta Bianca around the peak. Although casualties were again heavy, the attacking troops made their way with great courage and determination through the fire, secured the base of the peak, and stormed the summit. In a fierce hand to hand encounter the enemy suffered six killed and four captured, while the remainder of the force fled in confusion down the Colle Piano spur which ran southwest from Mt. Folgorito. The 3d Battalion, now joined by Company K and the remainder of Company M, which had suffered 38 casualties from fierce enemy mortar fire as they made their way up the steep slopes to rejoin the battalion, dug in to hold the ground gained.

Simultaneously with this operation, the 100th Battalion of the 442d Combat Team had attacked north toward Mt. Folgorito as the 3d Battalion

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drove south. A ten minute preparatory barrage by the 599th and 329th Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company of the 442d Combat Team, B Company of the 895th Tank Destroyer Battalion, B Company of the 84th Chemical Battalion (4.2 mortar), and the assault guns of the 758th Tank Battalions had driven the enemy into his emplacements, and the 100th Battalion attacked behind this devastating fire at 050500B April. The first objective was "Georgia" peak. This knob of solid rock, containing at least fifteen emplacements and manned by a company of the enemy, had never been reduced though it had been shelled and attacked constantly over a five month period. The leading elements of the 100th Battalion had advanced approximately 150 yards toward their objective through a thickly sown minefield when an enemy mine was tripped. Almost immediately, seven more mines were tripped, causing heavy casualties and bringing down grenade, automatic and small arms fire on the attacking forces. Not once did the troops falter. By 0532 B, they had destroyed the enemy's defenses and gained the crest of the "Georgia" peak. It had taken the 442d Combat Team exactly 32 minutes to accomplish a mission that had resisted the best efforts of friendly troops for five months. Now thoroughly aroused, the enemy threw heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire on the reverse slope of "Georgia" as the leading elements advanced down the slope to attack the first of the "Ohio" peaks. In addition, enemy machine guns located in bunkers set into the saddle between the two peaks opened up, pinning the assault company to the ground. Still another company was forced to seek cover as they tried to maneuver to the left of the leading elements. Mortar and artillery fire failed to dent the well-constructed emplacements. Finally, the troops of the 442d Combat Team, infiltrating through the fire at the cost of heavy casualties to themselves, closed to assault range and attacked the applacements with grenades and bazookas. The battle raged throughout the day, and by night-fall, against fanatical resistance, twelve bunkers were destroyed and the position taken. At 052345B, the enemy mounted a strong counterattack, but the attack was smashed and thrown back after an hour-long firefight at close range.

A complete tabulation for the Combat Team for the day revealed that in addition to the ground gained, 30 enemy were known to have been killed, 12 bunkers were destroyed or captured, 17 machine guns and three 75mm howitzers were captured, and several tons of explosives, ammunition, and supplies were taken intact. This had been achieved at a cost to the Combat Team of 20 killed in action and 123 wounded.

Although casualties had been extremely heavy and fighting had continued intermittently throughout the night, the 442d Combat Team allowed the enemy no time for rest or reorganization. The night of 5 April, the 2d Battalion was committed from reserve and sent over the same route that the 3d Battalion had followed the previous night, passing through the 3d Battalion on 6 April and launching an immediate attack to the north on Mt. Belvedere, the last terrain feature before the key communications center of Massa. It was decided by the Combat Team commander to do this because of the argent need to deal the enemy continued hammer blows before he could recover, even though the unit to the left had not advanced, leaving the CT's left flank exposed for a depth of 2½ miles. The right flank was totally

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exposed, there being no troops closer than the Serchio Valley. The following day, 6 April, saw the 442d Combat Team close the pincers on the enemy troops remaining between the 100th and 3d Battalions on the three Chio peaks and Mt. Cerretta. Even though surrounded, the enemy fought desperately. Positions on the "Chio" peaks, protected by well-situated minefields resisted the most gallant efforts of the troops of the 100th Battalion to destroy them. After a two-hour battle at hand grenade range. characterized by grim determination on both sides, had yielded only slight gains, the combat team commander called for an air mission on the "Ohio" peaks. As the planes arrived, each made an initial pass for range. Ground observers relayed corrections to officers at regimental headquarters who in turn relayed them to the pilots through air liason personnel there. In this way, pin-point bombing and strafing were achieved. Following this mission, the 100th Battalion attacked behind a ten-minute artillery concentration. Although the enemy was battered and stunned, small groups resisted desperately with machine guns, small arms and grenades, but they were no match for the determined attackers who closed rapidly with each group and wiped it out. The close coordination of the enamy's fires had been destroyed by the devastating accuracy of the air attack directed by the observers of the Combat Team. Troops advanced methodically from peak to peak, effecting a junction with troops of the 3d Battalion advancing from the north at 1930 B. In their push, these troops had engaged in a two-hour battle with enemy strongpoints on the north slope of Mt. Cerretta, killing about 20 of the enemy and capturing eleven after fighting their way to hand grenade range. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion had relieved elements of the 3d, completed the reduction of Mt. Carchio and initiated an assault on Mt. Belveders by the end of the day. During the fighting on 6 April, the enemy casualties were 31 known dead and 106 captured by the 442d Combat Team. The combat team lost 13 killed and 60 wounded.

The 442d Combat Team continued to organize and clear the ground gained of enemy forces, meanwhile continuing to push relentlessly to the north. Elements of the 3d Battalion in a furious two-hour battle wiped out an enemy force which had been infiltrating toward Mt. Folgorito from the west flank of the combat team up the Colle Piano spur. Meanwhile other elements of the 442d Combat Team struck west along the north side of the Colle Piano spur, and, in a brilliant encircling movement, entered the town of Strinato and captured four eighty-one mm mortars, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, and twenty-three of the enemy after a short skirmiss. While this action was taking place the 2d Battalion of the 442d Combat Team had secured about half of the plateau-like expanse of the summit of Mt. Belvedere, the defense of which the enemy had intrusted to the crack Machine Gun Battalion "Kesselring", now reorganized and fighting as infantry. These veteran troops gave ground grudgingly and battered the attacking troops with heavy concentrations of mortar, artillery, and fire from the deadly coastal rifles on Punta Bianca.

Throughout this three day action, troops of the 442d Combat Team not engaged in actual conflict with the enemy worked twenty-four hours a day, under fire, in order to give the fighting troops fire support and accomplish the herculean task of supply and evacuation. Cannon Company of the 442d Combat Team, farther forward than any other elements of the Division Artillery, fired 1497 rounds in support of the attack during this three day period,

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despite the fact that the enemy from his commanding ground had direct observation on their gun positions and consistently fired counter-battery at their guns. The regimental Service Company, reinforced by the 206th Army Ground Force Band, maintained a constant flow of supplies as far forward as trucks could be driven over roads that were constantly interdicted by the enemy's heavy guns, in addition to maintaining assumition, gasoline, and ration dumps in the company area so that emergency calls for asmunition and other supplies could be filled with a minimum of delay. Since it was necessary during the initial three days of the attack to hand carry supplies and ammunition to the attacking battalions, over terrain so steep and broken that there was no footing even for sales, the regimental supply personnel secured carrying parties of partisans and civilians, augmented by extra men of the Service Company, the Provisional Replacement Company, the 206th Army Ground Force Band, and the Anti-Tank Company. These carrying parties packed supplies, water, and vitally needed ammunition to the three forward battalions on three successive nights, each round trip requiring sixteen hours of the most exhausting physical effort. When civilians panicked and deserted during an enemy mortar barrage on the carrying party, the troops of the 442d Combat Team assumed the extra load and successfully supplied the front-line troops. In addition, troops of the Anti-Tank Company and the Provisional Replacement Company assisted the medical personnel of the 442d Combat Team in hand carrying the wounded over this same exhausting route, day and night for three days.

(Incls #5, Operations reports).

The fourth day of the attack, 8 April, saw the 442d Combat Team launch a two-pronged attack, the 2d Battalion to complete the reduction of Mt. Belvedere and the 3d Battalion to make a rapid attack down the Colle Piano spur, and seize the community of Montignoso, thus opening Highway#1 almost to Massa and cutting the former 16 hour supply and evacuation route to 2 hours (Incl #3, Sketch). The now dazed and confused enemy offered slight resistance to the swift advance of the 3d Battalion, and Colle Piano was cleared by 1430 hours. Two hours later, Montignese was in the hands of the 442d Combat Team, and fifty of the enemy had been made prisoner. On the right of the Combat Team sector, the 2d Battalion launched a dawn attack, overrunning the enemy positions and clearing Mt. Belvedere proper by 0930 hours, killing twenty of the enemy and capturing 30. It was now necessary to clear the Colle Tecchione spar, a 2000 yard long ridge which ran from Mt. Belvedere to the eastern outskirts of Massa, both to protect the left flank of the Combat Team and to make Massa untenable to the enemy. This ridge was occupied by an estimated 200 enemy troops. The attack was launched at 1200 hours despite heavy mortar and artillary fire by which the enemy attempted to stall the assault. Advancing across exposed ground, the troops of the 442d Combat Team were stopped by heavy machine gun fire coming from a fringe of trees to their front. After a three hour battle on the rough, broken terrain, this defense line was broken and the advance continued slowly as the troops closed with a series of heavily defended enemy strongpoints and destroyed them one by one. At 2000 hours, the 2d Battalion had seized the ridge, only to be hit by heavy mortars and barrages from enemy self-propelled guns on the coastal plain, followed by several enemy counterattacks. With the added support of heavy machine guns, the troops of the 2d Battalion beat back these counterattacks, but only after two desperate charges by the enemy had penetrated their positions Authority 785 017

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causing great confusion in the darkness.

Meanwhile, other elements of the 2d Battalion, 442d Combat Team were advancing down the slopes of Mt. Belvedere toward the Frigido River Valley, their objective to seize the towns of Altagnana and Pariana on the reverse slopes of Mt. Belvedere, where the enemy was thought to be mustering reserves to counterattack the positions on Mt. Belvedere. By nightfall, advance elements of the battalion had reached the outskirts of both towns in the face of long range machine gun fire and heavy concentrations of mortar fire which raked their routes of advance, causing heavy casualties. During the day's action, the enemy lost forty-two known dead and fifty-sight captured to the 442d Combat Team.

The following day, 9 April, the 442d Combat Team resumed its drive on the enemy forces. The 2d Battalion resumed its attack against Altagnana and Pariana. Altagnana was cleared against light resistance in the early morning hours. The battle for Pariana, however, raged all through the day, first the enemy and then the troops of the 442d Combat Team gaining the upper hand. At 1200B hours, elements of the 2d Battalion had penetrated the town, but were immediately driven back by a vicious counterattack by infantry, two armored cars, a tank, and supported by self-propelled and machine gun fire from both flanks. Recovering, the troops of the 2d Battalion turned 8 Slam mortars they had captured two hours earlier on the Germans and again drove them off. Then, in house to house, room to room fighting they proceeded to destroy the Machine Gun Battalion "Kesselring", killing 77 and capturing 75 of the enemy(including three officers). They also seized one house filled with ammunition, four 50mm mortars, 12 Slam mortars, 16 machine guns, and great quantities of small arms and equipment. Two armored cars were damaged, but escaped.

Concurrently with this smashing blow at the enemy, the troops of the 3d Battalion, which had now driven abreast of the 2d Battalion, advanced on the Colle Tecchione ridge line. During the night of 8-9 April, the enemy had infiltrated a large force back onto the ridge from the western tip, and were again threatening the 2d Battalion. The advance of the 3d Battalion directed by the Combat Team commander caught these troops in a pocket from which there was no escape. The 3d Battalion pounded this force to pieces with 81mm and 4.2 mortar fire, rockets and automatic weapons. They killed 60 of the enemy, captured 20, and seized seven machine guns, four mortars, six

machine pistols, and one full truck load of ammunition.

The enemy now retreated headlong for his second defensive position, the so-called "Green Line". The A42d Combat Team, although it had fought for five consecutive days and nights over terrain as rugged and broken as any in the ApCennine chain, had utterly destroyed two battalions of the enemy and had badly mauled a third, itself sustaining heavy casualties in the process, now pressed on rapidly. On 10 April, through intermittent artillary fire, the 2d Battalion scaled 3000 foot Mt. Brugiana, which dominates both Massa and Garrara. The 3d Battalion, attacking on the left of the 2d, crossed the Frigido River, seized Bergiola Foscalina, and took the western slopes of Mt. Brugiana, meanwhile protecting its own left flank and rear, since the unit on the left had not yet advanced beyond Massa. Quickly, the Combat Team Commander assembled the Anti-Tank Company, dispatched it to Forne and Granda on the right(eastern) flank of the Combat Team to establish road blocks. This mission was accomplished successfully although the company was subject to mortar fire from the mountains to the east and were forced to repel two enemy raiding parties

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in a brisk skirmish. The 100th Battalion was then assembled in Altagmana to guard against attack from the right rear, while elements of the 370th Infantry, 92d Division took over the garrison of Mt. Belvedere and Mt. Carchio.

The following day, the battalions of the 442d Combat Team were rapidly leap-frogged. The 100th Battalion was dispatched to the extreme right flank, and seized Collennata after an eight hour climb through an abandoned marble quarry, capturing twenty-two prisoners. The 2d Battalion held Mt. Brugiana, while the 3d Battalion pushed rapidly ahead, drove into Carrara, and secured the city together with a well-organized Partisan group. Following this, the battalion quickly spread out to the surrounding hills, occupying Torano, Sorgnano, and Gragmana (Incl #4, Sketch).

The 232d Combat Engineer Company, which had previously worked day and night opening the supply route to Massa, now battled furiously against time to open Highway #1 to Carrara, even though their working parties were constantly harassed by sniper and heavy artillery fire. In addition, they were faced with the task of opening a route to the 100th Battalion to the east. The engineers were also faced with a new and deadly demolition device. Three twelve inch shells had been wired together by the Germans and set two feet under the road, which was then resurfaced to prevent the detection of the charges, which were detonated by a stake-type device. The engineers lost four bulldozers to these deadly mines, but the crews continued on, even though each man realized the deadly danger under which he worked. The supply route was opened in the face of these obstacles just twelve hours after the fall of Carrara. (Incl #5, Operations Reports).

On 13 April, the 442d Combat Team resumed its drive, now pressing toward Aulla, vital road center, which controlled the only avenues of escape for the enemy in this sector to the Po Valley. The 2d Battalion rapidly advanced on Castelpoggio, and occupied the hills beyond, preparing for an attack on Mt. Pizzacuto. The 100th Battalion was moved into Gragnana in close support, coming under violent enemy shellfire in the process. The 3d Battalion was held in Carrara to protect the regimental left and rear until the 473d Infantry should advance that far. It also came under heavy and sustained fire

from the enemy's coastal rifles.

Because of the fact that the forward elements of the 2d Battalion were spread very thin, the Combat Team Commander decided to move B Company to Castelpoggio during the night of 13-14 April to reinforce the 2d Battalion command group there. Increased enemy activity also indicated that such a move was necessary. On 14 April, under cover of an early morning fog, a battalion of the enemy, supported by 18 machine guns, advanced to within 30 yards of the town before they were detected by the outposts. In the ensuing firefight, which lasted two and one-half-hours, the enemy lost at least eight killed, 16 wounded, and carried away many of his casualties when he withdrew. This force was identified as the 1st Battalion, 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 90th PG Division. Later identified were the 4th Hight Mountain Battalion, another crack unit, and the 3d Battalion, 361st PG Regiment from the German mentral mobile reserve behind Bologna. In spite of the fact that

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his situation in the Po Valley was critical, the enemy was now diverting some of his scant reserves to stop the drive of the 442d Combat Team on his lifeline at Aulla. The enemy had also committed the Mittenwald Mt. Battalion and 1st Battalion, 285th Infantry Regiment in the sector.

Following the breaking of this counterattack, the 2d Battalion pressed forward, and by 1900B hours had seized Mt. Pizzacuto, with a loss

to the Germans of 12 Killed and 54 captured.

Thus within 10 days, the 442d Combat Team had captured 504 prisoners, killed 307, and wounded or killed an additional 250 snemy troops. In addition, it had destroyed 35 bunkers, captured or destroyed 59 machine guns, 20 81mm mortars, 8 50mm mortars, 3 75mm pack howitzers, 2 20mm guns, and took tons of ammunition and other materiel. More important, however, is the fact that the 442d Combat Team was able to seize the key heights of Mt. Folgorito and Mt. Carchio. For with these went the enemy's last hope of holding the coastal sector. The fall of Massa and Carrara were assured and the way was opened to La Spezia and Genoa. The attack that began as a diversion had, largely due to the efforts of this Combat Team, become an all-out assault.

- 3. Sketches: Showing movements of troops cited and general terrain features. (See attached overlays: Oblique)
- 4. a. Nature of terrain: Mountainous with steep slopes and scant growth, inadequate road net. This necessitated the handcarrying of supplies during such of the action.

Enemy morale: Very good. After recovering from initial

surprise, enemy resisted fiercely.

c. Morale of our troops: Excellent, despite adverse terrain obstacles.

Weather: Misty and sometimes cloudy in the morning, usually clearing in the afternoon.

e. Exact time and dates of action: 0500B 5 April 1945 to 1900B 14 April 1945.

- 5. a. Number of men assigned to unit cited who took part in action: 5 April: 442d Inf Regt- 3435; 232d Engrs-163; 206th ACF Bend-30; 6 April: 442d Inf Regt-3300; 232d Engrs-159; 206th AGF Band-30; 7 April: 442d Inf Regt- 3482; 232d Engrs-159; 206th AGF Band-30; 8 April: 442d Inf Regt-3462; 232d Engrs-159; 206th AGF Band-30; 9 April: 442d Inf Regt-3500; 232d Engrs-160; 206th ACF Band-30; 10 April: 442d Inf Regt-3473; 232d Engrs-155: 206th AGF Band-30; 11 April: 442d Inf Regt-3501: 232d Engrs-153; 206th AGF Band-30; 12 April: 442d Inf Regt-3544; 232d Engrs-154; 206th ACF Band-30; 13 April: 442d Inf Regt 3551; 232d Engre-154; 206th AGF Band-30; 14 April: 442d Inf Regt-3522; 232d Engrs-167; 206th AGF Band-30.
 - b. Number of casualties suffered by unit cited: 56 KIA and 247 WIA.
 - c. Approximate strength of troops adjacent and in support, and character of support rendered by other units: One battalion

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of 370th Inf attacked along the coastal plain on left flank, gaining approximately 1000 yards before it was stopped. 473d Inf Regt, which relieved the 370th Inf on 7 April, took up the Combat Team's left flank and attacked along the coastal plain, The 599th FA Bn, 329th FA Bn, 1st Platoon of B Company, 896th TD Bn, B Company, 84th Chemical Battalion(4.2 mortars), and Assault Guns of the 758th Tank Battalion supported the Combat Team's attack by firing on targets as called for by the Bn commanders through forward observers. The 57th Fighter Group, XXII Tactical Air Command, 12 AAE supported the Combat Team's attack by bombing and strafing enemy strongpoints.

6. a. Approximate strength of enemy: 1st and 2d Battalions, 281st Regt, 148th Div; "Kesselring Machine Gun Battalion"; 1st Battalion, 285th Regt, 148th Div; 4th High Mt. Battalion; 1st and 3d Battalions, 361st Panzer Grenadier Regt; Mittenwald Mt. Battalion; and supporting artillery, self-propelled guns and engineers.

vation from prepared positions on commanding ground. Automatic weapons fire was heavy; and artillery fire, especially from econtal guns located on Punta Bianca, was both heavy and accurate. Mortar fire was also heavy in the early stages of the action.

c. Apparent enemy intention or objectives: To hold the commanding ground in this sector as long as possible and prevent the Allied troops from advancing.

d. Losses suffered by the enemy: 504 prisoners, 307 killed and an additional 250 wounded or killed; 35 bunkers destroyed, 59 machine guns, 20 heavy mortars, 8 light mortars, 3 75mm pack howitzers and 2 20mm guns destroyed or captured; in addition a great number of rifles, machine pistols, grenades and tons of ammunition and equipment were taken.

- 7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated above.
- 8. Previous Citations:
 100th Infantry Battalion (Seperate), per Section VII, General
 Order #121, Hq 5th Army, dtd 18 July 1944.
 100th Battalion, 442d Combat Team, per Section II, General Order
 #360, Hq 7th Army, dtd 3 August 1945.
 2d Battalion, 442d Combat Team, per Section I, General Order
 #89, Hq 5th Army, dtd 17 July 1945.

3d Battalion, 442d RCT, per Section II, General Order #317, Hg 7th Army, dtd 16 July 1945.

Companies F & L (Task Force O'Connor), 442d Combat Team, per Section II, General Order #13, Hq 7th Army, dtd 21 January 1945.

9. PROPOSED CITATION:
The ALZD REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM, less the 522d

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 785 017

NATA Date 510.04

Ltr Hq 92d Inf Div, subj: "Citation of Unit", dtd 7 Oct 45.

Field Artillery Battalion, is cited for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 April to 14 April 1945 in the vicinity of Serravezza, Carrara, and Fosdinovo, Italy. When the 92d Infantry Division, with the 442d Combat Team attached, was ordered to open the Fifth Army offensive by executing a diversionary attack on the Ligurian Coast of Italy, the Combat Team was ordered to make the main effort of this attack. By executing a daring and skillful flanking attack on the positions which formed the western anchor of the formidable Cothic Line, an attack which necessitated that the striking force of the Combat Team climb for hours over precipitous terrain and launch an attack without rest or reorganization, positions which had withstood the best efforts of friendly troops for five months were over-run and completely destroyed in four days. This was accomplished in the face of skilled enony troops who were nearly equal in strength to the attacking forces and who had had at least five months to improve their positions, located on formidable and tactically sound natural barriers. Then, although their casualties had been heavy and the action had been physically exhausting, the AA2d Combat Team pressed forward, allowing the retreating enemy no time for rest or reorganization, liberated the city of Carrara, seized the heights beyond, and opened the way for further advances on the key road center and port of La Spezia, and later, Genoa. It accomplished the mission of creating a diversion along the Ligurian Coast of Italy which served as a feint for the subsequent break-through of Fifth army forces into Bologna and the Po Valley, attacking with such skill and daring that the enemy was compelled to divert part of his desperately needed central reserve to meet this thrust. In ten day's fighting, the 442d Combat Team had advanced fifteen (15) miles, captured 50% prisoners, killed 307, and probably wounded or killed an additional 250. Enemy material captured or destroyed by the Combat Team amounted to 35 bunkers, 59 machine guns, 20 heavy mortars, 8 light mortars, and numerous other weapons and tons of supplies. The Combat Team suffered losses of 56 killed and 247 wounded in action. By successfully accomplishing this mission, the 442d Combat Team turned an action which had been ordered as a diversionary attack into a full scale offensive which played an important part in the final destruction of the German armies in Italy. The gallantry and esprit de corps displayed by the officers and men of the 442d Regimental Combat Team against a formidable enemy and great natural obstacles exemplify the finest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States.

> J. E. WOOD, Brigadier General, U. S. A., Commanding.

6 Inels: Inel #1 - Sketch

Incl #2 - Sketch

Incl #3 - Sketch

Incl #4 - Sketch

Incl #5 - Operations Reports

Separate Cos, 442d RCT. Incl #6 - Map # 0.5.G.S. -4229: 1:50,000

Number: 104-I; 96-II; 96-III.

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