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
Prompted by observations made before and during the operation 8-11 February 1945, a reorganization of the 370th Infantry Regiment was initiated on 24 February 1945. The purpose of the reorganization was to assemble in this regiment the best Infantry officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men that could be selected from three regiments of the 92d Division. Emphasis was placed on the utilization of those individuals who had in some way demonstrated their reliability in combat operations. Battalion Commanders, staffs, Company Commanders, platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers were all chosen with an eye to providing the best leadership and guidance that could be obtained. This reorganization was completed on 17 March 1945 and an intensive training and rehabilitation program was initiated.

Between 12 February 1945 and 5 April 1945, many inspections were conducted by the Division Commander and/or by members of his staff. An average of four (4) patrols per day were sent out by the regiment. Officers and enlisted men attended the Division Combat Intelligence School and the Division Mine School. Eighty-two (82) officers and 796 enlisted men were given rest leaves. Varied training problems were conducted. Periodic reliefs gave each of the three battalions rest, training time, an opportunity to become familiar with each other and with the terrain over which they might fight. Equipment was furnished and replaced where needed. All indications pointed to a considerable improvement in the functioning of the regiment and the outlook was good when the 370th Infantry Regiment, as reorganized, in conjunction with the 442d Infantry on its right drew its "second wind" and attacked the enemy west of the 99 Easting at 050600B April 1945. Authority NARA Date 5/10/04

During the previous operation, 8-11 February 1945, the Division reinforced (-365th Infantry) had attacked the enemy on its front west of the 97 Easting. The objective was limited and the infantry regiments were well supported. At the conclusion of the operation, however, the Division front was still substantially on the same line from which it had launched its attack. There were frequent demonstrations of straggling, disintegration, and of a lack of aggressiveness and offensive spirit. Disorderly and panicky withdrawals with little heed to command and leadership, particularly in the platoon echelons were recurrent. Thus, commanders concluded at that time that the Infantry of this Division was unreliable while the performance of service elements and artillery was all that could be desired; and that the combat capabilities of the Infantry of this Division favored its employment in quiet sectors with activities limited to patrolling and operations of a defensive nature until a more determination and reliability could be developed.

In the present operation the regimental mission was to STRETTOIA full Masses and Paire as Introduction attack in the same area as before and to capture C. VENTURBILO, which we will work a work and the present of the FRIGIDO RIVER, more up the coastal and rear areas cross the FRIGIDO RIVER, seize a phase line in zone, and maintain contact with the 442d Infantry. Engineers, tanks, tank destroyers, artillery, air and naval gunfire support were available. The terrain was difficult and defended by an estimated 350 Reichsdeutsch Germans who indicated no willingness to give up any ground that they held; but the regiment was thoroughly familiar with its front as a result of two months of nightly patrolling, air photo study, and other Intelligence information that had been furnished.

The attack was preceded by a ten-minute preparation by the Division Artillery reinforced. The 1st and 3d Battalions



in column and echeloned to the right crossed the line of departure as scheduled. The 2d Battalion was in reserve. Heavy enemy mortar fire slowed the advance of the leading battalion, and a number of counterattacks on the leading elements forced them to withdraw and to reorganize that afternoon. Enemy mortar fire disorganized the leading company of the 3d Battalion and two companies passed through them. They dropped back later and the battalion remained throughout the day under heavy enemy fire. The 2d Battalion, as reserve, moved forward from its reserve area in the early noon to a forward assembly position behind the assault elements and passed through the lst Battalion in the evening.

During the first night the 1st and 2d Battalions reorganized and consolidated their positions. An enemy counterpreparation broke up a scheduled attack in the morning and resulted in disorganization that required regrouping during the
remainder of that day. Excessive straggling in the forward
areas reduced the 1st Battalion from a combat strength of over
the men to eighty-eight (2) men and it became necessary to
call off the attack in the late afternoon.

The positions were harassed by enemy mortar mortars and artillery during the second night. As a result of the failures the previous day, in order to keep up with the gains made by the 442d Infantry Regiment on the right and to accomplish the mission in the coastal sector, the 2d Battalion, 473d Infantry was attached to the 370th Infantry Regiment and attacked in the morning. The battalion advanced slowly under heavy fire and over ground that had previously been assigned to the 370th Infantry Regiment. Enemy resistance was strong and the battalion suffered considerable losses, including the death of the Battalion Commander. The 2d Battalion, 370th Infantry

also attacked in the morning and met light opposition. A block was established at STRINATO. The 3d Battalion, 370th Infantry reverted to regimental control in the early noon and was ordered to attack north along Highway 1 to PORTA, supported by tanks. Straggling prompted by enemy artillery fire left this battalion with a strength of forty-eight (48) men in the forward areas, and progress was made impossible. The 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, was assembled and departed for the SERCHIO VALLEY in the afternoon.

During the same period, the 442d Infantry Regiment had driven three (3) miles into the crest of the German defenses Tower secured its initial objective, had driven off strong enemy counterattacks, and had captured one hundred and eighty-one (181) prisoners. The enemy had been engaged, killed, or captured and positions were established on the newly gained ground. This was all accomplished over new and difficult terrain after only two (2) days of preliminary reconnaissance.

The attached overlay (Inclosure No. 1) shows the results of operations (ground gained) for the 370th Infantry and the 442d Infantry for the period 050500B to 071800B April 1945.

Inclosure No. 2 shows comparative statistical figures for the two regiments. The regimental commander's narrative of the attack. Again the results are most disheartening. The observations and conclusions made previously are substantiated. Despite excellent leadership, the unreliability of the Infan-

try and their lack of a determined will to fight cannot be denied. Again the supporting Artillery and Service Elements


were all that could be desired.

The ground work for success had been thoroughly prepared, but the 370th Infantry did not have the Infantry that would take advantage of it.

2 inclosures:

incl. No. 1 - Map

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Inclosure No. 2 to accompany letter, "Report of Operations".

Comparative statistical figures for the 370th Infantry and the 442d Infantry Regiments for the period 050500B to 0218008 April 1945.

Authorized Strength - Infantry Regiment - 3207

Present for Duty strength at 050500B April 1945:

370th Infantry - Officers: 139

Enlisted Men: 2800

442d Infantry - Officers: 158

Enlisted Men: 3286

II. Killed in Action:

370th Infantry - Officers:

Enlisted Men:

Infantry - Officers: 4420

2 Enlisted Men: 27

-938

11

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III. Wounded in Action:

370th Infantry - Officers:

Enlisted Men

442d Infantry - Officers:

Enlisted Men: 191

IV. Missing in Action:

370th Infantry - Officers:

Enlisted Men:

442d Infantry - Officers:

0 Enlisted Men: 0

V. Prisoners of War:

370th Infantry Regiment ::


442d Infantry Regimenten: 181

VI. Stragglers Apprehended by the Provost Marshal:

370th Infantry Regiment: 105

442d Infantry Regiment:





SECRET

INTEROFFICE REFERENCE SHLET HEADQUARTERS 92d INFANTRY DIVISION Office of the AC of S, G-1

| SUBJECT: | - | I mo | | |
|--------------|------|---|---|--------------------------------|
| DATE | FROM | TO | | 1 |
| 9 Apr 45 G-1 | G-1 | G-2 (Attn: Capt. | 1. Pursuant to your verbal recthe following report is submitt | uest on 8 Apr 45 |
| | | Goodman) | a. Date Reorganization of 3 | 70th Inf was begu |
| | | b. Date Reorganization of 3 ted - 17 March 1945. | 70th Inf was comp | |
| | | c. Number of officers and e 370th Inf on rest leave bet and 5 Apr 45. | enlisted men from ween 11 Feb. 45 | |
| | | Off 82 796 | | |
| | | d. Present for Duty Strengt Bn as of 050500@ | h of 370th Inf by | |
| | | Special Units 48 1st Bn. 21 2d Bn. 26 | WO EM 3 601 0 694 0 733 | |
| | | 3d Bn . 28 | 0 674 | |
| | | e. Present for Duty Strengt 442nd Inf as of 050500: | | |
| | | | 370th Inf 123 39 442nd Inf 158 | WO EM 3 2900 2702 6 3286 |
| | | | f. 370th Inf | 442nd Inf Off EM |
| | | | KIA 6 9 WIA 11 175 MIA 2 40 | 2 27 7 191 0 0 |
| | | g. Stragglers: | | |
| | | | 370th Inf105 442nd Inf <u>None</u> | |
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