MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM P. SCOBETY

Subject: Situation at Camp Shelby, Mississippi

1. Confirming and amplifying the report made to your office by radio, April 6, 1943, it is herewith stated that an investigation of the situation at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, reveals no evidence that the assignment of the 442nd Combat Team to that area is likely to create new race frictions or exacerbate existing ones.

2. The factors serving to assure an orderly reception and training of additional Japanese American units within the area designated may be briefed as follows:

   a. A better than average discipline and state of contentment in the Negro troops within this command and a friendly interest on their part in the Japanese Americans as another minority group, which interest is not compromised by any jealousy on the part of the Negro troops toward the Japanese Americans because the latter have greater liberties when off the reservation.

   b. The soldierly bearing of the men of the 100th Battalion (Japanese Americans from Hawaii) which has won for all Japanese Americans the friendly regard of a majority in the community and within the camp, and has resulted in a consistent improvement of the position of the Japanese American soldiers both with relation to the community and to their fellow soldiers.

   c. Frank acceptance by the leaders of the civilian population of the equality of the Japanese Americans and of the need to stimulate an educational program toward the end that such minor discriminations as now exist will be eliminated. Examples: House owners refusing to rent to Japanese; Caucasian girls declining to dance with Japanese American soldiers at the USO. Regarding the latter, this situation existed soon after the arrival of the 100th Battalion, but its members are now being extended the same hospitality as any white soldier. Housing, however, is extremely scarce in the Hattiesburg area, and it is to be expected that the white population will prefer not to rent to Japanese families.
d. An unusually keen awareness of the factors in the situation on the part of the command as well as of the interested unit commanders, and a general understanding of the methods to be pursued, to wit, fostering of optimum recreational facilities for Negro troops within the camp while encouraging friendly treatment of them by merchants, bus operators, etc., and, according the Japanese the same disciplinary treatment and privileges as any other group of soldiers.

e. The fact that with the arrival of the combat team the Japanese Americans will not be any more conspicuous because of their numbers. This is so because the number of Negro troops and white troops at Camp Shelby are building up simultaneously and, therefore, the ratio of white troops to Negro troops to Japanese troops will remain approximately the same as now.

3. The negative factors which may prove a source of trouble at some future time are all of minor character and are subject to positive treatment by the War Department. They are as follows:

a. A faulty public relations situation whereby all news of the Japanese troops is bottled by the War Department, thus surrounding them with an air of mystery and creating the suspicion that they are not to be trusted and that the unit has a sinister character. This refraction is so apparent that it is openly discussed both in the camp and in the community. If not corrected it may do untold harm and generate the very frictions which the War Department is anxious to avoid. It is felt that this situation can be corrected at once, without jeopardy, if the local commanders are given the same discretionary powers regarding the news of Japanese American troops as with any other troops.

b. The likelihood of serious frictions within the Combat Team itself, due to the composition of the cadre which is nearly 100% mainland Japanese whereas the unit will be better than 60% Hawaiian Japanese. These latter, feeling themselves to be superior soldiers, will probably resent the situation from the outset. Officers of both the 100th Battalion and the 442nd Combat Team have misgivings about it and the Japanese officers of the former said positively that they felt it would lead to strife unless the present situation is reconsidered.

c. Uncouth treatment of the Japanese Americans by some of the local M.P.'s, which is a cause for complaint from their officers who say this has been the chief source of discrimination against them.

d. The tendency on the part of outside interests to see all Army situations involving the different races as ipso facto race problems rather than as problems in human relationships and adjustments to be treated with massive common sense by those directly concerned rather than to be investigated and analyzed by those who do not have final responsibility. The situation at Camp Shelby and Hattiesburg is in good hands; there is not one facet of it which is not apt to be brightened within the future by methods now being pursued.

S. L. A. MARSHALL,
Lt. Colonel, A.U.S.,
Chief, Orientation & Publications Section,
Information Branch.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL:

Attention: Colonel R. M. Gray

This office is in receipt of a report from Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, with reference to the local conditions as affecting Japanese American soldiers stationed at Camp Shelby. The following paragraph from this report is considered to be of primary interest to the Provost Marshal General.

"3. The negative factors which may prove a source of trouble at some future time are all of minor character and are subject to positive treatment by the War Department. They are as follows:

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2. Uncouth treatment of the Japanese Americans by some of the local M.P.'s, which is a cause for complaint from their officers who say this has been the chief course of discrimination against them."

Elaborating upon this statement, Colonel Marshall orally reports to the undersigned that the Military Police in the city of Hattiesburg, as well as at Camp Shelby, apparently deliberately single out Japanese American soldiers for attention and in the course of addressing them use opprobrious names and swear at them.

In view of the fact that the Army will shortly have nearly 5000 additional Japanese American soldiers in Camp Shelby, members of the 442nd Combat Team, and in further view of the fact that many of these soldiers will come from Hawaii, where they have been accustomed to special considerations from the white and native population, it
is felt by this office that if this report is correct, immediate corrective measures should be taken.

Subject: Situation at Camp Shelby, Mississippi

The Military Police at Hattiesburg and Camp Shelby should be informed that the Japanese American soldiers are to be treated exactly as all other soldiers.

April 8, 1943.

William P. Scobey
Colonel, G.S., Operations and Training of
Executive Designated may be, briefed as follows:

1. The factors serving to assure a better than average discipline and state of contentment in the Negro troops within this camp and a friendly interest on their part in the Japanese Americans as another minority group, which interest may on the part of the Negro troops toward the latter have greater liberties than off the post, has resulted in a consistent improvement of the position of the Japanese American soldiers both with relation to the community and to their fellow soldiers.

2. Frank acceptance by the leaders of the civilian population of the equality of the Japanese Americans and of the need to formulate an educational program toward the end that such minor discriminations as now exist will be eliminated. Examples: House owners refusing to rent to Japanese; Caucasian girls declining to dance with Japanese American soldiers at the USO. Regarding the latter, this situation existed even after the arrival of the 100th Battalion, but its members are now being extended the same hospitality as any white soldier. Housing, however, is extremely scarce in the Hattiesburg area, and it is to be expected that the white population will prefer not to rent to Japanese families.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCLOY:

One of the urgent matters which should be handled as soon as you can conveniently do so is the Japanese problem.

SECTION I

As result of the War Department's plan to organize a Japanese American combat team several subsidiary problems have been precipitated. In a number of cases War Department decisions will have to be made. During your absence Mr. Bundy has been my contact with the Secretary on the Japanese problems.

A brief summary of the situation follows:

There was not the whole-hearted acceptance of the War Department's plan for organizing the combat team as was anticipated. Opposition generally fell into the following categories:

a. Pro-axis group opposition, clandestine and undercover for most part but organized and open at Tule Lake and Gila River.

b. Opposition because of the segregation feature. This opposition developed among most of the known loyal nisei leaders, who felt that the separate unit led away from assimilation.

c. Opposition to the "voluntary" feature. Claim was made that this feature marked the Japanese as being in a different class from American citizens, and they sought only to receive the same treatment as other Americans. In general, the opponents to the voluntary feature are also those opposed to the segregation feature.

d. Apathetic opposition by large numbers of individuals who feel that they, as American citizens, have been mistreated. They resent evacuation, loss of property, barbed wire, guard towers, etc. Their general demeanor
may be characterized by the statement "The United States not only failed to stand by us, but allowed us to suffer, therefore there is no reason why I should do anything, on my own volition, for the United States".

e. Opposition by a substantial number who felt that no hope remained for their future in America. Evacuation and the continuing anti-Japanese campaign in the west, and the introduction of hostile legislation confirm their belief that the United States holds no future for them. They are resigned to being sent to Japan and they do not want a record of having done anything to aid the United States. Mary have applied for expatriation.

f. Objection to the 4 C Selective Service classification which many of the loyal nisei felt placed them in the same position as enemy aliens.

Efforts were made in each of the centers by our Army teams to overcome the objections to the plan. In addition, I made two trips (to Manzanar, Poston, Gila River, Rohwer, and Jerome) to give the War Department's ideas at first hand. Unfortunately, the Army teams' efforts were handicapped in some instances by inability to fulfill promises made, e.g., the Army teams promised that a Japanese American soldier in uniform would have the same rights as any other soldier and could travel to any point in the United States on legitimate business. In a number of cases Japanese who had volunteered asked permission to return to the west coast to make final settlement of business or personal affairs. Request made of Commanding General, Western Defense Command, were refused. (See cases of Youhsie J. Okuba, Hiyoshi Imoto, Henry A. Morimoto, and Lloyd Mori all of Poston -- also note file on Corporal George Sakemi.)

The surprising development in the Army registration of citizens of military age was the high mortality of loyalty. Indications now point to at least twenty-five percent answering question No. 28 of the questionnaire in the negative -- the negative answer is equivalent to stating their disloyalty.

While the total number of volunteers in the United States mainland will but slightly exceed 1000, Hawaii reports enthusiastic acceptance of the War Department's plan and over 10,000 volunteers. It is my opinion that the difference in
treatment of the Japanese on the mainland and in Hawaii is largely responsible for the difference in enthusiasm.

It is my view that little will be accomplished in the development of enthusiastic loyalty among the United States mainland Japanese Americans until some amelioration is made in the existing regulation of the War Department and the Western Defense Command.

I recommend the following:

a. That the War Department instructions of February 9, 1942, directing the discharge of all civil employees of Japanese extraction be revised (upon the urgent request of General Emmons, Hawaii was exempted from this). Staff action is now being taken to accomplish this.

b. That War Department instructions, contained in AGO letter October 7, 1942, file AG 220.71(9-28-42)08-S-E, Subject: Revision of War Department Instructions Governing Granting Furloughs to Soldiers of Japanese Ancestry, be revised to conform to the following policy:

(1) Permit Japanese American soldiers in uniform, upon authorization and approved furloughs granted by their commanding officers, to return to any relocation center to visit their families, relatives, and friends without the necessity of obtaining authority from the Western Defense Command.

(2) Permit Japanese American soldiers in uniform to travel under military orders to any locality in the Western Defense Command without special authorization and permission of the Western Defense Command.

(3) Permit Japanese American soldiers to return to restricted areas in the Western Defense Command on urgent personal matters, but only when in possession of written authorization of the Western Defense Command. When permit has been granted it will not be necessary for the soldier to be accompanied by an escort. Application for this travel will be cleared through the War Department.

Staff action was initiated to accomplish this change (See OPD 291.2(2-20-43) March 4, 1943), but when the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, refused to concur in the proposed change, further action was deferred.
pending your return. The matter was taken up with Mr. Bundy who stated he approached the Secretary, but the Secretary felt it should be held in abeyance until your return.

c. That the Western Defense Command be required by the War Department to revise its policy on the return of mixed-marriage Japanese individuals. This matter was also taken up with Mr. Bundy following receipt of Western Defense Command's reply to your letter suggesting a reconsideration.

SECTION II

In your absence the Western Defense Command has made one change affecting the Japanese situation. By Proclamation No. 16 the boundary of Military Area No. 1 has been shifted to the south to exclude the relocation centers at Gila River and Poston. This change was directed by the War Department and accepted by General DeWitt with protest.

SECTION III

The status of the Japanese American combat team is as follows:

a. The cadre officers and enlisted men are assembled at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and are undergoing training.

b. Because of poor volunteering in the United States quotas have been reassigned:

(1) Hawaii's quota has been raised to 2,500.

(2) United States quota placed at 1,000.

(3) Balance of personnel to be acquired by transfer of all Japanese Americans in Service Commands (estimated to be 1,000 to 1,500) to the combat team.

c. Entire commissioned medical personnel will be obtained by calling to active duty medical officers of Japanese ancestry. This will undoubtedly cause much disappointment among the doctors in the relocation centers who have volunteered.
SECTION IV

The next logical step in the extension of the program will be to reinstitute selective service. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, now has the matter under consideration, but a decision should be made in the near future. If this is done, a continuation of the segregation policy for soldiers in the Army would be of doubtful wisdom.

SECTION V

A sequence to the program is a voluntary induction of Japanese girls into the WAAC. This step seems highly desirable in that the suggestion has been enthusiastically received by the girls whose mortality rate on the loyalty question is very low.

WILLIAM P. SCOBEEY
Colonel, General Staff
Executive
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCLOY:

Subject: Visits to Japanese Relocation Centers.

During your absence I made three trips to the Japanese relocation centers. A summary of my activities in connection therewith follows:

FIRST TRIP

Left Washington February 11, returning to Washington February 14.

Relocation centers visited:

Gila River
Manzanar
Colorado River

I. Purposes of Trip:

1. Observe operations of the registration teams.
2. To assist the War Department registration teams in any way it appeared necessary.
3. To observe in general the operations of the relocation centers and administration thereof.

II. Activity at Gila River Relocation Center

I arrived at Gila River Relocation Center about 11 A.M. February 12, reporting at the Military Police Company for transportation. I talked to the Military Police Commander and discovered the general conditions of the Military Police Company were not good. There was an excessive number of unauthorized absences running as high as 30 at one time, thus reducing the number of personnel available for duty. Since I was not directed or authorized to make a report on the Military Police Company conditions, I made no effort to make a formal report on the situation but did informally report the situation to General B. M. Bryan, PMG Office, and suggested that an inspector be sent to make a detailed inspection of the unit.
On the War Department registration, I discovered a definite coordinated anti-registration and anti-cooperation activity. This consisted of Kibei standing outside of the registration building, advising the Nisei and threatening them should they answer the loyalty question in the affirmative. As a result there was a fear on the part of the Nisei to register and when they did they were inclined to answer in the negative on loyalty.

Following a conference with Captain Thompson, officer in charge of registration, Mr. Bennett, the Project Director, Mr. Terry, Project Attorney, and other officials of the project, I suggested that definite action be taken against the interfering individuals. This action should take the form of arrest and indictment for interfering with recruitment.

Later in the day I had a conference with some 12 Japanese leaders in the center, consisting of Issei, Nisei, and Kibei. In this conference, I explained the purpose of the War Department program and suggested that no interference would be tolerated. I answered a number of questions with reference to the registration. The result of this conference is not known, but it is my belief that the arrest of 28 Japanese for interfering with the registration some three days later was occasioned by my activities. Following this arrest there was a marked improvement in registering, but still little increase in volunteering.

III. Activity at Manzanar Relocation Center

Leaving Gila River Relocation Center at 3:00 P.M. February 12, and arrived at Manzanar about 6:00 P.M. That evening I conferred with Mr. Gozzens, the District Supervisor; Mr. Brown, acting Project Director, the Project Attorney, and several other members of the Project staff. I explained the purpose of the registration and the War Department plan. Lieutenant Bogard, the officer in charge of the registration, reported that no difficulty in registration had been encountered but there had been a large percentage of expressed disloyalty and few volunteers. The project itself appeared quiet and the information given me was that the evacuees were under full control since the December 8 affair. Later in the evening I discussed the general situation with two leading Japanese in the center; one a Nisei, the other an Issei. They expressed a desire to cooperate with the War Department plan and said that they did not believe any trouble would be encountered in carrying out the plan. The following morning I made an inspection of the project and found conditions generally good. I was informed by the officials that farming operations were under progress but the evacuees would not work in the camouflage net factory.
IV. Activity at Colorado River Relocation Center

Leaving Manzanar at 9:00 A.M., I arrived at Colorado River about 11:30 and went directly to the relocation center. I inspected registration and found general excellent cooperation on the part of the Japanese in registering. Due to the limited time there I had no opportunity to inspect the installations, but the general atmosphere encountered was one of cooperation. The project director, Mr. Wade Head, informed me that since he had removed some five Kibei, who had beaten up Mr. Kido, president of the J.A.C.L., there had been a material improvement in the morale of the evacuees and no longer were they afraid to express their loyalty. After lunch I had a conference with two of the leading council members and explained the War Department plan.

Summary of My Observations of the Relocation Centers Visited

The Japanese are appreciative of the War Department plan to give them an opportunity to serve in the military service and to get out of the relocation centers.

There is some resentment on the part of the loyal Japanese-Americans against their evacuation from their homes in California. They constantly raised the point that they were citizens and loyal citizens. As such they have felt mistreatment.

Almost without exception, the Japanese opposed the voluntary feature of the induction. They claim they prefer to be placed on the same status as all other citizens and desire Selective Service induction.

Most of the Japanese are opposed to the separate Japanese combat team on the grounds that such an organization constitutes segregation; however, most of the opposition against this has been dissipated as a result of careful explanation on the part of the officers in charge of registration.

From my own observations and information that I obtained from other people, it is my definite opinion that a great many of the Japanese are indeed and in fact very loyal in their attitude toward the United States. Failure on the part of the War Relocation Authority and other agencies to give adequate protection to Japanese has caused them to be inarticulate in their expression of loyalty.
SECOND TRIP

Left Washington March 2; returned March 3.

Relocation centers visited:

Rohwer, Arkansas, Relocation Center
Jerome, Arkansas, Relocation Center

I went on this trip following a conversation with Lieutenant Siler and Captain Holbrook, the officers in charge of registration at these centers. Both of these officers informed me over the telephone that they had run into a very difficult situation which appeared not capable of solution by them. This situation was a failure at Rohwer of evacuees to register and the failure of the volunteer program at both centers. I came to the conclusion that if I, as the War Department representative, should go there and talk the matter over with the representative members of the Japanese controlling body, it might be that some good could be accomplished.

I. Activities at Rohwer Relocation Center.

At the Rohwer Relocation Center I talked to Captain Holbrook, War Department officer in charge of the team, and learned that the situation had developed to a point where no registration was going on. Captain Holbrook felt that there was organized opposition but it had not been possible for either him or the project officials to uncover the conspiracy. That evening at 8:00 I talked to the council, consisting of one member from each block. I explained the War Department program and the purpose of the registration. I also answered questions in regard thereto. One of the members present expressed the belief that my visit had clarified the situation but at the same time he said there was definite opposition to volunteering and to the separate unit. The purpose of this phase of the plan was fully explained. It was not possible for me to tell what the reaction was to my talk. Captain Holbrook expressed his feeling that it would accomplish good.

II. Activities at Jerome Relocation Center

The conditions at Jerome were very similar to those at Rohwer and it is my belief that there is a close liaison between the evacuees of the two centers. I talked to some 50 or 60 leaders in the morning and in the presence of the War Relocation Authority officials; and felt that the reaction was good. The registration was proceeding with little difficulty but few volunteers were presenting themselves for induction.
Summary of My Second Trip:

I received the distinct impression that the project officials were not enthusiastic about any program which would cause a liquidation of the projects. This was expressed at both projects by the directors stating to the evacuees, following my talk, that no individual would be required to leave the center unless he desired to do so. Mr. Whitaker, the District Supervisor, who was present with me at both places, told me confidentially that it was his feeling that at both centers there had been too much laxity and the Japanese had been given too much authority, to the extent that now they refused to do anything unless they felt that they wanted to. He stated that my talk to them had been just the thing they needed.

THIRD TRIP

At the Direction of General McNarney, I left Washington on March 5 and returned March 9, going to Phoenix, Arizona and visiting Gila River and Colorado River Relocation Centers. This visit was made at the suggestion of Brigadier General Persons who wanted me to go and meet Senator Chandler who was conducting hearings and investigations of the Arizona projects.

Senator Chandler had previously visited Manzanar, at which place he encountered considerable difficulty in getting information, both from the War Relocation Authority project director and the War Department representative, Lieutenant Bogard. Arriving at Manzanar on March 2, he had required Lieutenant Bogard to submit the questionnaires which were being executed by the Japanese male citizens. Lieutenant Bogard refused him these papers and the summary of the answers thereon, on the grounds he had been instructed at the War Department that they were confidential. Senator Chandler then wired the Secretary of War, asking that Lieutenant Bogard be given instructions to release the information to him. In the meantime Lieutenant Bogard had called me by telephone explaining the situation. My instruction over the telephone to Lieutenant Bogard was to give Senator Chandler any information or document he had with him. Therefore, in answering Senator Chandler's telegram, it was possible for me to say that instructions had already gone out.

General Persons felt that since Senator Chandler had been accompanied to Manzanar by two Army officers from the Western Defense Command, he would be subject to influences which were in opposition to the War Department program and that it was necessary for either myself or some officer cognizant with the War Department policy and having knowledge of the general situation to meet Senator Chandler in Arizona.
Senator Chandler's schedule, as was known here, was to conduct hearings in Phoenix. I arrived at Phoenix about noon on Saturday, March 6. Hearings did not start until about 2:30. I first met Senator Chandler at the hearings. It was evident by Senator Chandler's questions, that he had a very poor impression of the loyalty of the Japanese and of the administrative conduct and control of the centers. At Manzanar he had discovered that 60% of the Nisei had answered in the negative on the question of loyalty, and he constantly stressed that point during the hearing, so that the newspapers wrote up the story to the effect that the Japanese in the United States were disloyal. This story was sent out over Associated Press wires and apparently re-published in most of the United States newspapers.

Following the hearing, about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, I had only a limited opportunity to talk to the Senator. Since Mrs. Chandler was with him and he was going to lunch, I agreed to go with the party to Gila River Relocation Center, where he conducted a hearing during the evening from 9:00 P.M. until midnight. The hearing at Gila River Relocation Center consisted of interrogating the project director and other officials. They made, I feel, a good impression and it appeared that Senator Chandler changed his views to some extent on the question of the loyalty of some of the Japanese. After the completion of his investigation, I did have about a 20 minutes' conversation with him, during which time he expressed appreciation for the War Department's consideration in sending an officer to assist him.

I told Senator Chandler it was my hope that he would not dwell upon the 60% disloyalty at Manzanar because that did no represent the real condition throughout other centers. I informed him that we would give him a complete tabulation on the question of loyalty as soon as it was received so that it might be incorporated in the Senate Investigation report. After Senator Chandler completed his hearings at the Gila River Relocation Center he went to Tuscon. He evidenced no further desire to conduct further investigations in Arizona. Mr. Malone, his Special Consultant, and I went back to Phoenix where I had a long talk with him on the general situation. On Sunday morning Mr. Malone accompanied me to Colorado River where we spent the day inspecting the project facilities, and interrogating project officials and several of the Japanese evacuees.

The general situation at Poston was, I felt, exceptionally good. It made a good impression upon Mr. Malone and by his interrogations it was clear that he felt the War Department program constituted a proper step in the direction of solving the entire Japanese question. He appeared obviously pleased by the progress being made by the War Relocation Authority officials.

Returning to Phoenix where we spent Sunday night, we left for Gila on Monday, March 8 and spent the entire day inspecting all facilities of the project and interrogating Japanese and the relocation project officials. Three groups of Japanese were called in and interrogated. One
group of three consisted of fathers of Japanese Nisei who had expressed disloyalty; a second group of five Japanese Issei had sons volunteering for service; the third group were Japanese Nisei.

In the first group the fathers of the disloyal Japanese Nisei said that they had not influenced their children and that their sons' action was entirely on their own accord and it was affirmed by them, that their children desired to return to Japan. In two instances the fathers admitted that their sons had associated with Kibei and it was their assumption that the expression of disloyalty by their sons might have been caused by this association. Mr. Malone apparently felt that these young Japanese who had expressed disloyalty may have done so through lack of appreciation of the consequences.

The interrogation of the five fathers having sons who volunteered made an exceptionally good impression upon Mr. Malone. The fathers in all instances were Issei. They said they heartily favored the volunteering by their sons; that they themselves had nothing to gain by Japan's successes; that they were American in thought even if not citizens; that they had cast their lot with this country and expected their sons to fight for it.

I am certain that following his observations in the two relocation centers, Mr. Malone had a much better impression than he received at Manzanar. He repeatedly emphasized the point that segregation must take place without delay; that loyal Japanese should be given the opportunity to leave the relocation centers as rapidly as possible. He expressed to me his ideas of the policy which he felt the Senate should advocate. This, in general, is as follows:

1. Loyal Japanese males of military age should be subject to the same Selective Service processes as all other American citizens.

2. Loyal Japanese citizens not eligible for military service should be immediately released from relocation centers under a minimum of supervision. This would include the Issei of known loyalty, and in particular, fathers of sons in the Army.

3. Known disloyal Japanese, both aliens and citizens, should be immediately placed either in internment camps or under much closer supervision and control than is exercised in the relocation center.

General Summary

As a result of these visits and my contacts with both WRA officials and the Japanese, I have formed the following concrete opinions:

1. Lack of WRA policy in segregation has caused a considerable deterioration of the loyalty on the part of the Japanese and has caused
the citizens to be subjected to pressure from the Kibei and aliens which many could not resist.

2. Most Japanese citizens feel mistreated in their evacuation and confinement in the relocation centers.

W. P. S.
Mr. Speaker, as one Member of Congress, I want to raise my voice in protest against coddling the Japs.

As I have said before, Japan is our permanent, and probably our most dangerous, enemy in this war. There can be no compromise with them. America must be humiliated or Japan must be destroyed.

I was shocked beyond expression to learn a few days ago that the Secretary of War was organizing a Jap unit in the American Army. Such a unit would not only be dangerous but it would do much to injure the morale of the men in our fighting forces and to shake the confidence of their people at home.

Instead of organizing these Japs into a so-called American unit, they should be separated and put into labor battalions where each and every one of them could be watched at all times. Not only that, but the American people are sick and tired of this policy of pampering the Japs in these concentration camps. Those camps should be turned over to the Army, and every one of them should be put under strict military control.

While our boys are being butchered by these brutal apes in the Pacific and while these savages are now on our soil in the Aleutian Islands, I submit it is no time to continue that maudlin policy toward them that resulted in, if it did not invite, the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Our most insidious and treacherous enemy in this conflict, I repeat, is Japan. We are either going to have to destroy the Japanese Empire or suffer defeat, humiliation, and probably invasion, of our Pacific Coast by her forces.

Patriotic Americans are demanding, and they will continue to demand, that we not only quit coddling the Japs but that we redouble our efforts in the Pacific until we forever wipe the Japanese influence from the face of the earth.