

ANNEX NO. 3

Proposed Citation, 3d Battalion,
442d Regimental Combat Team

HEADQUARTERS 92d INFANTRY DIVISION

JEW/saj

AG 200.6-AD

APO 92, US Army
26 September 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit

TO: Commanding General, MTOUSA,
APO 512, US Army

1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that the THIRD BATTALION, 442d Regimental Combat Team, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period, 5 April 1945 to 11 April 1945 in the vicinities of Montignoso Massa, and Carrara, Italy.

2. The Third Battalion of the 442d Regimental Combat Team is being recommended for a unit citation for distinguishing itself by extraordinary heroism in action in which it exhibited gallantry, determination, and an "esprit de corps" that set it apart and above units participating in the same engagement. This action was the "Diversion Attack" commencing 5 April 1945 along the west coast of Italy and served as a feint for the subsequent breakthrough of the Fifth and Eight Armies in the east.

This diversionary attack in the west was carried out by the 92d Division. The 370th Infantry Regiment, the 473d Regimental Combat Team, and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (latter two attached to the 92d Division) spearheaded the Fifth Army's attack in this sector. The 370th moved along the flat plains of the coast while the 473d ranged the foothills. Several miles inland, the 442d swept the mountain areas. However, the entire attack along the west coast hinged upon the 442d Regimental Combat Team's successful seizure of the enemy's "eyes" located in the mountain peaks of Mount Folgorito (2800') and Mount Carchio (3300'). These two vitally important mountain peaks, the high points in the ridge running north and south, dominated the Ligurian coastal plain and Highway #1 leading to the key communication center of Massa. Hence, any movement by friendly troops along the coastal area was impossible due to the observation that the enemy maintained from its posts situated along the Mount Folgorito-Mount Carchio ridgeline. As long as the enemy held these long-prepared defenses on the peaks, the coastal flats and the route north were barred from use by friendly troops; therefore, it was imperative that this key mountain observation fortress be taken.

Mount Felgorite

Time had allowed the enemy to become well-entrenched and fortified. Furthermore, the enemy were veterans, rich in mountain-fighting experience and secure in their high morale resulting from the successful defense of their strong points against numerous Allied probes and attacks. The enemy had repeatedly repulsed attacks waged during the preceding winter months.

View from Azzano

Terrain in every way favored the strategy-ranified defenses of the enemy. Mount Felgorite and Mount Carchio were three thousand foot rock bastions rising abruptly from a moat-like swift flowing stream which lay directly at the base. The slope of the Mount Felgorite-Mount Carchio ridgeline was scantily specked with low growing shrubs and almost entirely bereft of cover. The sliding sandy surface of the steep slope made ascent slow, laborious, and dangerous.

This was the enemy, the terrain, and the significance assigned to the Third Battalion of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.

On the first day of the attack, Mount Folgorito and the ridge to Mount Carchio were taken. The massive mountain walls of the enemy which had resisted all previous attacks throughout the late fall and winter of 1944-1945, crumbled under the spearheading drive of the Third Battalion in one day. Within a week, the Battalion had swept relentlessly forward for twelve miles through the mountain defenses of the enemy to assist in the liberation of Massa, and to occupy the worldfamed marble-mining city of Carrara.

The Third Battalion thus opened the way for the Fifth Army advance in this sector and fulfilled in every way, the feint for the later all-out attack of the Fifth and Eighth Armies in the east.

In detail, the operation of the Third Battalion was as follows:

The Regimental plan of attack was for one battalion to attack north along the dominating ridgeline of Mount Folgorito and Mount Carchio while the Third Battalion, making an undetected approach march, was to attack the ridgeline broadside from the east in a surprise enveloping movement to take possession of the saddle between Mount Folgorito and Mount Carchio as well as the peaks themselves. In order to maintain the surprise element, the success of the attack depending largely on this feature, the troops of the Third Battalion moved at night from their bivouac area in the vicinity of San Martino through Serevezza to Azzano on 3 April 1945, and in the night of 4 April 1945, from Azzano to the "military crest line" of the ridge (saddle) between Mount Folgorito and Mount Carchio. This was the line of departure for the attacking Third Battalion. All movements had to be accomplished under cover of darkness.

The troops of the Third Battalion entrucked at San Martino at 1930 hours, 3 April 1945, and detrucked at Pietrasanta at 2100 hours. From here, the troops began the long torturous march through Serevezza to Azzano, accomplishing the approach in the strictest of secrecy in order not to forewarn the enemy by their presence. The trip from Serevezza to Azzano was begun at 2115 hours and proceeded up a winding, rocky, mountain trail. The utter blackness of the night, the full load of fighting equipment, the never-ending narrow uphill trail fringed with steep drop-offs (ranging from 15 to 150 feet), and the cold drizzling rain which

Looking South Along the Attack Slope.

made each unseen step slippery and dangerous, combined to produce great physical and mental exhaustion among the men. The ascent was made by forming a "human-chain" whereby each man grasped the pack in front of him, yet, even with this precaution, twenty-five men slipped or fell from the trail. Two were seriously injured while the remainder were treated for bruises and abrasions and were able to rejoin the Battalion. The trail led along the forward slope of a deeply indented mountain ridge, separated from the enemy by a valley approximately 1500 yards wide. Azzano was finally reached at 0245 hours, 4 April 1945. This mountain village was located approximately half way up the slope of Mount Cavallo (3145') and in daylight, the village was under direct observation of the enemy and had been subject to sporadic harassing fire. The Battalion moved into the houses of Azzano and the men remain inside throughout the day of 4 April 1945. West, directly across the deep valley, atop the Mount Folgorito-Mount Garchio ridgeline, were the enemy-held positions, strengthened through months of occupation, and commanding virtually impenetrable fields of fire down the steep open slope of the ridgeline.

That same night, 4 April 1945, at 2200 hours, the attack companies of I and L with elements of M, and the Battalion Command Group, moved out of Azzano, down the steep slope to the streambed, from there, up the steeper pathless side of the Mount Folgorito-Mount Carchio ridge. Company K and the remainder of Company M remained in reserve in Azzano. The entire area from the streambed to the enemy-held ridgeline had never before been reconnoitered by friendly troops in the months during which this area had been the "No-man's-land". A fact of particular importance in that it emphasizes the terrain difficulties and the rigid control that the enemy exerted over this area of combat. Prior reconnaissance was impossible as secrecy dictated no daylight parties and the short time allotted the Third Battalion for the attack, permitted only a limited visual reconnaissance. Undaunted, the Third Battalion, picking the route of attack based only upon this type of reconnaissance and the unconfirmed information of a Partisan as to the whereabouts of enemy concentrations, pushed in darkness towards the objective. The "trail" to the ridgeline of Mount Folgorito-Mount Carchio zigzagged constantly upwards over the shifty shale-like slope. The men, with full battle gear, including mortars and machine guns, crawled upwards on their hands and knees, or pulled themselves up the steep trail by grasping low-growing shrubs or the rifle butt of the man above, but often slipping and falling until a comrade halted them to push or pull them forward again. One Company I rifleman was hospitalized for concussion after a dislodged boulder struck and threw him 20 yards down the slope. Many others suffered bruises and sprains from slides and falls but none turned back. Thus, there was no trail until the men of the Third Battalion made one. The regular trails were avoided for they were known to have been zeroed-in, boobytrapped, and watched. Another example of the natural obstacle offered by this mountain route can be gleaned from the fact that sixteen aid relay posts had to be set up along this trail to evacuate the wounded.

The attack on Mount Folgorita, Mount Carchio, and the ridgeline was scheduled for 0500 hours 5 April 1945 and was to be made without artillery preparation. Surprise was the keynote of the attack. Due to the superhuman task of scaling the mountain side in the dark to reach the line of departure, the troops were unable to jump off until some minutes after 0500 hours, but by 0600 hours and before it had become light, the attack was in full swing. Thus, the attacking Third Battalion, without time for reorganization, without rest after six hours of steady and exhausting climbing, plunged into attack on the enemy positions.

Company L swung left along the saddle towards Mount Folgorito and Company I sent one platoon north along a spur towards Mount Carchio. The surprise element had been maintained. Gun positions were seized and the enemy killed or made prisoner. By 0730 hours, the ridgeline between Mount Folgorito and Mount Carchio had been taken but by this time, the remaining enemy were now thoroughly aroused. Company I in its initial assault on Mount Carchio had to swing

swing south behind Company L and then turn north again along the main ridge towards Mount Garchio. The enemy had excellent observation from towering Mount Altissimo on the extreme right and the original route of attack of the Company I platoon was rendered militarily inexpedient in the growing light of morning. However, by cutting back to the main ridge leading to Mount Garchio, Company I successfully drove forward and locked the enemy helpless in the recesses of rocky Mount Garchio. Direct hits on two troublesome observation posts were scored by the artillery after a forward probing patrol led by the Company I commander had spotted their positions.

In the meantime, at the military crest of the ridge, Company L swung left along the reverse slope while the second platoon of the company was ordered to move over the ridge and to establish a flank guard on the forward slope. Even as the second platoon neared the ridge top, the first scout spotted a lone sentinel who was silently and quickly captured. From this first prisoner, much information was gathered. The attack on the Mount Folgorito-Mount Garchio ridgeline spread like wildfire. The prisoner's comrades were in a large dug-out on the forward slope of the ridge. While this first prisoner was guiding the platoon to the dug-out, three cleverly concealed and fortified machine gun nests were detected. The essential firing parts were removed and a guard placed on the guns to prevent retaking and use by the enemy. Still at the point of an M-1, the prisoner led the platoon to the deep dug-out. When shouts failed to bring the enemy forth, a BARman fired a burst into the entrance. Seven enemy surrendered. Minutes later, this same platoon proceeded 50 yards south on the forward slope of the ridge to flush seven additional enemy from another large dug-out. These prisoners were also sent to the rear. As the platoon continued forward towards the peak of Mount Folgorito, the enemy threw artillery, mortars, and machine gun fire from a direction north along the forward slope at a point near Mount Garchio and Mount Belvedere. Machine gun and sniper fire also came in from the direction of Mount Folgorito. Casualties were suffered. This frontal, rear, and flank fire was possible due to the conformation of the terrain. The ridgeline horseshoed to the east while the enemy were in positions to the north, west, and south. Unable to find cover from the incoming fire, the platoon, after encountering and successfully repelling a small force of the enemy from the direct front, moved back over the ridgeline and took cover on the reverse slope. The second platoon thereupon rejoined Company L to move in concert towards Mount Folgorito. By the afternoon, after frequent patrol clashes, the central portion of the ridgeline had been cleared and the first and third platoons of Company L were moving directly onto the peak of Mount Folgorito. Here was located one of the enemy's observation posts. Three enemy were visible in the nest on the peak.

Later examination revealed an eight man dug-out immediately below the peak, and near the base, dug-outs and shelters for a platoon of the enemy. Also, enemy mortar and artillery communication ran from this 2800 foot peak down to waiting batteries. This was a key observation post. A ring of fire consisting of SP's, long range coastal guns, heavy mortars, machine guns, and small arms was placed by the enemy around this strategic peak. The enemy was determined to keep this observation which commanded a view of the entire Ligurian coast for miles to the west, north, and south. The Third Battalion was determined to knock it out. At approximately 1800 hours, 5 April 1945, the third platoon of Company L infiltrated through the heavy fire and secured the base of the peak. The first platoon then moved through the fire, pushed through the third platoon, and attacked the very peak top from the left flank. After a brief but fierce hand-to-hand small arms and grenade fight, the enemy suffered six killed and four captured. An estimated platoon fled under fire down the Cle Piano spur which ran southwest from the peak of Mount Folgorito.

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In addition to the prisoners, the enemy dead, and the approximately twenty enemy wounded, the Third Battalion on the first day of the attack seized four machine guns, six machine pistols, three peak (75 mm) howitzers, two dug-outs filled with ammunition and explosives, stores of enemy food and loot, many rifles, and hundreds of grenades. The ground gained was of the greatest value. The vast area extending coastward could now be observed from the ground taken. The importance of this observation post can be realized not only from the heavy defensive fire that the enemy had placed around the peak, but also from the presence of strong concentrated enemy forces deployed to the south near Mount Carreta where previous attacks had been attempted and where attack was expected. Strung out over the ridgeline had been strategically spotted and firepower-packed strongpoints. The enemy after months of resisting attacks felt secure in the natural barrier that the steep Mount Folgorito-Mount Garchis ridge offered, and in their own spirited defenses. The enemy did not allow for the extraordinary drive and unflagging determination displayed by the men of the Third Battalion, which, in the end, overcame natural obstacles and the surprised but stubbornly resisting enemy.

Company K and elements of Company M were called from reserve in Azzano to reinforce the attacking companies at 1000 hours, 5 April 1945. Again the terrain proved to be the worst enemy. At the streambottom, the acute vee formed by the sharply descending mountain sides provided a perfect bounding "board" for the enemy mortar bursts which fell as the companies moved forward. Observation was maintained by the enemy from Mount Altissimo to the north. A space interval that would have been "safe" on ordinary

terrain, proved to be insufficient in the steep valley across which the only usable trail to the forward companies led. Four men were killed and thirty-four wounded in attempting to cross the creek bottom. In spite of the intense mortar barrage, the companies continued to move up the mountain side to reinforce the two thousand yard ridgeline held by the attack companies who were thinly spread. By nightfall, Company K and the elements of Company M had dug in along the reverse slope of the ridgeline between Company I on the right and Company L on the left. The Third Battalion sustained losses of six killed in action and fifty-five wounded in action.

Supplies for the front lines had to be hand-carried, and carrying parties from the Partisans, Anti-Tank Company, Provisional Company, and Regimental Headquarters were employed. It was necessary to use a different carrying team for each night as one complete trip from the supply point to the ridgeline and back took 16 hours and the men were so exhausted upon returning that daily trips by the same men were impossible. On the 7th, badly needed communication supplies had to be dropped by airplane to the ridgetop Third Battalion inasmuch as the carrying party consisting of Italian civilians (88) had dropped during the night of 6 April, the entire supply load down the mountain side in a moment of panic engendered by exhaustion and fear of the enemy mortar bursts which harassed the route.

On 6 April 1945, throughout the day, in the sudden lifting and falling mist, Third Battalion patrols probed under harassing enemy artillery and mortar fire and engaged in many brief but intense firefights. On the right flank, Company I in the Mount Carchio sector was replaced by elements of the Second Battalion. Company I was thereby able to move south with the other Third Battalion companies. Company I now occupied the ridgeline between the Second Battalion and Mount Folgorite. Company K stretched out along the ridge in the vicinity of Mount Folgorite. Company L pushed southeast and downhill toward Cerreta to establish contact with the left flank unit (100th Battalion, 442nd Regimental Combat Team). This maneuver was designed to block the trail running east from the town of Montignoso and the eleven branching mountain trails leading towards the Battalion area. Thus it was a safeguard against counterattacks as well as fulfilling the military requirement of maintaining contact with units on the flanks. In moving down, Company L hit a resistance point approximately half way to Cerreta. After an intense two-hour close-in battle with automatic weapons, rifles, and handgrenades, the remaining enemy surrendered. Eleven prisoners were taken; an unknown number killed and wounded; one fifty caliber heavy machine gun, eight rifles, a dug-out of ammunition, and several

boxes of handgrenades were also seized.

Company K had shifted into the Company L sector when the latter moved south to contact the unit on the flank. In the late evening, Company K pushed down the same route taken by Company L earlier in the afternoon, then out west through elements of the flank unit to secure a portion of the Cle Piano spur that extended southwest from Mount Folgorito. This last minute shift caused Company I to spread over the entire ridge-line from a point half-way to Gerreta to elements of the unit on the right flank located half-way between Mount Folgorito and Mount Garchio.

The Battalion lost two killed in action and fifteen wounded in action on this day.

During the early morning of the 7th, the enemy silently infiltrated reinforcements and strengthened positions near the base of the peak of Mount Folgorito in a design to ambush forward movements of our troops. On the same morning, alert Third Battalion men had spotted this mishrooking enemy hedgehog. Company I, after a strong firefight, wiped out this resistance point; killed five enemy; destroyed three enemy machine gun nests; took a dug-out of ammunition and supplies; and captured eleven prisoners. Company K from its position along the Cle Piano spur moved north to approach, well into enemy-held territory, the enemy's 81 mm mortar positions. After a short skirmish, the surprised enemy surrendered. Four 81 mm mortars were taken intact with hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Twenty-three enemy were captured.

On this day, the Battalion sustained nineteen wounded in action.

On 8 April 1945, the Third Battalion's objective was to clear Cle Piano completely. The now dazed and routed enemy offered slight resistance and Cle Piano was taken at 1430 hours. Company I cleared Vietina to the right and the surrounding area, while Company K pushed through Cle Piano to Montignoso to take and clear this community by 1830 hours. Still driving relentlessly, elements of the Third Battalion that same night moved northwest out of Montignoso toward Massa and Carrara. On the 8th, eight men of the Third Battalion were killed in action. Fifty of the enemy had been made prisoner in the rapid thrust toward Montignoso.

On 9 April 1945, in the hills before Massa, the Third Battalion completely crushed a strong enemy resistance point.

During the early morning, the enemy had been engaging a small force of the widely-spread right flank unit reinforced by one of the Third Battalion's night patrols. At 1200 hours, the attack companies of the Third Battalion had contacted and had driven the enemy troops estimated at company strength into a pocket, then proceeded to pound them to pieces with Company M and "4.2" mortar fire, with machine guns and BAR's, and with M-1's and carbines. Approximately 60 enemy were killed, 90 captured; seven machine guns, four mortars, six machine pistols, and one truckload of ammunition were seized. Ole Tecchione and the hills controlling Massa were wiped clean of the enemy. The Third Battalion suffered twelve wounded in action in this devastating assault on the retreating enemy.

On 10 April 1945, the Third Battalion in the face of sporadic artillery fire, skirted and left Massa behind, pushed on towards Carrara, and liberated the villages of San Carlo, Santa Lucia, Bergiola Maggiore and several others. The enemy continued to retreat in the face of this furious and determined drive.

The high ground to the east and south of Carrara was cleared on the morning of the 11th. At 1200 hours, the Third Battalion entered enemy-shelled Carrara. Strategic suburbs to the front, flanks, and rear were also occupied.

Thus, within a week's fighting time, the Third Battalion had captured 135 prisoners; killed 90; and wounded or killed an estimated 90 additional enemy. Fifteen machine guns, eight heavy mortars, three howitzers, one half track, and tons of ammunition and supplies were taken. But most important and decisive of all, the Third Battalion blacked-out the enemy's observation posts on the Mount Felgorite-Mount Garchio ridgeline. The enemy's eyes were made blind and his mountain backbone had been broken. The fall of the key communication center of Massa was assured and took place, Carrara was occupied, and the route north lay open. The Third Battalion had irreparably shattered the six month stalemate in this Fifth Army sector and had produced a "diversion attack" of the highest order.

3. Sketch showing movements of troops cited, and general terrain features (See: attached overlay, oblique).

4. a. Nature of terrain: The 12 miles covered by the Battalion in its drive from Azzano to Carrara were mountainous with steep slopes and scant undergrowth. This necessitated the hand-carrying of supplies; each trip averaging 6-8 hours, one way.
 - b. Enemy Morale: Good. After recovering from the initial surprise, the enemy resisted stubbornly.
 - c. Morale of our troops: Excellent, in spite of the adverse terrain and situation.
 - d. Weather: Misty and slightly cloudy in the mornings and bright and clear in the afternoons.
 - e. Exact time and dates of action: 0500 5 April 1945 to 1200 11 April 1945.
5. a. Number of officers and enlisted men assigned to unit cited who took part in action: 5 April, 948; 6 April, 899; 7 April, 862; 8 April, 848; 9 April, 909; 10 April, 892; 11 April, 915.
 - b. Number of casualties suffered by unit cited: 101 men wounded; 16 killed.
 - c. Approximate strength of supporting troops: 100th Bn, 442d Inf on left; 2nd Bn, 442nd Inf on right; supported by 599th FA Bn; 329th FA Bn; 1st Platoon, B Co, 894th TD Bn; B Co, 84th Chemical Bn (4.2 mortars); Assault Guns of 758th Tank Bn; Cannon Co, 442d Inf; 57th Fighter Group, XXII TAC.
6. a. Approximate strength of enemy: 1st and 2nd Bn, 281st Regt; 1048 Regt, 148th Div.; supporting troops, "Kesselring" MG Bn; coastal guns, Ponta Bianca; artillery; SP's; mortars; and TD's.
 - b. Character of enemy fire and observation: Enemy had good observation from prepared positions on commanding heights. Artillery and mortar fire from adjoining Mount Altissimo took a heavy toll on the first day. Snipers active throughout the action.
 - c. Apparent enemy intentions or objectives: The enemy was determined to hold the commanding peaks and prevent the Allies from advancing in this sector.
 - d. Losses suffered by the enemy: The casualties inflicted on the enemy by the 3rd Bn were: 133 prisoners, 80 killed, and approximately 80 additional, killed or wounded; 15 machine guns,

8 heavy mortars, 3 pack (75 mm) howitzers, 1 half track, 1 truckload of ammunition, 4 dug-out ammunition dumps, and numerous machine pistols and rifles were captured.

7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated above.

8. Proposed Citation:

The THIRD BATTALION, 442d Regimental Combat Team is cited for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 April to 11 April 1945 in the vicinity of Montignose, Massa, and Carrara, Italy. When the Combat Team opened the Fifth Army's spring offensive against the formidable enemy defenses in the Ligurian sector in northern Italy which were defended by picked and veteran troops, the THIRD BATTALION was ordered to make a daring flanking attack on the high ground of Mount Folgorito and Mount Carchio. In order to do this task, it was necessary for the Battalion to move from Serevezza to Azzano, thence to the ridgeline between the two peaks in the strictest of secrecy and under cover of darkness in order not to forewarn the enemy of their intentions. The journey from Serevezza to Azzano, was over a torturous winding rocky mountain path in the dead of night along the forward slope of a deeply indented mountain ridge and separated from the enemy by a valley 1500 yards wide. The trail was bordered in many places by steep drops ranging from 15 feet to 150 feet and in many places, small streams flowed across the trail making it slippery and dangerous to walk upon. The men had to form a "human chain" by hanging onto the man ahead and even with this precaution, twenty-five (25) men fell from the trail, seriously injuring two. Azzano was reached at 0245 hours, 4 April and the Battalion occupied the houses, to remain in hiding the balance of that day. On the night of 4 April, the Battalion moved out at 2200 hours on the last leg of its journey to the line of departure, the ridgeline between Mount Carchio and Mount Folgorito. Company L leading with Company I following. The trail to the saddle was made by the men of the Third Battalion. It was a path scratched out over a series of shifty shale-like outcroppings, never running in a straightline, but zigzagging up the 3000 foot ridge. The men with full battle equipment literally had to crawl up on hands and knees, many times slipping, getting up and slipping again, finally to be pushed up by a more fortunate comrade and helped along. Sixteen (16) relay aid stations had to be set up along this trail in order to evacuate the wounded. The attack was set at 0500 hours 5 April but due to the superhuman task of reaching the line of departure, the troops arrived after 0500 but by 0600 hours and before it was light, the attack was in full swing. Without a chance to reorganize and with no rest whatsoever after steadily climbing for over six (6) hours, Company L and Company I attacked. Company L swung left along the saddle toward Mount Folgorito. The surprise element had been maintained; the enemy had been caught offguard, and by 0730, the saddle had been taken by

Company L and Company I had driven the enemy back into the recesses of Mount Carchio, blasted their observation posts, and locked them helplessly under relentless fire. In the meantime, Company L pushed on; knocked out the observation post on the very peak of Mount Folgorito in spite of a heavy defensive ring of artillery, mortar, and small arms fire thrown around the base of the peak, and were securely dug-in and commanding the peak and ridge. The following day, contact was made with the unit on the right flank, and an enemy force estimated at two platoon strength was uprooted and sent fleeing with heavy losses. On 7 April, Company I destroyed 3 machine guns and took eleven prisoners; Company K attached an enemy mortar section, seized its four 81mm mortars intact and took twenty-three (23) prisoners. On 8 April, the Battalion descended on Montignoso at the base of the forward slope of the Mount Folgorito-Mount Carchio ridge and captured fifty (50) of the routed enemy along with much materiel. Montignoso was cleared and taken at 1630 hours. On 9 April, the Battalion continued its attack towards Carrara; pocketed a company of enemy, killed sixty (60) and captured twenty (20) with all their arms, ammunition, and supplies; then cleared the hills and villages to the right of Massa, a key communication city which fell to friendly troops that same day. On 10 April, the Third Battalion continued its attack clearing San Carlo, Santa Lucia, Bergiola Maggiore; and several other villages. On the 11th of April, the Third Battalion entered and occupied the city of Carrara.

In a week's fighting, over terrain necessitating the hand-carrying of most supplies, the Third Battalion had advanced twelve (12) miles, captured 133 prisoners, killed 80, and wounded or killed approximately 80 more; took 15 machine guns, 8 heavy mortars, 3 howitzers, 1 half track, numerous small arms, rifles, and machine pistols, and tons of ammunition and supplies. The Third Battalion suffered a loss of 101 men wounded in action and 16 killed in action during the period.

By successfully completing the initial attack on Mount Folgorito and Mount Carchio, the Fifth Army Advance in this coastal sector was made possible helping to bring the war to a far quicker end, with the saving of many lives. At the same time, this attack, initiated as a feint, developed along with the decisive and overwhelming breakthrough of the Fifth and Eighth Armies on the Adriatic flank to present a concerted crushing blow to all enemy forces in Italy. The courage, determination, and aggressiveness displayed by the officers and men of the Third Battalion against a formidable enemy and tremendous natural obstacles exemplifies the finest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States.

J. E. WOOD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding