January 27, 1943

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposed Program for Army Recruitment of and Determination of Loyalty of Japanese Evacuees.

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army.

1. Pursuant to oral permission granted by the Assistant Secretary of War in a telephone conversation dated January 18, 1943, I submit herewith comments on a memorandum prescribing procedure for determining loyalty of Japanese-Americans. The subject memorandum is attached as Tab A.

   2. One of the most fundamental questions presented by the subject proposal is this: If the War Department and the Joint Board (representing the Federal establishment) do certify as to the loyalty of certain Nisei and they are permitted to work in war plants, how can the Government continue to justify the prohibition against their re-entry to the Pacific Coastal Frontier (the evacuated zone of Western Defense Command)? Perhaps it will not. If the Government will not or cannot justify its position in this regard, critics are certain to force a confession of original mistake in evacuation. (See Paragraph 4-b below.) If the Federal Government is unable to resist pressure for the return of certified Nisei to the Pacific Coastal Frontier (or if it does not intend to) then, in my opinion, one of the basic military security requirements of the Pacific Coastal Frontier will have been disregarded.

   3. a. As I understood it, the initial objective which led the War Department to the formulation of the subject plan was:

      To develop a practicable means for raising a combat unit from among the Nisei class.

      I am advised informally that later another element entered the picture because there was apparently a duplication of effort among Army agencies investigating released evacuees who were furloughed or released by WRA to the vicinity of vital installations. Accordingly, a secondary objective seems to have developed. It is:

      To eliminate a multiplicity of investigations by Army agencies in cases where WRA releases or furloughs
Japanese for private employment or other purposes.

b. However, the purpose of the plan as stated in paragraph 1 thereof is much broader in scope. It is to determine,

"(a) loyalty of Japanese-Americans of the Nisei class to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from war relocation centers; and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or be employed in plants and facilities important to the war effort."

c. Stated another way, the objectives as I understand them from reading the plan and from my conversation with the Assistant Secretary of War are twofold: (1) To recruit an unstated number of American-born Japanese for an Army combat unit, and (2) to determine the loyalty of American-born Japanese, other than those accepted by the Army, in order to facilitate the War Relocation Authority relocation-release program.

4. Before commenting in detail on the essential features of the proposal, there are a few observations associated with the initiation of evacuation which are pertinent. They are made primarily in connection with the public relations aspects of the intended program. These comments are:

a. At the time of evacuation, many elements in our population charged that it was unnecessary and based on hysteria and/or pressure from selfish West Coast interests desiring to rid the West Coast area of Japanese. The Army answered this by positively stating that a military necessity existed. Critics then questioned the necessity for mass total evacuation and asked why it was not confined to aliens or others known to be disloyal. There was considerable public discussion at the time as to why loyalty boards were not used. These critics were answered by statements, direct and indirect from authorities, that it was substantially impossible to determine the loyalty of Japanese. Cited were ties of race, religion, customs, positions, and the fact that the group had largely been unassimilated.

b. On the other hand, a majority of the public was not critical of the evacuation, but on the contrary whole-heartedly indered the mass evacuation and, in my opinion, still views all Japanese with suspicion.

c. Thus in viewing the public relations of the proposed plan, there are two definite problems created: (1) Those elements originally critical of mass evacuation will ask: Why was not loyalty

determined during the assembly center phase if it can be done now? At that time the evacuee group was under complete military control and security requirements were satisfied - there was time to determine loyalty without expending 50 to 60 millions on relocation centers. (2) Those major elements in the population that view Japanese with suspicion may or may not now accept them notwithstanding the proposed certification by the board. It is doubtful if they will be accepted unless a very substantial and logical selling job is done. And so far as the Western states are concerned, it is probable that this area will remain recalcitrant in spite of such a selling job.

5. In developing detailed comments on the proposed plan, I will divide them into four categories as follows:

I General Comments
II Mechanical and Investigative Aspects
III Legal Aspects
IV An Alternative Program.

6. Category I, General Comments.

a. The general comments on the subject plan are of considerable extent. There are three topics in this category. The first is a restatement of the basic mechanics, which appear to be required by the plan. The second is an outline of the basic assumptions which were apparently adopted in devising the plan. It is also a statement of several questions left unanswered by the plan. The third is a summary of comments which follow from the premises established by the first two. In order to limit the length of this paper as much as possible, the first topic is attached as Tab B. The second and third topics follow here.

b. The following basic assumptions are inherent in this plan:

(1) That it is desirable to have in the United States Army a combat unit consisting of American-born persons of Japanese descent.

(2) That to get such a combat unit it is necessary simultaneously to provide for the release of other American-born Japanese from relocation centers.

(3) That as a condition of release it is necessary for the Japanese to have a definite stamp of approval as to loyalty guaranteed by a joint board of the Army, Navy, and FBI.

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(4) That there has now been devised a satisfactory procedure to determine the loyalty of American-born Japanese, and that this plan is acceptable to all of the investigative agencies.

(5) That the plan will produce the desired results because, for all practical purposes of the war effort, (a) the records of the investigative agencies are sufficiently complete for all Japanese-Americans, (b) a satisfactory questionnaire has been devised, and (c) an investigation of each Japanese person in his former community of residence will produce additional objective loyalty evidence.

(6) That, since no statement has been made indicating that the machinery would be operated for the duration, the basic loyalty determination for all practical purposes can be a "one shot" operation undertaken simultaneously in all centers.

(7) That the program will result in the acceptance by the American community of those Japanese who are given the official stamp of approval as to loyalty and, if it is not intended to force a separation of families, that the American community will accept the uncertified alien members of their families.

The information now at hand is not sufficient to answer the following questions:

(1) The most important unanswered question is whether the plan is a "positive" or a "negative" plan. Stated otherwise, which way is the basic presumption – in favor of, or against loyalty? Will an evacuee be regarded as loyal unless a derogatory finding of fact (not opinion) is developed. To carry it farther, if no information can be developed on a given Nisei, is he to be classified as loyal?

(2) Will the presence of parents, brothers and sisters, children, etc., in Japan or Japanese occupied territory (i.e., possibility of "pressure" by Japanese Government) be considered in the process of clearance? Same question for father or brother in internment camp in this country.

(3) Will the War Department as such undertake the publicity campaign necessary to make the loyal Japanese (and their Issei parents) acceptable in all communities and occupations, including war industries?
(4) Will a Japanese whose loyalty has been verified be permitted (a) to return alone to the evacuated area of the West Coast for employment in war industries under exactly the same circumstances as he could be employed elsewhere in the United States, (b) to bring his wife and children and/or his alien parents with him? Also, will the members of the families of soldiers be permitted to establish residence outside of the relocation project, including the return to their former residence in the evacuated area or elsewhere? Will the public accept those whose loyalty (a) has not been investigated or (b) not affirmatively established?

c. (1) The active mechanics of this program effectively place the responsibility for its success on the War Department. The teams are Army officers and enlisted men; the questionnaire analysis is an Army function; and the locality-of-former-residence investigation will be done by Western Defense Command. However, the Army is neither administratively responsible for the operation of relocation centers, nor for relocation. Yet this is definitely and conclusively a relocation program. It was definitely understood at the time the War Relocation Authority was established that this agency would free the Army from responsibility for the relocation of Japanese evacuated from the West Coast area. It was deemed wise to require the clearance of evacuees with all law enforcement agencies, including the Army, in the process of granting releases from centers. The Army has always given as expeditious treatment as possible to its functions in such clearance, but the responsibility for, and the mechanics of, securing the clearance have remained a function of the War Relocation Authority. Apparently the War Department has now assumed the responsibility for and the active role in the clearance of evacuees. This is apparent in spite of the statement that, "The procedure.....is intended to supplement the leave regulations.....issued by the War Relocation Authority, and not to supersede those regulations or instructions except as may be ordered by the War Relocation Authority."

(2) The active role and renewed interest of the Army in this problem which has been passed to a civilian agency may assist rather than block the efforts of those Congressmen who would have the Army assume the operation of all relocation centers.

(3) The program is voluntary. It can, therefore, be blocked by any factor which influences the American-born Japanese not to submit a questionnaire. The most active pressure group in each relocation center consists of the parent-generation Issei and their Japanese-educated Kibei children. These Kibei, incidently, must be classified as Nisei for purposes of this program since they are American-born and citizens. The program will operate with the Issei-Kibei group still actively in control.
of the Japanese in centers, since no segregation is to be made prior to
the Army recruitment and the soliciting of questionnaires. Repeated
statements have been made by this headquarters that segregation must
be a first step for the successful operation of any actively pro-American
program in the relocation centers. This is still the view of this head-
quarters. As long as the Issei-Kibei group, including many persons who
openly requested repatriation to Japan and parolees from internment
camps who are actively pro-Japanese, is the dominant force in the re-
location center, the Army and the War Relocation Authority, or any other
agency which attempts to promote a program within a center, will be at
the mercy of the Imperial Japanese Government.

(4) It is often assumed by those unfamiliar with the pattern
of Japanese life in the United States that there are two classes of
families, (a) those composed of pro-Japanese parents and children and (b)
those composed of American-born citizen Japanese. This does not appear
to be the case. All foreign-born Japanese are aliens, and all native-
born Japanese automatically citizens. This is the consequence of national
policy since the first exclusion acts of 1906. In nearly every family,
therefore, there are alien parents and citizen children. Among the
citizen children will be found those who were educated in Japan, the
Kibei. Some of the Kibei have completed a term of training in the Japan-
ese Army. There are also many children who have felt no deep loyalty
to any country other than the United States. It must be remembered that
the median (i.e., the 50 per cent point) of the age of foreign-born
Japanese is 17.5 years for males and 16.8 years for females. Of the 71,896 American-born Japanese in Arizona, California,
Oregon, and Washington in 1940, only 22,375, or 31 per cent, were 21 years of
age or older. On the other hand, 99 per cent of the alien Japanese were
adults. In these states foreign-born Japanese adults outnumbered their
adult citizen children 40,524 to 22,375. Though 64 per cent of the entire
Japanese population were citizens, including all small children, of the
adult Japanese population, 64 per cent were aliens. (See Table 1 and
Chart 1, attached as Tab C heretofore.)

(5) It is indeed regrettable that the Army teams will go
into relocation centers without complete information concerning, and ap-
preciation of, the objectives and mechanics of the evacuation program.
The Japanese in the centers will expect these men, the representa-
tives of the United States Government, to know the answers to their questions
concerning the evacuation program. When such questions are not answered,
or the answers given prove that the Army man does not know what he is
talking about, there will be an immediate loss of face. The Issei and
Kibei can be expected to ask embarrassing questions and otherwise con-
fuse the members of the recruiting team. Certain War Relocation Authority
project officials assure this headquarters that the pro-Axis Issei-Kibei

group is now highly organized to exert pressure and that due to the failure to promptly undertake segregation, the larger percentage of Nisei have developed an "anti-Caucasian" view.

(6) Apparently there is no intention to try out the program in one center as a "dry run" to determine any weaknesses in the proposed approach to the evacuees and to test the effectiveness of the publicity program. While such a preliminary trial might provide the anti-American Japanese with time to organize against the program, it would insure consistency of action and statement by team members in meeting problems in all centers. Anyone familiar with Japanese psychology knows that they are not easily stampeded by "blitz" tactics and high pressure propaganda. The Japanese in relocation centers will be especially suspicious of any such action by uniformed Army men.

(7) Undoubtedly the Public Relations Division of the War Department will prepare releases which will advise the general public, especially the public on the West Coast, concerning the objectives and procedures of this program. Unless this is done with a full knowledge and appreciation of the present state of public opinion on the West Coast, the program may excite so much public controversy on the "Japanese question" (now before State Legislatures) that it will become almost impossible for interviewers from the Western Defense Command to secure a fair appraisal from the former associates, employers and neighbors of Japanese.

d. Two of the most fundamental questions which seem to be left unanswered (see above) are these:

(1) Is the proposal based on a "negative" or a "positive" approach? Are all Nisei presumptively loyal – a presumption to be rebutted only by the development of derogatory evidence? Or is the presumption the converse – to be rebutted only by the development of evidence in affirmation of loyalty? If the presumption is favorable to loyalty then the Federal Government would seem to be embarrassing its original position that evacuation was a military necessity. (See paragraph 4-a, above.) This follows because it was the fundamental premise that Japanese loyalties were unknown or doubtful. If the presumption is unfavorable to loyalty then the chances of determining the loyalty of any substantial segment will probably be low. This is because there is a great dearth of positive information on the majority of Nisei. There are two reasons for this: (1) Only the Japanese themselves know the answers and (2) the Nisei Japanese are mostly too young to have any records. (See Chart 1 and Table 1, Tab C.)
The resultant inability to establish the loyalty of any substantial segment of Nisei may unnecessarily embarrass the Government because such a determination as is here proposed is not essential to the attainment of the primary objective, viz., raising a combat unit.

(2) The second question left unanswered, which may seriously threaten the attainment of the stated objectives, is the method by which it is proposed thoroughly to indoctrinate the Army Questionnaire Teams to enable them to answer the many questions which will be propounded not only by the Nisei, but also by Issai and Kibei. (See para. 6 c. (5), above.) I understand that these teams will initiate their activities simultaneously in each Relocation Center on February 4. Even those who have been associated with the relocation and evacuation from the beginning would experience great difficulty in answering many of the questions which will necessarily be met. Some examples of questions which may be encountered are:

(a) Will those of us whose loyalty is favorably determined be permitted to return to the West Coast?

(b) If so, may our dependent (Issai) parents accompany us when we are released for war work? Or to the Coast?

(c) If our loyalties are favorably determined, will we be released only for direct war work or can we be released to engage in our former businesses? Or any business of our choosing? Any place?

(d) Our cars and our property are stored on the West Coast. Will the Government bring them to us if we are released for work in the interior?

(e) If we can be released now to go in the Army, or to work in war plants, why were we evacuated?

(f) If our loyalties are favorably determined, do we become eligible to leave at once? Or will it continue to be necessary for us to have a job, a place to live, and a community of destination which will accept us, as is now the case under the WRA furlough plan? If not, why not? Particularly, if on examination, we have been determined to be loyal citizens and we do not seek to be protected?
Letter to Chief of Staff, U. S. Army - January 27, 1943.

7. **Category II. Comments on Mechanical and Investigative Aspects.**

   Detailed comments on this subject are found in Tab D.

8. **Category III. Legal Aspects.**

   Certain arguments were advanced by the Government in the pending Federal Court cases challenging authority for the evacuation program. It is pertinent to set forth in resume the substance of some of these arguments so far as they may be affected or weakened by the proposed program. The position taken by the Government in the court cases is in some respects contrary to the implications of the instant program. The importance of this consideration cannot be over-emphasized. The inclosure, Tab E, speaks for itself in this regard.

9. Of some value in considering the public relations aspects of the program are various newspaper editorials touching the subject. Excerpts from a very few of the many editorials along the same line which appeared in leading periodicals are attached as Tab F.

10. **Category IV. An Alternative Program.**

    Virtually all of these comments have been critical of the plan. This, of course, logically raises the question as to what the suggestion of this headquarters would be for a program which would meet the criticisms advanced and, at the same time, satisfy the War Department objectives, viz., (a) provide a method for raising a combat unit; (b) eliminate multiplicity of investigations; and (c) to facilitate a feasible program for fuller utilization of evacuees in the war effort with provision for release and ultimate rehabilitation. For the purpose of discussion such a program is attached in outline form (Tab G).

11. The foregoing comments have been developed on the basis of the experience gained by this headquarters in evacuating all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coastal Frontier and in operating assembly centers providing for their temporary residence for a period of over six months. Irrespective of whether a final decision has been made on the subject proposal, I request that my comments be given careful consideration and, further, that they be made of record in the War Department. Notwithstanding whatever course of action is ultimately followed by the War Department with respect to the instant subject, I reaffirm my previous position that no persons of Japanese ancestry should be readmitted to the Pacific Coastal Frontier (the evacuated zone of Western Defense Command) for the
Letter to Chief of Staff, U. S. Army - January 27, 1943.

duration of the present war.

J. L. DeWitt,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

7 Incls.:
Tabs A to G, Incl.
Table 1

NATIVITY OF THE TOTAL JAPANESE POPULATION AND OF THE ADULT JAPANESE POPULATION OF ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON AND WASHINGTON: 1940*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Nativity Group</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Adult population**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>112,985</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>71,896</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>41,089</td>
<td>36</td>
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Males

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>63,208</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37,438</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>38,094</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12,628</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>25,114</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24,810</td>
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</table>

Females

<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>49,777</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25,461</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>33,802</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>9,747</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>15,975</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15,714</td>
<td>62</td>
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</table>

*Note that whereas 2/3 of the total Japanese population are American born, only 1/3 of the adult population is American born.

**Persons 21 years of age or older.
AGE AND NATIVITY OF JAPANESE IN
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON: 1940

Note Table 2, the source, follows
Table 2

AGE AND NATIVITY OF JAPANESE POPULATION IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON AND WASHINGTON: 1940
(Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (Years)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Foreign-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages....</td>
<td>112,985</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>71,896</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 5.....</td>
<td>7,189</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7,134</td>
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<td>5 to 9.......</td>
<td>8,357</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8,281</td>
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<td>10 to 14.....</td>
<td>12,860</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12,743</td>
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<td>15 to 19.....</td>
<td>18,139</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17,893</td>
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<td>20 to 24.....</td>
<td>14,636</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14,193</td>
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<td>25 to 29.....</td>
<td>7,667</td>
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<td>6,381</td>
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<td>1,120</td>
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<td>40 to 44.....</td>
<td>7,068</td>
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<td>394</td>
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<td>5,854</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>195</td>
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<td>50 to 54.....</td>
<td>7,412</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 to 59.....</td>
<td>5,917</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 64.....</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 to 69.....</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 to 74.....</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 and older..</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 and older.. | 62,899  | 55.7        | 22,375       | 31.1        | 40,525       | 93.6        |
San Diego, California. - "San Diego Union", March 24, 1942.

The experience we have had with the Japs should cure us of the delusion that they can become responsible and loyal citizens.

Salt Lake City, Utah. - "Salt Lake Telegram", March 25, 1942.

News stories about evacuation say Japanese appear happy. Important thing now is to assure the safety of the nation on the home front. That's just as important to a loyal Japanese-American citizen as it is to any other American Citizen. The Japanese in America can well regard their evacuation as their part of the nation's victory effort - and with a grin and a "thumbs up" make it a demonstration of patriotism. Somehow we like that spirit. It is typically American.


America cannot afford a Trojan Horse. - Franc Shor in This World.

Portland, Oregon. - "Oregonian", April 30, 1942.

They (the Japanese) are very fortunate to be under restraint in an orderly, democratic manner. It may not have been their fault, in any degree, that we were betrayed by their nation and their race. But the time for trusting without precaution is past.

San Francisco, California. - "Chronicle", May 18, 1942.

The disloyal ones among them - there are disloyal ones and it is because of inability to quickly weed them out that all the Japanese have had to go - will take the oath perhaps most loudly of all. From the loyal one, the oath is not needed. From the disloyal, with fingers mentally crossed, it will mean nothing. If it did, we could safely take the oath from all the Japanese and let them all come back.

Los Angeles, California. - "Times", May 19, 1942.

What arguments were presented to the President by the military authorities of this district have not been made known, but to assume that General DeWitt, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Army and Naval Intelligence were motivated by race prejudice, greed for land, or popular hysteria, as this letter calmly does, is just silly. And, it was the arguments of this group that plainly impressed the President.

One has but to recall the original objections of the administration, as voiced by Attorney General Biddle, to removal of the Japs, to realize that it was not popular clamour that influenced the President, but very cogent evidence submitted by the military command. The implication that the President would be swayed by race prejudice, greed, or hysteria is no compliment. His instincts are in the other direction.....The exclusion was a military measure and was recognized as such, and as such, and as necessary, by the Japanese themselves, who submitted to it with more good sense than is displayed by the signers of the petition. These Japanese knew that there were traitors to the United States in their midst and further that complete identification of all of them was impossibly difficult.

Dallas, Texas. - "Herald Times", June 6, 1942.

The removal is perhaps the most remarkable thing that our government has done since we entered the war. This huge transplanting of population was essential.


The removal of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese extraction from the West Coast to interior points is, perhaps, the most remarkable thing that our government has done since we entered the war.....Many of the Japanese who have been evacuated are American citizens by right of birth and are loyal to this nation, but there were too many of them in one locality.....The evacuation of the Japanese as a war measure shows that it is not wholesome for the nation for any immigrant group to become too numerous in a particular locality.

San Bernardino, California. - "Sun", June 26, 1942.

In the face of reports that the large majority of Japanese in California evacuation camps approve of the army's decision that it was unwise to permit Japanese to reside on the Pacific Coast war zones, Mike Masaoka, national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, has made vigorous protest in New York.....When Masaoka will point out how the United States Army can determine who is a good Japanese
citizen and who is an enemy, the country might be interested in his protest....Miss Teru Masumoto offered resolution, narrowly defeated, that "as all loyal Americans, we support every measure that will help to insure victory for the United Nations, despite any personal hardships or sacrifices." Among the opponents of her resolution were many white Americans who are interested in the technical questions as to how the United States government can restrain the movements of citizens, regardless of their racial inheritance. The army has taken a practical viewpoint of the Japanese situation on the Pacific Coast and adopted the only plan that seems feasible.

Los Angeles, California. - "Times", July 10, 1942.

"Now General DeWitt has let Governor Olson know that the Governor was talking through his well-used hat and that the Japs - rounded up at tremendous cost and trouble aren't going to be released for anybody. This is straight talk, that even an Olson should understand. If the Governor will get down to earth and join in the sensible efforts of various groups to recruit various available city workers.....for emergency jobs in the fields, we can save the crops." - "As You Might Say---" ED AINSWORTH'S column in Times.

Merced, California. - "The Sun-Star", July 6, 1942.

Releasing the Japs to work on the farm would, in large measure, undo all the government has done so far to provide that safety. Only Japs who volunteered would be used on the farms, and, obviously, if any of them wanted to get outside the reception centers for purposes of sabotage or other acts of treachery, volunteering for farm work would provide him the opportunity to get out and do his dirty work. "Jottings" by "Vic" Reich

Martinez, California. - "Gazette", July 14, 1942.

Governor Olson's pleas that Japs be returned here from internment camps to work in harvest fields has met with a cold reception from the war department. General DeWitt did a mighty fine job in removing Japs from important military zones. The job was done with the usual precision and thoroughness with which the army always goes about a task. And when it was completed everyone breathed easier. They
felt that a menace to the safety of the entire Pacific Coast has been removed. It was with some amazement then that the people read several days ago that the Governor was advocating their return.


The Army, which has smoothly, expeditiously, and humanely handled the evacuation, and is carrying out the advance phases of the relocation, is not officially concerned with the peacetime problem which will follow as night follows day. The probable outcome is that the Constitution will prevail rather than the unconstitutional opinions or desires of any group or even State. That is the normal and expected course of affairs. The Army, meanwhile, through its Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Wartime Relocation Authority, the completely civilian agency engaged in placing Japanese in groups where they may support themselves for the duration, are setting examples in smooth, harmonious functioning which may point the way for new postwar relationships between Japanese and the white population. The Japanese, both aliens and American citizens, are being provided an opportunity to prove themselves willing and able to make serious sacrifices for this, the adopted land of some, the homeland of many more. As they continue to prove themselves, they will be proving also their right to the full and complete protection of the American Constitution, in peace or war, from this time forth. This war can conceivably put a definite end and answer to the domestic "Japanese question." "The Wide Horizon — Beyond the War" by Rodney L. Brink. A discussion of future peacetime disposition of West Coast Japanese.


Editorial comments on Columbia's transfer of coast aliens inland, comparing it to evacuation of California Japanese. "Hard on the innocent, it is forced on them because of the difficulty of separating them from the guilty." Other examples of difficulties arising from mixed populations were also given.
Long Beach, California. - "Press-Telegram", December 8, 1942.

The violent demonstration by pro-Axis Japanese at Manzanar does not provide the evidence whereby a complete separation of the sheep and the goats can be made, but it does prove beyond any doubt that a considerable percentage of the Japanese in this big relocation camp are loyal to Japan and consequently are enemies of the United States.


We cannot select on the basis of the disorders because the bad actors are sure to plant their kind on the other side. There is no ready-made solution. As with other matters, we must make the best of it and increase protection inside the camps. This, of course, means more restriction, which the decent ones endure but find onerous.

Los Angeles, California. - "Los Angeles Times", December 9, 1942.

Events at the Japanese centers at Manzanar and at Poston, Ariz., prove up to the hilt the necessity of Gen. DeWitt’s order clearing all persons of Japanese ancestry out of the Pacific Coast military areas. The evacuation order, it will be remembered, was roundly criticized by uninformed Easterners and by some Westerners who should have known better. It is now clear that the feeling of too many Japanese was entirely unfriendly to the United States, and that considerable numbers of Japanese born here were included in the unfriendly group. **

***For the safety of the Japanese themselves — and the safety of Japanese loyal to the United States at least was entitled to protection — the evacuation was wise and necessary. ***


All Japanese were moved away from potential war zones along the coast and placed under guard in camps of the interior for the good and sufficient reason that some of them were dangerous to the United States when this nation and Japan were involved in war, and nobody could tell certainly which of the Japanese were loyal to America and which were enemies.

Riots staged by anti-American Japanese in Arizona and California camps lead to two conclusions. One is that the army moved none too soon in its general evacuation of Japanese from coastal areas. The other is that this country faces a real headache in any final disposition of the Japanese problem.
Digest of Newspaper Editorials Showing Press Attitude on Loyalty

Up to July 23, 1942

San Francisco, California. - "Chronicle", February 9, 1942.

Realism must govern alien enemy issue. No infallible
way of separating sheet from goats in mass order.

Oakland, California. - "Tribune", March 11, 1942.

In war we must expect shocks, economic as well as
military....but nobody can question the wisdom of actions
and orders behind the jolts.


Japs must be removed to areas where they can do no
harm.

El Centro, California. - "Post-Press", March 15, 1942.

Displeasure in Tokyo, but everyone favors evacuation.

Long Beach, California. - "Sun", March 16, 1942.

Evacuation absolutely necessary. Many loyal Japanese-
Americans realize this. Americans, soldiers are suffering,
too. In case of raid, Americans might not make distinction
between loyal and other Japanese.

Orange, California. - "Orange County News", March 17, 1942.

Our security requires Japanese be removed, but in a way
in keeping with the principles of humanity.


All Japanese must be excluded even though a majority
are loyal citizens. The loyal Japanese should not allow
their citizenship to be marred by taking too long to arrange
for evacuation. - Key Hartsook.
November 21, 1942

My dear Mr. McCloy:

When the Chief of the Statistics Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration (Mr. Dedrick) was recently in Washington you expressed, during an interview with him, the desire that certain statistical data in the records of these Headquarters be assembled, reflecting the potential number of American-born Japanese who might be available for military service.

About that same time, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, requested through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this Headquarters, that similar statistics be assembled. It was also requested that those participating in the assembly of the data express certain opinions on the number of Nisei who might volunteer.

Accordingly, a memorandum has been developed embodying not only the statistics desired by you, but also the opinions requested by G-2, War Department. I am enclosing herewith for your information a copy of a letter, with its enclosure, forwarded this day to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. I believe the copy of the memorandum accompanying my letter to the Chief of Staff will provide the information you desire.

As I pointed out to the Chief of Staff, the expressions of opinion in the subject memorandum reflect only the views of those who participated in the preparation, and not necessarily my own.

Sincerely yours,

J. L. DeWitt
 Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
 Commanding

Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

Inclosures - 2
1 - copy ltr C/S 11-20-42
2 - statistical report
November 20, 1942

Subject: Potential Number of Nisei Japanese available for Military Service.

To: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, War Department

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, has requested the compilation of certain statistics to be developed from the records of this Headquarters, with regard to persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from military areas of the West Coast. The request was directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this Headquarters, by confidential teletype. The request indicated that the statistics were desired for use in connection with a study in progress as to the feasibility of organizing combat units composed of American-born Japanese for employment in theaters where no Japanese enemy troops appear. The request also called for certain expressions of opinion as to the number of American-born Japanese who might be expected to volunteer for military service and for a statement of views on the methods which might best be employed in raising such a force from among evacuees and other American-born Japanese.

2. Pursuant to that request, a memorandum has been prepared at these Headquarters and is forwarded herewith. The statements of opinion in the memorandum are chiefly those of the person who gathered the statistics and do not necessarily reflect my own views.

3. The Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of this Command, created by my general order in March of 1942, was the agency through which the evacuation program - particularly the operation of assembly centers, protection of property, etc. - was primarily accomplished. Recently the Chief of the Statistical Division of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was in Washington on official business. At that time he had an informal interview with the Assistant Secretary of War. The Assistant Secretary of War expressed a desire for the development of statistics similar to those requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By reason of that request, a copy of the enclosed memorandum is also being forwarded the Assistant Secretary of War.

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Inclosure - 1
Statistical report
November 20, 1942

Subject: Potential number of Nisei Japanese available for Military Service

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

1. a. The Statistical Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, has been directed to assemble data reflecting the potential number of American-born Japanese who might be available for military service. This memorandum is in response to that directive.

   b. In addition to statistical data, this memorandum includes the expression of certain opinions based on observation of the evacuation program and certain policy recommendations which are predicated on these opinions. In the assembly of the statistics themselves, these opinions have not influenced the compilation of the subject statistical data.

2. How many Nisei are there?

   a. The total Japanese population of the United States in 1940 was 126,947; today it is approximately 126,000. The following table summarizes the nativity and sex composition of the present Japanese population of continental United States:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Japanese population</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born Japanese (United States)</td>
<td>81,200</td>
<td>43,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born Japanese</td>
<td>44,800</td>
<td>27,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Of this population approximately 110,500 have been evacuated from West Coast military areas and are now under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority.

   b. The Nisei or native-born Japanese now constitute 65 per cent of the total, 43,100 males and 38,100 females. These are nearly all less than 35 years of age; a large proportion are children. Figure 1 shows the unusual age distribution of the foreign-born and the native-born Japanese. It should be noted that there is a missing generation of males between 25 and 50 years of age, and of females between 25 and 40. This was caused by the reduction of immigration in 1924.
Figure I

AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION
JAPANESE POPULATION
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON AND WASHINGTON: 1940

AGE

60

70

80

65

75

MALE

FEMALE

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80

FIGURES IN THOUSANDS

NATIVE BORN

FOREIGN BORN

SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE CENSUS

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND PROPAGANDA UNIT
STATISTICAL, LABOR, STATISTICAL, AND COMMISSIONER
DEPARTMENT OF THE CENSUS

4/10/42

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND-74006-2
By MS NARA Date 4/18/83
NATIVE-BORN JAPANESE EVACUATED TO RELOCATION CENTERS BY AGE AND MARITAL STATUS: 1942
Potential Military Service of Nisei Japanese
John J. McCloy
Col. Karl E. Bendetsen
November 17, 1942

The following table presents a summary estimate of the native-born Japanese population 18 to 35 years of age for the United States as of April, 1942. (The estimate may be low to the extent that the decennial census of population undercounted the Japanese population.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Evacuated U. S.</th>
<th>Evacuated Japanese</th>
<th>Evacuated Other Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total, 18 to 35 years</td>
<td>21,250</td>
<td>18,727</td>
<td>2,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 and 19 years</td>
<td>4,070</td>
<td>3,745</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24 years</td>
<td>8,940</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>1,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29 years</td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34 years</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 years</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are approximately 22,330 native born Japanese males 18 to 44 years of age; 21,250 in the 18 to 35 group; and 18,440 in ages 18 to 29. In addition, there are 1,780 youths of 17 who will pass their 18th birthday by April 1, 1943.

A more detailed picture of the age distribution of the male native-born group is provided by Figure 2. These data are for the evacuated population only and are presented in detail in Table 1 (Tab A.) Less than the normally expected number of males are in the ages 22 to 25 years. This is probably the result of (1) selective service, (2) voluntary migration from the west-coast prior to evacuation and (3) some migration of Kibei from the United States to Japan.

The Relocation Center destination of 18,727 native-born, male Japanese evacuees 18 to 35 years of age is shown in Table 2 (Tab A.)

3. How many Nisei would be available for military service?

An accurate answer to this question will require considerable research. Chief among the questions which must be answered are:

(1) How many of the native-born Japanese feel some degree of loyalty to the Emperor of Japan because of education, Japanese military training, Shinto worship, membership in alien organizations, etc.

(2) How many are physically unfit for active military service?
(3) How many have wives and other dependents?

b. There are no statistical data on loyalty to the United States, or loyalty to Japan. The writer believes that under present circumstances at least one-third of the native-born group would be of doubtful loyalty to the United States. In this one-third would be found the Kibei (educated in Japan), the children of persons detained in Army and INS camps, and those who are embittered by the evacuation. This group is increasing because of the pro-Japanese pressures in centers.

c. The only data immediately available as to the physical fitness of Japanese is that compiled from records of the San Francisco Recruiting and Induction Station for the calendar year 1941. Of the 463 Japanese selectees, Class 1-A, who reported for examination, 42, or 9.1 percent, were rejected. During the same period at this station 9.5 percent of the white selectees were rejected. (See Table 5, Tab B.)

d. Twenty-one percent of the native-born Japanese who registered for evacuation were registered with a wife. Most of the group are too young to be married. (See Figure 2.) Those who were evacuated with their wives, and those without wives but with a parent 65 years old or over, are shown separately in the tables in Tab A. Probably more men were married than are shown "with wife" because some men were evacuated later than their families and some families listed daughter-in-laws as daughters.

e. Preliminary estimates. Assuming: (1) That only native-born males from 18 to 35 years of age are desired; (2) that only one-third of these are ineligible because of pro-Japanese sentiment; (3) that one-fifth have wives or other immediate dependents; and (4) that one-tenth of the remainder are unable to pass the Army physical test for combat duty:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-born males 18 to 35</td>
<td>21,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Japanese</td>
<td>7,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives and other dependents</td>
<td>2,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically unsuited</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential recruits</td>
<td>10,201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The writer believes this to be a high rather than an average or low estimate of potential recruits. Of the 10,200 potential
Potential Military Service of Nisei Japanese
John J. McCloy
Col. Karl R. Bendetsen
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recruits, 9,200 should be found in Centers for evacuees.

4. Recruitment policy.


b. A resumption of Selective Service induction of Japanese would create numerous problems, because nine of every ten men lived in evacuated areas.

(1) Registrants were at their normal homes for the first three registrations. Many Japanese were in Assembly Centers during the fourth registration last April.

(2) A draftee could not visit his board in evacuated area without a permit and escort.

(3) Substantial numbers of single Japanese men would be called immediately by boards in this area, because these boards have exhausted registers of single men. This would raise an issue of board favoritism, create resentment among many who might be willing to volunteer.

If compulsion must be used—and this writer is opposed to it—then it would be advisable to amend Selective Service regulations to the extent of providing for re-registration (or deposit of original registrations) in special boards at Centers, or in near-by communities.

2. An intensive drive to get volunteers would probably produce the desired results over a period of time. Such an effort would require the direction of an army officer who is thoroughly familiar with the evacuation program, life in Assembly and Relocation Centers, and the psychology of the evacuees. Evidence has reached this office that certain Nisei would welcome an opportunity to volunteer for European service. A petition to the President of the United States requesting permission to volunteer as a unit for European operations was circulated at Manzanar and had 218 names at one time. It is not known whether this petition was forwarded to the White House. The absence of business enterprises requiring personal attention, the assurance that members of the family will be taken care of by a Federal agency, the increased compensation paid to enlisted men, plus the benefits of the Service Men's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, the desire of young men to escape from the domination and economic control of their parents,—these are but a few of the factors which would be
expected to further successful voluntary enlistment. The
principle factor which would work against such a program would
be activities of the Kibei, parolees, repatriates, and other
pro-Japanese groups in bringing pressure on potential recruits
and their families. Such pressure was exercised on the signers
of the above-mentioned petition at Manzanar.

d. A successful campaign to secure volunteers must begin
with an effort to change the attitudes of the present community
toward military service. To do this the following steps are
necessary:

(1) The segregation of at least the anti-American
elements must be a first step for any volunteer recruiting.
Not only must the Nisei be relieved from the jibes and threats
of the Kibei and pro-Japanese Issei, but the prospective
volunteers must be given the assurance that these groups will
not run the Centers and dominate their wives, children, and
parents during their absence.

(2) A definite program must be undertaken to stimulate
patriotism in Centers by such steps as: Furloughs in the
Centers for sons now in the army; encouragement for display
of service flags; special functions for parents of men in
service; exhibits and contests in schools, art classes, etc.

(3) That there will be a post-war advantage from mili-
tary service not only for the individual Nisei, but also
for the American Japanese as a group, must become a credo
in the Center. Issei who acquired citizenship as a result
of service in the last war could provide considerable lead-
ership in this.

e. The recruiting of Japanese should be an Army function.
There are relatively few Japanese now in the Navy or the Marine
Corps according to our best information. On the other hand,
there are organized Army units consisting entirely or largely
of Japanese in the Army. A letter has been sent to the Adjutant
General requesting information as to the number of Japanese in
the service and their branch of service.

5. Relocation Center problems for the WRA.

e. The removal of any substantial number of young Nisei
males from the Centers would seriously effect the active labor
force. As indicated in Chart 1, the labor force 15 years of
age and over consists of two distinct groups: (1) The old
Potential Military Service of Nisei Japanese

John J. McCloy
Col. Karl R. Bendsten
November 27, 1942

Nisei, most of whom are between 50 and 65 years of age, and
(2) the young Nisei who are between 15 and 35 years of age.
Much of the labor force now available for employment outside
of Centers is recruited from the young Nisei.

b. The sex-age ratio of the Center would be seriously
upset, as is that of any community when large numbers of young
men are removed. The very old, the very young and the women
require a different Center program of employment, health,
recreation, etc., from that adapted to a normal population.

g. Mention has been made above of the probable domination
of the community by pre-Japanese Nisei and Kibei after removal
of the Nisei if a satisfactory segregation program is not in-
stituted.