HEADQUARTERS 92d INFANTRY DIVISION Office of the Commanding General JEW/mds

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APO 92 U. S. Army 15 October 1945


SUBJECT: Reason for Delay in Submitting Citation of Unit.

: Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512, U. S. Army.

- 1. Transmitted herewith is the proposed citation for the 442d Infantry Regiment.
- 2. Delay in submitting proposed citation is the fault of this command.
- 3. During the processing of historical and official records of the 92d Infantry Division, it was apparent that an eversight had been made in not granting the proper recognition to the outstanding accomplishments of the 442d Infantry Regimental Combat Team.
- 4. The 442d Infantry Regiment was detached from this division on 15 June 1945; communication difficulties occasioned considerable delay.

1 Incl: as indicated

J. E. WOOD Brigadier General, U. S. A. Commanding



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#### HEADEMARTERS 92D INFANTRY DIVISION APO#92, U.S. ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit.

TO : Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO #512, U. S. Army.

- 1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that the 442d Regimental Combat Team, less the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 April 1945 to 15 April 1945 in the vicinity of Serravezza, Carrara and Fosdinovo, Italy.
- 2. The 442d Regimental Combat Team, less the 552d Field Artillery Battalion, is being recommended for a unit citation for distinguishing itself by extraordinary heroism in action in which it exhibited gallantry and determination that set it apart and above other units participating in the same engagement. This action was the diversion attack which began 5 April 1945 along the west coast of Italy and served as a feint for the subsequent break-through of the bulk of Fifth army forces into Bologna and the Po Valley. This attack in the west was carried out by the 92d Infantry Division with the 442d Regimental Combat Team and the 473d Infantry Regiment attached for operations. The 370th Infantry Regiment attacked initially along the coastal plain, but was relieved after two days by the 473d Infantry Regiment (Incl.#1 Sketch). Several miles inland, the 442d Combat Team swept the mountain areas. However, the entire success of the attack hinged upon the 442d Combat Team's ability to completely destroy the enemy's elaborate system of defensive fortifications, hewn out of solid rock and reinforced with concrete, which formed the western anchor of the Cothic Line. These fortifications were so constructed as to give interlocking fires and allaround protection to the defenders and to afford observation for the enemy's mobile field guns as well as his batteries of long range coastal rifles located on Punta Bianca, a peninsula jutting out from La Spezia. They were dug into mountain peaks rising almost sheer from the coastal plain, themselves formidable natural barriers, and leading up to Mt. Folgorito (2800') and Mt. Carchio(3000') the peaks of which gave the enemy unlimited observation of the Ligurian Coast and Highway #1. So long as the enemy held out here, the coast and the route north were untenable. These rock masses were bare of vegetation save for scanty scrub growth. Their surfaces were steep and in places precipituous. Loose soil and sliding rock made the slow, laborious ascent dangerous in itself without the added hazard of enemy observation and fire. The enemy forces, which had been upgraded for three weeks prior to the attack, were veteran troops of the 281st Regiment, 148th Division, later reinforced by five crack battalions which had initially been in reserve, but were later committed by the enemy in an effort to stop the 442d Combat Team.

In spite of these almost unsurmountable obstacles, the enemy positions which had resisted all assaults through the fall and winter of

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1944-1945 were penetrated by the 442d Combat Team on the first day of the attack. On the second day, 6 April, the entire enemy MLR from Serravezza to Mt Carchio was utterly destroyed and our positions were secure. Within ten days, the 442d Combat Team had swept forward twelve miles over terrain that was never less than mountainous, flanked Massa, occupied Carrara, and was threatening the last defenses before the naval base of La Spezia.

In detail, the operations of the 442d Combat Team were as

follows:

The Combat Team commander was first faced with the necessity of making a difficult decision: whether to throw two battalions against these formidable positions in a frontal assault or to attempt an encircling movement which would send one battalion into a 2500 foot climb up the precipituous slopes of Mt. Folgorito in total darkness, to be followed by a dawn attack over unknown terrain. It was decided to follow the latter plan, since it gave the Combat Team the advantage of surprise and, though the physical difficulties were extreme, indications were that the terrain was so difficult the enemy had not fortified this approach heavily. Consequently, the 100th Battalion was assigned the task of making a frontal attack on the enemy MLR, situated on a series of sawtooth beaks culminating in the Mt. Folgorito hill mass. These peaks had been designated from south to north as "Georgia", "Ohio 1", "Chio 2", "Chio 3", and Mt. Cerretta. The 3d Battalion was directed to make the encircling movement against Mt. Folgorito, and the 2d Battalion was held in mobile reserve, prepared to follow either of the leading battalions should the necessity arise. (Incl.#2, Sketch)

During the night of 3-4 April, the 3d Battalion marched to an assembly area in the small mountain town of Azzano on the Mt. Cavallo hill mass, separated by a narrow valley from Mt. Folgorito and under direct observation of the enemy. The climb to the assembly area required five hours with full equipment, and was accomplished in total darkness with the steep rocky trail made even more dangerous by a drizzling rain. A miss-step meant a plunge of anywhere from 15 to 150 feet down the mountainside. In this climb, twenty-five men of the battalion were injured in falls. All the following day, 4 April, the battalion remained hidden in the houses of Azzano since the

entire success of the operation hinged on secrecy.

The next night the 100th Battalion moved up to its line of departure on the hill mass designated "Florida", just south of the enemy held "Georgia" peak, effecting the relief of elements of the 371st Infantry Regiment without arousing the slightest suspicion on the part of the enemy that a relief was taking place. At the same time, the night of 4-5 April, the regimental Cannon Company moved into position at Vallecchia and tied into the Fire Direction Center of the 599th Field Artillery, acting as an extra battery. Anti-tank Company, unable to employ its guns effectively in the mountainous terrain was split up into platoons to act as carrying parties for rations and ammunition and assist as litterbearers where needed. Two platoons were assigned to the 3d Battalion, and one each to the 100th and 2d Battalions. The regimental command post was established at Vallecchia and contact established with the two attacking battalions.

At 042200B April, the 3d Battalien moved out from Azzano, taking only Companies I and L and the machine gun platoons of Company M for the

initial assault, which was to be made from the saddle between Mt. Folsorito and Mt. Carchic at 050509B, at the same time the 100th Battalion made its frontal assault on the enemy MIR. Picking a route of advance based only on limited visual recommaissance and the unconfirmed information of a Partisan as to the whereabouts of enemy concentrations, the battalion climbed toward its objective. The "trail" zigzagged constantly upwards over the treacherous, shale-covered slope. The men, with full bettle equipment, including mortars and machine suns, crawled for the most part on their hands and knees or pulled themselves up by grasping a low growing shrub or the rifle butt of the man above them, but often slipping and falling until a comrade caught them to push or pull them forward again. One rifleman was hospitalized when a falling boulder struck him and hurled him 60 feet down the slope. Many others suffered bruises and sprains but none turned back. Another example of the difficulty of the climb can be gleaned from the fact that it was later necessary to set up sixteen relay aid posts along the trail to evacuate the battalion's wounded.

The attack on the Mt. Folgorito-Mt. Carchio ridgeline was scheduled for 0500 hours and was to be made without artillery preparation. Due to the almost superhuman task of scaling the mountainside to reach the line of departure, the troops did not jump off until some minutes after the scheduled time, but by 0600 hours, some time before dawn, the attack was in full swing. Thus, the attacking battalion, after six hours of exhausting effort. plunged into an attack on strong enemy positions. Company L swung south along the saddle toward Mt. Folgorito and Company I sent one platoon north along a spur toward Mt. Carchio. Cun positions were seized and the enemy killed or made prisoner, and it was evident that complete surprise had been achieved. By 0730 the ridgeline was secured, but it was evident that the enemy were now thoroughly aroused. It was considered inadvisable to waste men trying to seize Mt. Carchie at this time, so Company I contented itself with driving the small enemy force into the recesses of the peak. meanwhile destroying two observation posts by artillery fire. Meanwhile Company L was driving rapidly toward Mt. Folgorito, until they were halted and forced to seek cover about midway to the peak as the enemy, desperate to hold this key observation post, countered with a storm of small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Casualties were heavy, but the attacking forces held grialy to the ground already seized, and repelled a sharp counterattack. Moving carefully through the heavy fire, Company L had reached the base of the extreme peak of Mt. Folgorito, when the enemy observation post located on the summit, called down a ring of fire from heavy mortars, artillery, and the heavy coastal rifles of Punta Bianca around the peak. Although casualties were again heavy, the attacking troops made their way with great courage and determination through the fire, secured the base of the peak, and stormed the summit. In a fierce hand to hand encounter the enemy suffered six killed and four captured, while the remainder of the force fled in confusion down the Colle Piane spur which ran southwest from Mt. Folgorito. The 3d Battalion, new joined by Company K and the remainder of Company M, which had suffered 38 casualties from fierce enemy mortar fire as they made their way up the steep slopes to rejoin the battalion, dug in to hold the ground gained.

Simultaneously with this operation, the 100th Battalion of the 442d Combat Team had attacked north toward Mt. Folgorito as the 3d Battalion

drove south. A ten minute preparatory barrage by the 599th and 329th Field Artillery Battalion, the Carnon Company of the 442d Combat Team, B Company of the 895th Tank Destroyer Battalion, B Company of the 84th Chemical Battalion (4.2 mortar), and the assault guns of the 758th Tank Battalions had driven the enemy into his emplacements, and the 100th Battalion attacked behind this devastating fire at 050500B April. The first objective was "Georgia" peak. This knob of solid rock, containing at least fifteen emplacements and manned by a company of the enemy, had never been reduced though it had been shelled and attacked constantly over a five month period. The leading elements of the 100th Battalion had advanced approximately 150 yards toward their objective through a thickly sown minefield when an enemy mine was tripped. Almost immediately, seven more mines were tripped, causing heavy casualties and bringing down grenade, automatic and small arms fire on the attacking forces. Not once did the troops falter. By 0532 B, they had destroyed the enemy's defenses and gained the crest of the "Georgia" peak. It had taken the 442d Combat Team exactly 32 minutes to accomplish a mission that had resisted the best efforts of friendly troops for five months. Now thoroughly aroused, the enemy threw heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire on the reverse slope of "Georgia" as the leading elements advanced down the slope to attack the first of the "Ohio" peaks. In addition, enemy machine guns located in bunkers set into the saddle between the two peaks opened up, pinning the assault company to the ground. Still another company was forced to seek cover as they tried to maneuver to the left of the leading elements. Mortar and artillery fire failed to dent the well-constructed emplacements. Finally, the troops of the 442d Combat Team, infiltrating through the fire at the cost of heavy casualties to themselves, closed to assault range and attacked the aplacements with grenades and bazookas. The battle raged throughout the day, and by nightfall. against fanatical resistance, twelve bunkers were destroyed and the position taken. At 052345B, the enemy mounted a strong counterattack, but the attack was smashed and thrown back after an hour-long firefight at close range.

A complete tabulation for the Combat Team for the day revealed that in addition to the ground gained, 30 enemy were known to have been killed, 12 bunkers were destroyed or captured, 17 machine guns and three 75mm howitzers were captured, and several tons of explosives, ammunition, and supplies were taken intact. This had been achieved at a cost to the Combat

Team of 20 killed in action and 123 wounded.

Although casualties had been extremely heavy and fighting had continued intermittently throughout the night, the 442d Combat Team allowed the enemy no time for rest or reorganization. The night of 5 april, the 2d Battalion was committed from reserve and sent over the same route that the 3d Battalion had followed the previous night, passing through the 3d Battalion on 6 april and launching an immediate attack to the north on Mt. Belvedere, the last terrain feature before the key communications center of Massa. It was decided by the Combat Team commander to do this because of the organt need to deal the enemy continued hammer blows before he could recover, even though the unit to the left had not advanced, leaving the CT's left flank exposed for a depth of 2g miles. The right flank was totally

exposed, there being no troops closer than the Serchio Valley.

The following day, 6 April, saw the 442d Combat Team close the pincers on the enemy troops remaining between the 100th and 3d Battalions on the three Chio peaks and Mt. Cerretta. Even though surrounded, the enemy fought desperately. Positions on the "Chio" peaks, protected by well-situated minefields resisted the most gallant efforts of the troops of the 100th Battalion to destroy them. After a two-hour battle at hand grenade range. characterized by grim determination on both sides, had yielded only slight gains, the combat team commander called for an air mission on the "Chio" peaks. As the planes arrived, each made an initial pass for range. Ground observers relayed corrections to officers at regimental headquarters who in turn relayed them to the pilots through air liason personnel there. In this way, pin-point bombing and strafing were achieved. Following this mission, the 100th Battalion attacked behind a ten-minute artillery concentration. Although the enemy was battered and stunned, small groups resisted desperately with machine guns, small arms and grenades, but they were no match for the determined attackers who closed rapidly with each group and wiped it out. The close coordination of the enemy's fires had been destroyed by the devastating accuracy of the air attack directed by the observers of the Combat Team. Troops advanced methodically from peak to peak, effecting a junction with troops of the 3d Battalion advancing from the north at 1930 B. In their push, these troops had engaged in a two-hour battle with enemy strongpoints on the north slope of Mt. Cerretta, killing about 20 of the enemy and capturing eleven after fighting their way to hand grenade range. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion had relieved elements of the 3d, completed the reduction of Mt. Carchio and initiated an assault on Mt. Belveders by the end of the day. During the fighting on 6 April, the enemy casualties were 31 known dead and 106 captured by the 442d Combat Team. The combat team lost 13 killed and 60 wounded.

The 442d Combat Team continued to organize and clear the ground gained of enemy forces, meanwhile continuing to push relentlessly to the north. Elements of the 3d Battalion in a furious two-hour battle wiped out an enemy force which had been infiltrating toward Mt. Folgorito from the west flank of the combat team up the Colle Piano spur. Meanwhile other elements of the 442d Combat Team struck west along the north side of the Colle Piano spur, and, in a brilliant encircling movement, entered the town of Strinato and captured four eighty-one am mortars, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, and twenty-three of the enemy after a short skirmish. While this action was taking place the 2d Battalion of the 442d Combat Team had secured about half of the plateau-like expanse of the summit of Mt. Belvedere, the defense of which the enemy had intrusted to the crack Machine Gun Battalion "Messel-ring", now reorganized and fighting as infantry. These veteran troops gave ground grudgingly and battered the attacking troops with heavy concentrations of mortar, artillery, and fire from the deadly coastal rifles on Punta Bianca.

Throughout this three day action, troops of the 442d Combat Team not engaged in actual conflict with the enemy worked twenty-four hours a day, under fire, in order to give the fighting troops fire support and accomplish the herculean task of supply and evacuation. Cannon Company of the 442d Combat Team, farther forward than any other elements of the Division Artillery, fired 1497 rounds in support of the attack during this three day period,

despite the fact that the enemy from his commanding ground had direct observation on their gun positions and consistently fired counter-battery at their guns. The regimental Service Company, reinforced by the 206th Army Ground Force Band, maintained a constant flow of supplies as far forward as trucks could be driven over roads that were constantly interdicted by the enemy's heavy guns, in addition to maintaining ammunition, gasoline, and ration dumps in the company area so that emergency calls for asmunition and other supplies could be filled with a minimum of delay. Since it was necessary during the initial three days of the attack to hand carry supplies and ammunition to the attacking battalions, over terrain so steep and broken that there was no footing even for sules, the regimental supply personnel secured carrying parties of partisans and civilians, augmented by extra men of the Service Company, the Provisional Replacement Company, the 206th Army Ground Force Band, and the Anti-Tank Company. These carrying parties packed supplies, water, and vitally needed ammunition to the three forward battalions on three successive nights, each round trip requiring sixteen hours of the most exhausting physical effort. When civilians panicked and deserted during an enemy mortar barrage on the carrying party, the troops of the 442d Combat Team assumed the extra load and successfully supplied the front-line troops. In addition, troops of the Anti-Tank Company and the Provisional Replacement Company assisted the medical personnel of the 442d Combat Team in hand carrying the wounded over this same exhausting route, day and night for three days.

(Incls #5, Operations reports).

The fourth day of the attack, 8 April, saw the 442d Combat Team launch a two-pronged attack, the 2d Battalion to complete the reduction of Mt. Belvedere and the 3d Battalion to make a rapid attack down the Colle Piano spur, and seize the community of Montignose, thus opening Highway#1 almost to Massa and cutting the former 16 hour supply and evacuation route to 2 hours (Incl #3, Sketch). The now dazed and confused enemy offered slight resistance to the swift advance of the 3d Battalion, and Colle Piano was cleared by 1430 hours. Two hours later, Montigneso was in the hands of the 442d Combat Team, and fifty of the enemy had been made prisoner. On the right of the Combat Team sector, the 2d Battalion launched a dawn attack, overrunning the enemy positions and clearing Mt. Belvedere proper by 0930 hours, killing twenty of the enemy and capturing 30. It was now necessary to clear the Colle Tecchione spur, a 2000 yard long ridge which ran from Mt. Belvedere to the eastern outskirts of Massa, both to protect the left flank of the Combat Team and to make Massa untenable to the enemy. This ridge was occupied by an estimated 200 enemy troops. The attack was launched at 1200 hours despite heavy mortar and artillery fire by which the enemy attempted to stall the assault. Advancing across exposed ground, the troops of the 442d Combat Team were stopped by heavy machine gun fire coming from a fringe of trees to their front. After a three hour battle on the rough, broken terrain, this defense line was broken and the advance continued slowly as the troops closed with a series of heavily defended enemy strongpoints and destroyed them one by one. At 2000 hours, the 2d Battalion had seized the ridge, only to be hit by heavy mortars and barrages from enemy self-propelled guns on the coastal plain, followed by several enemy counterattacks. With the added support of heavy machine guns, the troops of the 2d Battalion beat back these counterattacks, but only after two desperate charges by the enemy had penetrated their positions causing great confusion in the darkness.

Meanwhile, other elements of the 2d Battalion, 442d Combat Team were advancing down the slopes of Mt. Belvedere toward the Frigido River Valley, their objective to seize the towns of Altagnana and Pariana on the reverse slopes of Mt. Belvedere, where the enemy was thought to be mustering reserves to counterattack the positions on Mt. Belvedere. By nightfall, advance elements of the battalion had reached the outskirts of both towns in the face of long range machine gun fire and heavy concentrations of mortar fire which raked their routes of advance, causing heavy casualties. During the day's action, the enemy lost forty-two known dead and fifty-cight captured to the 442d Combat Team.

The following day, 9 April, the 442d Combat Team resumed its drive on the enemy forces. The 2d Battalion resumed its attack against Altagnana and Pariana. Altagnana was cleared against light resistance in the early morning hours. The battle for Pariana, however, raged all through the day, first the enemy and then the troops of the 442d Combat Team gaining the upper hand. At 1200B hours, elements of the 2d Battalion had penetrated the town, but were immediately driven back by a vicious counterattack by infantry, two armored cars, a tank, and supported by self-propelled and machine gun fire from both flanks. Becovering, the troops of the 2d Battalion turned 8 8 mm mortars they had captured two hours earlier on the Germans and again drove them off. Then, in house to house, room to room fighting they proceeded to destroy the Machine Gun Battalion "Kesselring", killing 77 and capturing 75 of the enemy(including three officers). They also seized one house filled with ammunition, four 50mm mortars, 12 8 mm mortars, 16 machine guns, and great quantities of small arms and equipment, Two armored cars were damaged, but escaped.

Concurrently with this smashing blow at the enemy, the troops of the 3d Battalion, which had now driven abreast of the 2d Battalion, advanced on the Colle Tecchione ridge line. During the night of 8-9 April, the enemy had infiltrated a large force back onto the ridge from the western tip, and were again threatening the 2d Battalion. The advance of the 3d Battalion directed by the Combat Team commander caught these troops in a pocket from which there was no escape. The 3d Battalion pounded this force to pieces with Slmm and 4.2 mortar fire, rockets and automatic weapons. They killed 60 of the enemy, captured 20, and seized seven machine guns, four mortars, six

machine pistols, and one full truck load of ammunition.

The enemy now retreated headlong for his second defensive position, the so-called "Green Line". The AA2d Combat Team, although it had fought for five consecutive days and nights over terrain as rugged and broken as any in the aptennine chain, had utterly destroyed two battalions of the enemy and had badly mauled a third, itself sustaining heavy casualties in the process, now pressed on rapidly. On 10 April, through intermittent artillery fire, the 2d Battalion scaled 3000 foot Mt. Brugiana, which dominates both Massa and Carrara. The 3d Battalion, attacking on the left of the 2d, crossed the Frigido River, seized Bergiola Foscalina, and took the western slopes of Mt. Brugiana, meanwhile protecting its own left flank and rear, since the unit on the left had not yet advanced beyond Massa. Quickly, the Combat Team Commander assembled the Anti-Tank Company, dispatched it to Forno and Granda on the right(eastern) flank of the Combat Team to establish road blocks. This mission was accomplished successfully although the company was subject to mortar fire from the mountains to the east and were forced to repel two enemy raiding parties

in a brisk skirmish. The 100th Battalion was then assembled in Altagmana to guard against attack from the right rear, while elements of the 370th Infantry, 92d Division took over the garrison of Mt. Belvedere and Mt. Carchio.

The following day, the battalions of the 442d Combat Team were rapidly leap-frogged. The 100th Battalion was dispatched to the extreme right flank, and seized Collonnata after an eight hour climb through an abandoned marble quarry, capturing twenty-two prisoners. The 2d Battalion held Mt. Brugiana, while the 3d Battalion pushed rapidly ahead, drove into Carrara, and secured the city together with a well-organized Partisan group. Following this, the battalion quickly spread out to the surrounding hills, occupying Torano, Sorgnano, and Gragnana (Incl #4, Sketch).

The 232d Gombat Engineer Company, which had previously worked day and night opening the supply route to Massa, now battled furiously against time to open Highway #1 to Carrara, even though their working parties were constantly harassed by sniper and heavy artillery fire. In addition, they were faced with the task of opening a route to the 100th Battalion to the east. The engineers were also faced with a new and deadly demolition device. Three twelve inch shells had been wired together by the Germans and set two feet under the road, which was then resurfaced to prevent the detection of the charges, which were detonated by a stake-type device. The engineers lost four bulldozers to these deadly mines, but the crews continued on, even thresh each man realized the deadly danger under which he worked. The supply route was opened in the face of these obstacles just twelve hours after the fall of Carrara. (Incl #5, Operations Reports).

On 13 April, the 442d Combat Team resumed its drive, now pressing toward Aulla, vital road center, which controlled the only avenues of escape for the enemy in this sector to the Po Valley. The 2d Battalion rapidly advanced on Castelpoggio, and occupied the hills beyond, preparing for an attack on Mt. Pizzacuto. The 100th Battalion was moved into Gragnana in close support, coming under violent enemy shellfire in the process. The 3d Battalion was held in Carrara to protect the regimental left and rear until the 473d Infantry should advance that far. It also came under heavy and sustained fire

from the enemy's coastal rifles.

Because of the fact that the forward elements of the 2d Battalion were spread very thin, the Combat Team Commander decided to move B Company to Castelpoggio during the night of 13-14 April to reinforce the 2d Battalion command group there. Increased enemy activity also indicated that such a move was necessary. On 14 April, under cover of an early morning fog, a battalion of the enemy, supported by 18 machine guns, advanced to within 30 yards of the town before they were detected by the outposts. In the ensuing firefight, which lasted two and one-half-hours, the enemy lost at least eight killed, 16 wounded, and carried away many of his casualties when he withdrew. This force was identified as the 1st Battalion, 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 90th PG Division. Later identified were the 4th Hight Bountain Battalion, another crack unit, and the 3d Battalion, 361st PG Regiment from the German mentral mobile reserve behind Bologna. In spite of the fact that

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his situation in the Po Valley was critical, the enemy was now diverting some of his scant reserves to stop the drive of the 442d Combat Team on his lifeline at Aulla. The enemy had also committed the Mittenwald Mt. Battalion and 1st Battalion, 285th Infantry Regiment in the sector.

Following the breaking of this counterattack, the 2d Battalion pressed forward, and by 1900B hours had seized Mt. Pizzacuto, with a loss

to the Germans of 12 Killed and 54 captured.

Thus within 10 days, the 442d Combat Team had captured 504 prisoners, killed 307, and wounded or killed an additional 250 enemy troops. In addition, it had destroyed 35 bunkers, captured or destroyed 59 machine guns, 20 81mm mortars, 8 50mm mortars, 3 75mm pack howitzers, 2 20mm guns, and took tons of ammunition and other materiel. More important, however, is the fact that the 442d Combat Team was able to seize the key heights of Mt. Folgorito and Mt. Carchio. For with these went the enemy's last hope of holding the coastal sector. The fall of Massa and Carrara were assured and the way was opened to La Spezia and Genoa. The attack that began as a diversion had, largely due to the efforts of this Combat Team, become an all-out assault.

- 3. Sketches: Showing movements of troops cited and general terrain features. (See attached overlays: Oblique)
- 4. a. Nature of terrain: Mountainous with steep slopes and scant growth, inadequate road net. This necessitated the hand-carrying of supplies during such of the action.

Enemy morale: Very good. After recovering from initial

surprise, enemy resisted fiercely.

 Morale of our troops: Excellent, despite adverse terrain obstacles.

d. Weather: Misty and sometimes cloudy in the morning, usually clearing in the afternoon.

e. Exact time and dates of action: 0500B 5 April 1945 to 1900B 14 April 1945.

- 5. a. Number of men assigned to unit cited who took part in action:
  5 April: 442d Inf Regt-3435; 232d Engrs-163; 206th ACF
  Bend-30; 6 April: 442d Inf Regt-3300; 232d Engrs-159; 206th
  ACF Band-30; 7 April: 442d Inf Regt-3482; 232d Engrs-159;
  206th ACF Band-30; 8 April: 442d Inf Regt-3462; 232d Engrs159; 206th ACF Band-30; 9 April: 442d Inf Regt-3500; 232d
  Engrs-160; 206th ACF Band-30; 10 April: 442d Inf Regt-3473;
  232d Engrs-155; 206th ACF Band-30; 11 April: 442d Inf Regt3501; 232d Engrs-153; 206th ACF Band-30; 12 April: 442d Inf
  Regt-3544; 232d Engrs-154; 206th ACF Band-30; 13 April: 442d
  Inf Regt 3551; 232d Engrs-154; 206th ACF Band-30; 14 April:
  442d Inf Regt-3522; 232d Engrs-167; 206th ACF Band-30.
  - b. Number of casualties suffered by unit cited: 56 KIA and 247 WIA.

c. Approximate strength of troops adjacent and in support, and character of support rendered by other units: One battalion

of 370th Inf attacked along the coastal plain on left flank, gaining approximately 1000 yards before it was stopped. 473d Inf Regt, which relieved the 370th Inf on 7 April, took up the Combat Team's left flank and attacked along the coastal plain, The 599th FA Bn, 329th FA Bn, 1st Platoon of B Company, 896th ID Bn, B Company, 84th Chemical Battalion(4.2 mortars), and Assault Guns of the 758th Tank Battalion supported the Combat Team's attack by firing on targets as called for by the Bn commanders through forward observers. The 57th Fighter Group, XXII Tactical Air Command, 12 AAR supported the Combat Team's attack by bombing and strafing enemy strongpoints.

6. a. Approximate strength of enemy: 1st and 2d Battalions, 281st

Regt, 148th Div; "Resselving Machine Gun Battalion"; 1st

Battalion, 285th Regt, 148th Div; 4th High Mt. Battalion; 1st

and 3d Battalions, 361st Panzer Grenadier Regt; Mittenwald Mt.

Battalion; and supporting artillery, self-propelled guns and
engineers.

vation from prepared positions on commanding ground. Automatic weapons fire was heavy; and artillery fire, especially from tometic guns located on Punta Bianca, was both heavy and accurate. Mortar fire was also heavy in the early stages of the action.

c. Apparent enemy intention or objectives: To hold the commanding ground in this sector as long as possible and prevent the Allied troops from advancing.

d. Losses suffered by the enemy: 504 prisoners, 307 killed and an additional 250 wounded or killed; 35 bunkers destroyed, 59 machine guns, 20 heavy mortars, 8 light mortars, 3 75mm pack howitzers and 2 20mm guns destroyed or captured; in addition a great number of rifles, machine pistols, grenades and tons of ammunition and equipment were taken.

- 7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated above.
- 8. Previous Citations:
  100th Infantry Battalion (Seperate), per Section VII, General
  Order #121, Hq 5th Army, dtd 18 July 1944.
  100th Battalion, 442d Combat Team, per Section II, General Order
  #360, Hq 7th Army, dtd 3 August 1945.
  2d Battalion, 442d Combat Team, per Section I, General Order
  #89, Hq 5th Army, dtd 17 July 1945.
  3d Battalion, 442d RCT, per Section II, General Order #317,
  Hq 7th Army, dtd 16 July 1945.
  Companies F & L (Task Force O'Connor), 442d Combat Team, per
  Section II, General Order #13, Hq 7th Army, dtd 21 January
  1945.
- 9. PROPOSED CITATION:
  The 442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM, less the 522d

Ltr Hq 92d Inf Div, subj: "Citation of Unit", dtd 7 Oct 45.

Field artillary Battalian, is sited for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 April to 14 April 1945 in the vicinity of Serrevezza. Carrara, and Fosdinovo, Italy. When the 92d Infantry Division, with the 442d Combat Team attached, was ordered to open the Fifth Army offensive by executing a diversionary attack on the Ligurian Coast of Italy, the Combat Team was ordered to make the main effort of this attack. By executing a daring and skillful flanking attack on the positions which formed the western anchor of the formidable Cothic Line, an attack which necessitated that the striking force of the Combat Team climb for hours over precipitous terrain and launch an attack without rest or reorganization, positions which had withstood the best efforts of friendly troops for five months were over-run and completely destroyed in four days. This was accomplished in the face of skilled enemy troops who were nearly equal in strength to the attacking forces and who had had at least five months to improve their positions, located on formidable and tactically sound natural barriers. Then, although their casualties had been heavy and the action had been physically exhausting. the 442d Combat Team pressed forward, allowing the retreating enemy no time for rest or reorganization, liberated the city of Carrara, seized the heights beyond, and opened the way for further advances on the key road center and port of La Spezia, and later, Genea. It accomplished the mission of creating a diversion along the Ligurian Goast of Italy which served as a feint for the subsequent break-through of Fifth Army forces into Bologna and the Po Valley, attacking with such skill and daring that the enemy was compelled to divert part of his desperately needed central reserve to meet this thrust. In ten day's fighting, the 442d Combat Team had advanced fifteen (15) miles. captured 504 prisoners, killed 307, and probably wounded or killed an additional 250. Enemy material captured or destroyed by the Combat Team amounted to 35 bunkers, 59 machine guns, 20 heavy mortars, 8 light mortars, and numerous other weapons and tons of supplies. The Combat Team suffered lesses of 56 killed and 247 wounded in action. By successfully accomplishing this mission, the 142d Combat Team turned an action which had been ordered as a diversionary attack into a full scale offensive which played an important part in the final destruction of the German armies in Italy. The gallantry and esprit de corps displayed by the officers and men of the 442d Regimental Combat Team against a formidable enemy and great natural obstacles exemplify the finest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States.

> J. E. WOOD, Brigadier General, U. S. A., Commanding.

6 Incls: Incl #1 - Sketch

Incl #2 - Sketch

Incl #3 - Sketch

Incl 4 - Sketch

Incl #5 - Operations Reports
Separate Cos, 442d RCT.

Incl #6 - Map. G.S.G.S. -4229: 1:50,000 Number: 104-I; 96-II; 96-III.

# ANTI-TANK COMPANY 442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM APO 782 U S ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report

TO : Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team

APO 782, U. S. Army.

On the morning of 4 April 1945, the 3d and 4th platoons, Antitank Company, 442d Infantry, moved into Serravezza as litter bearers, ration carriers, ammunition bearers and P. O. W. guards with the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry attacked and captured Mt. Carchio and Mt. Folgorito. During this action the 3d and 4th platoons were performing their duties as described above. On 5 April 1945 the 3rd and 4th platoons continued being attached to the 3rd Battalion. The 1st platoon was attached to the 100th Battalion, 442d infantry as carrying party. The 2d platoon was attached to the 100th Battalion as litter bearers.

On 6 April 1945, the 1st platoon continued as litter bearers with the 100th Battalion, 2d platoon was relieved from 100th and attached to 2d Battalion while the 3d and 4th platoon

was attached to 3d Battalion.

On 7 April 1945, the 3d and 4th platoons were relieved of attachment to the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry, and attached to the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry as litter bearers. The aid station and the evacuation route down Mt. Carchio to Azzano was under observed mortar and artillery fire coming down from Mt. Altissimo.

On S April 1945, Antitank Company, was relieved of attachment and returned to the Company C. P. at Pietrasanta. For the next two days the Company remained at Pietrasanta.

During the days from 4 April to 8 April 1945, it was the men of Antitank Company who carried rations, led mule trains, and carried medical equipment to their own positions.

On 10 April 1945 the 1st and 3d platoons were sent to establish road blocks on the right flank of the regimental sector at Forno and Gronda. The mine platoon was used to sweep roads for mines in front of the advancing 1st and 3d platoons. The 2d platoon was kept in the Company C.P. as reserve.

On 11 and 12 April 1945, the 1st, 3d and 4th platoons were engaged as rive troops on our right flank. During this time the platoon leaders with the help of the Italian Partisan leaders organized a group of 100 or more Partisans to help protect our right flank. During this time the 2d platoon was used to carry water, rations, ammunition and medical supplies to the 1st, 3d, and 4th platoons.

On 13 April 1945, the 1st, 3d and 4th platoons received a considerable amount of mortar fire. The Company C.P. moved to a new area in Montignoso about 1300.

On 14 April 1945, the 3d platoon was relieved and

returned to the Company C.P. as regimental reserve.

On the evening of the 13 April 1945, the Regiment was notified of the 1st, 3d, and 4th platoons having some Italian Fascist prisoners who had been attacking the town of Resceto which was in the immediate vicinity of the road blocks. These fascists had come from Mt. Tambura on a mission to determine the strength of the American units. Six Fascists were captured and two escaped.

/s/ Charles L. Schettler CHARLES L. SCHETTLER 1st Lt. Infantry Commanding

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY Capt. Infantry, S-2, 442d RCT.

# CANNON COMPANY 442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM APO 782 U S ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team, APO 782, U. S. Army.

When the Combat Team was attached to the 92d Infantry Division for operations along the Ligurian Coast of Italy, it was directed that Cannon Company be attached to the Artillery Battalion in direct support of the Combat Team, in this instance, the 599th Field Artillery Battalion. As attached, the company served as an extra battery for the 599th Artillery Battalion. However, the company furnished a proportionate share of forward observer teams to the battalion and employed its commuters at the battalion's fire direction center.

On 4 April 1945, between 2030B and 2130B hours, the company moved out into positions in the vicinity of Ripa, Italy (97.0 - 95.5). During the night positions were prepared, ammunition supplies brought up and the guns registered to fire the initial barrage the following morning.

By the following morning, the positions were completed and the company guns joined in firing the initial barrage which was to be followed by the assault by foottroops of the Combat Team. The company fired 650 rounds in direct support of the Combat Team in missions throughout the day.

On 6 April, the company remained in position near Ripa, firing 504 rounds of R.E. and 39 rounds of W.P. in support of the Combat Team. The first observation team of one officer and 6 enlisted men were sent forward to the 2d Battalion. Due to the difficult terrain and the desire to lay telephone wire for communication in addition to the radio, a large party from the company was required. During this day, counter-battery fire on our gun positions were received.

On 7 April, the company fired 304 rounds of H.E. on enemy positions in support of the Combat Team.

The next day, 8 April, the company fired 260 rounds of R.S. Targets were nearing extreme range and reconnaissance was carried out for displacement forward. During the first 4 days in positions near Ripa, the company was subjected to enemy harassing artillery fire, mostly during the hours of darkness. However, no casualties or damages were sustained, though several rounds fell within 10 yards of the gun pits. Supplies of asmunition and rations were brought forward during the hours of darkness as the road leading to the gun positions was under enemy observation and subject to artillery fire. After dark on this evening, the company prepared to displace to new positions in the vicinity of Montignoso.

On 9 April, displacement to the new position at Montignoses was completed at 0130B hours. During the blackout drive, the 4th Section prime mover overturned in a bomb crater at the edge of a road, killing one and injuring five others. All casualties were evacuated and the 4th Section gun was manned by men drawn from other sections in order to keep all six guns in action. An observation team of one officer and three men joined

the 3d Battalion as forward observers. During the day, 124 rounds of H.B. were fired in support of the Combat Team.

On 10 April, the company fired 200 rounds of R.S. and on the following day, 11 April, 5 rounds were fired on base point for registration. However, most enemy targets were out of range and displacement forward was not possible as roads were impassable. The company fired no rounds the following day, still unable to displace due to impassable roads.

On the 13th of April, the company displaced forward to new positions at Carrara. The position was occupied just before dawn. It was learned later that the company was under hostile observation and that for several hours there were no friendly troops other than the company as flank security of the Combat Team. Immediately upon the opening of fire for registration in the afternoon, counter-battery fire was received from enemy self-propelled guns and artillery located at Punta Bianca. One man was wounded by this fire.

During the night of 13-14 April, the company was subjected to moderate enemy artillery fire, wounding three enlisted men, one of whom died later. Two rounds of W.P. were fired in an attempt to register, but observation was impossible due to a heavy fog. However, enemy counter-battery fire was received immediately after the company opened fire. The enemy had good observation on the high ground in front of the Regiment on our left.

/s/ Sydney S. Bruce /t/ SYDNEY S. BRUCE let Lt, Infantry Commanding

A TRUE SETRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY Captain, Infantry, 3-2, 442d RCT.

### HEAD WARTERS COMPANY 4420 REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM APO #782 US ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO: Commanding Officer, 4A2d Regimental Combat Team, APO #782, U.S. Army.

Prior to the day the Combat Team was alerted to go on line for the spring offensive along the Ligurian Coast, two enlisted men from the company returned from a mine school held at the 92d Division headquarters near Viareggio, Italy. The Radio Section received a new type of radio set designated as the SCR 694, a comparatively new set for combat operations.

On 5 April 1945, the day of the "jump-off", both the SCR 300 and 694 radio sets opened their nets at 0455. Contact was established with cub planes carrying the divisional commander and staff and the forward observation posts. All enemy action was received through the 300 radio.

One wire crew, the night before, 4 April, laid a communication line to the 3d Battalion which was to attack Mt. Folgorito at 0500 hours. This line was laid under cover of darkness. Four wiremen each carried a D-R 4 (1/2 mile of 110 wire) up the steep slope where the 3d Battalion CP was located. Another wire crew laid communication lines to the 100th Battalion CP, while another laid locals within the Regimental CP. After the 3d Battalion jumped off, the 2d Battalion moved into position near the 3d Battalion CP. One wire crew was sent out to lay a line from the 2d Battalion to the CP. This line was laid under enemy observation. The wire crews maintained wire communications during the rest of the day and through the night. On this day, the I & R platoon sent out two squad to operate an observation post for the Regimental Staff. Communication lines were laid by the men in the squads with the assistance of company wire crows. This line was laid up a 500 foot hill in the vicinity of Vallecchia. From this OP, enemy action on the right flank was observed. Information relayed to the CP proved to be of strategic value as enemy was sent into disorganization and confusion by friendly action.

On 6 April, the Radio Section continued to maintain communication on both the 300 and 694 sets.between the battalions and observation posts. The main radio traffic was on the 300 radio. The wire crew laid another line to the 3d Battalion through another route as the battalion had moved to another position. The wire men were forced to maintain the line all day as the line was frequently cut by artillery fragments. The I & R platoon continued to man the Regimental OP all day and through the night by alternating squads.

On 7 April, three men from the Radio Section volunteered to carry rations to the 3d Battalion. These three men were wounded when they came under an intense mortar barrage. while carrying the supplies. Two switch-board operators from the Wire Section volunteered to carry rations and supplies to the 3d Battalion on Mt. Folgorito. The I & R platoon continued to maintain the observation post near Vallecchia, while another squad was sent to maintain

Ltr Hq GO, 442d RGT, subj: "Operational Report", dtd 7 Oct 45.

another OP located near Castello. As enemy artillery fire increased, the communication lines were broken, but in each instance, the lines were quickly

repaired by the men operating the CPs.

When the 442d Combat Team was entering Montignoso on 8 April, unidentified tanks were observed by the 3d Battalion OP. Before artillery fire was to be placed, the identity of the tanks had to be known. Contact with these tanks was established through our 300 radio sets, the tanks were friendly. The wire section continued maintaining communication lines, and also prepared for movement to a new CP site. The I & E platoon was called to lay smoke pots near Mt. Folgorito for a supply route. The smoke screen was a success, enabling supplies to move ahead.

On 9 April, the Regimental CP moved into Montignoso. The elements of the I & R platoon were attached to the 2d Battalion to maintain an OP. The following day, the platoon continued manning OPs, and also aided in bringing

back prisoners to the rear Regimental CP.

On 11 April, the forward radio crew departed for Pariana, carrying all radio equipment themselves over steep and broken terrain. Although the terrain

was not favorable for radio communication, communication was maintained.

On 13 April, the Regimental CP moved into the town of Carrara. Wiremen of the company laid wires to the separate companies, locals, and to the forward battalions. One crew laid a line to the 3d Battalion in Gragnana and also set up a switch. Another crew with the assistant communication officer, went to Castelpoggio to lay the 2d Battalion line. While laying this line, the men were under enemy observation and came under a barrage of mortar fire. Although the Regimental Wire crews usually lay lines to the battalion rear CPs, this wire crew laid a line to the 2d Battalion forward CP. The switch at Gragnana, which came under heavy artillery fire, operated with efficiency with whe wire crew. Artillery fire coming from Punta Bianca hit the town of Carrara continually, many hits were scored on the Regimental CP and company CP. Two wire men were wounded while laying wire to Service Company in Carrara by this fire.

/s/ Milton A. Hirsh Jr /t/ MILTON A. HIRSH JR Captain, Infantry, Commanding.

A EXTRACT TRUE COPY

Captain, Infantry, S-2, 442d RCT.

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO: Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team, APO 782, U. S. Army.

On 5 April 1945, after carrying on their backs medical supplies, litters and individual full field packs through steep and winding trails to the "jump-off" point on the night of 3 April, the 100th and 3d Battalion Medical Sections were committed to action, accompanying their respective battalions. Both battalions met heavy resistance immediately, and casualties passing through both battalion aid stations were very heavy. Constant enemy artillery and mortar barrages in the vicinity of the forward aid stations made treatment and evacuation of the wounded trying and difficult. Bespite the mountainous and torturous terrain, the evacuation of casualties was effected by the litter relay train system. This process took litter bearers, walking continuously, 8 hours to complete a case. The first day's casualties totalled well over 130 plus many medical cases. Due to the fact that the aid station groups anticipated heavy casualties, all necessary arrangements were completed before the "jump-off" and the casualties were evacuated and treated with minimum loss of time.

On 6 April, the 2d Battalion Medical Section moved into line and met the same difficult evacuation problems as other aid stations. In addition, the 2d Rn aid station was subjected to mortar and artillery barrages and long range machine gun fire, which made the process of treatment and evacuation all the more trying. Litter bearers from the Provisional Company, Company B, 317th Medical Battalion, and Italian Partisans assisted the 2d Bn Medical Section in evacuating the battalion's casualties.

During the first 4 days of action, Medical Detachment personnel, who were serving the aid stations and the front-line companies, suffered casualties totalling 13 WIA and 1 KIA from enemy action.

Through the night of 8 April and the morning of 9 April, the evacuation of the wounded continued to remain over the long and torturous terrain. However, the Combat Team's casualties since the first day became considerably lower. On the afternoon of 9 April, a new route was opened on Highway #1, reducing the 12-hour evacuation trip to 2 hours and relieving somewhat the litterbearers, who had been working long continuous hours. These included the men from the Provisional Company, Anti-Tank Company, the anti-tank platoons of each battalion, and Italian civilians.

On the 13th of April, the Regimental Section moved into Carrara by motor convoy from Massa. During the evening, the Regimental CP and Aid Station were subjected to heavy shelling from coastal guns located at Punta Bianca. A direct hit was scored on our 22 ton truck, setting it and a medical

(CONT)

jeep which was adjacent to it on fire. Both vehicles were a total loss. Equipment and records were partly salvaged and no troop casualties were suffered. During the four-hour period from 1515 to 1900 hours, some 1300 rounds of fire of all types were thrown near the Regimental Section.

/s/ Clarence H. Buckley, /t/ CLARENCE H. BUCKLEY, Major, Medical Corps, Regimental Surgeon.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY Captain, Infantry, S-2, 442d RCT.

#### SERVICE COMPANY 442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM APO #782 US.ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operations Report.

: Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team, APO 782, U. S. Army.

When the Combat Team launched the diversionary attack along the Ligurian Coast of Italy on 5 April 1945, the company was bivouacked near Camaiore, Italy, from which point it serviced the attacking elements of the Combat Team. Although the area did not come under enemy shellfire, elements of the company, such as truck drivers hauling supplies to the forward battalion supply dumps, came under fire but without suffering casualties.

During the first five days of operations, the company was taxed with the problem of reaching supplies to the forward elements of the Combat Team, operating on rugged mountainous terrain which necessitated the hand-carrying of all rations and ammunition. The company supply officers and enlisted men personnel attached to each battalion, supervised the distribution and packing of supplies, established supply routes up to Mt. Folgorito and Mt Carchio, supervised the carrying parties made up of both Combat Team personnel and Italian civilians. and often times led the supply parties to the unloading point.

On 13 April, the company moved into Carrara by motor convoy, and was met by a heavy artillery shelling as it entered the town. On this day, the Regimental ammunition dump was also moved into Carrara. Despite the shelling of the town, the munitions personnel successfully unloaded and placed the ammunition in a safe a place as possible. No casualties were suffered by the company in spite of the artillery fire coming from Punta Bianca. The moving of the ammunition dump into the town was necessary since the supply route to the south was almost impassable due to enemy shelling and bridge blowing.

Enemy shelling of the town continued intermittently

during the day and night for the next several days.

The Postal Section operated each day, going for the mail to Viareggio and making the distribution of mail and parcels to the companies.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY

/s/ Roderick Matheson /t/ RODERICK MATHESON Captain, Infantry Commanding.

ORVILLE C. SHIREY Captain, Infantry S-2. 442d RCT.

## 232D COMBAT ENGINEER COMPANY 442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM APO 782 U S ARMY

7 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 442d Regimental Combat Team,

APO 782, U. S. Army.

When the 442d Infantry launched its attack along the Ligurian Coast in Italy on 5 April 1945, the third platoon of the Engineers was called upon to support the infantry by sweeping roads for mines and maintaining them in the area north of Mount Altissimo.

During the rapid advance of the 442d Infantry the dozer was used constantly to fill road craters, remove carcasses of
dead animals from supply lines, and build by-passes. On 10
April 1945, the 100th and 2d Battalions advancing north and east
of Massa in a drive toward Carrara, Italy, were in need of a
suitable supply and evacuation route. The road from Massa to
Canevara had been made impassable by a 50-yard long crater dug
by the retreating Germans on the out-skirts of Massa. It was
also mined with anti-tank, anti-personnel, and artillery shells
converted into mines with pressure devices which were buried
too deep for detection by electrical mine detectors or probing.

The 232d Engineers began the work of opening this vital route at 1300 hours 10 April 1945 in spite of heavy enemy artillery barrages which intermittently hit the area and mines which were highly sensitized by the long period underground. The company, realizing the critical need for the road for evacuation and supply, worked continuously, alternating among the three platoons of 40 men each on every shift, under intermittent barrages which caused some damage to equipment and wounded two riflemen standing in the work area. By methodical hand probing and by the use of detectors when feasible, 20 12" artillery shells rigged as mines were removed with truck winches. In addition, 30 schu-mines, 3 Tellermines, and 5 Italian box-mines were removed.

The highly sensitized nature of the mines and the difficulty of detection made the work of the dozer operators a hazardous proposition. Four dozer operators who braved this danger in order to help open the route without delay were wounded when their dozers were blown up by undetected mines. Despite the fact that 1 officer, 4 dozer operators, and 2 other enlisted men were injured in four mine explosions and shelling continued unabatingly the work was continued without let-up.

Bee-hive charges were utilized in blowing up the side of the cut to get material for an embankment. When one of the

wrecked D-7 dozers could not be removed, an ingenious solution was evolved whereby the immovable dozer was used as a trestle and a 30-feet bridge of 10-ton capacity was built over it. After working from 1300 10 April, the Engineers had the supply and evacuation route open by 2200 hours the next day. The opening of this vital link from Massa to Canevara with a minimum of delay helped open the only supply route and alleviated the serious supply difficulty caused by terrain that precluded

the use of hand-carrying parties.

Frequently details of men from the company were detached and attached to 442d Infantry units to clear gaps through minefields and do other engineer work during infantry assaults. During the attack of Mount Belvedere by the 2d Battalion, one squad of the first platoon was attached to F Company to do engineer work from 7 April to 10 April. On 12 April three enlisted men were attached to I Company, and four enlisted men were attached to I Company, and four enlisted men were attached to L Company. One squad of the first platoom was attached to the 2d Battalion from 13 April to 15 April, and from 20 April to 23 April one squad of third platoon was attached to the 100th Battalion to do engineer work.

/s/ Pershing Nakada, /t/ PERSHING MAKADA, Captain, Corps of Engrs, Commanding.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORVILLE C. SHIREY Capt., Infantry, S-2, 442d RCT.